Philosophy 539/Theory of Knowledge
1
Philosophy 539/Theory of Knowledge
Princeton University
Spring 2008
Wednesdays 1:30-4:20, Marx 201
An examination of select issues at the intersection of philosophy of science and epistemology, with a focus on the theme of ‘evidence’. Recent work on the concept of evidence, with some attention to both informal and formal approaches. Williamson’s conception of evidence as knowledge. Evidence and epistemic diversity. How should we think of evidence which bears on philosophical theories? (Is there some distinctive kind of ‘philosophical’ evidence, e.g., ‘intuitions’, or is such evidence ultimately of a piece with scientific evidence?) In what respects (if any) does common sense provide a kind of data for philosophy? The role of normative ideals for believers who have evidence of their own finitude and fallibility.
Bas van Fraassen Thomas Kelly
219 1879 Hall 221 1879 Hall
Office hrs: Th.12:30-1:20 + by appt. Office hrs: F 12-12:50 + by appt.
1. February 6th. Introduction/Overview
2. February 13th. Evidence: What Is It? Williamson on evidence
*Timothy Williamson, “Evidence”, Chapter 9 of his Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford
University Press 2000), pp.184-208.
Thomas Kelly, “Evidence”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available
online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence/.
3. February 20th. Evidence and Epistemic Diversity (I).
*Roger White, “Epistemic Permissiveness” in John Hawthorne (ed.) Philosophical
Perspectives, vol.19: Epistemology (Blackwell 2005), pp.445-459.
Bas’ voluntarist response.
4. February 27th. Evidence and Epistemic Diversity (II).
*Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence” forthcoming in
Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement (Oxford University Press
2008).
5. March 5th. Evidence in Probabilistic Epistemology.
*Talbott, William. “Bayesian Epistemology”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Available online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-
bayesian/.
James Joyce, “How Probabilities Reflect Evidence” in John Hawthorne (ed.)
Philosophical Perspectives 19: Epistemology (2005), pp.153-178.
[Also: Timothy Williamson, “Evidential Probability”, Chapter 10 of his Knowledge
and Its Limits (Oxford 2000), pp.209-237.
6. March 12th. Glymour on Evidence for Theories.
Clark Glymour, “Logical Empiricist Theories of Confirmation”, chapter II of his
Theory and Evidence (Princeton University Press 1980), pp.10-62.
*Glymour, “Theory and Evidence”, chapter V of Theory and Evidence, pp.110-175.
March 19th. No Class; Spring Break
7. March 26th. Evidence for Theories: A Case Study (1)
*Michael Gardner, “Realism and Instrumentalism in 19th Century Atomism”,
Philosophy of Science, Vol.46, No.1 (March 1979), pp.1-34. Available online via
JSTOR.
John Nyhof, “Philosophical Objections to the Kinetic Theory”, The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, Vol.39, No.1 (March 1988), pp.81-109. Available online
via JSTOR.
8. April 2nd. Evidence for Theories: A Case Study (2)
*Peter Achinstein, “Evidence for Molecules: Jean Perrin and Molecular Reality”,
Chapter 12 of his The Book of Evidence (Oxford University Press 2001), pp.243-265.
Penelope Maddy Second Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2007) [selections]
9. April 9th. Evidence in Philosophy
*Timothy Williamson, “Evidence in Philosophy”, chapter 7 of his forthcoming book
The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford 2008).
Thomas Kelly, “Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and
Skepticism”, manuscript. Final version will appear in Peter French (ed.) Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, vol.32: Truth and Its Deformities.
10. April 16th. Evidence and Idealization in Epistemology
*David Christensen, “Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and
Rational Ideals”, in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies
in Epistemology, vol.2 (Oxford 2007). Available online at
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/faculty/christensen/Murphy.pdf
David Christensen, “Logic and Idealization” Chapter 6 of his book Putting Logic In Its
Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief (Oxford University Press 2004),
pp.143-178.
11. April 23rd. TBA
12. April 30th. TBA