PHIL 210 The Apology-Crito Inconsistency Problem: Four Possible ‘Ways Out’ Lesher
1. In the Crito Socrates stated only that we always have an obligation to obey the law, not that we must always, all things considered, obey the law.
“What the theory tells me is that I am under the obligation to obey the system as a whole…But this ubiquitous obligation does not expunge others which are distinct from it and on occasion might go contrary to it, so that I could only discharge one or more of these by disobeying the law….the distinction [is] between what one has an obligation to do and what, on balance, one ought to do. (From Gregory Vlastos, ‘Socrates on Obedience,’ The Yale Review (1974), pp. 530-31.)
But do ‘the Laws’ appear to you to be stating what a citizen is (merely) obligated to do but might be free not to do under some circumstances? Or do they appear to you to be calling for universal obedience (cf. Crito 51b-c: “You must undergo whatever treatment it prescribes for you…in war and law courts, and everywhere else, to do whatever your city and fatherland commands…”)? Indeed, do the Laws ever even consider the possibility that some ‘over-riding obligation’ might permit us to disobey the law? Vlastos’ distinction seems not to be part of the moral consciousness possessed by the Laws; hence not usable in explaining what their words mean.
3. The permitted exception of the Crito is just the disobedience reported or promised in the Apology, open defiance as advocating a change in the laws of the city.
Woozley notices that the Laws actually speak in terms of ‘either or’; i.e. either you must obey or you must change our view of what is just. So perhaps we can disobey while trying to change the Laws’ view of what is just? In addition:
“The one course other than obedience to the law and its commands which Socrates’ argument in the Crito (51-51) permits [i.e. try to change the city’s view of what is just] is the one course which he had said in the Apology (29-30) he would, if banned from philosophy, take. Once we see that it is not the doctrine of the Crito that a man must always, and no matter what, obey the laws of his state, the supposed conflict between that dialogue and the Apology disappears.” (From A. D. Woozley, “Socrates on Disobeying the Law” in G. Vlastos, ed., The Philosophy of Socrates (1971, 1980), p. 308.
But (a) do the Laws really allow for disobedience under some circumstances (or do they insist on obedience even while attempting to change their views)? And (b) Can Socrates’ earlier acts of disobedience be accurately described as ‘trying to change the city’s view of what is just?
3. There is a clear inconsistency between the two dialogues, but it stems from Plato’s desire to counteract the unfortunate impression left by the ‘defiant Socrates’ of the Apology.
“In defending himself against the Dikasts, Sokrates had exalted himself into a position which would undoubtedly be construed by his auditors as disobedience and defiance to the city and its institutions. He professed to be acting under a divine mission, which was of higher authority than the enactments of his countrymen…In the judgment of the Athenian Dikasts Sokrates by using such language had put himself above the laws; thus confirming the charge which his accusers advanced, and which they justified by some of his public remarks….Xenophon in his Memorabilia recognizes this impression as prevalent among his countrymen against Sokrates, and provides what he thinks a suitable answer to it. Plato also has his way of answering it; and such I imagine to be the dramatic purpose of the the Kriton….Sokrates is thus made to express the feelings and repeat the language of a devoted democratic patriot. (From George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, Volume I, pp. 301-02.)
But is it likely that Plato would portray Socrates as contradicting himself on so fundamental a matter as our duty to obey the law? Compare Socrates’ remarks in Plato’s Gorgias (428c): “As for myself, I would rather than my lyre were out of tune, or a choir I was training, and that the greater part of mankind should dissent from me and contradict me, than that I should be out of tune with my own single self.” If Plato was seeking to honor Socrates’ memory, and was aware that Socrates prided himself on remaining consistent to his own principles, then Grote’s ’way out’ of the inconsistency is hard to accept.
4. The speech of the Laws does not reflect Socrates’ personal moral convictions; hence there is no inconsistency with the disobedient stance Socrates adopted in the Apology.
“Readers of the Crito are inclined to assume that the reasons the Laws offer against escape are Socrates’ reasons. [But] the Laws’ reasons for opposing Socrates’ escape are antithetical to Socrates’ reasons in both form [i.e. are highly rhetorical rather than grounded in logical argument] and substance. They reflect a moral perspective that is at its core unsocratic [in so far as they show no appreciation for Socrates’ commitment to the principle that one may never commit injustice]. (From Roslyn Weiss, Socrates Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato’s Crito (New York, 1998), pp. 4-5)
But if this view is correct we must ask why Socrates undertook to persuade Crito that it would be wrong for Socrates to leave the prison cell on the basis of considerations that Socrates not only did not subscribe to but were manifestly inconsistent with principles Socrates clearly believed in (e.g. the over-riding importance of acting justly). Isn’t ‘Say what you believe’ one of Socrates’ rules for philosophical discussion? Are we really to believe that Plato could portray Socrates as so insincere an individual as this ‘way out’ requires us to see him?