OSS Proprietary & Corporate Confidential

11 September 2001

STREAMLINING NATIONAL SECURITY: A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE

  1. Background. The Center for Strategic Leadership within the Collins Center at the Army War College, sponsored a workshop 5-7 September 2001 on the topic of "Streamlining National Security Overseas and in the Homeland." Professor Michael Pasquarett, , or (717) 245-3160, is the official point of contact for this event. What follows are the strictly personal views of one participant on what was said and where we might go next. This is revision 1.1.
  2. Findings. At the strategic level the findings regarding overseas defense centered around the need for Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) Headquarters (not the forces themselves) within each CINC; for inter-agency Operational Planning Groups (OPG), largely virtual, across a complete spectrum of external issue areas; and for increased out-sourcing of homeland or out-of-theater support functions. With respect to homeland defense the findings centered on the urgent need for a single Federal-level point through which to orchestrate Federal support to the states; on the primacy of state sovereignty in homeland defense and the need for Federal forces to be subordinate to state leadership; on the potential of a restructured National Guard; and on the need to develop inter-agency training, exercise, and communications protocols that are coordinated with and approved by the majority of the states in advance. Explicitly discussed, without a consensual finding, was the need for Congress and the Administration to revisit Title 10 authorities and roles of the Services; the Goldwater-Nichols Act; and the National Security Act of 1947.
  3. Overseas Defense. The following highlights are those perceived by the author:
  1. The majority of our defense professionals, the best of the best, have still not made the leap from reactive defense to pro-active international security measures (e.g. beefing up Global Coverage early warning in lower-tier countries, and making deeper investments in Program 150 initiatives revolving around water, food, and safety). Longer-term education and wargaming initiatives are needed to demonstrate the long-term value of non-military instruments of national power.
  2. They do recognize the need for a National Security Institute dedicated to inter-agency as well as cross-branch (judicial, congressional, state & local) training, and for inter-agency training and experience as pre-requisites for advancement within both DoD and civilian agencies. [Note: private sector senior student sources should include NGOs, corporations, universities, and media.]
  3. The lack of collaborative tools that can be used by all possible players, not only those with US clearances and money for fancy US equipment, is a major problem. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) could be a vital part of the solution if it can develop C4ISR equipment, processes, and procedures that are inclusive of NGOs.
  4. All appear to agree that SJTF, whether under regional or type CINCs, are part of the solution. These must include—and habitually exercise with—civilian elements and assigned forces. Under this new organizational paradigm, considerable savings are possible through the elimination of redundant HQS.
  5. Among the needs brought out by the overseas scenario were those associated with emerging technologies in C4ISR (especially the use of the Internet as a common carrier, and the need for ISR capable of detecting individuals underground or under jungle canopy); energy-reduction technologies including long-lasting lightweight batteries; labor-saving technologies; and a general need to resize all equipment to the point that it could be containerized, FedExed, or delivered via sling under rotary wing power.
  6. Outsourcing of half of the core functions (Personnel, Medical, Logistics, Transportation, Financial, C4I, and legal) was considered do-able, generally in relation to those operations running from the nearest third country outside the Area of Operations, back to CONUS. The need for a Joint Requirements Board (JRB), for maximum utilization of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS); and for standardization of parts across common functionalities with now widely varying configurations, was also emphasized for all equipment used by uniformed forces.
  1. Homeland Defense. The following highlights are those perceived by the author:
  1. "Activate intelligence assets world-wide", the first recommendation for dealing with a biological threat to CONUS from an unknown party, dramatically reflects the false faith most defense professionals have in the U.S. Intelligence Community, as well as the general lack of understanding of how non-existent state and local intelligence resources actually are. [Note: a domestic intelligence organization that fully integrates local, county, state, tribal, and federal capabilities subordinated to state sovereignty appears to be needed, at least as an overarching "virtual network" with pre-designed points of contact for intelligence and counterintelligence at all levels. Increased emphasis on global coverage, lower tier, non-traditional threats by national capabilities is also required.]
  2. The group appears to see a need for both dramatically improved (formalized, nurtured, resourced, respected) habitual relations between Federal and State offices as well as those of the various NGOs; and for standing humanitarian assistance and other relevant planning groups. It merits strong emphasis that state sovereignty was widely perceived by participants as being inadequately understood at the Federal level, and as a factor that will play heavily in all aspects of homeland defense. National Guard could play a key interface role.
  3. Inter-agency and Federal-State training and exercises across the various homeland defense issue areas (bio-medical, refugees and law enforcement, fire fighting, electronic) are seen as largely non-existent and as being urgently required on a sustained recurring and adequately funded basis.
  4. The National Guard is clearly of great value to a homeland defense architecture. There was consensus that there should be minimal use of regular military forces in any domestic situation. Guard-PAO-Intel-Media interface considered critical.
  1. Conclusion. This workshop produced a small rough "gem" at a time in our history when it may finally be possible to revisit through legislation our needs for national security (overseas and at home). A full-court press by CSL, not only to flag officers but to Governors, Attorney Generals, and distinguished private sector leaders, could conceivably serve as the catalyst for a national paradigm shift and legislation to follow. St.

PERSONAL FROM ROBERT D. STEELE, OSS CEO

Post Office Box 369, Oakton, Virginia 22124

Voice: (703) 242-1701 Fax: (703) 242-1711