On the semantics of what there isn't
The topic to be discussed in this paper is how apparent reference to that which does not exist should be analysed. What is said, e.g., when the existence of this or that is denied? The problem seems to be that we can truly and falsely predicate things about what there is, but about what is not nothing could be said, perhaps not even that it does not exist. We whish to declare that it (the non-existent) can certainly have no properties. You se the problem; what does "it" occuring in the preceeding sentence stand for, nothing or nothingness?
It is part of a philosopical tradition with ancient roots to test philosophical standpoints by their capacity to handle different puzzles. Theese puzzles are typicaly generated from pre-theoretical or theoretical conceptions of a topic. The challange is to produce a theory without puzzling or paradoxical implications[1]. In this case we are going to pay attention especially to the semantics of negative existential statetements, as did Russell once.
The traditional perspective on semantics
There is a demarcation problem concerning the semantic domain versus the psychological or perhaps the cognitive domain. The descriptivist program comprised a broad set of issues of both, prima facie, cognitive and semantical character such as:
1 the problem of informativeness of identity statements. (C.f. Frege's sinn/bedeutung distinction and Russell‘s definite descriptions substitution for names)
2 (a) the issue of substitutivity of coreferential terms in contexts of broadly intensional character and in quotational contexts
2 (b) the problem of propositional attitude reports (C.f. Frege's sinn/bedeutung distinction and Russell‘s definite descriptions substitution for names)
3 the problem of assigning truth values to negative existentials (Russell)
4 the problem of explaining how reference is secured or established. (Russell‘s acquaintance relation and Frege‘s modes of presentation)
Frege especially attended to 1 and 2 above. His solution in terms of the distinction between sense and reference is well known. As far as I know, Frege did not explicitly raise the question about negative existentials. Russell on the other hand took that issue to be a crucial one for semantics. He did not evoke a two-dimensional semantics, as did Frege, but distinguished between genuine names and ordinary proper names that were concealed definite descriptions.
What is wrong with descriptivism?
Se bifogad text. Här bör den bara uppta några rader
New theory of reference
The principle of descriptive fit is abbandoned. Instead reference is established by a causal connection between the term used and the referent. The direct reference theory says that the name contributes to the sentence meaning only with its reference.
The problem:
P1 Q says "A does not exist"
P2 Q knows that "A" has no referent.
P3 If the direct reference theory is true then the name or its history does not contribute to the sentence meaning if the name is empty.
P4 The name "A" is empty
P5 I am Q and I know P1-P4.
(C) I know that when I utter "A does not exist" I utter "..does not exist" which says nothing. I allso know that every time I utter a negative existential either the term is empty and nothing is said or the term refers and what is said is false or perhaps senseless again.
Possible solution: for causalists
some kind of narrow/wide meaning distinction. Wide meaning is externalistic in the above sence. Narrow meaning does not like Freges sense determine wide meaning. A sentence of the form "A does not exist" may miss wide meaning but have narrow meaning. A suggestion is that when we analyse sentences in belief contexts there is a narrow meaning interpretation.
Functional role is a suggestion as to the nature of narrow meaning (Fodor's inferential role)
Another problem, from intuition:
Presumably it is not incorrect to say that a name's history explains its contribution to the meaning of a sentence of which it is a part, but I am inclined to tink that there is something more to understand, something that is hidden for us if we don't consider non-historical components tied to the name in its present use. Think of the child that learns the truth that Santa Claus doesn't exist. Ofcourse the history of the child's use of "santa Claus" explains why and how the expression has got the meaning it has for the child in the current situation. But think about all the 'beliefs' that the child thought she/he had about Santa Claus, weren't they real beliefs. Hasn't she/he learned something more than that a certain linguistic device has no referent? Has she/he not learned something about the world and what is or is not in that world?
Contextual analysis 3 sidor max
Under this heading I will try to structuring the discourse of denying of existence. I hope that I can sort out some problems that have something in common. Then I know what is to be unified under a explanation. Hopefully it will also show up if it is primarily a semantic, linguistic or cognive problem.
Perception
-That whale is not a whale. (It is a rock, context of perception and recognized missperception)
-The gunshot we heard was not a gunshot. (It was ... that sounded exactly like ... context of perception and recognized missperception)
In perceptual cases it seems plausible to rewrite what is said on the form: That which I perceived as a Q is not a Q
False theories:
You should not beleive in God, there is no evidence of his existence. (Context of missing evidence, or perhaps non-existent evidence)
Phlogiston does not exist. (Context of false/useless theory, context of negative evidence?)
In case of missing or bad evidence for a theory it sems natural to rewrite above statements on the form: The hypothesis that there exist an x of kind Y is abbandoned.
Modal claims:
Ralph why haven't you brought in my new suit, I am going to visit lady Helen to night? Sorry Sir, but there exists no new suit. Skräddaren died last week. (Context of not yet existing things)
The father to his son -Pay attention to my instructions, young man. You might not even have existed if it were not for my goodness to your mother. (Modalities of the past)
Fictive Claims:
Santa Claus does not exist. He is part of a mythical tradition. (Context of fiction/fraud)
Hamlet does not exist" (Shakespears Hamlet is a fictive male human individual with a fictive life and personality. But the historician Gramaticus' Hamlet is not fictive. The expression "Hamlet" used is not used to introduce an amusing story that evrybody knows has no evidence, but to claim things about a historical person.
So there are different contexts here. This example shows I think that thecontext of fiction is not just a discourse consisting of sentences containing empty names. Lewis thinks (I think) that if a story is narrated, claimed to be true, it would be true that bla,bla bla, if the story were true.
If Lewis is right about that, then fiction is perhaps conscious withdraw of demand of actual truthvalue of what is said. Surely, when the actors of a play and the audience are engaged in the common pretense that Hamlet do this and that the use of "Hamlet" is not empty. On the other hand the use does not denote a historical person. A child who is not familiar with any theatre performance including Shakespears Hamlet and who comes to belive that Hamlet is a real person, a danish king etc, uses "Hamlet" in a totally different way.
Hur skall problemet bäst hanteras
Är det en fråga för semantiken? Varför?
Hur skall semantiken i så fall se ut?
Finns det ett entydigt svar? Måste alla andra frågor lösas? samtidigt?
Kan man plocka bort tex Fictiva kontexter från problemområdet eller är det tvärtom så att det är via förståelsen av dessa som problemet löses?
[1]1CF Russell's claim in "On Denoting" that logical theories should be capable of solving a set of puzzling problems.