CHAPTER 1
Introduction
On the morning of September 11, 2001 the nation woke up to the horrific news of war on U.S. soil. Suspected Al Qaeda operatives hijacked four American jetliners, two of which were used as missiles to target the upper stories of the WorldTradeCenter in New York. The third jetliner smashed into the western part of the Pentagon, the U.S. military headquarters in Virginia, while the other reportedly crashed near Pittsburgh (Gold & Farley, 2001). The attacks were so catastrophic that an estimated 3000 lives were lost. As a terrified nation seeked reason, hope, and guidance, the media frantically gathered information to disseminate to the eager public. This marked one of the most important media events in the history of the U.S.
In times of national crisis, the President automatically becomes the primary source of news as the entire government ceases to engage in any sort of public opposition to the administration’s point of view (Graber, 1980; Grossman & Kumar, 1981). Although crisis situations, such as that of September 11, are terribly tragic, these circumstances provide the President with an almost unlimited source of power as well as the ability to rhetorically shape images and construct meaning (Kiewe, 1994; Lule, 2002; McChesney, 2002).
This study examined how The New York Times employedmyth to tell stories about the role of the President as a hero in times of crisis. The purpose was to specifically examine The Times coverage of the President, George W. Bush, following the events of September 11. Much like past incidents of war or national crisis, the attacks placed the President well beyond the usual scope of his authority, which raised significant issues of censorship, news manipulation by the government, and the apparent lack of dissent in the domestic press. Here I analyzed the reporting of the President from the perspective of the hero myth to understand Bush as a modern version of the archetypal heroes. To accomplish this, I relied on the principles of textual analysis and semiotics to decipher The Times’ coverage of the President in a time of national crisis.
The research questions asked were: 1.) How did The Times employ myth to establish the U.S. President’s image as a hero in the wake of the September 11 attacks? And 2.) How did the President rhetorically construct his own image as a hero in TheTimes’ coverage of the September 11 attacks?
The findings clearly show that the President was indeed portrayed as a modern day hero in the front pages of The Times. The Bush Administration invoked timeless religious, frontier, and national hero metaphors to bolster public morale, alter his image, and recruit support for the War on Terror. Overnight, the President’s image was transformed into a spiritual cowboy hero who was on a mission to persuade the public that the attacks were far more than mere criminal acts. The Times reported that, for Bush, the attacks were acts of evil and his response was a mission sent to him by God. In this way, the President was portrayed as a modern version of the archetypal warrior hero who was courageous enough to wage a global war against evil to defend peace on earth.
The research showed that The Times rarely questioned the Administration’s point of view, which severally limited dissent in the news. The newspaper rarely offered the audience any alternative viewpoints on the War on Terror; instead it spread the Administration’s ideology, presenting the war as the only logical option.
CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
The events of September 11 were so catastrophic that they are ranked as “the worst and most audacious terror attack in American history” (Schmemann, 2001, ¶1).
A close look at U.S. history shows that in times of a national crisis, journalists play an important role when covering the President; unfortunately, they (consciously or unconsciously) typically tell lies and misleading stories that may manipulate the public (McChesney, 2002). Because of the inherent drama involved in a national crisis, the media, public, and elite are expected to reevaluate their opinions and support for the commander in chief (Brody, 1991). In times of crisis, the press uses myth to create a hero who can offer comfort and encouragement, while at the same time supporting and justifying the actions of the President (Lule, 2001).
To better understand The Times’ coverage of President Bush, a variety of themes will be explored throughout this literature review. The first part of the discussion will be devoted to the modern American President and his established relationship with the U.S. media. The attacks will be framed as a crisis situation, which unlike any other political issue creates a unique time when the only opinion most of the public hears is that of the administration and/or experts who are supportive of his agenda. The discussion will look at Bush’s tremendous boost in popularity after the attacks and investigate the traditional role the President plays in forming his own image. The key to this is the ways in which the media adhere to a set of phases while addressing the President’s views in times of a national crisis. In addition, the public’s apparent need for their leader to step-up and address a crisis will be traced back to the Kennedy and Nixon Administrations. A close look at these modern rhetorical Presidents and a few who have come before and after them, will reveal the role of deception in times of crisis. Together these patterns will form a base for interpreting the media as a vehicle for President Bush’s rise to a heroic status in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
The second part of the literature review will define the President as a symbolic hero. The case will be built starting with the President as a symbol of America, a powerful icon who inherently represents the ideals of democracy. The discussion will outline the public’s apparent need for a hero in times of a national crisis and show how the President can become a hero in the first place. The archetypal stories of the hero will also be reconstructed in the hope of discovering such themes in the stories of modern mythmakers. Finally, myth and semiotics will be outlined as the foundations for understanding the historical narratives that will be analyzed in The Times coverage of the President following the attacks.
The Media and the President During a National Crisis
The attacks of September 11 left many Americans stunned and immediately became the U.S. news media’s highest priority – a national crisis. One study describes news coverage of a national crisis as dramatic, reactive, and extensive (Lule, 1993). The September 11 attacks had all the traits of a “crisis” situation; it posed a serious threat to high-priority goals, restricted reaction time by the news media and the President, and to many, it was a complete surprise (Arno & Dissanayake, 1994). In crisis situations, Graber (1980) suggests that the press communicates all the information that it can get, but the first news is often fragmented and incomplete. However, Wanta and Foote (1994) argue that in times of a national crisis, the press will often communicate limited and incomplete information because the President holds a unique position as the primary source of news. The key newsmaker is always the President, who reporters have very limited access to, and who is the only person who can create news every day (Cook, 1989). Broder (1987) also points out that the President is the only person who has the ability to demand live press coverage to reach an entire nation (Broder, 1987). This lopsided relationship between the President and the press has a direct impact on the way news stories are told about the president – especially during a national crisis such as September 11.
When the nation is confronted with a crisis, the press tends to have a reaction similar to the political elites; it will support the President’s views and/or silence all criticism and opposition (Nacos, 1990). Graber (1980) concluded that when the nation is in danger, the usual state of enmity is suspended among American politicians.
One of the most established findings in media research is that reporters and political officials engage in a relationship of mutual dependence (Bennett, 1994). The media’s dependence on the President becomes even more evident in times of a national crisis, when the press turns to Congress for a reaction to the President’s policies (Bennett, 1994). This may lead to an uncritical perspective of an administration’s views because, as William Dorman stated, “When it comes to foreign policy, if a member of Congress doesn’t say it, it isn’t likely to be covered” (Bennett, 1994, p. 26).
One problem with focusing purely on the official viewpoints of Washington is the potential for the creation of a normative order, which “favors social values, ideas, and actors over conflict” (Bennett, 1994, p. 27). Specifically, a normative order is intended to create a standardized system of established authority, which claims to be addressing the world’s fundamental problems: “coexistence, nonaggression, indirect aggression and peace” (Dore, 1984, p. xii).
A normative order can foster the development of both deception and manipulation in the news media (Bennett, 1994). Bennett (1994) points out that there are those who would argue that a normative order is a good thing because mainstream views are the foundation of American politics. On the other hand, Bennett (1994) argues that the media may be providing a steady stream of stories that appear to be objective and true but are really intended to manipulate and deceive the public. McChesney (2002) contends that this type of press coverage is awfully similar to the restricted press freedom found in “authoritarian societies” (p. 95).
The press may attempt to create an appearance of independence from the government by seeking experts to analyze the official message. However, as Bennett (1994) points out, these experts may highlight the same dominating views because they will have often established their credentials by advising the same government officials who provided the official message (Bennett, 1994).
This rally situation is best explained by Brody (1991): “If the elite is silent or openly supportive of the administration’s position, the public will respond to the administration’s generally positive one-sided view of the events – to the administration’s ‘spin’– and rally behind the president. A rally will last as long as the president’s tacit or explicit support-coalition persists” (p. 212).
In the case of September 11, the range of the debate in the U.S. media was limited almost entirely to experts from the establishment and their supporters (McChesney, 2002). Therefore, journalists were in many ways limited to covering the military agenda of President Bush. McChesney (2002) argued that because there was no debate among the politicians, there was no balance, and no one who could represent the public’s interests.
The President and Public Opinion
After the most fiercely disputed presidential election since 1877, Bush moved into the White House under much scrutiny, partly due to his controversial victory over Al Gore, the Democratic candidate and former Vice President (McChesney, 2002). McChesney (2002) argues that the media assisted in anointing the President by not reporting that Gore had actually won the majority of votes in Florida and therefore he technically won the 2000 presidential election. After the September 11 attacks the press suspended almost all criticism of the Bush administration and even failed to report on his defeat in the election (McChesney, 2002).
As Brody (1991) explained, the public tends to reconsider their opinions of the Administration during a national crisis. A good example is President Bush’s job approval ratings, which show that public approval of his performance significantly increased from 55% to 92% in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks (Polling Report, 2002).
Writing about the U.S. President and symbolism, Hinckley (1990) explained how a President’s popularity ascends and descends based on the media’s coverage of good news vs. bad news (whether the coverage is of the state of the economy, a national crisis, health care, etc.). In general, the President’s popularity will: 1) increase in times of crisis situations as the public rallies behind him, 2) fall in times of economic hardship and during lingering wars that have failed to come to a halt, 3) and fall after the President has enjoyed a high point in his popularity, usually during the first months of his four-year term (Hinckley, 1990). Therefore, since the events of September 11 threatened the U.S.’s national interests, it is not surprising that President Bush’s popularity would take such a dramatic upward turn.
Following a national crisis, public support of the President will likely increase, regardless of the President’s individual efforts. Greenstein (1974), who has analyzed the public’s views of past Presidents, argued that citizens would support the President even after critics have viewed his actions as inappropriate during a crisis. For example, President Kennedy experienced a ten-point boost following the bungled incident in Cuba involving U.S. sponsored uprisings against Fidel Castro (Greenstein, 1974).
Like Kennedy, President Ronald Reagan’s ability to control his image in the news was key to his success and popularity. One of Reagan’s top aides suggested that for a President, “there is no political reality apart from news reality” (Bennett, 1996, p.81). Bennett (1996, p. 81, 82) presents three components to successful image-making in the news:
- “Message composition:” Creating a simple message for the public to use when considering the situation.
- “Message salience:” Flooding the media outlets with this simple message so that it will be more prominent and obvious than all other communication efforts.
- “Message credibility:” Sustaining this message with credible sources so that the public will sustain and tolerate it without protest.
In his study of elite leadership of mass opinion, Zaller (1991, p. 189) referred to the rally phenomenon as the “mainstream effect,” which occurs when the public has no basis for dissent because they are heavily exposed to a one-sided message. Mueller (1973) shows that because the better educated tend to follow the news more closely, they are also prone to support the official message during a national crisis. Therefore, the rally situation is manifested because “elite opinion leaders change their behavior, not because the public alters its approach to evaluating the president” (Brody, 1991, p. 213).
The President and the press are intertwined in a relationship with high stakes, where the press serves the President as the most important tool to influence public opinion (Grossman & Kumar, 1981).
Bennett (1975) states, “Traditional democratic theorists have long argued that democracy is possible only if people recognize the issues that face the state and have attitudes or opinions about these issues” (p. 3). However, Bennett (1975) explained that no state has ever attained this ideal democracy because the public is not as concerned as it should be nor does it have the adequate information needed to control its own government. This is not to suggest that the mass media’s influence on the public is absolute. However, it is important to understand that the media’s influence is significant enough to alter the “attitudes and behaviors of political elites” (Protess et al., 1991, p. 18).
Media Support and Opposition for the Government
Many researchers have stated that the press is not oppositional to the President’s policy and will (consciously or not) carry out the government’s agenda (Bainerman, 1992; Bennett, 1996; Blanchard, 1992; Brody, 1991; Iyengar & Simon, 1993). To show this, one study (Gutierrez-Villalobos et al., 1994) of the Panama Invasion presented the distinction between media support and opposition to government policy, which was the difference between strategic and tactical critique. Strategic critique questions U.S. foreign policy and explores the international perspective (Gutierrez-Villalobos et al., 1994). For example, the news account might suggest that the reasons for the September 11 terrorist attacks are U.S. meddling in Islamic affairs, such as the C.I.A. funding the Taliban in the Russian/Afghanistan war in the 1980s (Chomsky, 2001). However, during times of national crisis this approach is rarely seen in the mainstream press, as it may oppose the Administration’s agenda (Chomsky, 2001).
Tactical critique of U.S. foreign policy would acknowledge the international perspective of the conflict, while it investigates the way in which the U.S. dealt with the conflict (Gutierrez-Villalobos et al., 1994). In this case, press coverage might frame U.S. policy in Afghanistan with a War on Terrorism scenario, but argue that sending in American troops to capture the leaders responsible for the terrorist acts would be superior to a favored Administration tactic of bombing the country. Tactical critiques such as this suggest agreement and support of the basic position of the Administration (Gutierrez-Villalobos et al., 1994).
In another important study of U.S. foreign policy conflicts (Gurevitch et al., 1982), the researchers point out three factors that affect press presentation of U.S. foreign policy conflicts. The first is the idea that the press serves the public as a “watchdog,” and as such its main function is to be a powerful critic of the government. The second is the fact that national pride and patriotism may intrude on the coverage of foreign conflicts. The third source of influence is government power and the media’s dependency on the government for news (i.e. news releases, press conferences), which keeps radical ideas out of the media and off the social agenda. Therefore, press coverage in times of a national crisis can be influenced by many more factors than the routine story coverage.