NUT SUBMISSION TO THE SCHOOL TEACHERS’ REVIEW BODY (STRB)

SEPTEMBER 2004

SUMMARY

Local Pay

This section addresses the issue of local approaches to pay, under the following headings: background; the current salary structure; and the STRB’s “Pay Band” proposals.

The national pay structure for teachers is essential to the efficient functioning of a system comprising some 25,000 schools and close to half a million teachers. Any move away from national pay arrangements for teachers will worsen the overall problems of recruitment and retention. The STRB’s proposals on local pay, presented as a solution to the problems of recruitment and retention, would exacerbate those problems. They are impractical, inflexible and prescriptive and must be withdrawn in favour of measures to improve salary levels and career prospects for all teachers.

Excellent Teachers Scheme

This section sets out the NUT’s views on the Excellent Teachers Scheme, under the following headings: introduction; pay levels under the Excellent Teachers Scheme; criteria for accessing the Excellent Teachers Scheme; operation of the Excellent Teachers Scheme; and conclusion.

The NUT’s view remains that the truncation of the Upper Pay Scale is a mistake. Under the Upper Pay Scale arrangements in place prior to September 2004, all Upper Pay Scale teachers could aspire to UPS5. It is clear that significant increases in salary levels on the Upper Pay Scale and any replacement for UPS4 and UPS5 are needed to enable teachers’ salaries to compete with those of other graduates. The separation of the Upper Pay Scale into two breaks the promises given previously to teachers on the introduction of the Upper Pay Scale, that all would have the opportunity to progress. Any quota-based system and/or inadequate funding provisions will only add to the problems inherent in the Excellent Teacher scale.

New Framework to Replace Management Allowances

This part of the submission is structured as follows: introduction; criteria for the award of allowances; the value of payments; circumstances in which payments may cease; managing the transition to the new framework; other issues; and conclusion.

The NUT has consistently sought improvements to the system for rewarding additional responsibilities. The NUT’s long-standing policy of clear national criteria governing the numbers and levels of responsibilities, accompanied by full funding of these payments, would address the lack of consistency in the current arrangements. Any new system should reflect the need for the teachers’ salary structure to generate proper, professional levels of salary supporting the recruitment, retention and motivation of teachers. Any new system must also ensure as a minimum that teachers do not receive awards of a lower value than those currently available.

Safeguarding

This section looks at safeguarding with particular reference to the following issues: general and assimilation safeguarding; LEA powers with regard to funding and redeployment; and safeguarding of the Social Priority Allowance and Inner London Area supplement.

Safeguarding protects teachers against changes outside their control and the NUT remains committed to the retention of the present safeguarding provisions. Any dilution of salary safeguarding will add considerably to the problems that will inevitably arise from falling school rolls, which would not be in the interest of any of the stakeholders concerned.

Pay Arrangements for Secondary Mathematics & Science ASTs

This section deals with the DfES proposal to extend the AST scale for mathematics and science ASTs.

The shortage of mathematics and science teachers can be solved only by means of proper, professional and competitive salary levels for all teachers. This is necessary to promote teaching as a career to all graduates, including mathematics and science graduates.

Continuing Professional Development (CPD)

This section reaffirms the NUT’s fundamental commitment to establishing an entitlement to CPD for all teachers and the importance of such provision.

The evidence of the NUT’s CPD programme and the evidence of recent research reviews of the effectiveness of CPD is that CPD, valued and owned by teachers, enhances professional confidence, morale and learning in direct contrast to the plethora of accountability measures introduced by this and previous Governments.

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is the first of two submissions to the School Teachers’ Review Body (STRB) by the National Union of Teachers (NUT) in respect of the issues identified in the Secretary of State’s remit letter of 22 July 2004. We will make a further submission when we have received and considered the DfES submission.
  1. The NUT has been excluded from multilateral discussions taking place between the DfES, the Employers and five teachers’ associations on a range of issues relating to the STRB’s remit. In view of our exclusion from these discussions, we will submit further evidence in the light of any proposals from those other parties.
  1. We also note the statement in the Secretary of State’s remit letter of 22 July, relating to proposals set out in the Government’s Five Year Strategy, that:

“I am not covering these issues in this remit letter because I want to begin a process with our partners before making a formal submission to the Review Body either later this year or early in 2005.”

  1. We consider that the exclusion of the largest teachers’ organisation, representing the largest single group of teachers in England and Wales, from discussions of such importance is entirely inappropriate and unjustifiable. The STRB’s views on the NUT’s participation in discussions on management allowances were set out in its Thirteenth Report Part 2 in March 2004 and are referred to in the relevant section of this submission. We invite the Review Body to make its views clear on this issue once more in its next Report.

LOCAL PAY

Background

  1. In its Thirteenth Report (Part 2) of March 2004, the School Teachers’ Review Body (STRB) recommended that the parties should consider its proposal on local approaches to pay and should present their views on this matter to this STRB by September 2004.
  1. This submission sets out the views of the NUT on the issue of local approaches to pay. In particular, we set out our concerns at any further movement away from national pay arrangements for teachers. We then go on to address the particular problems that would be created should the STRB’s proposed system of pay bands be implemented.
  1. This is not the first time that proposals for localised pay determination have been put forward. The issue of local approaches to pay was identified as a long-term issue for examination by the then Secretary of State Estelle Morris in her remit letter to the STRB of 1 August 2002.
  1. Following this, the STRB took evidence on the issue of localised pay in both 2002 and 2003. In its Twelfth Report of January 2003 the STRB noted the concerns expressed by consultees at any proposals to weaken national pay arrangements and introduce further local flexibility. Even the DfES had identified a number of problems associated with moving away from national pay scales.
  1. In its March 2004 Report the STRB noted that: “most of (the parties) strongly opposed regional or local pay, wanting to retain a national framework” (STRB March 2004, paragraph 4.3, page 26).
  1. Despite the repeated, widespread and grave concerns expressed by a range of consultees, the STRB has chosen to put forward a proposal for local pay bands which would lead to major problems.

The Current Salary Structure

  1. The STRB’s proposals on local approaches to pay are based on a series of false assumptions about the current salary structure. One of these is that there is insufficient scope for pay differentiation in the salary structure.
  1. In fact, there is already significant scope in the salary structure for pay differentiation. In particular, schools have the power but not necessarily the funding to make discretionary payments for recruitment and retention.
  1. The recruitment and retention allowance scale was abolished with effect from April 2004 and replaced with payments to be determined by schools. Schools are now free to determine the value of any payment for recruitment and retention. This has significantly increased the already substantial level of discretion in the salary structure.
  1. Discretion in the current pay structure has worsened, not addressed, problems of recruitment and retention. It has made the pay structure less transparent and increased the scope for inequity. Potential teachers cannot make an accurate prediction of their future earnings and career progression. The DfES itself noted in its submission to the STRB of September 2002 that: “National pay scales have value in promoting the profession to potential entrants.” This has been underlined by independent research. In 1998 Coopers and Lybrand noted that there was a high level of uncertainty in terms of how a newly qualified teacher’s career would progress. It is clear that, too often, matters outside of the control of teachers such as their school’s financial position determine their salary position. Teachers doing the same job can receive significantly different salaries.
  1. Indeed, Government and, regrettably, the STRB have sought to solve the problems of recruitment, retention and motivation through a long procession of piecemeal sticking plaster solutions. We illustrate at Annex A the number of shortage subjects alongside the various bursaries and golden hellos which now operate on top of the already considerable local discretion within the salary structure. Yet they, for reasons which are beyond our comprehension, exclude the 4-year BA or BSc courses with QTS.
  1. The combined effect of schemes such as the training bursaries and Golden Hellos is that the majority of people entering teaching receive incentive payments. With regard to training bursaries, postgraduate trainees accounted for 75 per cent of those recruited to initial teacher training courses in England and Wales in 2003-04. The subjects covered by the Secondary Subject Shortage Scheme and Golden Hellos accounted for almost three-quarters of the secondary initial teacher training places allocated in England and Wales for 2003-04.
  1. This clearly demonstrates the veracity of our argument that starting salaries and salary levels for teachers are inadequate. This is further confirmed by the high wastage rate for teachers in the early years of their careers.
  1. It is clear therefore that what is needed are competitive levels of salary for all teachers at all stages of their careers, including substantially increased and improved London and Fringe Area allowances.
  1. The experience of private sector employers which operate on a national basis does not support the STRB proposals for four pay bands. Indeed, Tesco, for example, devote a very small proportion of their total pay bill to payments additional to the national scales. Furthermore, the number and geographical density of private sector employers’ units of employment is fundamentally different from the education service and the problems that arose from the Social Priority Schools scheme introduced in 1974 are eloquent testimony to the dangers and inappropriateness of any new measures similar in character.

The STRB’s “Pay Band” Proposals

Background

  1. In its March 2004 Report, the STRB put forward its latest proposals on local approaches to pay. It set out a proposed system of “pay bands”, under which any school would be able to apply to move to any of the current four salary bands. At present, the pay band to which schools belong is determined according to the location of the school.

The Current Position

  1. The STRB argued that the pay system it had recommended from April 2004 “does not provide sufficient scope to deal with schools outside London and the fringe locations which face persistent labour market difficulties.” No evidence was provided to support this assertion. In particular, no account was taken of the impact of the STRB’s earlier recommendation that the recruitment and retention allowance scale be abolished and replaced with payments made at the discretion of the school or the LEA. Data illustrating the impact of this change are not yet available.
  1. The STRB went on to say that it wished to promote a more even level of vacancy and turnover rates between schools in England and Wales. Yet the latest data available at the time of writing shows that a striking level of comparability between schools already exists. For example, the latest STRB Pay Survey shows that outside of Greater London the extent to which recruitment and retention allowances were used varied little from region to region. At September 2003, the proportion of teachers in receipt of such allowances was within a relatively small range of 0.6 per cent (Wales) to 5.4 per cent (South East England). This casts doubt on the theory that action needs to be taken to introduce localised pay. Schools are reluctant to use the current significant powers to vary pay locally.
  1. The latest data on vacancies by region in England show the picture at January 2004. Again, excluding London, they show a limited range in the vacancy rate between regions – from 0.3 per cent in the South West to 0.9 per cent in the East of England. This represents a change compared to January 2001, when the range was 0.5 per cent to 2.0 per cent.

Equal Pay and Equal Opportunities

  1. Incomes Data Services (IDS) has pointed to the danger of equal pay problems within geographical pay systems where different rates are not fully justified. We have serious concerns about the equal pay and equal opportunities issues raised by the STRB’s proposals for pay bands.
  1. According to the latest STRB Pay Survey, men were more likely to benefit from recruitment and retention allowances than women. Whereas 5.7 per cent of male teachers had a recruitment and retention allowance as at September 2003, this was true of only 4.3 per cent of women teachers.
  1. The system proposed by the STRB would entrench problems of unequal pay. Teachers doing the same job would be paid differently according to whether their school was judged as deserving to move to a higher pay band. Schools with similar recruitment and retention problems could be in different pay bands due to the decisions taken by their LEA. The principle of equal pay for equal work, a key feature of a national system of pay determination, would be undermined. This would result in major equal opportunities issues including issues of equal pay.
  1. Another area of concern with regard to equal opportunities is the position of unattached and centrally-employed teachers. The STRB makes no mention of such teachers in its “pay band” proposals. Whereas teachers in schools would have a chance of receiving increases in pay should their schools be successful in bidding to move to higher pay bands it is not clear whether teachers not employed by schools would have such opportunities.
  1. The STRB’s proposed solution of “pay bands” would mean that schools could opt to pay their teachers on any of the four pay spines. The STRB further proposed that schools seeking to move to a higher pay band would have to give evidence of persistent labour market difficulties over the past three to five years. This long timescale could mean that in many cases serious recruitment and retention problems could not be addressed until they had existed for up to five years. Any action taken at that stage could well mean that the damage had already been done. Alternatively, any recruitment and retention problems which had existed might have disappeared by the end of the three-to-five year period.
  1. The proposal also begs a very serious question about the definition of persistent labour market difficulties. We have referred earlier to the large number of officially designated shortage subjects which by any standard of common sense clearly falls within persistent labour market difficulties. On that basis, very few schools would fail to meet such a test. This only serves to reinforce the need for competitive national levels of salary for all teachers at all stages of their career, including substantially increased and improved London and Fringe Area allowances.

Inter School Competition

  1. Previous research undertaken for the Union by Professor Alan Smithers and Dr Pamela Robinson has illustrated, frequently and graphically, the substantial extent of inter school competitive recruitment. The STRB’s proposals would only intensify such problems. They also raise serious questions not only about the funding methodology, but about the extent to which well endowed schools would use their own resources to secure a competitive advantage over less fortunate schools.
  1. In its March 2004 Report the STRB acknowledged the potential risk of poaching. It argued that this risk could be minimised by setting in place a tight “window” within which schools could apply to their LEAs to move to another pay band. This does not follow, however. Poaching would still be a problem once a school had moved to a new pay band, regardless of when it moved to that new pay band. Where teachers saw a school close to their own, or in circumstances similar to their own, move to a higher pay band they would be vulnerable to poaching.
  1. The condition that schools could then not apply to move to a new pay band until after a given period would then increase the likelihood of poaching, since teachers at schools that had not moved to a new pay band would know that there was no prospect of their doing so in the near future.
  1. In all but the most rural areas, the density of the geographical location of schools is relatively high. It is therefore common for teachers to be within ready reach of a significant number of different schools. This is a very different situation from Tesco or Lloyds TSB where the density of their branch locations is very much lighter and embraces far fewer units of employment.

Staff Mobility