Neither Democracy Nor Stability in Prospect

Pakistan

A coup from Wonderland

Nov 15th 2007

From The Economist print edition

Neither democracy nor stability in prospect

IN THE topsy-turvy logic of General Pervez Musharraf, it takes an army dictator to deliver democracy to Pakistan—and a spell of martial law to safeguard the constitution. Or so Pakistan's president seemed to suggest this week, in a series of impassioned efforts to justify his second seizure of power, on November 3rd. How to deal with such a man? [by declaring a state of emergency, Musharraf was able to put the country’s Constitution on ice, make his own laws, remain head of military and retain presidency, and disband or recreate Parliament and the Supreme Court as he saw fit.]

America's idea had been to urge him to share power with Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) [and ousted former Prime Minister]. According to this plan, the general would have stood down as army chief on November 15th, as the constitution had required. He would then have held an unrigged election in January [for Parliament seats], which the PPP would hope to win. The PPP might then have formed a government supportive of the general.

The scheme was supposed to balance short-term security with the needs of long-term stability. It would have left General Musharraf as a strong civilian president, committed to fighting Islamist militancy, including a runaway Taliban insurgency on the north-western frontier with Afghanistan. It would also have given Pakistan a more legitimate government than it has enjoyed since the general launched his first coup, in 1999. These two benefits are related. As Pakistan's most liberal party, the PPP would offer better support for General Musharraf's terror-fighting than he has hitherto found.

A halfway representative government might also start healing Pakistani grievances. Sixty years after it was cobbled together—by the idea of a Muslim homeland in South Asia that perhaps only a minority subscribed to—the country is dreadfully divided. In western Baluchistan, a flickering separatist insurgency is flaring. On the frontier, Pushtun nationalism and anti-Americanism boost the Taliban. The general and his Punjab-dominated army cannot fix these problems.

Indeed he has exacerbated them by attacking the civil institutions that hold the country feebly together. Even before his coup, he ruled more or less by decree. Parliament has been reduced to a facile talking-shop. And his latest wrecking-job on the judiciary is impressive even by his own standards. Of 17 Supreme Court judges, 12 have been dismissed since his coup. Several, including the chief justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, are under arrest. They have all been replaced with army-picked sycophants. Indeed, it was for this purpose that General Musharraf grabbed power: Mr Chaudhry had developed a bad case of judicial independence.

Though still in uniform, which the constitution seemed to frown on, the general got himself re-elected president by Parliament last month [his own rigged Parliament]. On the eve of his coup, the judges were due to give a ruling on whether this was legal. To forestall their judgment, the general in effect declared martial law. He has since taken private television news channels off the air, arrested several thousand opposition politicians, lawyers and human-rights workers, and issued orders for civilians to be tried by military courts.

Cornered

To its credit—and the surprise of jaded Pakistanis—America has strongly condemned this outrage. It insists that the general restore the constitution and return to the plan: to ditch his uniform and hold an election soon. General Musharraf, as if in a spirit of compromise, has suggested he will lose his uniform just as soon as his new pet judges bless his re-election. He also says the general election will be held in January. But he refuses to say when he will restore the constitution—and suggests it will not be until after the poll.

This is unsurprising. Unless he can rewrite the constitution to account for his actions he runs the risk that they will be reversed—and he will be held accountable for them. Three former Pakistani coupsters, including General Musharraf himself, have encountered this problem. Their solution was always the same: hold a rigged election under martial law; blackmail Parliament into changing the constitution to order; and, as a reward, restore it.

But an election held under martial edicts would be a farce—no matter what clothes the general happens to be wearing. A poll held under the constitution, but adjudicated by the new judges, would also be unlikely to be seen by Pakistanis as free and fair. Almost every opposition party except the PPP has said it will boycott the election. Miss Bhutto, put under house arrest this week, says she may do the same (see article).

This promises worse mayhem. To avert it, General Musharraf should restore both the constitution and the sacked judges. He must also honour his promise to disrobe and hold a fair election. If the judges then rule that his presidential re-election was illegal, so be it. His choice would be to quit, or offer himself to the next Parliament as a civilian candidate. Failing these steps, Pakistan will be neither stable nor secure.