1
47.08.25(440w)
TO ROBERT A. LOVETT August 25, 1947
Radio No. 74. Top SecretPetropolis, Brazil
Humelsine from Carter. Eyes only for Lovett from Marshall. Your 76 and my 63 refer.1 I want to make it clear that in approving submission of this problem to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, I do not accept either the premises or the categorical position taken by Mr. Bevin in his personal message to me.2
As to his first and second paragraphs, I cannot reconcile his stated essentiality of British withdrawals by autumn with the drastically changed conditions that have occurred since March. He must also realize that the problem is much larger than the mere offset of British withdrawals by increase of Greek Army.
On Italy, my concern rests with the maintenance of at least a status quoin that area, and not on the desire of the British Government to fulfill a pledge to itself which manifestly can have but little effect on solution of its present financial problems.
It seems to me that our thorn-pulling operations on the British lion continue to be beset by her stubborn insistence on avoiding the garden path to wander in the thicket of purely local Labor Party misadventures. They are far too casual or freehanded in passing the buck of the international dilemma to US with little or no consideration for the harmful results.
NA/RG 59 (Top Secret File, 841.2368/8–2547)
1. On August 1, in response to Britain’s assertion that it planned to withdraw troops from Greece and Italy, Marshall wrote to British Foreign Secretary Bevin that he was “very much concerned” and that he felt “that the decision was made at a most harmful time and that such abrupt action makes cooperation unnecessarily difficult.” Moreover, Marshall said, “I am still more disturbed at the possible implications of this decision as to future British policy.”
Carlisle Humelsine’s Radio No. 76 of August 22 transmitted a personal message from Bevin (undated but presented on August 20). He reminded Marshall that they had discussed the question of British troops in Greece and their Military Mission at the Moscow Conference, during which“I made it clear to you that it would be impossible for us to keep the troops in Greece beyond the autumn of this year.” British and American chiefs of staff should confer on Greece, but the most important consideration was for the United States to help increase the size of the Greek Army. British troop reductions were necessary by the end of 1947, Bevin said, “in order that the Government may fulfil its public pledge to reduce the numbers of British troops by 133,000.” (Foreign Relations, 1947, 5:273–74, 301–2, 308.)
2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) had been created in January 1942 to plan and implement Anglo-American global strategy during World War II. It consisted of the British and US service chiefs, along with special chiefs of staff to Churchill and Roosevelt. The CCS also included a military secretariat and numerous committees composed of key military planners from both nations.
The British and American chiefs met during the numerous Allied wartime summit conferences. At all other times the British chiefs would be represented at CCS meetings in Washington by members of the British Joint Staff Mission, headed by former British army chief Field Marshal Sir John Dill until his late 1944 death and then by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.Although the primary purpose of the Combined Chiefs of Staff ceased with the conclusion of World War II, the organization continued to exist for several years. On October 14, 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued memorandum for information no. 687 with the title “Dissolution of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Organization.”