Morality, Nature, and Evolution
Evolutionary theory is often taken to paint a rather bleak picture of nature, depicting it as an aggressively competitive arena, “red in tooth and claw”, in which organisms are pitted against each other in a battle for survival of the fittest. Morality, on the other hand, seems centred on benevolence, cooperation and other kinds of altruistic behaviour that promote the survival of the unfittest. This might be taken to generate a puzzle: Where does morality, with its emphasis on helping those less fit, belong in the seemingly amoral economy of an environment hospitable only to the fit? The course begins by exploring Darwin’s solution to this puzzle, which centres on the idea that our moral sense is itself a product of evolution, designed to foster social instincts and thereby to promote the interests of the group. Subsequent lectures introduce more recent elaborations of this idea by contemporary thinkers and examine some of the central debates within the evolutionary science of morality. Along the way, various empirical studies involving humans and non-human animals are considered, and their implications are carefully analysed. Our focus then turns to wider questions about the philosophical implications of evolutionary science for politics, ethics, and metaethics. We ask, for instance, whether an evolutionary understanding of human nature yields particular views about moral rightness, about the fairness of free markets, and about the power relations between the sexes. On the metaethical side, we explore the ways in which an evolutionary understanding of morality bears on issues to do with the nature of moral judgments and the existence of objective moral truths.
Preliminary Reading:
•Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006).
Lectures:The lectures for this module will be held in xxx, on Mondays from 2 to 3pm in the Spring Term. The lecturer is Dr. Cristian Constantinescu ().
Seminars:The seminarsfor this module will be held on Mondays from 3 to 4pm in the Spring Term, as follows: BA seminars will be held by xxx in Room xxx; MA seminars will be held by Cristian Constantinescu in Room xxx.
Readings: Every week there is one key reading that is the focus of the seminar discussion. One of the purposes of the seminar is to help you to understand the reading, so do not worry if you have not fully understood the reading in advance. Nevertheless, it is essential that you attempt the seminar reading each week if you are to follow the lecture and to participate in the seminar discussion. In addition, there is ‘additional reading’ listed that will deepen your understanding and help you to get the most out of the module. You are especially advised to cover the additional reading for those topics on which you are planning to write.
Essays (BA): This module is assessed by one essay of around 3,000 words (maximum 3,200 words). It must be written in response to one of the set questions listed below, except with permission from the module convenor. The deadline for submission is xxx 2016. For details concerning submission of the essay see the BA Handbook.Prior to this assessed essay, you may also write up to two essays during the course, taken from the titles below, and receive feedback on them from your seminar leader. These can be useful practice for your eventual assessed essay. You should submit the first such essay by the first seminar after reading week, and the second by one week after the last seminar of term. [Notes: 1) You are always welcome to submit an essay earlier than these dates; 2) the seminar leader should not be expected to comment on the same essay more than once.]
Essay (MA): Students doing the new MA degree will be assessed by one essay of around 3,500 words (max. 3,700 words). It must be written in response to one of the set questions listed below, except with permission from the module convenor. The deadline for submission is xxx.
Students doing the old MA degree will be assessed by two essays of 2,750 words at most. They may have a tutorial on a draft of one essay, to be submitted by the first Monday of Term 2. No mark is given for these drafts. The deadline for submitting the two essays is xxx.
Part I: Evolved Morality (Weeks 1-3)
Week 1: Darwin’s Account of Morality
Seminar Reading:
•Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: John Murray, 1871), Vol. 1, Part I, Ch. 3: ‘Comparison of the mental powers of man and the lower animals (continued)’,pp. 70-106. [Available online at
Additional Reading:
•Robert T. Pennock, ‘Moral Darwinism: Ethical Evidence for the Descent of Man’, Biology and Philosophy 10 (1995), pp. 287-307. [Available online at
•Dennis Krebs, ‘Darwin’s Theory of the Origin of Morality’, Ch. 4 of his The Origins of Morality: An Evolutionary Account (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 40-56.
•James Rachels, ‘Darwin’s Discovery’, Ch. 1 of his Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 6-61.
Essay Question:
oExpound and assess Darwin’s account of the origin of a moral sense in humans.
Week 2: Morality in the Animal Kingdom
Seminar Reading:
•Frans de Waal, ‘Morality and the Social Instincts: Continuity with the Other Primates’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Princeton University, 2003). [Available online at:
•Optional: watch de Waal’s brief and engaging presentation of his research with monkeys and apes on TED at:
Additional Reading:
•Richard Joyce, ‘Moral Language and Moral Emotions’, Ch. 3 of his The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006), pp. 75-105.
•Christine Korsgaard, ‘Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action’, in de Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved (Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 98-119.
•Philip Kitcher, ‘Ethics and Evolution: How to Get Here from There’, in de Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved (Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 120-139.
Essay Question:
oCan non-human animals be said to act morally? If not, why not? If so, is there nevertheless something distinctive or unique about human morality?
Week 3: When Nature Plays Games: Evolution, Altruism, and Cooperation
Seminar Reading:
•Richard Dawkins, ‘Nice Guys Finish First’, Ch. 12 of his The Selfish Gene (3rd edition Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 202-233. [Available as an e-book via Birkbeck library.]
Additional Reading:
•Elliot Sober, ‘Did Evolution Make Us Psychological Egoists?’, Ch. 1 in his From a Biological Point of View: Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 8-27.
•Richard Joyce, ‘The Natural Selection of Helping’, Ch. 1 of his The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006), pp. 13-44.
•Philip Kitcher, ‘The Springs of Sympathy’, Ch. 1 of his The Ethical Project (Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 17-66.
Essay Question:
oYou scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours. Are we being genuinely altruistic, or merely mutually self-interested?
Part II: Ethical and Political Implications (Weeks 4-6)
Week 4: Evolution, Brains, and Trolleys
Seminar Reading:
•Peter Singer, ‘Ethics and Intuitions’, Journal of Ethics 9 (2005), pp. 331–52. [Available online at
Additional Reading:
•Joshua Greene, ‘From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?’, Nature Neuroscience Reviews, 4 (2003): pp. 847–50. [Available online at
•Selim Berker, ‘The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37 (2009), pp. 293–329. [Available online at
•Kwame Appiah, Experiments in Ethics (Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 89–101.
Essay Question:
oDo the findings of evolutionary psychology have any bearing on the debates between deontologists and consequentialists in ethics?
Week 5: Evolution and Sexual Coercion
Seminar Reading:
•A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher, ‘Pop Sociobiology Reborn: The Evolutionary Psychology of Sex and Violence’, Ch. 6 in Cheryl Brown Travis (ed.), Evolution, Gender, and Rape (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 139–167.
Additional Reading:
•Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer, ‘Why Men Rape’, The Sciences, 40 (2000): pp. 30–6; this is a précis of their book, A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion (MIT Press, 2000).
•Peggy Reeves Sanday, ‘Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone: How Culture Makes a Difference’, Ch. 14 of Cheryl Brown Travis (ed.), Evolution, Gender, and Rape (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 337–61.
•Christine Drea and Kim Wallen, ‘Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control’, Ch. 2 in Cheryl Brown Travis (ed.), Evolution, Gender, and Rape (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 29–60.
Essay Question:
oCan evolutionary science provide a plausible account of rape? If not, why not? If so, what is it, and what are its implications for the moral impermissibility of rape?
Reading Week
Week 6: Evolution, Competition, and Society
Seminar Reading:
•Steven Pinker, ‘Politics’, Ch. 16 of his The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (Penguin, 2002), pp. 283-305.
Additional Reading:
•Peter Singer, A Darwinian Left: Politics, Evolution, and Cooperation (Yale University Press, 1999), Chs. 1 & 2, pp. 10-43.
•Larry Arnhart, ‘Darwinian Conservatism’, in M. Ruse (ed.), Philosophy After Darwin: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 349-364.
•Robert Frank, The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good (Princeton University Press, 2011), Chs. 2 & 3, pp. 16-45.
Essay Question:
oWhat, if anything, does evolutionary theory tell us about what a good society should be like?
Part III: Metaethical Implications (Weeks 7-10)
Week 7: Is Moral Judgment Based on Reason or Intuition?
Seminar Reading:
•JonathanHaidt and Fredrik Bjorklund, ‘Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 181-217. [Can be obtained online by visiting and clicking ‘Request article’ under article 49, then entering your email address.]
Additional Reading:
•Daniel Jacobson, ‘Does Social Intuitionism Flatter Morality or Challenge It?’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 219-232.
•Darcia Narvaez, ‘The Social Intuitionist Model: Some Counter-Intuitions’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 233-240. [Available online at
•JonathanHaidt and Fredrik Bjorklund, ‘Social Intuitionists Reason, in Conversation’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 241-254.
Essay Question:
oExpound and critically evaluate the debate over Social Intuitionism between Jonathan Haidt and his critics.
Week 8: Is Morality Innate?
Seminar Reading:
•Jesse Prinz, ‘Is Morality Innate?’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness. (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 367-406. [Available online at:
Additional Reading:
•Susan Dwyer, ‘How Not to Argue That Morality Isn’t Innate: Comments on Prinz’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness. (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 407-418.
•Valerie Tiberius, ‘The Nativism Debate and Moral Philosophy: Comments on Prinz’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness. (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 419-426.
•Jesse Prinz, ‘Reply to Dwyer and Tiberius’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness. (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 427-440.
Essay Question:
oExpound and critically evaluate the debate over nativism between Jesse Prinz and his critics.
Week 9: Is Evolved Morality Universal or Relative?
Seminar Reading:
•Steven Hales, ‘Moral Relativism and Evolutionary Psychology’, Synthese 166 (2009), pp. 431-447. [Available online at
Additional Reading:
•Philip Kitcher, ‘From the Local Community to the Human Population’, in his The Ethical Project (Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 302-311.
•Peter Railton, ‘Naturalism Relativized?’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness. (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 37-44.
•Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian, and David Wong, ‘Naturalizing Ethics’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness. (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 1-26. [Available online at:
Essay Question:
oIs it plausible to expect evolution to have yielded trans-cultural, universal moral values? If so, what could those values be? If not, is there any viable prospect of transcending the narrow limits of our parochial moralities?
Week 10: Does Evolution Debunk Morality?
Seminar Reading:
•Sharon Street, ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value’, Philosophical Studies 127 (2006), pp. 109-166. [Available online at
Additional Reading:
•Richard Joyce, ‘The Evolutionary Debunking of Morality’, Ch. 6 of his The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006), pp. 179-220.
•Russ Shafer-Landau, ‘Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Reason, and Moral Knowledge’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2012), pp. 1-37. [Available online at
•Hallvard Lillehammer, ‘Debunking Morality: Evolutionary Naturalism and Moral Error Theory’, Biology and Philosophy 18 (2003), pp. 567-581. [Available online at
Essay Question:
oIn what way, if any, should the revelation that morality has evolved threaten our commitment to its demands?
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