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Inherency

Military transportation infrastructure failing now – need more access to power projection areas

Mallon, Program Director CSU Long Beach Office of Naval Research, ’10 (Larry, May 31, “Strategic Mobility 21 SM21 CONOPS Revised - Phase II Joint Force Deployment and Distribution Support Platform: Joint Operational Concept” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a526512.pdf)

Current Military Problem DoD is no stranger to supply chain disruption and logistics network challenges. Despite quantum improvements in throughput velocity and efficiency over logistics efforts a decade earlier in support of Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom after action reports and lessons learned indicate many deficiencies still exist. In short, there is still a significant gap yet required to be closed to implement focused logistics practices. While the commercial sector has been concentrating on end-to-end distribution process visibility (origin to destination represented by the ultimate consignee), both military planners and systems have, until recently, limited distribution network planning to port-to-port and not end-to-end planning. The responsibility for intra-theater distribution has been traditionally the combatant commander’s responsibility. The Theater Movement Control Agency, without the benefit of integrated information-centric logistics support, independently managed the most critical elements of the deployment and distribution process: reception, staging, onward movement and integration of military forces and sustainment distribution. The impact has been the predictable breakdown in end-to-end deployment and distribution process visibility resulting in cargo shrinkage, redundant ordering of supplies, loss of operational and tactical flexibility, and in the case of critical components, mission degradation. The pending return of as many as 70,000 additional military forces to the United States, and the associated unprecedented retrograde and reset of unit and pool equipment will similarly exacerbate an already troubling force deployment and sustainment situation. The final report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, completed in May 2005 concluded: “The Commission is concerned, however, that adequate strategic sealift, airlift, and pre-positioned equipment and stocks do not exist and that current intra-theater airlift is over-stressed. Aside from the lift capability, the Commission is also concerned that the air and sea ports, inter-nodal connectivities and other mobility enabling systems are not adequate to meet potential contingencies.” Moreover, the Commission noted that the budgetary plans for mobility assets are inadequate to meet projected lift demand. In a twenty-first century geopolitical focus on the Pacific Rim and Southwest Asia, DoD cannot rely upon a single west coast Power Projection Platform located at Fort Lewis, Washington, and a single capacity constrained strategic port. The Department of Defense has a vital stake as an invested stakeholder in the outcome of resolving freight bottlenecks and wringing full capacity utilization from the Southern California freight transportation infrastructure and improving transportation equipment management to meet burgeoning trade related demand. DoD has a stake in this effort not only as our largest domestic shipper, but also in the need for preserving power projection capability on the West Coast to the Pacific Rim. In addition, most pre-deployment roads lead through one or the other of the DoD’s large scale unit training facilities located in the Southern California region: Fort Irwin National Training Center and 29 Palms Marine Air Ground Training Facility for US Army and Marine Corps units respectively. Currently units are constrained by the existing transportation infrastructure at the Fort Irwin National Training Center from deploying their full complement of combat vehicles so they can “train as they will fight.” Instead units train on pre-positioned equipment. The result is training on combat systems that can be significantly different from what they must operate in a combat situation. Currently all force deployments from Fort Irwin must travel by an extended convoy route to the Yermo rail yard located on the Marine Corps Logistics Base near Barstow, California. At the Yermo facility unit equipment is loaded on railcars for subsequent deployment through the Port of Beaumont, Texas. The Southern California port congestion problems, supporting rail infrastructure, and lack of an integrated transportation network have created this undesirable situation.

Plan

The United States federal government should invest in Strategic Highway Network and STRAHNET Connectors infrastructure improvements.

Hegemony Advantage

The US military is shifting away from overseas base operations and now relies more heavily on CONUS-based operations – this places a premium on effective domestic infrastructure

Ackerman, SIGNAL Magazine, ’12 (Robert, July, “The Army Maneuvers Back to the United States” https://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.asp?articleid=3010&zoneid=40)

The wind-down of U.S. Army combat operations, along with the re-balance in national military priority toward the Asia-Pacific region, is forcing a shift as well as a surge in Army networking. The service must continue to modernize the network to meet growing capability demands, but it also must adapt its architecture to accommodate major changes in force deployments and missions. These changes take the form of an entirely new single information environment that will be developed across the Defense Department. As a major player, the Army will both influence and adapt to the new environment. Entering the force are mobile computing and communications systems based on commercial consumer technologies, and these must be absorbed without unduly disrupting the network or threatening its security. The increase in cybersecurity threats also is changing the way the networked Army operates. With the network extending down to the warfighter, individual soldiers must learn to wage cyber operations at all levels. And, this threat is evolving as quickly as information technology changes. After a decade of overseas combat operations, the Army is transitioning to a continental United States (CONUS)-based force. Traditionally, the Army has relied on a forward-based presence in Europe, Southwest Asia and the Pacific region. But now, it will be siting most of its brigade combat teams in the United States. Maintaining operational effectiveness from a CONUS-based environment is a foremost challenge, especially with the Army reducing in size over the next few years. The network must continue to ensure that the smaller Army does not lose its capabilities or effectiveness. Lt. Gen. Susan Lawrence, USA, U.S. Army chief information officer (CIO)/G-6, is at the heart of these networking challenges. She elaborates that the Army must be able to deploy anywhere in the world, with little or no notice, into an austere environment, and quickly become a joint task force. “By building out the Joint Information Environment [JIE], we can take a team as small as a five-man squad—[up to] a division in a corps—and punch them out anywhere in the world and have them immediately connected to the network and their data once they land,” she states. “That’s the goal we are going after.”

STRAHNET key to deterrence – ensures the effectiveness of CONUS-based Power Projection Platforms

Global Security, ’11 (May 7- date provided by google, “Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET)” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/strahnet.htm)

The Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) system of public highways provides access, continuity, and emergency transportation of personnel and equipment in times of peace and war. The 61,000-mile system, designated by the Federal Highway Administration in partnership with DOD, comprises about 45,400 miles of Interstate and defense highways and 15,600 miles of other public highways. STRAHNET is complemented by about 1,700 miles of connectors-additional highway routes linking more than 200 military installations and ports to the network. The Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) is a system of public highways that is a key deterrent in United States strategic policy. It provides defense access, continuity, and emergency capabilities for movements of personnel and equipment in both peace and war. Most large military convoys use the Strategic Highway Network. These routes connect military bases to the interstate highway network and include over 15,000 miles of roadway nationally. STRAHNET roadways are those which would be used for the rapid mobilization and deployment of armed forces in the event of war or peacekeeping activity. In 1981, as DOD's designated agent for the Highways for National Defense Program, the Military Traffic Management Command Transportation Engineering Agency (MTMCTEA) prepared a comprehensive update of these defense-important routes, formally identified as STRAHNET. In March 1985 MTMCTEA published MTMC Report TE 82-4b-29, STRAHNET Connector Atlas. The report documented the first systematic evaluation of the connecting roads between STRAHNET and the origins and destinations for defense traffic. It included 31 Army installations and 21 related ports. Fort Hood is home to 50,000 personnel and seven miles of motor pools filled with combat power that must be able to deploy effectively to perform missions around the world. In 2001 a new STRAHNET was established between Fort Hood and Corpus Christi, however, such designation doesn't guarantee funding. The port of Beaumont has been the positional port of deployment for Fort Hood and remains an important element for its deployments, US 190 from the Texas trunk system and as such is designed for four-lane divided status. A four-lane US 190 and Texas 30 linking to US 69 and 287 will provide an excellent deployment route to the port of Beaumont. The No. 1 priority for the governor of Louisiana of this military advisory board is expanding Louisiana to four lanes between England Air Park outside of Alexandria and Leesville in Fort Polk. Next is to reach the airport at Beaumont. STRAHNET Connectors (about 1,700 miles) are additional highway routes linking over 200 important military installations and ports to STRAHNET. These routes are typically used when moving personnel and equipment during a mobilization or deployment. Generally, these routes end at the port boundary or installation gate. However, if the installation gate that is used for mobilization or deployment is usually closed, then the STRAHNET Connector should be designated as the route between the primary peacetime gate and STRAHNET. While installations may have multiple access/egress routes, the STRAHNET Connector is generally the most direct and highest functional class roadway. As the Department of Defense (DOD) designated agent for public highway matters, the Military Traffic Management Command Transportation Engineering Agency (MTMCTEA) is the proponent for STRAHNET and STRAHNET Connectors. MTMCTEA identified STRAHNET and the Connector routes in coordination with the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the State transportation departments, the military Services and installations, and the ports. Together, STRAHNET and the Connectors define the total minimum defense public highway network needed to support a defense emergency. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 and the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 provided for inclusion of STRAHNET and important STRAHNET Connectors in the 160,955-mile National Highway System (NHS). The primary Connector routes for the Priority 1 and 2 installations and ports are included in the NHS. Federal oversight will ensure optimum maintenance levels for the NHS, thus assuring that the roads can support an emergency deployment. With DOD's current emphasis on continental US-based military units, the NHS will play an increasingly important role in new deployment scenarios. MTMCTEA's primary concern is deployment of the military forces from the Power Projection Platform (PPP) installations (which are DOD's critical installations and are all Priority 1 facilities) to their respective sea ports of embarkation. This is also the primary objective of FHWA's National Security Strategic Goal. The secondary concern is deployment from the Power Support Platform (PSP) installations (which are DOD's important Priority 1 installations which support the PPPs). Therefore, regarding how the States and FHWA Divisions should address road improvements as it relates to the installation and port priorities, improvements should be given to the PPP facilities, the PSP facilities, followed by the remaining Priority 1 facilities, and then the Priority 2 facilities. Bridge capability, pavement condition, and congestion are specific issues that should be addressed.

Power Projection Platforms are the biggest internal link to US military primacy

Langford, Lieutenant Colonel US Army, ‘4 (Gary, May 3, “Power Projection Platforms: An Essential Element of Future National Security Strategy” US Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423647)

In the Army's vision for transformation, General Shinseki, the 34th Army Chief of Staff, stated that the Army had to become a lighter, lethal, and more deployable force. This force must possess the ability to rapidly deploy to any portion of the globe where national interests are threatened and decisively counter those threats on terms favorable to the United States. In order to accomplish this, Shinseki directed that the Army objective was to "develop the capability to put brigade combat teams anywhere in the world within 96 hours after liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days." 3 The Army vision of transformation and the stated deployment timelines for Army formations has very real implications for Army Installations. Over the past five years Forces Command (FORSCOM) has wrestled with the challenges of deploying large formations from the Continental United States (CONUS) Installations. This has taken the form of various concepts and initiatives starting with the concept of creating Warfighting Centers, to Post Mobilization Maneuver Training Centers, and finally to the concept of Power Projection Platforms (PPPs) and Power Support Platforms (PSPs). Power Projection Platforms are defined as “Army installations that strategically deploy one or more high priority active component brigades or larger and/or mobilize and deploy high priority Army reserve component units.” 4 The PPPs primary function is to train and deploy fully capable and ready forces to combatant commanders. In his October 7, 2003 speech to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, reinforced the importance of our Installations to future strategic requirements and readiness when he stated; "our Installations must be resourced to serve as our flagships, able to project power, support tough realistic training, and provide for Soldiers, families, and civilians." 5 The future concepts of the Army and DOD require a strategic investment in the capabilities of Installations to perform as PPPs. The current status of the PPPs could degrade the delicate balance between the ends, ways, and means of the National Security Strategy and the strategic vision posited by the new Army Chief of Staff. The CONUS Installations (PPPs) represent the means by which the military element of national power will be projected to threats either foreign or domestic. “It is clearly recognized that PPPs are essential to execute power projection operations. Installations designated as PPPs will be prioritized resources to perform power projection functions together with designated sea and aerial ports in support of national strategy.” 6