Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Bundy and Mcnaughton on Operational Plans

Bookmark 1

Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Bundy and McNaughton on Operational Plans for September 1964, 27 August 1964

Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, pp. 553-554

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.20301
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

27 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. WILLIAM BUNDY
MR. J. T. McNAUGHTON

Subject: OPLAN 34A-September Schedule

Reference: MACSOG Message 8618 DTG 240855Z August

1. Attached hereto is COMUSMACV's proposed schedule of 34A actions for September.

2. All of the actions listed have either been specifically approved previously or are similar to such approved actions. For example, Action (3) (d) was specifically approved by consideration of JCSM-426-64 dated 19 May 1964, while Action (3) (b) is similar to a previously approved action against a security post.

3. The method of attack has been changed in some instances from destruction by infiltration of demolition teams to the concept of standoff bombardment from PTF's. These actions are so indicated in the attachment.

Rollen H. Anthis
Major General, USAF

Attachments

The proposed September 34A actions are as follows:

(1) Intelligence Collection Actions

(a) 1-30 September-Ariel photography to update selected targets along with pre- and post-strike coverage of approved actions.
(b) 1-30 September-Two junk capture missions; remove captives for 36-48 hours interrogation; booby trap junk with antidisturbance devices and release; captives returned after interrogation; timing depends upon sea conditions and current intelligence.

(2) Psychological Operations

(a) 1-30 September-In conjunction with approved overflights and maritime operations, delivery of propaganda leaflets, gift kits, and deception devices simulating resupply of phantom teams.
(b) 1-30 September-Approximately 200 letters of various propaganda themes sent through third country mail channels to North Vietnam.
(c) 1-30 September-Black Radio daily 30-minute programs repeated once, purports to be voice of dissident elements in North Vietnam.
(d) 1-30 September-White Radio broadcast of eight-and-one-half hours daily, propaganda "Voice of Freedom."

(3) Maritime Operations

(a) 1-30 September-Demolition of Route 1 bridge by infiltrated team accompanied by fire support teams, place short-delay charges against spans and caissons, place antipersonnel mines on road approaches. (This bridge previously hit but now repaired).
(b) 1-30 September-Bombard Cape Mui Dao observation post with 81 MM mortars and 40 MM guns from two PTFs.
(c) 1-30 September-Demolition of another Route 1 bridge (see map), concept same as (3) (a) above.
(d) 1-30 September-Bombard Sam Son radar, same as (3) (b).
(e) 1-30 September-BombardTigerIsland barracks, same as (3) (b).
(f) 1-30 September-BombardHonNguIsland, same as (3) (b).
(g) 1-30 September-BombardHonMattIsland, same as (3) (b) and run concurrently with (3) (f).
(h) 1-30 September-Destruction of section of Hanoi-Vinh railroad by infiltrated demolition team supported by two VN marine squads, by rubber boats from PTFs, place short-delay charges and anti-personnel mines around area.
(i) 1-30 September-Bombard Hon Me Island in conjunction with (3) (a) above, concept same as (3) (b).
(j) 1-30 September-Bombard Cape Falaise gun positions in conjunction with (3) (h) above, concept same as (3) (b).
(k) 1-30 September-Bombard Cape Mui Ron in conjunction with junk capture mission, concept same as (3) (b).

(4) Airborne Operations-Light-of-moon period 16-28 September

(a) Four missions for resupply of in-place teams.
(b) Four missions for reinforcement of in-place teams.
(c) Four missions to airdrop new psyops/sabotage teams depending upon development of drop zone and target information. These are low-key propaganda and intelligence gathering teams with a capability for small-scale sabotage on order after locating suitable targets.

(5) Dates for actual launch of maritime and airborne operations are contingent upon the intelligence situation and weather conditions.

Return to Vinnie's Home Page

Return to Vietnam War Page