Meetings with Yu Ta-Wei and John Leighton Stuart

#5-481

Meetings with Yu Ta-wei and John Leighton Stuart

June 20, 1946 Nanking, China

YU Ta-wei, 9:30 A.M.

Marshall asked General Yu what he thought would be an appropriate extension of the present fifteen-day truce; one day, Yu replied. Marshall thought this was unrealistic and probably based on the government’s assumption that the U.S. would support a civil war in China. “General Marshall stated emphatically that ‘it would not’”; furthermore, in the event of a civil war, the Marines and the Seventh Fleet probably would be withdrawn from China and all U.S. economic and military assistance probably would be cut off.

With regard to the Americans having the final decision on field teams and at Executive Headquarters, Yu suggested that the government would accept wording that permitted a majority, rather than unanimous, vote. The Communists were unlikely to accept this, Marshall responded; moreover, the government would probably have to modify certain of its stipulations regarding North China, Manchuria, and communications (see Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 1075–81) if there were to be further discussions with the Communists. The current truce should be extended by at least five days. (Ibid., pp. 1105–6.)

John Leighton Stuart, Frank W. Price, and W. P. Mills, 11:00 A.M.

The missionary group had talked with Chou En-lai, and Dr. Stuart with Chiang Kai-shek, the previous day, and they desired to tell Marshall what had occurred. Chou had said that the Communists desired an unconditional cessation of hostilities; the government was being unreasonable with regard to Manchurian and North China arrangements; and the two sides should jointly control the railways. He also saw dangers from both a U.S. withdrawal and Soviet influence. American guidance and technical assistance would be welcome in reorganizing the army, Chou said; however, American final authority in making decisions would impinge upon Chinese sovereignty.

In his long, frank conversation in Chinese with the Generalissimo, Stuart said, Chiang admitted that there were many problems in China, but the government was making reforms. The Communists were the chief offenders, breakers of agreements, and obstacles to economic recovery; they did not really want to cooperate with the government. Stuart told Chiang that the people were losing confidence in the government and that he was overestimating his personal popularity. Chiang failed to see economic problems clearly, in Stuart’s opinion. Price and Stuart thought that the Generalissimo would meet Chou half way if the Communist leader (preferably accompanied by General Marshall) would go to Chiang with a fresh, cooperative approach. Dr. Stuart said that Chiang was willing to abide by Marshall’s decisions, for example on railway control, and Chou had also agreed. “You don’t mean that,” Marshall responded. “He [Chou] has not agreed to my having the power of decision—he has resented it.” Stuart thought that it did not matter whether Chou agreed in principle with Marshall’s judgments so long as Chou could say to the Generalissimo that it was his decision that concessions first be made on the method by which railways would be controlled. (Ibid., pp. 1106–10.)

Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945–January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 600–601.