Mead Data Central, Inc., Appellant V. United States Department of the Air Force, Et Al
LEXSEE 566 f2d 242
Mead Data Central, Inc., Appellant v. United States Department of the Air Force, et al.
No. 75-2218
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
184 U.S. App. D.C. 350; 566 F.2d 242; 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 11772; 3 Media L. Rep. 1001
November 18, 1976, Argued
August 30, 1977, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
[**1]
As Amended September 27, 1977. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied November 28, 1977.
PRIOR HISTORY:
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 75-0927).
DISPOSITION:
Remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant challenged decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which held that the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), did not require disclosure of certain documents relating to a licensing agreement between appellee government department and publishing company.
OVERVIEW: Under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), appellant filed a request with appellee government department seeking disclosure of certain documents pertaining to appellee's computerized legal research system. Appellee refused to disclose some of the documents pursuant to 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5). Appellant filed suit seeking an injunction to compel the disclosure of the withheld documents. The trial court found in favor of appellee holding that the documents were exempt under 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5). The appellate court reversed and remanded holding that the trial court applied an impermissibly broad interpretation of the scope of the attorney-client privilege and the deliberative process privilege as they relate to 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5).
OUTCOME: The appellate court reversed and remanded a decision to exempt documents under the Freedom of Information Act holding that the trial court applied an impermissibly broad interpretation of the scope of the attorney-client privilege and the deliberative process privilege as they related to exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act.
CORE CONCEPTS
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
See 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Where there is such a factual dispute over the nature of the information sought in a suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), the lack of access of the party seeking disclosure undercuts the traditional adversarial theory of judicial dispute resolution. Although in camera inspection of the disputed documents may compensate somewhat for this deficiency, it is a far from perfect substitute. Moreover, the burden which the FOIA specifically places on the government to show that the information withheld is exempt from disclosure cannot be satisfied by the sweeping and conclusory citation of an exemption plus submission of disputed material for in camera inspection.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Courts require that when an agency seeks to withhold information it must provide a relatively detailed justification, specifically identifying the reasons why a particular exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), is relevant and correlating those claims with the particular part of a withheld document to which they apply.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
In a Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), action the district court is not limited to review of the quality of agency decisionmaking. It decides a claim of exemption de novo, and the agency's opinions carry no more weight than those of any other litigant in an adversarial contest before a court.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
In an appeal under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), in order to show that the district court's decision was incorrect as a substantive matter, appellant must establish that it was either based on an error of law or a factual predicate which is clearly erroneous.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970), exempts from mandatory disclosure those matters that are intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. Although Congress clearly intended to refer the courts to discovery principles for the resolution of exemption five disputes, the situations are not identical, and discovery rules should be applied to FOIA cases only by way of rough analogies. FOIA exemptions should be narrowly construed.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
A court's decision in a discovery case may rest in part on an assessment of the particularized need of the party seeking discovery, but in a suit under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), the court does not consider the needs of the requestor.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970), is intended to protect the quality of agency decision-making by preventing the disclosure requirement of the FOIA from cutting off the flow of information to agency decisionmakers. Certainly this covers professional advice on legal questions which bears on those decisions. The opinion of even the finest attorney, however, is no better than the information that his client provides. In order to ensure that a client receives the best possible legal advice, based on a full and frank discussion with his attorney, the attorney-client privilege assures him that confidential communications to his attorney will not be disclosed without his consent. This same protection should be extended to an agency's communications with its attorneys under exemption five.
Evidence : Privileges : Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege does not allow the withholding of documents simply because they are the product of an attorney-client relationship. It must also be demonstrated that the information is confidential. If the information has been or is later shared with third parties, the privilege does not apply.
Evidence : Privileges : Attorney-Client Privilege
Where a client is an organization, the attorney-client privilege extends to those communications between attorneys and all agents or employees of the organization who are authorized to act or speak for the organization in relation to the subject matter of the communication. Moreover, the privilege is not lost because an attorney consults other attorneys about the subject matter of the communication.
Evidence : Privileges : Attorney-Client Privilege
In the federal courts the attorney-client privilege does extend to a confidential communication from an attorney to a client, but only if that communication is based on confidential information provided by the client.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
With respect to documents containing legal opinions and advice, there is no doubt a great deal of overlap between the attorney-client privilege component of exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970), and its deliberative process privilege component. The distinction between the two is that the attorney-client privilege permits nondisclosure of an attorney's opinion or advice in order to protect the secrecy of the underlying facts, while the deliberative process privilege directly protects advice and opinions and does not permit the nondisclosure of underlying facts unless they would indirectly reveal the advice, opinions, and evaluations circulated within the agency as part of its decision-making process.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
If documents are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970), only because of the deliberative process privilege, the court must require defendant to describe the factual content of the documents and disclose it or provide an adequate justification for concluding that it is not segregable from the exempt portions of the documents.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970), incorporates the governmental privilege, developed in discovery cases, to protect documents containing advisory opinions and recommendations or reflecting deliberations comprising the process by which government policy is formulated. Under this facet of exemption five, the courts have required disclosure of essentially factual material but allowed agencies to withhold documents which reveal their deliberative or policy-making processes.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
A decision that certain information falls within exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970), should rest fundamentally on the conclusion that, unless protected from public disclosure, information of that type would not flow freely within the agency.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Many exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970), disputes may be able to be decided by application of the simple test that factual material must be disclosed but advisory material, containing opinions and recommendations, may be withheld. The test offers a quick, clear, and predictable rule of decision, but courts must be careful not to become victims of their own semantics. Exemption five is intended to protect the deliberative process of government and not just deliberative material. Perhaps in the great majority of cases that purpose is well served by focusing on the nature of the information sought. In some circumstances, however, the disclosure of even purely factual material may so expose the deliberative process within an agency that it must be deemed exempted by 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Discussions among agency personnel about the relative merits of various positions which might be adopted in contract negotiations are as much a part of the deliberative process as the actual recommendations and advice which are agreed upon. As such they are equally protected from disclosure by exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Predecisional materials are not exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(5) (1970), merely because they are predecisional; they must also be a part of the deliberative process within a government agency.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
In an action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), an agency cannot meet its statutory burden of justification by conclusory allegations of possible harm. It must show by specific and detailed proof that disclosure would defeat, rather than further, the purposes of the FOIA.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Since the exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) are permissive rather than mandatory, particularly with respect to information that does not raise issues of individual privacy rights, an agency may impose upon itself a more liberal disclosure rule than that required by the FOIA. The Air Force has done just that by providing by regulation that even though a requested document or portion thereof falls within an exemption, it should nonetheless be disclosed unless it is also determined that a significant and legitimate government purpose would be served by exercising the exemption. 32 C.F.R. § 806.23 (1976).
Administrative Law : Agency Rulemaking : Informal Rulemaking
An agency is bound by its own regulations.
Administrative Law : Judicial Review : Questions of Law
An agency's interpretation of its own rule is entitled to a presumption of validity.
Administrative Law : Judicial Review : Standards of Review
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
An agency must show by detailed and specific justification that information it seeks to withhold from public disclosure falls within one of the exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), Once that is shown, however, the FOIA does not apply, and a court's review of the agency's decision whether to release it, nonetheless, is limited to determining whether the agency's action amounts to an abuse of discretion.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
The exemptions from the mandatory disclosure requirement of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), are both narrowly drafted and narrowly construed in order to counterbalance the self-protective instincts of the bureaucracy which, like any organization, would prefer to operate under the relatively comforting gaze of only its own members rather than the more revealing "sunlight" of public scrutiny. Where there is a balance to be struck, Congress and the courts have stacked the scales in favor of disclosure and against exemption.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
The focus of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), is information, not documents, and an agency cannot justify withholding an entire document simply by showing that it contains some exempt material. Non-exempt portions of a document must be disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwined with exempt portions. Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided after deletion of the portions which are exempt. 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b) (Supp. V 1975).
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), agencies must show that withheld documents contain no separable factual information.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
The question of segregability of documents under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), is completely dependent on the actual content of the documents themselves and the requesting party is helpless to counter agency claims that there is no non-exempt and reasonably segregable material within a withheld document.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Unless the segregability provision of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b) (Supp. V 1975), is to be nothing more than a precatory precept, agencies must be required to provide the reasons behind their conclusions in order that they may be challenged by FOIA plaintiffs and reviewed by the courts. In addition to a statement of its reasons, an agency should also describe what proportion of the information in a document is non-exempt and how that material is dispersed throughout the document. Armed with such a description, both litigants and judges will be better positioned to test the validity of the agency's claim that the non-exempt material is not segregable.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
Since the focus of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), is information, not documents as a whole, and not simply words which the government has written down, it should be legitimate to consider the information content of the non-exempt material which a FOIA plaintiff seeks to have segregated and disclosed. This does not mean that a court should approve an agency withholding because of the court's low estimate of the value to the requestor of the information withheld. It does mean that a court may decline to order an agency to commit significant time and resources to the separation of disjointed words, phrases, or even sentences which taken separately or together have minimal or no information content.
Administrative Law : Governmental Information : Freedom of Information
If an agency has provided the description and justification for segregating information under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b) (Supp. V 1975), a district court need not conduct its own in camera search for segregable non-exempt information unless the agency response is vague, its claims too sweeping, or there is a reason to suspect bad faith.
COUNSEL:
Robert N. Sayler for Appellant.
Michael H. Stein, Attorney, Department of Justice, for Appellees. Rex E. Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Earl J. Silbert, United States Attorney, Leonard Shaitman, Ronald R. Glancz, and Karen K. Siegel, Attorneys, Department of Justice, were on the brief, for Appellees.
JUDGES:
Danaher, Senior Circuit Judge, and McGowan and Tamm, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Tamm. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge McGowan.
OPINIONBY:
TAMM
OPINION:
[*247] TAMM, Circuit Judge:
Mead Data Central, Inc. appeals from a judgment of the United States District [*248] Court for the District of Columbia holding that seven documents relating to a licensing agreement between the United States Department of the Air Force and West Publishing Co. need not be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.§ 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), because they fall within exemption five [**2] of the FOIA. n1 While we agree with the district court that the attorney-client privilege and the deliberative process privilege are essential ingredients of exemption five, we find that both the Air Force and the district court applied interpretations of the scope of those privileges that are impermissibly broad, and accordingly remand the case to the district court for further consideration under the narrower constructions set forth in this opinion. We also hold that the Air Force did not adequately justify its claim that there was no non-exempt information which was reasonably segregable, and direct that agency segregability decisions be accompanied by adequate descriptions of the documents' content and articulate the reasons behind the agency's conclusion.
------Footnotes------
n1 Exemption five provides that the FOIA does not apply to:
inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
------End Footnotes------[**3]
I. BACKGROUND
In early 1975, Mead Data filed a FOIA request with the Air Force seeking disclosure of several categories of documents dealing generally with the Department's "Project FLITE," a computerized legal research system. n2 The Air Force agreed to disclose some of the requested documents, but the Chief of the General Litigation Division of the Office of The Judge Advocate General advised Mead Data by letter that eight of the documents would be withheld. J.A. at 7-8. He provided a very brief description of each document n3 and asserted that "the foregoing are exempt from disclosure under . . . 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5), as attorney work products or intra-agency memoranda." J.A. at 8. Mead Data appealed this decision to the Office of the Secretary and was informed that, although one of the eight documents would be disclosed, n4 the remaining seven would not. The Air Force characterized three of these seven documents as legal opinions of Air Force attorneys advising their client as to applicable law and recommending courses of action with respect to Project FLITE. The other four were described as internal memoranda prepared by Air Force employees, which reflect [**4] the course of negotiations between the Air Force and West Publishing Co. for a licensing agreement to use the copyrighted West key number system and offer recommendations as to negotiating positions. n5 The Air Force claimed that the legal opinions fell within the attorney-client privilege incorporated into exemption five of the FOIA, and that the internal memoranda were also covered by that exemption because their disclosure would adversely affect the decisional process within the Air Force by inhibiting the expression of candid opinions. J.A. at 9-10.