Lessons from the German Blitzkrieg in France

Elmonairy 1

UNITED STATESMILITARYACADEMY

Learning from Lightning

Lessons from the German Blitzkrieg in France

MS489: ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL STUDY- MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

SECTION D8

MAJ BEAULIEU

By

CADET ELMONAIRY ’11

WEST POINT, NEW YORK

25 APRIL 2011

____ MY DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFIES ALL SOURCES USED AND

ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN COMPLETING THIS ASSIGNMENT.

____ NO SOURCES WERE USED OR ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN

COMPLETING THIS ASSGNMENT.

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Contents

I: Introduction

Methodology

Literature Review

Road Map

II: Definitions

Blitzkrieg

Operations

Success

Excellence

III: Fall Gelb

An Operational Throw of the Dice

Race to the Meuse

Lightning at Sedan

The Drive to the Channel

Why Victory?

IV: Doctrinal Roots of Victory

The Lineage of Truppenführung

Operational Concept

Command Principles

Technology

V: Institutional Roots of Victory

Recruitment

Training

Replacements

The Effect of This System

VI: The American Experience

Desert Storm

Iraqi Freedom

American Personnel Management

VII: Policy Implications

Doctrinal Lessons of 1940

Institutional Lessons of 1940

Technological Lessons of 1940

VIII: Conclusions

Bibliography

I: Introduction

“The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected”

Sun Tzu[1]

The U.S. Army today faces a set of present and potential challenges of ever increasing complexity. Even as the Global War on Terror (Global Overseas Contingency Operations?) continues, new threats to national security menace just over the time horizon. The world is currently witnessing several geo-political trends that promise to drastically alter the strategic environment in the near to midterm.[2] The disproportionate population growth in the developing world and associated youth bulges, the increasing scarcity of such essential resources as water and oil, and the explosive urbanization and growth of Third World metropolises, are just a sampling of the processes that have the potential to create serious and complex security dilemmas. [3] These challenges face the nation at large but hold special significance for the nation’s army. The Armymust come to grips with a future in which it is likely to face greater and more uncertain demands.

Further complicating the situation is the fact that the Army will face resource constraints in the future that are much more serious than anything experienced within the last decade. The nation’s burgeoning debt and the rapid expansion of entitlements will exert strong downward pressures on defense spending in the future. If the latest budget projections released by the White House hold true, defense spending will fall to a historically low three percent of the gross domestic product before the close of the current decade.[4] This contraction of overall defense spending will affect the Army particularly hard as the fastest growing part of defense budget is personnel related expenditures. [5]While the American tradition has always been to reduce military spending in times of relative security to reap a “peace dividend”, the near future promises to present the U.S. Army with a dilemma unprecedented in its history. Unless there is either a significant change in the trajectory of strategictrends or projected spending levels, the Army is facing a future in which it will need to be prepared to accomplish significantly more with significantly less. As First Sea Lord John Fisher said when faced with declining funding for the Royal Navy on the eve of the First World War, “Gentlemen, the money is gone. Now we must think.”[6]The present situation certainly calls for a good deal of thought on the part of the Army, but where should the Army’s attention be turned?

History is replete with examples of militaries that were able to stretch the resources at hand further than their contemporaries in order to achieve their operational and strategic goals. Even the most casual student of military history knows of the brave stand of the Spartans at Thermopile, the exploits of Frederick the Great’s grenadiers in Prussian blue, or the excellence of Swiss pike men. However,upon deeper consideration it is difficult to think of a more effective fighting force, man for man, than the German Wehrmachtthat fought World War II. During the war’s early years, the Wehrmachtracked up a string of victories that are truly impressive. In the space of 2 years, German troops marched triumphant through Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, France, the Balkans, Greece, and much of the Soviet Union. The later stages of the war represent a different matter entirely. 1942 and 1943 witnessed a series of major German reversals in North Africa and the Eastern Front. In 1944, the Wehrmacht was steadily pushed back on the Eastern Front, in Italy to the south, and in France to west.[7] All the while, shortages of ever increasing intensity in weapons, ammunition, fuel, transport, and manpower constrained the German ability to respond to Allied and Soviet attacks.[8] What is truly remarkable is that the Wehrmachtcontinued to fight on and continued to outperform their opponents even in the extreme conditions they faced towards the end of the war.[9] It is based on this outstanding performance, that the Wehrmacht, and the German Heer or German Army in particular,serves as the case for this study.

While the Wehrmachtconsistently outperformed its opponents throughout World War II, the gap in comparative performance was obviously wider during certain phases of the conflict than others. By almost any reckoning, the gap between theWehrmachtand its opponents reached its pinnacle duringFall Gelb, the first and decisive phase of the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940. The feats of the Wehrmacht and Panzergruppe Kleist, German 12th Army in particular, are unparalleled in military history.[10]Fully 72% of all Allied personnel involved in the defense of France, no less than some 1.2 million soldiers, were either killed or captured during the course of the campaign.[11] But while the magnitude of this success is beyond question, the reasons for this success are hotly debated. It is the secret of this success that is the theme of this study. Mainly, the paper seeks to answer the question, “What are the underlying causes of the Wehrmacht’s success during Fall Gelband what are the lasting lessons that would serve the American Army today?”

Methodology

Ability of the Wehrmacht to achieve and maintain tactical and operational excellence within its combat formations throughout World War II was truly remarkable. The persistently high levels of excellence maintain throughout the war make material explanations of excellence, such as the technological superiority of certain German weapons over their Allied counterparts, unsatisfying at best. The primary hypothesis of this study is that the excellence of the German Army, especially when faced with significant resource shortages and overwhelming odds, was the result of those intellectual and organizational factors that comprise a military organization’s fighting power. [12] More specifically, the German Army’s excellence came from two primary factors which comprise this study’s sub-hypothesis. First, the German Army derived a significant advantage, especially in the 1940 invasion of France, from a superior doctrine and conceptualization of war. Second, the German Army’s very structure and personnel management were all arranged so as to foster the unit cohesion and trust that are the building blocksof fighting power.

In order to test this hypothesis and its two subcomponentsit was necessary to closely examine the official expression of German doctrine during this period, Truppenfürhrung. [13] In addition to official doctrine, this paper’s analysistook advantage of doctrinal writings by personalities involved in the campaign such as Guderian’s Achtung- Panzer!, written in 1937.The structure of the German Army and its personnel management system also presents evidence of practices that fostered tighter unit cohesion and organizational trust. After examining the German expression of doctrine and the structure of the German Army, a detailed review of the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in 1940 presents evidence of German doctrine in action. This step serves as a check to ensure that the German Army practiced what it demanded on paper and that its personnel management system had the desired effect.

The method of comparing the doctrine of the German Army with its conduct on campaign was chosen precisely because it establishes the most direct link between the historical case in question and the organizational and doctrinal factors that form the core of the hypothesis. Naturally, it is nearly impossible to determine if a given action that is in agreement with doctrine was done out a conscious application of doctrinal principles or simply in accordance with them. However, if a pattern of actions in line with doctrine should emerge in the course of examining the campaign in France, it is fair to say that doctrine exerted an influence on the course of events. Also, if evidence of the qualities sought in the German personnel management system presents itself in a consistent manner, it is safe to say that those practices also had a strong hand in the outcome of the campaign. In short, if evidence of a strong doctrinal and organizational influence can be found in the course of an examination of the German invasion, this would demonstrate that these factors were primary contributors to success of Fall Gelb and the overall excellence of the Wehrmacht.

Literature Review

There is no shortage of theories as to howthe Wehrmacht decisivelyachieved its operational goals during Fall Gelb. One early explanation, largely devoid of factual analysis, was the popular myth of Blitzkrieg.[14]The fiction of the myth lies in the mischaracterization of Blitzkrieg as the cult of the tank. This myth conjuresup images of hordes of invincible Nazi tanks rolling across the plains of Europe and deserts of Africa in unstoppable and unending waves.[15]In fact, despite years of secretive preparations in violation of the Versailles Treaty, only 10% of the German Army was motorized at the commencement of Fall Gelb.[16]This explanation owes its rapid and widespread acceptance to films by Nazi propaganda minister Goebbels and Allied governments eager to conjure a palatable excuse for their failures.[17]While this explanation does little to advance any understanding of the conflict, it is not wholly without its merits. This explanation is historically noteworthy for the wide currency it held in the immediate aftermath of German victories in France and the Low Countries.[18] The fact that something so far from the truth was widely believed can be seen as further evidence of the shocking nature of German victories in the spring and summer of 1940. Also, this mischaracterization of the German Army as an armored juggernaut had very real material consequences.[19]President Roosevelt specified overly ambitious production targets for the Victory Program in response to a faulty appraisal of the level of mechanization in the German Army. [20]

The explanation most widely accepted in German military circles in 1940 was that the victories of the Panzergruppe in France were the product of much organizational experimentation and theoretical work that occurred during the interwar period.[21] The application of Strosstruppen , or storm trooper, tactics to armor formations is one of the most important intellectual developments of the period.[22] The of James S. Corum treats this period in detail and explores the work German General Hans von Seeckt in exploring the use of technology to revive operational principles buried under the mud of Flanders in WWI. Guderian’s writings, in both Achtung- Panzer! and Panzer Leader are represent clear evidence of German theoretical work on armor centric combined arms warfare well ahead ofsuch thought in the militaries of the other principal combatants.[23]Also, the fact that Germany’s Panzer divisions, large armor centric combined arms formations first formed in 1935, were unique in the militaries of the world until the eve of the war supports this line of reasoning.[24] The various Panzer Corps and the Panzergruppe employed by the Germans during Fall Gelb were operational experiments without precedent and without parallel until the 1942.[25]

In many ways, German doctrinal superiority extended to the fundamental issues of the nature of war and command principles. In what may be a direct result of their experiences in World War I, the western allies and the Wehrmacht developed strikingly different outlooks on these issues. German doctrine stressed a strictly Clausewitzian view of warfare.[26] This firm grounding in Clausewitz resulted in a doctrine that stressed the difficulties posed by uncertainty and friction. This image of war had several profound consequences. The German Army developed doctrine stressingdecentralized command using mission type orders. The Allies relied on a modernized version of the tightly controlled methods of command that had typified operations on the Western Front.[27]This reliance on firm control, combined with an “engineering approach” to war would leave the Allies soundly outpaced in the face of more fluid German command principles.[28]

Another explanation of German excellence finds its source in the way German Army created and maintained its combat formations.Structure of the German Army in World War II, from recruitment through replacement sought to instill in its combat formations a sense of trust and unit cohesion.[29] Because of a well thought out method of personnel management that was first and foremost oriented towards generating fighting power, the Germans experienced the unit cohesion their doctrine demanded.

Some literature on the topic takes issue with the underlying assumption that the Wehrmacht enjoyed any sort of qualitative advantage over its principal opponents in World War II. A recent addition to this line of argumentation is Keith Bonn’s When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944- January 1945. This book’s premise is that in a situation where the German Army and American Army faced each other with roughly similar numbers of men, artillery and armor, the result was an American victory. Bonne’s argument, in its general outline, is typical of this school of thought denying that the Wehrmachtpossessed a qualitative edge.A number of issues exist with the accuracy of Bonne’s analysis. One, his appraisal of the comparative quality of the American Army and the German Army in a single campaign is inherently anecdotal. This is very problematic in so much as Bonn’s findings are contrary to those findings arrived at by other scholars who examineda broader range of cases.[30] Additionally, Bonne’sdecision to focus on the immediate situation of the American and German armies in the Vosges Mountains campaign draws an artificially narrow boundary around the comparison. In choosing a single campaign in the late stages of the war, Bonne excludes several key factors from meaningful consideration.Among those factorsare the marked inferiority of the Luftwaffe in this late stage of the war, German supply shortages, the scarcity of reserves, and the fact that the training available to German replacements in this late stage of the war was not representative of the training practices the German Army maintained in most circumstances.

As demonstrated above, the topic of the excellence of the German Army in World War II has received much examination. Where this study looks to add something novel to the existing body of literature is in demonstrating the instrumentality of German doctrine and institutions to their success during Fall Gelb. This study will also add to the existing by determining what lessons of the invasion of France and the Low Countries are applicable to the U.S. Army today. By systematically establishing the principle causes of German success in Fall Gelb and comparing the conduct of the German Army in that campaign with the conduct of the American Army in major combat operations in operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, this study will offer policy recommendations aimed at increasing the fighting effectiveness of America’s combat formations, and putting it in a better position to face the strategic and resource challenges of the future.

Road Map

Having established the problem and the basic premise of this paper, it is fitting that a detailed outline as to how this paper will proceed should be added. First, there will be a preliminary definition of terms that will be used frequently in the paper but have become vague in their general usage. After that will follow a brief synopsis of the course of Fall Gelb. This synopsis will be divided into two phases; the planning and preparation phase, and the operation itself, from the crossing of the German border until the British evacuation of Dunkirk. Following this synopsis will be the analysis. This will be subdivided into two broad subheadings, one dealing with German doctrine as it stood on the eve of battle on 10 May 1940 and the other dealing with the German institutions that created and sustained the combat units that fought Fall Gelb to a successful conclusion. After settling on the causes of German combat excellence as rooted in their doctrine and institutions, a brief comparison between the operational conduct of the German Army in Fall Gelb and the American Army in operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom will serve to show which lessons remain to be learned from the German experience. Finally, the policy implications of the study will be laid out, providing both a platform for continued study and concrete action. The policy implications will cover doctrinal, institutional, and technological recommendations for the U.S. Army as it moves into the future.