Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia(FARC) and the Colombian Government

Las fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia(FARC) and the Colombian Government

by Josh Neuhaus

A clash between left and right,legitimacy and illegitimacy, violence and peace; however one chooses to classify current proceedings in Colombia right now, the events will profoundly impact Colombian democracy in the future and thus must be taken seriously. When President Alvaro Uribe came to power in 2006, he vowed to combat the left-wing guerillas that had terrorized Colombia for decades; his efforts were unsuccessful due to the immense economic and political power that these rebel groups have acquired since their nascence. Realizing the failures in this head-on approach, Uribe’s successor Juan Manuel Santos- who served as Uribe’s defense secretary- vowed to end the conflict when he came to power in 2010; in October 2012 he took affirmative action by sitting down for peace talks with the largest rebel group currently operating in Colombia- The Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia (Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)or FARC for short. In the following essay, I will analyze the significance of these negotiations by looking at the history of FARC and their growth from a small, left-leaning peasant organization in 1964, to the influential, 10,000-member strong group that it is today. The organization’s involvement in politics, drug trafficking, kidnappings and everything in between makes it both a fascinating and unpredictable force for the Colombian government (and myself) to contend with.

History of FARC

In the 1920s and 30s, coffee plantation owners in the rural south of Colombia imposed harsh working conditions on employees which caused widespread disputes and unrest amongst the peasant population. These peasants banded together to complain about the exacting conditions as well as issues over tenure of their land. Another key characteristic of these early peasant organizations was their leftist ideology, as they drew ideas and inspiration from other communist and socialist movements in South America. The government responded heavy-handedly to the formation of these left-wing organizations through legitimate measures like outlawing communism and via the formation of illegitimate militias. It should be noted that up until the early 1940s, the movement was limited to peasants in Southern Tolima and had failed to gain traction amongst the working classes. This all changed with the murder of the Liberal politician Jorge E. Gaitán, which marked the beginning of a ten-year civil war (1948-1958) in which the Colombian Liberal Party fought the Colombian Conservative party mostly through support groups in the countryside. When Gaitán was murdered on April 9th1948, huge riots occurred in the capital city of Bogota killing an estimated 5,000 people and destroying most of downtown Bogota. This incident, known as ‘El Bogotazo’, only served to fuel the violence in the countryside that had been developing over the previous decade. When the Conservative Party came to power in 1946, politicians at the highest level as well as local town police encouraged Conservative Party supporters to seize land from Liberal peasant supporters. As a result of this government-fueled aggression, peasants organized themselves into more robust self-defense units and adopted guerilla warfare tactics. Now finding themselves without land or homes and rapt on revenge, many of the more extreme displaced peasants fled to inhospitable areas in the mountains and grouped together into armed militias. It is at this point in the chronology that we start to recognize traits within these armed groups not too dissimilar to the FARC of today; one of these traits or tactics that remains integral to the group today is the process of ‘armed colonization’. During the 1950s, the government legitimized the use of force against opposition groups; popular movements that had the potential to lead to the formation of grassroots groups were criminalized. Peasants could not organize themselves and demonstrate against their plight without risk of persecution. This further intensified the resolve of the early FARC fighters and by the end of this period, known as ‘La Violencia’,an estimated 200,000 people had lost their lives.

The civil war was ended in a rather unsatisfactory manor for the peasants- the creation of the National Front in 1958. Although this body symbolized a commitment from both political parties to share power, it also concentrated state power almost entirely in the hands of elites. Even more significant was the declaration of a ‘state of emergency’, which meant that any expression of intent outside of the established political norms could be put down using force. Instead of allowing the natural formation of left-wing opposition, the government essentially shot itself in the foot by limiting political freedom; the FARC rebels were spurred on by this political exclusion (and events in Cuba) and occupied a stance further left on the political spectrum than perhaps they would have done without the declared state of emergency. They started out as one of many minor guerilla groups operating in the shadow of the Colombian Communist Party and had only nine fronts by the end of the 1970s; the group was by no means a coherent force at this point and had many geographical and leadership divisions; an example of this is the fact that five fronts operated in the southern states of Colombia while only one fractured force existed in the north. There was also disagreement over competing visions for the group; certain leaders saw the expansion of FARC’s military operations as the top priority while others stressed the need for increased political participation. The following series of events in the 1980s contributed to the resolution of this problem: The Communist Party worked hard to reconcile different left-wing factions, bringing FARC and various groups together under an umbrella organization called the Patriotic Union (La Union Patriotica). This grouping was supposed to represent a third, politically left leaning option designed to challenge the two existing elitsitparties however it could never establish itself due to the constant threatsof kidnapping and assassination that people affiliated with the UP organization faced. This was enough to convince the FARC leadership that expanding military operations would be more effective in the struggle for representation and legitimacy in the eyes of the rebels.

The 1990s was when the nature of the conflict shifted most, mainly due to the much-publicized issue of drug trafficking. The United States became even more involved in the ‘war on drugs’ that had begun with President Richard Nixon’s statement of intent back in June 1971. Essentially, drug traffickers began to make colossal sums of money due to the explosive growth in demand for drugs like cocaine in the Americas. This became retrospectively known in the United States as ‘the American crack epidemic’ and contributed heavily to the influence that traffickers were acquiring in Colombia. They could afford to pay off high-ranking officials all across the political spectrum and funded paramilitary militias that attacked leftist organizations across the country. The aims of the FARC guerillas became unclear with the added complications of the drugs cartels. The guerillas fought back using all tactics at their disposal including the targeting of regular citizens who may or may not have been associated with any paramilitary groups. The proliferation of the cartels also forced FARC to reorganize itself into more efficient fighting units and it was in this period that it was able to hone its fighting, organizational and recruitment techniques. Many citizens recognized the widespread corruption in the Colombian government and no longer saw it as a legitimate representative body; FARC positioned itself as a hardline alternative to these corrupt politicians and their puppet masters i.e. the drug traffickers. To put it into perspective, by 2004 Colombia was responsible for 80% of world cocaine production despite only possessing 14% of the world’s cocoa leaves. The political and economic power that this statistic equates to is immense and gives some indication of the scale of the conflict between the FARC, the cartels and the government. 3 million Colombians have been displaced in the past two decades alone as a direct result of this ongoing internal power struggle.

Negotiations in Havana

In 2013 the Colombian government and the FARC sat down to resolve decade-old disputes focused around six major issues. The topics planning to be covered were rural development, guarantees for the exercise of political opposition, citizen participation, ending armed conflict, drug trafficking and rights of the victims in the conflict. Although negotiations represent significant progress in piecing back together this broken nation, the pace of talks was tediously slow; in the first six months of discussions, land reform was the only issue to have been resolved. Another factor to take into consideration is the presence of other rebel groups; the National Liberation Army (ELN) is a small but effective force of 3000 military men that is classified by other countries and international bodies (including the United Nations) as a terrorist organization. Leaders of the ELN said that they would be willing to negotiate with the Colombian government after seeing the progress made by FARC in becoming a recognized body however President Santos is yet to give in. He sees the ELN as a more extreme, less influential group compared to the FARC and refuses to negotiate with terrorists; the ELN must release its hostages before President Santos even begins thinking about negotiating as “actions speak louder than words”. (Quote from a presidential speech made in 2012). There are various reasons for the Havana talks occurring when they did but perhaps the most important contributing factor was Uribe’s targeting of rebel leaders, which severely weakened the organization and led to many members deserting. In November 2013, Humberto de la Calle and Ivan Marquez, the chief negotiators for the government and the FARC respectively, made a significant announcement- the rebels would be granted full democratic participation in politics if they agreed to give up using violence to achieve their political ambitions. There is still some ways to go before the signing of an official peace treaty, however, Jorge Restrepo, head of a Bogota-based thinktank and an expert on the issue, said the announcement is fundamental in that ‘the exchange of violence for political participation is a fundamental manifestation of the Farc’s intention to end the conflict’. It should be noted that the Havana talks are the fourth time the government has attempted to sit down with the rebels and discuss political participation thus any progress must be viewed with a certain degree of caution. The aforementioned land reforms redistributed land to the lower classes and others whose land was originally seized at the beginning of the conflict. In addition, members of any new political party are given the promise of security under the deal which should help prevent a situation arising like that of the Patriotic Union in the 1990s where over 2,000 officials were murdered and thousands more kidnapped. Finally, it is worth considering some of the issues that the negotiations fail to deal with; it is unclear whether the FARC commanders will be allowed to participate in politics in the future, as the Colombian constitution does not allow people with previous convictions of crimes against humanity to hold positions in public office. With that said, the commanders have not officially been tried in a court of justice and thus may be able to represent their constituents without penalty.

The Future

President Santos is not a popular man. He was criticized harshly by his predecessor Uribe for even negotiating with the FARC in the first place and by many citizens for the slow pace of negotiations. While some feel that negotiations are necessary for sustained peace in Colombia, others are of the opinion that the FARC are an untrustworthy group of terrorists who deserve nothing more than to be crushed by the full force of the Colombia military. It is these remaining divisions in Colombian society that need to be addressed before the nation can truly begin to recuperate from half a century of violence, corruption and all the other consequences of such large-scale civil conflict.

Democracy

The prospect of a previously illegitimate body of former rebels becoming part of the political system raises interesting questions about the nature of democracy in Colombia and in a wider sense. Is this move justifiable if it leads to better representation (for the peasant classes especially) and ends a five decade long civil conflict? Or would it be more appropriate to simply exclude all the corrupt government officials as well as the FARC from the political system and start afresh? The second option is difficult to implement because of the sheer number of politicians that would be excluded from the political system; there would not be enough people remaining with the skills and political nous to guide the country through a new prolonged period of peace. Saying this, there is an argument to be made for the taking over of the political system by technocrats to kick-start the Colombian economy and therefore reduce dependency on money made from drug trafficking. If one views the FARC as a terrorist organization, as Uribe and Zuluaga did (both members of the ultra-conservative Democratic Centre party), then perhaps it is justifiable to exclude the rebels from political participation, regardless of the consequences. Is this truly democratic though if it means a significant part of the population forfeits the opportunity to be accurately represented? Personally I would support the efforts of President Santos and advise the population to be patient. Peace is around the corner if both sides can compromise and work out a way to respect each other’s wishes in the long run while also respecting the mandates of the Colombian constitution. This will eventually lead to a reduction in the size of the military wing of the FARC as they pile more resources into their political aims. This reallocation of resources (simple production possibility frontier economics) will hopefully mean the next generation of Colombians, living in a thriving democracy, can think of civil conflict as a notion of the past. Wishful thinking.

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