Kosovo: What Next?
“War is a grave matter; one is apprehensive lest men embark upon it without due reflection” Sun Tzu
No-one would disagree with the fact that the persecution of the Kosovo Albanians by the Serbs is both a tragedy and a disgrace; and that when diplomatic efforts to stop the slaughter were exhausted, a military option was the only course of action left. I wholeheartedly support the principle of stopping the activities of the Serb special police and military in Kosovo by force.
But, the key question is what happens next? The answer to this must involve an examination of the views, characteristics and circumstances of both the Serbs and NATO, and the expectations of and the impact on the Kosovans.
My experience of dealing with the Serbs is based on my time in Sarajevo working for General Sir Michael Rose. I had firsthand experience of negotiations with the likes of Karadic and Mladic, who are essentially of the same mindset as Milosevic. They demonstrated a fanatical patriotic resolve, stubbornness, cunning and ruthlessness, together with a highly developed level of brinkmanship.
From the Serb point of view, the Kosovo problem is an internal one of a sovereign nation, Serbia, dealing with an internal revolt perpetrated by an armed terrorist movement. What are conveniently glossed over are the ethnic and historical questions and also the strategic and economic importance of Kosovo to Serbian industry, in that it produces a high proportion of the country’s coal. This, combined with the inescapable fact that the NATO operation is a direct attack by an external force on a sovereign European nation does, at first glance, give them the justification for outrage and for the support they have received from Russia, China and others. However, read on to put this view into context.
In addition, one has to understand the mentality of the Serbs – they are very proud people to whom history and the mythology of the Battle of Kosovo in 1392 are important. If this is superimposed on their strong nationalistic feeling – in spite of dissenting political support for the Milosevic government – their collective response to this attack is likely to be one of determined defiance, a temporary halt to their political differences and a unification of their national desire to defend themselves.
Combine this with the military legacy that Tito left them – a strong, well equipped army and a national defence plan aimed at preserving their non-aligned status during the cold war – coupled with one of their trump cards – terrain – and you have a formidable enemy who is unlikely to back down in the face of collective adversity. The West was given a foretaste of this in the attitude and action of the Bosnian Serbs prior to the Dayton Accord.
From the NATO point of view – the increasing intransigence of Milosevic, together with the repeated threats of action, both of which have been inflamed by instantaneous and graphic media coverage – has forced them to act against Serbia in the defence of a persecuted minority. After all, this is what most people believe to be one of the just and proper uses of military force.
The full scope of the NATO plan remains to be revealed, but it has been stated on a number of occasions, particularly by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, that the deployment of ground troops is not envisaged. The current air operations are reminiscent of the opening phase of Operation Desert Storm, and the punitive operations that have taken place since. However, seven things remain unclear:
· What is the aim of the operation? Is it to prevent Serb attacks on the Kosovans by destroying military infrastructure and breaking the will of the Serbian military? If so, it is unlikely to be successful. Or is it to try and destabilise the government and bring about internal change? If so, will this have the desired effect? Or is it simply to protect and preserve Kosovan lives?
· How long will the air strikes last and what happens afterwards?
· Does NATO need to put troops on the ground to achieve its aim?
· What is the exit strategy and what will happen to the Kosovans after that?
· What effect will these actions have on NATO and European unity in the future?
· Who will guarantee the peace and safety of the Kosovans in the long term?
· How will this impact on the wider issues?
In addition, what are the expectations of the Kosovans and what impact will the air strikes have on them? Their overriding aspiration is one of independence from Serbia. However, they have been persuaded to accept a state of autonomy and if the Rambouillet Accord is signed, this autonomy would be protected by NATO. Most Kosovans only accept this as a stepping stone to independence.
It has taken considerable effort on the part of the political element of the Kosovan leadership to persuade the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) to moderate its viewpoint and accept a deal. But the Kosovans must be considerably confused – there are a lot of promises flying about as well as aircraft. On the one hand they see themselves outlawed by the West: there is, for example, a UK Statutory Instrument introduced in February 1999 enacting a UN sanctions order not only banning the supply of arms to Kosovo, but also preventing anyone giving them training or any other assistance that will enhance their capabilities. On the other hand, the Kosovans see the air strikes going in, but a refusal to send ground troops actually to protect them.
As we have seen, the air campaign has had the not unpredictable effect of increasing Serb atrocities against the Kosovan Albanians. NATO will not protect them on the ground, and international law prevents anyone else, such as private military companies, helping with their training, weapons needs, medical support, etc. Surely the NATO planners realise that, however much of the Serb conventional military infrastructure they destroy, the most basic weapons will suffice for the Serbs to carry on their atrocities – rifles, shotguns, knives, petrol bombs – it does not have to be tanks and MIGs.
Options
1 Continue bombing and hope Milosevic signs the Rambouillet Accord. If he does not, keep bombing until the Serbian infrastructure is totally destroyed. In this case NATO will have acted de facto as the KLA air force.
2 Bomb and send in ground troops to protect the Kosovans. This is the least attractive option for NATO, but it is not a matter of military complexity; it is a matter of political will – the ‘body bag’ syndrome.
3 Stand aside when bluff is called and do nothing else – in which case the full wrath of the Serbs will descend on the suddenly unprotected Kosovans.
4 Bomb periodically, but provide (or at least allow) training and arms for the KLA to let it defend Kosovo.
Prediction: Milosevic will not back down – the bombing campaign will come under increasing criticism. NATO will not send ground troops, but will eventually be forced to select option 4 and begin to provide active support to the KLA. The political dislike for committing ground troops is too great – although here again is an unanswered question – why be prepared to commit ground troops as part of the Rambouillet Accord, but not put it into effect?
What should happen is that, in spite of the Serbs ruthless streak, NATO should realise they are bullies – it is one thing to be defiant in the face of remote bombardment and defenceless civilians in Kosovo, but when confronted with effective ground troops their forces will be no match for NATO. Therefore, NATO should have the courage of its convictions and send in troops to seal off Kosovo, eject Serbian forces, hunt down war criminals and do what they say is the aim of the operations – protect the Kosovans.
Tim Spicer OBE
Chief Executive, Sandline International
13 April 1999