Table 15-3:

Key Details of July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action[1]

What Iran “Gave”
(Conversely, what the United States “Got”) / What Iran “Got”
(Conversely, what the United States “Gave”)
Uranium Enrichment, Natanz, and Fordow[2]
(1) Iran must reduce its uranium stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched UF6 by 98 percent, to 300kg (660 lbs.), of up to 3.67 percent enriched UF6, and respect those thresholds for 15 years. Note the 3.67 percent limit is a decrease from the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action, under which Iran enriched uranium to nearly 20 percent.
(2) Iran cannot install more than 5,060 centrifuges at Natanz for 10 years.
(3) Those centrifuges must be the oldest and least efficient models, i.e., IR-1 centrifuges.
(4) Because Iran has roughly 19,000 IR-1 and IR-2M centrifuges installed at Natanz, it must remove the excess centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure, and put these items in storage under continuous IAEA monitoring.
(5) Any R&D activities Iran conducts must be done at Natanz.
(6) Iran is not permitted to conduct any uranium enrichment, or uranium enrichment R&D, at Fordow for 15 years.
(7) Iran must convert Fordow to a nuclear, physics, and technology center, which means Iran must dismantle some of the 2,700 IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow (of which 700 are enriching uranium). (As per the next column, Iran is permitted to keep 1,044 centrifuges, and thus must dismantle 1,656 of them.) / (1) Iran may conduct limited, specific R&D activities in respect of uranium enrichment during the first 8 years of the JCPOA.
(2) After the first 8 years of the JCPOA, Iran’s uranium enrichment activities may evolve gradually, at a reasonable pace, solely for peaceful purposes.
(3) At Fordow, Iran will be permitted to keep 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in 6 cascades, on 1 wing of the Fordow facility, and employ them to produce radioisotopes for use in medicine, agriculture, industry and science.
(4) In respect of point (3), of the 6 cascades, Iran can use 2 for spinning without uranium to produce stable isotopes, but must keep the remaining four idle.
Plutonium and Arak Facility[3]
(1) With an international partnership that will certify the final design, Iran will re-design and re-build its heavy water reprocessing facility at Arak to ensure the new facility cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium.
(2) Iran may not use its Arak facility to produce weapons grade plutonium.
(3) Iran will build no new heavy water reactors, or accumulate heavy water, for 15 years.
(4) Iran will export all of its spent fuel from its present and future research and power nuclear reactors. / (1) Iran may use its redesigned Arak facility for peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and teaching purposes.
(2) Iran may keep pace with international technological advancements in using light water for research and power, in cooperation with international partners.
(3) Those partners will assure Iran a supply of necessary fuel.
Transparency and Inspections[4]
(1) Iran will allow the IAEA to continuously monitor its declared nuclear sites.
(2) Iran will provisionally adhere to the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (as per Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol). Under this Additional Protocol, Iran must allow IAEA inspectors to access any site they deem suspicious.
(3) With respect to Possible Military Dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will allow the IAEA to prevent it from developing a nuclear program in secret by verifying that Iran has not covertly moved fissile material to a secret location to build a bomb.
(4) Also with respect to PMDs, Iran will allow IAEA inspectors to request visits to military sites.
(5) Iran will implement fully its agreement with the IAEA to resolve all past and present issues in respect of its nuclear program.
(6) Iran will allow the IAEA a long-term presence in Iran.
(7) For 25 years, Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor its production of uranium ore concentrate.
(8) For 20 years, Iran will allow the IAEA to contain and monitor centrifuge rotors and bellows.
(9) Iran will use only IAEA approved and technologies, including online enrichment measures and electronic seals.
(10) For 15 years, Iran will follow a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of concerns about IAEA access. / (1) IAEA access to military sites is not guaranteed, and could be delayed, by Iran.
(2) Iran has the right to challenge an IAEA request to inspect a military site.
(3) In the event of such a challenge, an arbitration panel will decide the issue.
Break Out Time[5]
(1) By implementing the JCPOA, Iran will remove the dimensions of its nuclear program it would need to create a nuclear weapon, and increase its break out time to at least 1 year.
(2) Iran will not engage in any activities, including R&D, uranium, or plutonium metallurgy activities, which could contribute to building a nuclear weapon.
(3) Iran will adhere to a procurement channel (set out in Annex IV of the JCPOA) endorsed by the United Nations Security Council.
Sanctions Removal[6]
(1) Under a United Nations Security Council resolution, all previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue will be terminated.
(2) The termination in point (1) will be simultaneous with IAEA verification that Iran is implementing the terms of the JCPOA, specifically the items in Annex V. That is, sanctions are lifted only upon IAE confirmation that Iran has complied with its obligations under the JCPOA.
(3) The United States will cease application of all sanctions listed in Annex II of the JCPOA, simultaneously with the IAEA certification in point (2).
(4) The American sanctions to be lifted are those relating to Iran’s nuclear program. However, American sanctions targeting Iran’s support for terrorism, missile activities, and human rights abuses will remain in effect.
(5) 8 years after the JCPOA has entered into force, or when the IAE concludes all nuclear material in Iran is for peaceful purposes, whichever is earlier, the United States will repeal its Iran nuclear sanctions statutes.
(6) The EU will terminate all of its nuclear related economic and financial sanctions, simultaneously with the IAEA certification in point (2).
(7) If Iran violates the JCPOA, then sanctions will snap back automatically for 10 years, with the possibility of a further 5 year extension. / (1) Iran will obtain sanctions relief at the same time as the IAEA certifies its compliance with the JCPOA, specifically the items in Annex V.
(2) Following point (1), Iran stands to receive more than $100 billion in assets frozen overseas; may resume selling oil on international markets; and (3) use the international banking system for trade purposes.
Arms Embargo and Ballistic Missile Sanctions Removal[7]
(1) The United Nations arms embargo on Iran will continue for up to 5 years, but could end earlier if the IAEA certifies that Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful.
(2) The United Nations ban on Iran importing ballistic missile technology will remain in place for up to 8 years. / (1) The United Nations arms embargo and ballistic missile import ban against Iran will be lifted within five and eight years, respectively.
Dispute Resolution[8]
(1) An 8-member Joint Commission is established consisting of representatives from each P5+1 country, the EU, and Iran.
(2) The P5+1 may refer to the Joint Commission any claim against Iran that Iran is failing to meet a commitment under the JCPOA.
(3) The Joint Commission must resolve the claim within 15 days, unless a longer period is agreed by consensus.
(4) If the claim remains unresolved after the period in point (2), and if the P5+1 deems the claim involves significant non-performance by Iran, then the P5+1 may treat the unresolved claim as grounds for it to cease performing all or some of its obligations under the JCPOA, and/or notify the United Nations Security Council of its view of significant non-performance by Iran. / (1) Iran is formally represented on the Joint Commission.
(2) Iran may refer to the Joint Commission any claim against the P5+1 that the P5+1 is failing to meet a commitment under the JCPOA.
(3) The Joint Commission must resolve the claim within 15 days, unless a longer period is agreed by consensus.
(4) If the claim remains unresolved after the period in point (2), and if Iran deems the claim involves significant non-performance by the P5+1, then Iran may treat the unresolved claim as grounds for it to cease performing all or some of its obligations under the JCPOA, and/or notify the United Nations Security Council of its view of significant non-performance by the P5+1.

2

[1] See Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 14 July 2015, posted at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2165489-key-excerpts.html [hereinafter, JCPOA]; Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details, BBC News, 14 July 2015, posted at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655.

[2] See JCPOA, pp. 1-2 (8 bullet points concerning “Enrichment, Enrichment R&D, Stockpiles”).

[3] See JCPOA, p. 2 (3 bullet points concerning “Arak, Heavy Water, Reprocessing”).

[4] See JCPOA, pp. 2-3 (5 bullet points concerning “Transparency and Confidence Building Measures”).

[5] See JCPOA, pp. 1-4 (generally, last 2 bullet points concerning “Transparency and Confidence Building Measures,” 4 bullet points concerning “Sanctions”).

[6] See JCPOA, pp. 2-3 (last 2 bullet points concerning “Transparency and Confidence Building Measures,” 4 bullet points concerning “Sanctions”).

[7] See JCPOA, p. 3 (4 bullet points concerning “Sanctions”).

[8] See JCPOA, p. 4 (3 bullet points concerning “Dispute Resolution Mechanism”).