John Stuart Mill

Utilitarianism

Reading Guide

Chapter 1

Mill starts with general remarks about moral philosophy as an introduction to the kind of theory he intends to develop and defend. Since the time of Socrates, people engaged in philosophical reflection about morality have been asking the following key question: What is the summum bonum? This is the Latin expression for the highest good. The reason that questions concerning the highest good surface so quickly on reflection is that, whenever we are faced with a particular choice, we ask ourselves which of the options is better.
Consider an example of an undergraduate student who is making a choice between two different academic programs. If one course of study is something the student thinks is less exciting, but there is reason to think it might lead to a more lucrative career, and another course of study is something the student thinks is quite exciting, but there is little guarantee that it will lead to a steady income, then the student will have to ask which is more important--having a more exciting line of work, or having a higher likelihood of larger financial rewards. As such, the student will need to rank the importance of these different aims.
Many of the things we think are important are good because they will lead us to something us to something else. For example, university students sometimes will enroll in a class simply because it fulfills a requirement. As such, they think it is good to take the class because it will lead to something else that they really want—such as a degree. In turn, some students are pursuing a degree mainly because there is something else they really want, such as a good job. As such, many of things we think are important are good as means to something else. Mill is asking a question about the kinds of aims that are good for their own sake.
If we had to rank all of the different aims that we might pursue, then we’ll need some kind of basis or standard for comparing the value of the different ends (i.e., goals or aims). Mill is suggesting that the summum bonum can serve as the standard for comparing the value of different aims because it is the end that has the highest value. Using this standard, we should be able to rank different aims that we might pursue ranging from those that are highest on the scale to those that are lowest on the scale.
Different philosophers have made claims about the highest good. For example, Socrates argues in the Apology that virtue is what makes all other things good, including wealth, power, fame, and even life itself. Mill’s goal in this book is to defend the utilitarian theory. Other philosophers, including Epicurus in the classical period and Bentham in the modern era, have tried to develop and defend this general kind of theory. As such, Mill is working from within this tradition, and he is trying to build on what they have done.
Mill compares two methods that can be used to develop a moral theory: the intuitive method and the inductive method. This gives rise to a key question: what is the best method to use for the purposes of developing a theory of the foundations of morality? Drawing on philosophical accounts of the methods used in other sciences, such as mathematics, biology and psychology, he is setting up an argument for the advantages of the inductive method. On his account, this is the only method that will enable us to find the correct answers about the foundations of ethics.
In order to defend this theory, Mill plans to offer some criticisms of competing theories of morality. The moral sense theorists are, Mill suggests, using the intuitive method. The philosophers who belong to this tradition often claim that we have a moral sense and that it enables us to perceive, as it were, the difference between what is right and wrong. Mill suggests that one problem with these kinds of theories is that they are based on the idea that, when we see that one action is right and another is wrong, that we just see it directly. As such, they simply assume that we have a power of sensing what is right and wrong—but they provide no account of the standard that needs to be used. As a result, they fail to explain something that clearly needs an explanation.
Mill suggests that any philosophers who hold that the grounds of our moral evaluations are known a priori are using the intuitive method. For instance, Kant argues in the Grounding that a priori grounds are the only basis that can be used to determine the form and the end of the primary principle of morality. Kant says that he is using the transcendental method in his account. Mill seems to be claiming that any method that draws on a priori grounds--including Kant’s transcendental method—is a species of the larger genus of intuitive methods.
Kant’s moral theory is based on the idea that the primary principle of morality must have the form of a categorical imperative: “So act that the rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational beings.” Mill considers Kant’s account for the sake of illustrating the defects involved in the claim that morality rests on a priori grounds. The main objection he makes here is that Kant fails to show how the principle can be used as a basis for our moral reasoning. On Mill’s interpretation of Kant’s account, the question of whether choice is consistent with the requirements of morality or violates those requirements can be determined by considering whether the maxim is inconsistent with the categorical imperative. The problem is that Kant is unable to show that an immoral action is inconsistent with the categorical imperative because it is an entirely formal principle. As a result, every action is consistent with the principle. Try as he might, the only thing Kant is able to show is that the consequences may be bad.
At the end of his General Remarks, Mill makes it clear that he plans to do two things in chapter 2-5. First, he plans to compare the utilitarian theory to other theories and the inductive method to other methods. In making this comparison, he will try to point out the defects in the other theories and the weaknesses in the intuitive method. Second, he will develop the utilitarian theory and try to provide arguments in support of the main claims.

Chapter 2

The title of this chapter is “What Utilitarianism Is.” I appears that Mill is going to elaborate on the account of the highest good that was offered in the first chapter and provide more developed explanations of the theory. One quick read through the chapter is enough to see that Mill spends most of his time responding to objections to the theory. There are two kinds of objections. Some are very simple and are based on a misunderstanding of key conceptions. Mill responds to several of these objections by quickly clarifying the conceptions and showing that the objections were based on simple errors. In this part of the chapter, Mill is really explain what utilitarianism is not. There are other objections that are more substantive in character, and Mill spends more time developing responses to each of the objections. In this guide, we will focus on the more substantive objections and the responses.
Before considering the main objections, we should examine Mill’s explanation of the principle of utility. This principle is offered as an explanation of the foundations of morality. He is trying to answer the following key question: what is the primary principle of morality? The answer is: the greatest happiness principle is that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. He then clarifies the point made in the previous chapter, which is the claim that happiness is pleasure and the absence of pain. Mill ends this paragraph by stating one of his main ideas that he will use to support his thesis that the principle of utility is the primary principle of morality. The claim is that “pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things . . . are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
The first substantive objection is stated on the second page of the chapter. The objection can be paraphrased in the following way: To suppose that life has no higher end than pleasure is an utterly mean and groveling notion, and it is a doctrine that is worthy only of swine. Notice that we’ve paraphrased the objection by removing Mill’s parenthetical remarks. This will help us see the point of the objection more clearly. What else can we do to clarify the point of the objection. Always try to make sure you understand what is serving as the target of the objection. In this case, the target is the hedonistic claim that pleasure and the absence of pain are the highest and most noble ends that we can pursue in life.
Mill accepts the common sense idea that there is a difference between the kinds of things that make a human life worth living and the kinds of things that bring pleasure to a pig. Utilitarians are claiming that pleasure is the highest end for all human beings. As such, how can utilitarians explain the difference between these two kinds of values. On their account, the same thing that brings value to a human life also brings value to other creatures, such as pigs. The objection is designed to help us see that the account of the highest good is at odds with our common sense notions of what brings value to a human life. Either the theory is based on some kind of error, or there is a mistake in our common sense conception of what is morally good, or the objection is based on a mistake of some kind.
Mill takes the last of these three options and runs with it. He starts by pointing out that all utilitarians, including those ranging Epicurus in the classical period to the Bentham in the modern period, have made a distinction between two kinds of pleasures and pains: intellectual and physical. What is more, they have generally attributed a higher value to the intellectual over the physical feelings. Mill agrees with this approach to the objection.
The problem that earlier utilitarians faced is that they did not give an adequate explanation of the differences in the respective values of these things. Mill thinks this is a serious problem. If he can develop a better response to the objection, then he will be a better position to make more significant revisions to the theory.
The mistake earlier utilitarians have made was to suppose that the sole basis of the difference in value when comparing intellectual and physical pleasures is the net quantity of the pleasures or pains associated with each. The mistake was to suppose that chief difference in value is based on “greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc.” of the intellectual pleasures in comparison to the physical. (Mill, 8)

Chapter 3

1. Mill starts with a series of questions. Can we put them into some kind of order? That is, will the answer to one help us find the right answers to the others? These questions can be asked about any moral requirement, such as the requirements to be kind, honest and fair. Mill has been arguing that all of the particular rules of morality are ultimately grounded on one highest principle, which is the principle of utility. As such, he is really trying to answer the following Key Question #1: why should you or I (or anybody, for that matter) live by the principle of utility?

a. What is the sanction of any supposed moral standard?

b. What are the motives to obey the principle?

c. What is the source of its obligation?

d. Whence does it derive its binding force?

2. This difficulty will always present itself until the fundamental principle is as well established as the particular rules of honesty, fairness, etc.

a. The general principle will form part of the customary morality when there has been an improvement in education. The feeling of unity with our fellow creatures will then be deeply rooted in our character.

c. Our consciousness of the principle and the requirements that follow from the general rule will then be as completely a part of our character as any other moral rule such as those prohibiting crimes.

d. Open question: is there another principle that is already a part of the character of human beings? Mill must admit: the principle of utility is at odds with some of the customary rules.

3. Answer to Question #1: “The principle of utility either has, or there is no reason why it might not have, all the sanctions which belong to any other system of morals.”

a. Is this true? Compare Mill’s psychological explanation of the causes of the moral motives to Socrates and Kant.

b. Socrates: Your deepest commitment should be the following: you should, on every occasion, act on the reasons that seem, upon reflection, to be the best to you. In the search for the strongest reasons, one should act from a love of inquiry. The love of inquiry might be called a pure impulse to find the truth.

c. Kant: Only those actions that are done from a motive of respect for moral principle have moral worth. Is the principle of utility the kind of rule that is capable of generating in us a feeling of respect? Only a principle that has the form of a universal, necessary and categorical rule is capable of engendering in us an incentive of respect. The principle of utility does not possess any of these formal features.

4. Mill’s presents two distinctions that he uses to classify different kinds of motives. They can be internal or external in their source, and they can be either innate or learned in terms of their operation. Let’s start with the internal sanction to do one’s duty:

a. Whatever the standard of duty may be (primary principle, or secondary rule?), is always based on a feeling in our own mind of pain. The feeling of pain might be more or less intense. In the more serious cases, it is experiences as a feeling that a line of conduct is an “impossibility.”

b. The feeling may be disinterested, and it may be connected with the pure idea of duty and not with some particular form of it. This is the “essence of conscience;” it is a complex phenomenon and not a simple feeling. The simple fact is “all encrusted over with collateral associations derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life, from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement.”

c. It is the “extreme complication” of all these different feelings and impulses bound together by habit in our conscience that is the “origin of the sort of mystical character which, by a tendency of the human mind of which there are many other examples, is apt to be attributed to the idea of moral obligation, and which leads people to believe that the idea cannot possibly attach itself to any other objects than those which, by a supposed mysterious law, are found in our present experience to excite it.”

5. Having considered some examples of different kinds of motives, Mill asserts that, for the purposes of his utilitarian theory, he does not need to decide whether the feelings of duty are innate or learned, or that they are internal or external.

a. His reason for making this claim follows closely from the ideas that he developed earlier in Chapter 2. He ended that chapter by claiming that, so long as a person follows the rules of morality, that the motive for following the rules is irrelevant to determining whether the action was right or wrong. As such, he is really saying that, on his theory, any motive will do so long as it is sufficient to get people to obey the rules of morality. As such, if one person does his duty out of a feeling of respect for God’s commands, and another person does his duty out of a fear of being punished under the law, and a third does her duty out a desire to avoid feelings of guilt, then they have all done the right thing on Mill’s account if they obey the rules of morality. Unlike Socrates and Kant, Mill does not need to single out one motive to the exclusion of all others.

6. Mill’s account of motivation is based on a classical empiricist theory of the mind. On this theory, there are three kinds of connections that can be made between impressions and ideas. One feeling can and will be associated with another based on the general laws of association: similarity, contiguity and a habit forming tendency.

a. This is essentially what constitutes the nature and origin of the feelings and impulses of conscience—regardless of what any other theory might offer in the way of an alternate explanation.

b. The utilitarian principle can, through the formation of customary habits, be associated with any feeling, impulse or motive—including the love of inquiry and respect for the moral law--that is cited in any other moral theory as central for the operation of conscience.