BODY: Security Council

ISSUE OF:Implementing measures to prevent cease-fire violations in Ukraine

SUBMITTED BY:Kristóf Vincze
DATE OF SUBMIUSSION: 2016.06.12.

BELLIGERENTS

  • Russian Federation
  • Pro-Russian Separatists
  • Ukraine
  • Federal Republic of Germany
  • French Republic
  • Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

BACKGROUND

The beginning of the Ukrainian conflict is marked by the appearance of Russian-led troops in the Crimea on the 27th of February 2014. In March 2014 after the Russian Federation has militarily seized the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, an armed conflict broke out between pro-Russian separatists and government forces.

Over 10000 troops are facing each other along a 500 kilometres long separation line.[1] In early 2015 the number of fighters was estimated to be 35000 on both sides, according to US sources. Certain allegations claim that the Russian Federation is providing both troops and weapons to the separatists however these were denied by the Russian government. Additionally, the struggle has caused a considerable humanitarian crisis. As of February 2016 estimates show that the number of fatalities are around 10 000 people, however German estimates from February 2015 claim that casualties were closer to 50 000 people. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre there were a minimum of 978500 internally displaced persons in Ukraine back in February 2015. Over 923700 people are thought to have fled Eastern Ukraine. On an economical level Ukraine has endured considerable difficulties: the Ukrainian Hryvnia has lost over half its worth and GDP fell 7% and inflation is at 25%.[2]

  • Historical background

It is crucial to understand that this conflict is not only because of Russian territorial claims but also because Ukrainian unity cannot be achieved due to cultural, historical, ethnical and religious reasons. While in the Westernmost parts of Ukraine Ukrainian language is spoken by almost 95% of the population, in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine that number barely surpasses 72% and in the Crimea Ukrainian is spoken by a mere 10% contrarily to Russian, which is spoken by 77% of Crimean people. In the Easternmost parts of Ukraine Ukrainian is spoken only by 3.7% and Russian has a rate of almost 87%.

Initially Crimea was part of the Byzantine Empire while the rest of Ukraine was mostly inhabited by various tribes until the foundation of the Kievan Rus’ in 882 AD. The Mongol and Turkish Invasions have both left the country conquered for certain periods leading to a great ethnical diversity. Eventually in the XXth century she became part of Russia. After the end of the Tsarist rule Ukraine has proclaimed sovereignty butin 1921 after the USSR conquered much of her territory, she was incorporated into the Soviet Union while the untouched regions became part of Poland.During the Collectivisation of the USSR under Stalin the inhabitants of Eastern Ukraine were deported beyond the Urals and replaced by people of Russian nationality due to a fear of collaboration in case of a Western attack on the USSR. (Hence the large Russian population of the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.) After the 1945 victory of the Allies in World War II, along with Poland the remaining parts of Ukraine were annexed by the USSR. In 1954, under Nikita Khrushchev the USSR delivered the Crimean region to Ukraine which was at the time part of the Soviet bloc, thereby under the control of the USSR. However after the collapse of the USSR the Crimea came under the territorial control of sovereign Ukraine and the Russian Federation lost control of the region. Consequently, in 1992 The Supreme Council of Russia deemed the delivery of Crimea to Ukraine to be illegitimate.Therefore due to these events the Ukrainian nationalities are fairly outweighed by others. Some 58% of people in Crimea are ethnic Russian, with the rest made up of Ukrainians and Tatars. In 2001 only 24.3% of Ukraine was ethnic Ukrainian.

In terms of religion, the three main churches are the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kievan Patriarchate[3], the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate[4] and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church[5]. As there is no united orthodox church and all churches take part in politics there can be no unity based on religion either.

This diversity therefore cannot only provide partially legitimate Russian claims but hinder any efforts done in an attempt to restore Ukrainian sovereignty.

RECENT EVENTS

The 2013 November protests aimed at former President Viktor Yanukovych for not signing an Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU) led to the violent mass demonstrations of pro-Western groups. This caused Yanukovych to step down and flee to Russia. The Russian response was the annexation of the Crimea in March 2014. Parallelly pro-Russian separatist groups have gained control over Luhansk and Donetsk in the Donbass region. On the 16th of March 2014 a referendum on the Crimea joining the Russian Federation was held and according to local sources 95.7% percent of voters voted in favour. Thereby on the 18th of March the Autonomous Republic of Crimea became part of the Russian Federation. According to the Crimean Parliament 81.37 percent of voters have shown up and the voting was in accordance with international law. However several Crimeans have boycotted the referendum and the EU and USA have not recognised the plebiscite as legitimate. The United Nations under General Assembly Resolution 68/262 of March 27, 2014 has refused to accept the referendum and urged state and non-state actors not to recognise it.[6]Thede-factoLuhansk People’s Republic (LNR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) have declared autonomy on the 11th of May 2014 following a referendum where most voters decided to become self-governing. Local sources proclaim that over 96 percent of LNR voters were in favour of self-rule and almost 90 percent of DNR voters supported autonomy. International parties have pronounced these referendums to be illegitimate as well.

  • 2014. 09. 05 – Minsk Protocol

The Minsk Protocol of September 5th of 2014 was adopted by the Trilateral Contact Group, comprised of the Russian and Ukrainian governments and the OCSE. Its key points outlined the goals of a ceasefire, the decentralisation of power within Ukraine, permanent monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian border, the release of prisoners by both parties, amnesty for insurgents, humanitarian intervention, the removal of armies and economic recovery. This agreement however was short-lived as separatist forces have, soon after its adoption, occupied the Donetsk airport and other vital territories in Eastern Ukraine, undermining the efforts of the signatories.

  • 2015. 02. 15 – Minsk II

The Minsk II agreement, the follow-up of the Minsk Protocol was signed by members of the Normandy Format (French Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Russian Federation, and Ukraine) on 12thFebruary 2015 and entered into force on the 15th. It has once again called for a ceasefire, humanitarian aid to be distributed, the release of hostages and the pull-out of armies. Furthermore, new goals were set, such as the removal of heavy weapons from afflicted areas by both parties, local elections to be held in Luhansk and Donetsk based on Ukrainian law, the restoration of social and economic welfare along with banks and a constitutional reform in Ukraine. The protocol was also signed by pro-Russian rebels, indicating some form of united push towards de-escalation. It is in fact regarded as the ultimate means to resolving the situation tranquilly and tactfully.

Parallelly to the talks, heavy combat continued in the East of Ukraine. Fights for Debaltseve persisted. Consequently, the situation of the Debaltseve region is still contestedwithin the Normandy Format as it is an essential positionconcerning transportation, hence its strategic importance. During the night of the talks 19 Ukrainian soldiers died in the fight for Debaltseve while neither of the parties has admitted responsibility for the increase in hostilities, both alleging that the other has struck first.

  • Post Minsk II developments

24 hours past its coming into effect the ceasefire has been violated 112 times by separatists and 27 times by the army of Ukraine. One such example was the bombing of anti-terrorist force ATO by rebels in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions via mortars. On the other hand major hostilities have ceased and only minor and periodic clashes are present. Additionally by September 2015 both sides have withdrawn a considerable percentage of their heavy weapons. The instances of localised incidents however still show a tendency towards re-escalation, thus the possibility of expansion and full-scale war is probable, although it is argued not to be decidedly prospective. This is supported by the fact that as of now the fronts have not been altered and violence mostly consists of shelling and not land forces battling each other. Rebels are however not operating jointly but as individual armies and the appearance of de-facto rulers whose words carry great significance also provide a bigger depth to the issue. This state of affairs results in military stalemate, thus decreasing the chances of a decisive military victory and the use of low-key strikes prevents considerable escalation, leading to the deduction that this conflict is liable to be going on for a longer amount of time.

This lack of development is purportedly due to the Russian Federation’s intent to let the war in Eastern Ukraine become a frozen conflict. This claim is supported by many indicators pointing out the lack effort on part of Russia in implementing the provisions of Minsk II. It apparently is a more crucial point on the agenda of the Russian Federation to exert pressure on Ukraine than to actually gain the rebel-held areas as Russian territory. Additionally, by becoming a frozen conflict, the Ukraine crisis would serve the needs of Russia, currently more occupied with the Middle East and Da’esh.

There however is no adherence to the ceasefire by either of the parties and certain impediments and implications can be derived from this situation. Land-based fighters in an interview with the newspaper Guardian have claimed that chaotic situations persist on the battlefield and in certain cases friendly fire has been observed due to the chaos. Parallelly the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine of the OCSE (SSM) tries to ease any such difficulties by brokering localised ceasefires between parties. Additionally the SMM aims to monitor the obedience to Minsk II and ease humanitarian distresses as social benefits and certain services are hard to come by and generally in Eastern Ukraine there is a great deal of scarcity. Moreover the economic paucity within Ukraine has caused the country to lose 5.5 percent of her GDP in 2015.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Parliament is occupied by debating and voting on whether the Luhansk and Donetsk regions could re-enter the Ukrainian system as, say an autonomic republic by means of decentralisation and granting self-rule. These regions have already been voted to be able to possess special statuses but autonomy is yet to be decided. While a constitutional reform has been outlined by the Parliament of Ukraine, its content allegedly favouring separatists caused it to lack the sufficient backing in case it is put to vote. The lack of progress on decentralisation and not granting amnesty to separatists has caused, in rebel-held areas, non-compliance with the provisions of Minsk II such as blocking humanitarian aid.

Likewise, it is pronounced by state and non-state actors alike that very little of Minsk II was fully implemented; many points agreed on in the protocol are yet to be fulfilled. It is argued that Minsk II is not effective however it is feared that revisiting the plan of actions would mean forfeiting all the content of Minsk II, effectively making parties to have to adopt a completely new plan. The protocol was intended to have been completed by the end of 2015 but the Normandy Format has decided to postpone its designated date of completion to 2016. A telephone conversation dated 24th May, 2016 between the Normandy Four has concluded that control and co-ordination exerted by the OCSE is ought to be improved, direct contact between the LNR, DNR and Kiev should be established, an OCSE police mission has to be deployed and the separatist-held prisoners are to be set free.

However it is essential to realise regardless of whether there is a new plan of action adopted or not, that an agreement cannot replace a settlement. In other words, there has to be an actual peace treaty adopted in order to ultimately resolve the conflict.

  • Indirect rivalry between the EU and Russia

The situation and allegiance of Ukraine acts as a proxy between the European Union and the Russian Federation. The AA with the EU that was to be signed in November 2013 by Viktor Yanukovych, former President of Ukraine would have caused Ukraine to be a step closer to joining the EU and sever ties with the Russian Federation. Yanukovych decided not to sign it as he had strong ties with Russia and joining the EU would have meant the loss of Russia’s support for Ukraine. An AA with the EU would have laid a 10 year plan in front of Ukraine with goals incredulously hard to accomplish and it would have been profitable only over a longer period of time. Additionally Russian pressure and political corruption eventually led to the conclusion that the AA is not to be signed. The EU in response to Russian hostilities since the occupation of Crimea and political pressure on Ukraine has imposed several sanctions on Russia throughout the course of 2014 including but not restricted to limiting access to capital markets, defence co-operation, exports, asset freezes and visa bans.On the 2nd of November 2015 the AA was eventually signed by Petro Poroshenko, President to Ukraine.

In the eyes of the Russian Federation the choice of Ukraine to sign the AA and the ousting of Viktor Yanukovych from his position were Western-backed and were intended to deteriorate Russo-Ukrainian relations. Consequently Russia’s efforts to create a frozen conflict can be explained as a response to the alleged proxies and the embargos and it could eventually lead to Ukraine’sreconciliation with Russia.

Opposing Russia’s claims in Ukraine, the EU backed by the US stands committed to the Minsk II agreement. While the US is not virtually involved in keeping the adherence to the agreement, she supports the EU in order to achieve its eventual accomplishment as to avoid a split in the EU or a Russian success. The efforts of the EU include but are not restricted to financial support to the legitimate Ukrainian government amounting 11 billion in Euros that is expected to be increased by a further 1.6 billion. Member countries have additionally provided €95 million in humanitarian aid for those in need. In 2014 the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM Ukraine) was deployed to ease political and judicial reform within the country. Furthermore the EU is considering the implementation of additional sanctions on the Russian Federation for supporting separatists with military equipment and politically which is to be decided on the 15th of September 2016. Logistical or military support however is not likely to be introduced as it could either turn into a weapons race between the sides involved in the fighting or even contribute to the re-escalation of the conflict. Additionally by providing any such support, charges against Russian intervention could easily turn hypocritical, making the support counter-productive.

SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

In order to resolve the power struggle in the East of Ukraine several concessions are to be made and agreements consummated. By defining the statuses of the DNR and LNR as well any other territory being contested and by holding legitimate local elections, the Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian government could resolve territorial disputes leading to the subsequent de-escalation of the state of affairs. However this is not conceivable until Russian troops and materiel disrupting the progress is not withdrawn from the near vicinity of Ukraine. By the extraction of any such units the Russian Federation could exhibit her inclination to reach a compromise and restore peace and security in the region as well as the well-being of civilians. Additionally, addressing the economic and humanitarian complications arising from the conflict should be a primary objective, either as a means to relieve tensions or as an obligation arising from the goals and principles of the United Nations.

SOURCES

ANNEX

UNGAR 68/262

  1. Underscores that the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol;
  2. Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status.

[1] As of February 2016

[2] As of 4thquarter of 2014

[3]22-30%

[4]17-20%

[5]5.3 million

[6] For the relevant Operative clauses of UNGAR 68/262 please see the Annex