Irrigation Management Transfer to Users in Southern Countries

BIBLIOGRAPHIC SYNTHESIS

Irrigation Management Transfer to users in Southern Countries:

Focus on users’ participatory to irrigation management in 2005

Virginie RODA

ENGREF Centre de Montpellier

B.P.44494 - 34093 MONTPELLIER CEDEX 5

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Fax. (+33) 4 67 04 71 01February, 2006

ABSTRACT

Irrigation management transfer (IMT) policy has been initiated by international donors in order to assist in the fight against poor countries’ bankruptcy. It came from the theory that irrigation (water allocation and maintenance) cannot be performed effectively enough by a centralized policy whereas users could carry it out more successfully. Successes or failures must be analyzed by considering both users’ and governments’ points of view, the former often being forgotten. This IMT policy comes from above, at the initiative of donor agencies and often without acceptance from local governments or users. Moreover, the notion of “user” is not even defined. While analyzing case studies, the difference between main cultural areas can be underlined (ethnic conflicts and property rights in Africa, land reform and political struggles in Latin America, traditional communities in Asia). Most cases rely on Elinor Ostrom’s Common Pool Resources theory. Collaboration between users is possible only if they have a strong interest in it. Cooperation comes when the resource is scarce and when social capital exists between people. Many case studies came to fail because they lacked such social capital. When IMT to users works, the final question relies on its long-term future: most of the time the transfer was carried out very speedily without letting users become accustomed to their new responsibilities.

KEY WORDS

IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT TRANSFER, CPR, DECENTRALIZATION, PARTICIPATORY, USERS’ ASSOCIATIONS.

INTRODUCTION

The FAO distinguishes irrigation management transfer (IMT) from users’ participatory in irrigation management. IMT is defined as the transfer of responsibility to NGOs such as water users’ associations (WUAs). It means replacing the government. Participation of users only means that users participate to the effective management of irrigation systems, with or without any hint of decentralization. There can, of course, be IMT and users’ participatory at the same time.

The decades between 1950 and 1980 witnessed an almost three-fold increase in the total area of irrigated agriculture throughout the world, which increased the quantity of food produced, especially in developing counties (Ostrom 1993). Irrigated land resulted from massive investments in large-scale irrigation projects by donor agencies such as the World Band or the Asian Development Bank. Despite these investments, the projects have not been sustainable economically speaking (the net flow of costs exceeded the net benefits), particularly because of underinvestment associated to operation and maintenance of the system. Moreover, persistent problems with almost all the projects led donor agencies to re-evaluate their physical approach to the system, including small-scale farmer organization, which began to be the new leitmotiv on which subsidies were given from the eighties.

Research has been particularly plentiful in the two decades that followed the 1980’s. Nowadays the pace of experimentation has somehow decreased; the last experiments concern Andrah Pradesh in India and Cearà in Brazil. Great attention was paid to how IMT was done and what subsequently became of it. Irrigation is commonly known as one of the main solutions to the end of starvation that could follow the expected increase of population. Most people think that only irrigated land will be able to provide enough food to feed the future population. The main question remains what the best way is to manage irrigation: who, at what level of efficiency, what is the optimum administrative medium (central, local…) and how (everyday water allocation, maintenance, development).

This bibliographic synthesis suggests that if success or failure of IMT policy is linked with the very methods of the transfer (voluntary or compulsory, depending on the condition of the system…), it also somehow relies on the inner culture of the country where IMT is to be carried out. IMT was built from a theoretical model and its implementation has been far from easy due to resistances either from governments or populations (Jamin 2005).

Case studies are far from homogeneous; successes and failures or mid-failures are observed in many countries because of the culture itself not having been taken into account. Most writers rely on Elinor Ostrom’s CPR theory and its social capital component; when there is no such social capital, there is a doubt about the long-term success of the considered case study.

This synthesis was developed from analyzing case studies found in the available literature. Most of the time articles were written by researchers who observed IMT in several countries. The synthesis is limited to case studies that were published in journals with impact factors and some personal communications given by researchers during its preparation and writing.

From theory to field reality: success and failure, a necessary definition

oDifferent examples, many realities

IMT and users’ participatory, new phenomena due to central government inefficiency

There are many reasons why IMT was developed.

Usually, the central government is in charge of irrigation management. Some counter-examples have taken place in countries where ancient and traditional communities used to small-scale irrigation exist, such as in South Asian paddy fields (Lam 1996). The role of central government in irrigation can be legitimated by the fact that it is a rather costly activity, involving investment and maintenance costs. Irrigation requires heavy financing capacities and a coordinated action in order to pursue a global policy on water allocation. This theory led, after the Second World War, to building large-scale irrigation systems in many Southern countries such as Morocco or in post-colonial African and Asian countries.

But these large-scale systems went less and less efficient. There was too little increase in crop production regarding the heavy investment costs supported by governments. New large-scale systems were promoted without maintaining those already existing. Water allocation was inequitable and problems of ground salinisation began to appear. The governments were reproached their policy in irrigation management and international opinion, especially donor agencies, began to feel that a local management would be more efficient than a central one. Besides, having a centralized irrigation management was said to be responsible for disengaging the users’ responsibility by relying on government for everyday water allocation (Lam 2001).

Another point was the bankruptcy of many Southern countries. The budget for irrigation was large enough to draw the attention of the World Bank and other donor agencies, especially when some governments could not afford maintenance costs. The World Bank subordinated its financial assistance to the effective transfer of irrigation management to users, in order for the governments not to support any more the costs related to irrigation. The idea of a transfer to users on a more local scale was concretised maybe without having noticed whether it was the most relevant scale or even whether users would and could effectively manage irrigation systems due to technical and financial issues.

The theory behind it is that the local level is considered as being better than a central level which is quite far away from field preoccupation and, sometimes, corrupt. Preferring the local level was (and still is) quite fashionable. Brazil is a good example concerning the whole water management issues, which (maybe) could not be sustainable if there were no decentralization of their management (Lemos and de Oliveira 2004). In Nepal, large-scale systems which cost billion of dollars were less efficient than traditional Nepalese small-scale systems (Lam 2001).

Case studies: from total failures to global successes

The first question that can be asked is: was the transfer really carried out? If so, is the situation better after the transfer than before?

First of all, one must consider what is to be transferred: everyday water allocation, maintenance, investment… these raise different questions and may not be transferred to the same level of users’ participatory. Some field experiences were carried out on these issues: everyday water allocation is often given to farmers whereas some countries preferred transferring investment or even maintenance to intermediary associations combining users and government members. Other countries transferred all competences to users.

Secondly, to learn about the consequences of these transfers means to analyse the process itself. For example in Pakistan, many administrative levels were created in order to realize the transfer. Unfortunately it didn’t work – except on paper; WUAs (water users’ associations) worked effectively much later. In that kind of example IMT can be considered a failure because the competences never really left the central government (Kijne 2001).

Success, failure: through which criteria are they considered and from what perspectives? Policies followed by donor agencies have led to an internal evaluation (WorldBank 2005). Researchers tried to broaden their point of view by considering both state governments’ and users’ points of view. Let’s underline Vermillion’s opinion about criteria: the increasing difficulties met in IMT experiments led to change the criteria in what was at first considered a success. IMT was meant, at first, to increase crop production; soon donor agencies and international institutions considered IMT a success when the state finances didn’t support irrigation systems any more and crop production did not decrease.

Analyzing criteria shows that the main criteria are: increase of crop production, equity of water allocation, sustainability of irrigated systems, reduction of the financial expenses for the state and sometimes protection of grounds against salinisation (Naik and Kalro 2000). Some authors would add the increase of farmers’ income and the impact on sustainable development and also the fight against poverty.

The most often considered is the state’s point of view. Many studies underline the consequences of IMT on financial performances without considering costs and benefits for the farmers themselves. But farmers’ opinions are part of IMT. If all actors (state and users) believe IMT to provide good results, then there is a positive impact. If it seems good only for one actor, then nothing can be said apart from considering one actor as more important than the other. Actors have a different way of considering events: governments look at their financial difficulties whereas farmers are more interested in crop production increase and water allocation equity (Naik and Kalro 2000).

So it seems quite difficult to judge the case studies. But some items would best define the would-be failures: negative perceptions by any of the main actors, a decrease of crop productivity, not enough maintenance leading to abandon systems after IMT (Kamara, van Koppen et al. 2002; Perret 2002; Kashaigili, Kadigi et al. 2003; Nkhoma and Mulwafu 2004; Haro, Doyo et al. 2005). Some other experiments were made in Asia where, inside a same territory, results were quite different depending on IMT effective methods and users’ involvement (Lam 2001). Successes are most often seen, but not only (Yercan 2003), in countries where a traditional small-scale irrigation exists or existed (Lam 1996; Aggarwal 2000; Naik and Kalro 2000; Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000; Lam 2001) and where IMT led to a better water allocation and even reduced ethnic conflicts.

oVarious approaches for IMT effective field realizations

A common point: a policy which came mostly from above and a lack in the definition of “user”

Usually a government won’t transfer its competences in irrigation unless there is a strong outside incentive, whatever its financial expenses may be (Swatuk and Rahm 2004). Most of the time, transfer is initiated by international donor agencies (IFM, World Bank), which subordinates their financial assistance to fundamental reforms (Nkhoma and Mulwafu 2004). So the limitations of this enforced policy can be perceived and analyzed:

-there can be an unspoken reluctance on the part of the state government to transfer its own competences;

-a universal framework is applied to many different countries, in different situations, at the same time;

-state governments and users are asked to apply a policy very quickly, to be compared with northern countries, which have always taken the necessary time to let people become used to new rules and changes. Here the time period is short and an immediate reaction is called for, whereas irrigation management transfer to users is a new process (Valony 2005).

Results are linked to limits: in some countries, governments apply reforms to the letter but do not respect them in spirit. They transfer on paper but prevent decentralization to users from happening effectively (Kijne 2001; Haro, Doyo et al. 2005). Others have the will to do it but the intermediary local governmental agent is reluctant to lose its competence because this would be synonymous with a loss of power (Lemos and de Oliveira 2004). Many African countries, even though they legally codified IMT, failed to negotiate with users; the international approach is based on northern countries’ culture, which functions differently from Africa’s.

Other countries, which cooperate more or are more able to enhance a local management because of their already existing institutions, gain from IMT policy and can show rather good results (Lam 2001). As a matter of fact, countries with strong centralized governments (such as Taiwan) are quite able to deal with this idea of decentralization whereas countries en route to democratization (such as Brazil or some African countries) pursue at the same time IMT policy, land reform and heavy institutional changes, leading to an excess of changes for local users. By the way users are able to chose between the changes and boycott what seems to them less important (Lemos and de Oliveira 2004; Nkhoma and Mulwafu 2004).

Besides, most governments seem to have underestimated maintenance and investment costs related to large-scale systems. It often happened that transferred systems were in a (very) bad condition because of a lack of maintenance when carried out by governments. Users were given systems in such bad conditions because of a lack of maintenance, that they just couldn’t prove they would have been able to rule the systems, had they been transferred in better condition. IMT failure would then be linked to the impossibility both for governments and users to pay for maintenance and rehabilitation.

One can now ask what “user” means. Researchers write about “users’ associations”, “users’ organizations”, “users”… Legally speaking all is about WUAs. These associations have a different legal basis, depending on countries but some common points can be underlined. First of all, they are mostly controlled and paid for by users through very similar internal structures. They have a non-profit making activity and their work is based upon water tasks, particularly irrigation (water allocation, maintenance, land acquisition…); the list of the tasks is legally defined. Most, but not all, have legal personality, a charter and/or rules of procedure. Users’ participatory can be voluntary (Mexico, England) or, more often, compulsory (India, Nepal). Those who participate are supposed to be the ones who benefit from the use of water (wells, irrigation systems…), who own and/or use (rights of users) irrigated land. Associations were either created by users themselves or, more often, by states on a compulsory basis. Users have to pay for the association overheads (water allocation costs, maintenance costs but also electricity and salaries) and must respect the rules. This gives them access to the resource and the right to elect representatives to the association’s general meeting. These users’ associations are found in almost all countries and were often created according to IMT policies (Hodgson 2003).

Another interesting point to mention is the lack of definition of “user”. Case studies show “farmers”, “users”. Sometimes the person who receives the responsibility in management is not the user himself: the man as the head of the family gets the responsibility whereas generally the woman effectively works on irrigated land (Kamara, van Koppen et al. 2002). Some systems draw aside the real participants (young people, women) who could be the most dynamic in participatory, while giving management to elderly men. The definition of users often reveals the culture which dictates farmers responsibilities in relation to irrigation management (Jamin 2005).

Points of view and cultural areas

When reading the literature, it was surprising to notice that the vocabulary used, the facts mentioned seemed to depend from cultural areas. Swatuk underlines that IMT often reflects relationships of power and struggle between states, donor agencies, administrations, users… (Swatuk and Rahm 2004).

To illustrate that point of view, let’s consider Africa, South America and Asia.

The situation in Africa seems to be the consequence of its colonialist past such as, for example, large-scale irrigation systems in Morocco, which came from northern countries’ policies (Zekri and Easter to be published). In sub-Saharan Africa, centralized governments carried out irrigation (for export), which was not a traditional way for farmers to cultivate their land. In Africa, the most important point relies on land property. Land is seldom owned by the farmers themselves, they are mostly state-owned (Perret 2002). Farmers live and work in ethnic communities and have traditional rights on lands but no real property. But use of water and land property are linked together in a complex way in IMT, mostly because the theoretical framework comes from northern countries where land is usually owned by users (Nkhoma and Mulwafu 2004). Many African countries have started land reforms.