NIB Neg
**topicality**
1nc direct spending
Investment” is direct spending on infrastructure and grants to support private sector asset creation
Scotland 5(Government of Scotland, “Infrastructure Investment Plan: Investing in the Future of Scotland”, February,
Appendix A: Technical Definitions of Infrastructure Investment
The public expenditure system uses different definitions of capital for budgeting purposes than for accounting purposes - both of which exclude elements of infrastructure investment in the wider sense used elsewhere in this publication.
For accounting purposes, capital spending is those resources used to create a fixed asset which goes on a Government Department's balance sheet. Assets are classified as fixed if they are owned by an organisation and have an ongoing benefit (generally over more than one year). If spending is not classified as being on fixed assets then it is treated as revenue expenditure.
For budgeting purposes, what scores within Capital Delegated Expenditure Limits (capital DEL) is everything that scores as capital for accounting purposes, as well as capital grants to and supported borrowing by local authorities and spending by Non-Departmental Public Bodies that will be included as capital in their accounts. For public corporations such as Scottish Water, capital DEL is the net lending to the relevant public corporation by the department and not the public corporation's own self-financed capital spending.
Net Investment - The Scottish Executive's definition of net investment for purposes such as the net investment rule incorporates spending within capital DEL as well as grants made to support capital spending (asset creation or enhancement) by private sector organisations such as Higher and Further Education Institutions. It does not include the capital element of PPP deals.
Violation --- the plan doesn’t mandate spending directly on transportation, it merely claims to result in a net expenditure.
Voting issue ---
1. Limits --- the scope of change that could possibly result in topical action is endless --- they could change tax policy or cut spending to other sectors --- makes research and preparation impossible
2. Ground --- a direct increase is necessary for CP competition and all disad links --- they could dodge core ground by changing potentially funded programs after the block --- undermines fairness
1nc increase
Interpretation: A substantial increase in investment must mean an increase in funding for transportation infrastructure
Investment refers to money or capital
dictionary.reference.com/browse/investment
in·vest·ment
[in-vest-muhnt] Show IPA
noun
1.
the investing of money or capital in order to gain profitable returns, as interest, income, or appreciation in value.
Violation:
Infrastructure banks are not an increase, they only increase EFFICIENCY of investments
Emilia Istrate, Senior Research Analyst, and Robert Puentes 2009, Senior Fellow and Director, Metropolitan Infrastructure Initiative, Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings, “Investing for Success Examining a Federal Capital Budget and a National Infrastructure Bank,” Brookings December 2009
Today’s fiscally constrained environment demands a new approach to infrastructure policy, allowing us to upgrade our existing infrastructure, expand choices in moving people and goods (and ideas), ease the burden on household budgets, and help us attain energy independence. Spending must produce real gains in productivity, inclusion, and environmental sustainability—the foundation of short- and long-term prosperity. In this time of limited resources, improving the federal investment process should be prioritized over finding ways to merely increase the amount infrastructure spending. This brief examines the current federal investment process and the extent to which a federal capital budget or a national infrastructure bank (NIB) would improve it. It finds that creating a federal capital budget would provide little improvement for the federal decisionmaking process on infrastructure financing. However, while the more modest NIB is no silver bullet, if appropriately designed and with sufficient political autonomy, it could improve both the efficiency and effectivenessof future federal infrastructure projects of national significance.
vote neg -
Predictable ground: we lose generic arguments based on the assumption that affirmatives will INCREASE investments owned by the federal government, efficiency arguments strip us of spending links to all core generic disads
Education – we lose good debates that hinge on increasing spending on infrastructure
**procedurals**
1nc bank spec
Interpretation: the affirmative must specify the type of infrastructure bank and its implementation measures
Violation: The plan only says national infrastructure bank
Several bills have been introduced – they vary significantly
Ronald Utt, Ph.D., is the Morgan Senior Research Fellow in Economic Policy at the Heritage Foundation, “The Limited Benefits of a National Infrastructure Bank,” October 20, 2011
My name is Ronald. D. Utt. I am the Herbert and Joyce Morgan Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.
Until recently, federal interest in infrastructure banks has been limited to legislation focusing on the creation and funding of state infrastructure banks, several of which were created in the 1990s and are still in operation. Recently, congressional focus has shifted to a federal infrastructure bank or a related financing facility, and several bills have been introduced in Congress to create such an entity. Added to the many congressional initiatives are the several plans that President Barack Obama has proposed since taking office.
What these federal-level proposals all have in common is the goal of attempting to muster a greater volume of financial resources for various types of infrastructure, but beyond that they all differ significantly in how they would operate, who would run them, the volume and source of funds, what they can invest in, and what types of infrastructure would be eligible for support.
Some would be limited to just transportation infrastructure; others would allow investments also in water supply and treatment, housing, energy, and environment; and still others would focus on infrastructure with a social welfare intent. Some would be funded by appropriations only, while others would have a mix of appropriations and debt. In some, this debt would be guaranteed by the federal government; in others, it would not. Some would provide loans, loan guarantees, and grants, while others would provide only loans and loan guarantees.
Some of the bills have changed significantly from session to session. The White House has offered at least three different proposals, the most recent being the American Infrastructure Financing Authority included in the American Jobs Act proposal.
Standards
1)We lose research depth and literature based arguments, this undermines clash and fairness.
2)Makes the affirmative a moving target, which undermines pre-round prep, and causes a strategic skew in the 1NC, 2AC clarification and CX are too late and are not binding.
1nc aspec
The debate is whether the bank should be in the department of transportation or wholly separate from the government
Mallettet. al. 2011, “National Infrastructure Bank: Overview and Current Legislation”
William J. Mallett, Specialist in Transportation Policy, Steven Maguire, Specialist in Public Finance, Kevin R. Kosar, Congressional Research Service, December 14.
Analyst in American National Government
In keeping with recent history, several infrastructure bank bills are pending before the 112th
Congress.18 The three primary infrastructure bank bills discussed here are S. 652, S. 936, and
H.R. 402. Two, S. 652 and H.R. 402, would create a wholly owned federal government
corporation. In contrast, S. 936 would create a “fund” within the Department of Transportation
(see Table 1 for a brief summary of the legislation).
There are several additional infrastructure bank bills pending that are not separately addressed in
this report as they are all very similar to the three analyzed. The discussion of S. 652 can
generally be applied to S. 1549 and S. 1769.19 And S. 1550 (and its House companion, H.R. 3259)
would create an “independent establishment” called the “National Infrastructure Bank.”20
William A. Galston, the Morgan Senior Research Fellow in Economic Policy at the Heritage Foundation, September 7, 2010 9:59am, “Infrastructure Bank Proposal Would Spur Economic Growth”
Much will depend on the architecture of this proposed institution. There is widespread agreement that it should focus on large regional initiatives that cut across jurisdictional lines and that its decisions should be made by a board of governors insulated from traditional political pressures. To reach the scale at which it could make a real economic difference, it must be able to leverage a modest amount of publicly provided capital to attract much larger amounts of private capital, which would demand a reasonable rate of return. To provide it, most projects the bank funds would have to generate revenue streams from user fees and other sources. The bank could supplement these fees with subsidies that reflect the gap between the private goods projects generate and the public goods whose value cannot be recaptured from individual beneficiaries.
**solvency**
1nc solvency
Investing in NIB is pointless, money is more effective towards existing programs
Mica ’11 (John Mica (R-Florida), is the chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, 10/13/11, “House believes National Infrastructure Bank is not necessary”
House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee leaders, transportation officials and experts believe the creation of a new National Infrastructure Bank would add to the amount of red tape and federal bureaucracy that already slows down and diverts funding away from transportation and infrastructure projects. The House T&I Committee held a hearing about the strategy on Oct. 12.Members of the committee and witnesses highlighted existing federal programs and authorities that could be strengthened to finance infrastructure projects more effectively than simply increasing the size of the government.“If the [Obama] administration’s goal is to get people to work immediately, a National Infrastructure Bank that will require more than a year to create and $270 million to run is not the answer,” said T&I Committee Chair John Mica (R-Fla.). “That is funding that should be used for infrastructure, but would instead be used to create more red tape.” Most at the hearing agreed that the main focus should be on expediting the cumbersome project-approval process, and creating the National Infrastructure Bank would make this goal almost impossible to meet.Rep. John Duncan (R-Tenn.), chairman of the House Highways and Transit Subcommittee, said the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act program (TIFIA) is already doing in essence the job of an infrastructure bank, and that more funding should be devoted to the already established program.“This proposal is simply just another distraction as Congress pushes for a long-term surface transportation reauthorization bill,” said Duncan. “The administration should be focused on helping Congress pass this much overdue legislation and give the states some long-term funding certainty that a National Infrastructure Bank would most certainly not accomplish.”
The scope of solvency is too small
MARK GERENCSER 11 (April 2011, Mark Gerencser, a Booz Allen Hamilton Executive Vice President, leads the firm’s U.S. Commercial Business. An article written for the American Interest “Re-Imagining Infrastructure”
We need a national vision that brings together a definition of our long-term needs, a policy framework that integrates the separate policies of energy, environment and transportation, and stable financing throughout the renewal lifecycle. We must create more stability in long-term funding, performance requirements and functionality, and policy leadership. Every successful large infrastructure program requires stability in all three of these areas.Developing a clear vision is the sine qua non. The magnitude of the challenge we face requires bold thinking and the mobilization of our national political will. President Obama and several Congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle have proposed creation of a National Infrastructure Bank, initially capitalized at $50 billion. Other proposals would fund, separately, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Defense (the largest Federal energy user). These efforts, though laudable, do not match the magnitude of the challenge at hand, nor do they enable the integration of national efforts toward a common vision.
Bank will fail – delays and politics
Ronald Utt, Ph.D., is the Morgan Senior Research Fellow in Economic Policy at the Heritage Foundation, Infrastructure ‘Bank’ Doomed to Fail September 14, 2011
President Obama remains enamored of an “infrastructure bank,” an idea flogged, in one shape or another, for several years now.
All of the proposals floated to date involve creating a new federal bureaucracy that would provide loans and grants for construction or repair projects sought by state or local governments. In some proposals, those funds would be provided via the congressional appropriations process. In others, the bank simply would borrow the money. But no matter what the source of the cash, this hard fact remains: An infrastructure bank would do little to spur the economic recovery — and nothing to create new jobs. Such a bank has all the liabilities of the American Revitalization and Investment Act of 2009 (ARRA). You’ll recall that this $800 billion “stimulus” included $48.1 billion for transportation infrastructure. Yet, as the president acknowledged recently and the Heritage Foundation predicted, the funded projects have been very slow to get under way and have had little impact on economic activity. Why is an infrastructure bank doomed to fail? For starters, it’s not really a bank in the common meaning of the term. The infrastructure bank proposed in the president’s 2011 highway reauthorization request, for example, would provide loans, loan guarantees and grants to eligible transportation infrastructure projects. Its funds would come from annual appropriations of $5 billion in each of the next six years. Normally, a bank acts as a financial intermediary, borrowing money at one interest rate and lending it to creditworthy borrowers at a somewhat higher rate to cover the costs incurred in the act of financial intermediation. That would not be the case here. Grants are not paid back. As a former member of the National Infrastructure Financing Commission observed, “Institutions that give away money without requiring repayment are properly called foundations, not banks.” Infrastructure bank bills introduced by Sen. John Kerry, Massachusetts Democrat, and Rep. Rosa L. DeLauro, Connecticut Democrat, illustrate the time-consuming nature of creating such a bank. Both bills are concerned — appropriately — with their banks’ bureaucracy, fussing over such things as detailed job descriptions for the new executive team; how board members would be appointed; duties of the board; duties of staff; space to be rented; creating an orderly project solicitation process; an internal process to evaluate, negotiate and award grants and loans; and so on. This all suggests that it will take at least a year or two before the bank will be able to cut its first grant or loan check. Indeed, the president’s transportation “bank” proposal indicates just how bureaucracy-intensive such institutions would be. It calls for $270 million to conduct studies, administer the bank and pay the 100 new employees required to run it. In contrast, the transportation component of the ARRA worked through existing and knowledgeable bureaucracies at the state, local and federal levels. Yet, despite the staff expertise and familiarity with the process, as of July — 2½ years after the enactment of ARRA — 38 percent of the transportation funds authorized were still unspent, thereby partly explaining ARRA’s lack of impact. The president’s fixation on an infrastructure bank as a means of salvation from the economic crisis at hand is — to be polite about it — a dangerous distraction and a waste of time. It also is a proposal that has been rejected consistently by bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate transportation and appropriations committees.
Turn: Infrastructure bank slows investment down
Ronald Utt, Ph.D., is the Morgan Senior Research Fellow in Economic Policy at the Heritage Foundation, “The Limited Benefits of a National Infrastructure Bank,” October 20, 2011
Would an Infrastructure Bank Contribute to Jobs and Stimulate the Economy?
For some advocates—especially the President—these banks are seen as mechanisms to propel the economy forward out of the lingering recession into an era of greater prosperity and more jobs. Sadly, all evidence indicates that this just isn’t so. As far back as 1983, the General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) reviewed an earlier infrastructure-based stimulus program and observed that although the program was enacted during the worst of the recession, “implementation of the act was not effective and timely in relieving the high unemployment caused by the recession.” Specifically, the GAO found that:
Funds were spent slowly and relatively few jobs were created when most needed in the economy. Also, from its review of projects and available data, the GAO found that (1) unemployed persons received a relatively small proportion of the jobs provided, and (2) project officials’ efforts to provide employment opportunities to the unemployed ranged from no effort being made to working closely with state employment agencies to locate unemployed persons.[5]