Paper 1
MARITIME SAFETY MSC 79/6/
79th Session 24 September 2004
Agenda item 6
MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY
Issues arising following the introduction of the new and amended SOLAS Regulations related to security and the ISPS Code
Submitted by BIMCO, International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), International Association of Dry Cargo Owners (INTERCARGO), International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)
Executive Summary: This paper identifies issues raised in reports received from ships following the introduction of the new security measures on 1 July 2004.Action to be taken: See paragraphs 3.4, 4.7, 5.4, 6.3, 7.3, 8.2, 9.2, 10.2, 11.3, 12.4
Related Documents: SOLAS, ISPS Code
1. Introduction
1.1 The “Round Table” participants (BIMCO, ICS, INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO) established a reporting system encouraging reports from ships on the way in which the provisions of the ISPS Code are being implemented in ports throughout the world since 1 July 2004. A number of reports have been received. These are summarised in the following paragraphs.
2. Positive Reports
2.1 The industry is pleased to report that a large number of masters/SSOs have reported “No problems” in respect of their port calls and, on several occasions, have positively complimented the attitude of port State inspectors on the conduct of their security inspections. This is not only a reflection of the considerable effort and resources devoted by the shipping industry towards ensuring that the tight deadlines imposed by the requirements were largely met but also indicates a general adherence to the appeals of the Secretary General, and the industry’s request at MSC 78, that port States adopt a positive, practical and pragmatic approach to the new requirements.
2.2 However, there have also been many reports identifying problems or issues in respect of the implementation of the new provisions. These are summarised in the following paragraphs together with requests that the issues identified be considered by the Committee with a view to their resolution.
3. Perceptions of port security
3.1 A number of reports expressed disquiet about the perceived lack of any additional security provisions adopted at various (approved) ports since 1 July. Whereas measures adopted by ships (access controls, establishment of restricted areas, appointment of SSOs etc) were regularly checked and confirmed by port based officials, in some ports there had been no noticeable improvement in security measures. In some cases, there was reported to be a lack of knowledge or understanding of port responsibilities under the ISPS Code. Some “approved” ports were unable to identify a PFSO with whom the ship could liaise..
3.2 In one port, declared as being at security level 2, the ship was required to adopt additional security measures with no evidence that the port was taking any measures (e.g. public access to the quay allowed, car parking on the quay alongside the ship.) Despite the ship being at Level 1 on arrival, a request for a DoS was denied by the port authority.
3.3 In other ports, masters/SSOs reported that requests for pre-arrival information from the port, re security level, contact identification etc remained unanswered.
Action
3.4 The Committee is asked to encourage approved port facilities to engage in dialogue on security issues with the ship prior to its arrival.
4. Access Controls
4.1 Masters/SSOs have reported several incidents where officials tried to gain access to ships without verifiable identification or were unwilling to follow the ship’s established (and flag state approved) security procedures such as:
a) demanding that all the crew assemble in the mess leaving the gangway unmanned.
b) refusing an escort when walking around the ship
c) presenting deliberately false ID
d) refusing to produce ID
4.2 One report indicated that, on refusing access to the ship to an official without ID, the gangway watch was threatened with being arrested and imprisoned. Shortly thereafter, the vessel’s agent was notified that the ship was being detained and was prohibited from commencing discharge. The following morning, over 12 hours after the initial incident, officials re-boarded the ship. One of the officials again refused to take a vessel security badge. The SSO was summoned and both officials were escorted to the Master’s cabin, where the Master further explained the vessel security requirements and issued unlimited access badges. The ship then received pratique. The total delay time to the vessel was approximately 12 hours.
4.3 The industry organisations believe that delaying the ship for 12 hours on the pretext reported is an abuse of power which is totally unacceptable. The shipping company has been advised to take legal advice in respect of “undue detention” (SOLAS XI-2/3.5.1).
4.4 In another port, an immigration officer who had visited the ship on arrival returned to the ship two days later without an ID. The gangway watch did not permit instant access but consulted the OOW via walkie-talkie. The immigration officer walked off. Later the immigration officer said that the gangway watch had been “rude” in not allowing access as the uniform, and the fact that the same officer had visited the ship two days earlier, should have been enough (N.B. the gangway watchman had changed.)
4.5 In another incident, two customs officers were asked at the head of the gangway to sign the ship’s visitors’ book, accept visitors’ passes and show ID. The senior of the two refused to co-operate. The master was informed and the customs officials were escorted to the ship’s office. The official stated that:
a) he was the authority; and
b) the ship had no right to question his authority on penalty of being detained.
4.6 The issue was resolved peacefully.
Action
4.7 The industry believes that these examples (others have been reported) indicate a lack of awareness of the provisions of the ISPS Code and the new security demands placed on ships. While relationships between shore officials and crew, and their respective attitudes to each other, have given rise to concern in the past, current maritime security threats make it imperative that the relationship between the two parties be addressed. Accordingly, the industry invites the Committee to consider requesting the Facilitation Committee, under their existing agenda item “Formalities related to the Arrival, Stay and Departure of Ships”, to begin development of a “Code of Practice” on this issue at FAL 32 (July 2005). Such a code would seek to outline the need for a co-operative rather than confrontational approach between boarding officials and crew and provide guidance to both.
5. Crew change
5.1 A port state inspector was prepared to deem a ship non-ISPS compliant when the Ship Security Officer was being relieved by another who was unfamiliar with that particular ship. The ship was given the options of either leaving the original SSO onboard until the new one had become familiar with it and its security plan (until next port of call), or allowing the relieved Chief Officer to depart in which case the ship would receive a letter of non-compliance. Other officers on board had received SSO training. The home leave of the original SSO was delayed and new travel arrangements made for repatriation from the next port of call.
5.2 The ISPS Code (Part B 13.2.1, 13.2.2) states that the Ship Security Officer “should have adequate knowledge of, and receive training in, some or all of the following, as appropriate:
1. The layout of the ship
2. the ship security plan
3. …….etc”
5.3 While agreeing with the need for SSO familiarity with the SSP for the ship on which he/she serves, the designation of this Part B (Recommendatory) provision as non-compliance seems unreasonable when SSOs are being relieved. Familiarisation of requirements for security systems is no different from those required for other ship functions, particularly for relieving situations involving senior officers where it has long been recognised that familiarisation briefing (e.g. cargo, safety, etc.) during the relieving process is adequate to assure compliance with all legal requirements and for ensuring the continued safe and environmentally responsible operation of the vessel. We do recognise the requirement that the SSO must be familiar with the vessel on which he/she serves. However, the normal transfer of information that has served the industry in safety and operational matters should suffice for security also. In summary, the fact that a relief has occurred should not be the determining factor but rather whether the relieving officer and the officer being relieved have performed the necessary transfer of information.
Action
5.4 We ask the Committee to agree with the view that provided the relieving SSO is briefed immediately on arrival by the relieved SSO he can be repatriated during the same port call.
6. Contacting the CSO
6.1 Inspectors boarded a ship for an ISSC verification inspection. The master was told that he had 15 minutes to contact the CSO. If the ship could not make voice contact with the CSO within that amount of time the inspectors said they would consider that the SSP was not functioning and the ship would have shut down operations. They also said that the ship could have potentially been ordered out of the port.
On this occasion the ship was able to contact its CSO on his cell phone but had the request come 2 hours later the CSO would have been out of cell phone range.
6.2 There are no specific time requirements for contacting the CSO under SOLAS or the ISPS Code but an arbitrary 15 minutes seems unreasonable. Shipping companies have been advised to provide the ship with more than a single contact point.
Action
6.3 The industry is not aware of circumstances under which immediate contact with a ship’s CSO would be necessary. The Committee is asked to consider a “reasonable” time within which the CSO should be contactable.
7. Demands for Additional Security
7.1 A ship with a Greek/Filipino crew was advised 24 hours before arrival that the “crew posed a threat to port security” and the ship would not be allowed to enter the approaches to the port until a crew security plan had been “approved “ by the port authorities. The plan had to allow for two armed guards being on board, hired by the ship, from its first stopping place until its departure from its last port or anchorage to prevent the crew from leaving the ship. The ship was given no viable commercial option but to agree.
7.2 At its first anchorage there was a thorough ISPS compliance inspection and the ship declared to be “in substantial compliance”. The alleged “threat to port security” was removed, together with the armed guards.
Action
7.3 The Committee is asked to oppose, in principle, the adoption of this practice as a general modus operandi.
8. Communication Security
8.1 A number of masters/SSOs have drawn our attention to the practice of some port authorities demanding that ships declare their pre-arrival security level over VHF. They fear that this information could be overheard by those intent on terrorist target selection.
Action
8.2 The Committee is asked to consider this issue and decide accordingly.
9. Port Labour Identification
9.1 Many reports have been received in respect of the lack of identification provided by port authorities and port employers to stevedores, pilots and others requiring access to the ship while approaching or in port. In one case stevedores refused to show ID, refused to take ID badges provided by the vessel, refused to sign the ship’s visitors book and, threatening to stop work on the ship, demanded that all security signs on board be in their native language. The ship had to comply.
Action
9.2 The Committee is asked to encourage Contracting Governments to require that, for PFSP approval, or a continuance thereof, an identity card system must be in place for all those whose work requires them to have access to the vessel.
10. Anonymous Information
10.1 According to a press report one authority received an anonymous tip-off that a ship was carrying five x 40ft containers of lemons contaminated with a “harmful biological” substance. The ship was boarded 11 miles off the coast. Despite tests showing nothing untoward the containers were destroyed after being fumigated with chlorine dioxide gas. It is not known whether the original tip-off was from a disgruntled seafarer or a competitor or another source.
Action
10.2 The Committee is asked to advise contracting governments to seek to corroborate such information, or at least analyse the likelihood of its potential accuracy, prior to taking drastic action which can result in considerable commercial penalties.
11. Crew Access to Quayside
11.1 Although most ships are now fitted with instruments which record and display the draught and trim of a ship, international standard practice requires the crew, while alongside, to visually “check the marks”, fore and aft, before, during and after discharging or loading cargo. To do this, crew members walk along the quay and record the draught readings on the hull of the vessel.
11.2 It has been reported that some ports are forbidding crew members from performing this task unless they hold a visa to enter the country. Similar prohibitions have been applied to crew needing to load stores and provisions from the quayside.
11.3 In one case, a chief engineer, whose ship arrived at a port over the weekend, was arrested by customs officials while reading the draught marks and deported because immigration officials did not work at weekends and had not cleared the crew.