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The following extract is edited, revised, and adapted from a paper presented at the International Conference on Intercultural Communication, Asian Economic Integration and Regional Order (March 18, 2014), National Chengchi University, Taiwan.
Intercultural Communication in Geo-political Affairs:
The Sino-JapaneseDiaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute as a Model
Edwin R. McDaniel, Ph.D.
Introduction
The peaceful resolution of international conflicts requiresextensive communicative interaction between delegates fromthe involved nations and any third-party representatives. In order to arrive at an amicable settlement, theemissariesmust exchange grievancesand negotiate mutually acceptable terms of settlement, establish methods of implementation,agree to verification procedures, and explore stepsfor future relations.Generally, the negotiators come from varied cultural backgrounds with differing worldviews. These differences can create divergent perceptions of the conflict, means of resolution, and the shape of the final solution. To understand and overcome these complicating conditions, it is necessary to have a broad appreciation of the factors which form and influence how an individualperceivesnot only the problem at hand but also associated conditions.
This essay contends that globalization has increased the requirement for enhanced intercultural communication skills. It is argued that in order to anticipate and understand the communicative behaviors and messages of international delegates negotiating geopolitical disputes, there is a need to consider a variety of variables, in addition to culturally instilled values. The Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islandsis used as amodel to demonstrate the importance of these variables.
Contemporary Global Social Order
We live in an increasingly complex global society. In the post-Cold War era, advances in transportation technology and the advent of the digital age have increased societal interaction and made the world socially, economically, and geopolitically smaller. Today, national borders have become porousas a result of interdependent economies arising from transnational organizations, international trade pacts, regional security alliances, and the requirement for growing international cooperation on issues such as environmental degradation, the potential for pandemic disease, human trafficking, poverty, privacy concerns, natural disaster response, illicit drug trade, and other compelling concerns. The risk of international conflict has also been amplified as nations engage in competition for natural resources, contest cross-border pollution, advocate varying concepts of human rights, and renascent nationalism revives contested historical geographical claims. As an illustration of this latter concern, Table 1 provides a listing of territorial disputes ongoing in the Western Pacific.
Table 1: International Conflicts in Western Pacific
Disputants / Issue / LocationChina – Japan / Territorial / ECS islands
Japan – Korea / Territorial / SOJ islands
Japan – Russia / Territorial / Kuril Islands
China – SEA Nations / Territorial / SCS
China – US / Geopolitical influence / NEA/SEA
Source: Edwin R. McDaniel
Geopolitical and Sociocultural Structures of Intercultural Communication
Any effort to determine an individual’s perception of a particular problem or problem set is fraught with difficulty and usually runs a high risk of failure. However, by considering the broad-based geopolitical and sociocultural structures influencing a larger social group, it is possible to derive a reasonable estimate of how a delegate, or delegation, from that social group might approach a problematic situation.
To further develop this premise, four primarygeopolitical and sociocultural structures thought toinfluence the perception of an international incident are identified and briefly discussed. Table 2 offers and an overview of the four concerned structures and their more salient sub-elements. Subsequently, current China-Japan tension over East China Sea territorial issues is used as a model for understanding howthose structural elements can give rise to varied perceptions that can influence communicative interaction between the disputants.
Table 2: Geopolitical and Sociocultural Structures
- National Ideologies
- Political
- Economic
- Role of Religion
- Leven of Nationalism
- Contested Geopolitical Issues
- Primary
- Secondary
- Socioeconomic Considerations
- Economic
- Social
- Collective Historical Memory
- Importance
- Construction
- Sensitivity to
- Role in national identity
Source: Edwin R. McDaniel
(Discussion of the first three variable sets has been omitted for the Global Classlesson)
Collective Historical memory
There are compelling scholarly arguments thatpropose“collective memory” and “historical memory”can carrydifferent connotations (e.g., see Halbwachs, 1980, 1992; Savage, 2006). For this essay, however, “collective historical memory” will be defined as how the past is constructed and representedby a social body or,more specifically, how members of a nation state receive, construct, and interpret nationalhistorical events. Collective historical memory, then, provides the cohesive that binds the people together, forms their national identity, andconcurrently reflects how they see themselves. Moreover, an examination of collective historical memory offers insight into the interests and political actions of a nation’s people (MacMillan, 2010; Wang, 2012).
A produce of multiple sources, construction of historical memory commences early in childhood with family stories recounting past memorableindividual, familial, and societalevents.Ultimately, the record and perception of historical events becomes“deeply embedded in the public consciousness and are transmitted to succeeding generations formally by education and informally through the arts, popular culture, and mass media” (Shin, 2011, p. 4). In effect, it becomes an integral part of one’s worldview.
However, the recording and presentation of the histories that constitute national collective historical memory are subject to multiple influences, including value laden interpretations of the events, individual perception, and selective presentation arising from political objectives and/or power relationships. In some nations, the historical accounts presented in the formal education systems are tailored to “shape beliefs and values in ways that legitimize the polity” (Jones, 2011, p. 208), with the objective being to construct a state sanctioned collective historical memory of past national and global events (Jones, 2011). This can, and indeed does, lead to divergent interpretations of history, or what Shin and Sneider (2011) call “divided memories”. For instance, in the US, the historical view of WWII greatly emphasizes the almost half a million American causalities and the heroic Normandy landing; but in Russia, the concentration is on the country’s over 20 million military and civilian deaths and the famous battle of Stalingrad and siege of Leningrad—two quite different focuses.
Perhaps the best explanation of the criticality of collective national memory is offered by Berger (1997, p. 41), who writes that “state behaviour is first and foremost shaped by the particular sets of normative and cognitive beliefs which a society and its leaders hold about the nation…” This is interpreted to mean that historical memory not only informs the nation and its leaders about the past but also provides a lens for viewing the future.Collective historical memory, then, can construct a compelling focus on how the people of one nation view the people of another nation.Thus, “divided memories” can have a critical impact on communication between representatives engaged in international dispute resolution.
The Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute as a Model
Until 2012, the long simmering dispute between China, Japan, and Taiwan over ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku/Tiaoyuta island group was confined to acrimoniousspeeches and jingoisticpress releases, with aperiodic incursions by activists, fishing boats, and government vessels. In 2012, however, the situation boiled over when the Government of Japan paid a private Japanese owner over USD26 million for three of the five islets it did not already hold title to. Peking greeted this event with escalated rhetoric, and anti-Japanese protestsquickly broke out across China, resulting in considerable damage to Japanese business interests. Since that time, the polemical battles have grown more frequent and accusatory and are now augmented by both Chinese and Japanese maritime assets maintaining a near continuous presence in the area(D.Z., 2013; “Sino-Japanese,” 2012; Smith, 2013).
With no mutually satisfactory solution yet identified, this unresolved territorial conflict presents an excellent opportunity to examine how themacrostructural geopolitical/socio-culturalvariables presented in Table 2 might impact perceptions and communicative behaviors. For this application, it is assumed that Beijing and Tokyo have agreed to begin negotiations to find a common agreement on the problem.1The intent is to explicatefactors that potentially influence the formation of perceptions representatives from the two nations bring to the discussions and toidentify issues which could potentially constrain or facilitate amenable resolution of the conflict. Table 3 provides an overview of the variables that may differ (or agree) between the two nations. The most significant discussion of the variables will center on collective historical memory, which is currently a very prominent factor in Beijing-Tokyo relations.
Table 3: Geopolitical & Sociocultural Structures of Intercultural Communication
Geopolitical Sociocultural Structure / China / JapanNational Ideologies / Political / Communist state / Parliamentary democracy
Economic / “Mixed” / Free-market
Role of Religion / None / Minimal
Level of Nationalism / High / Low but increasing
Contested Geopolitical Issues / Primary / Territorial claim / Territorial claim
Secondary / Maritime sovereignty
Seabed resources
Pelagic resources
Socioeconomic Considerations / Economic* / Exports 7.4% (3rd)
Imports 9.8% (1st) / Exports 18.1% (1st)
Imports 21.3% (1st)
Social / Historical enmity
Face
Collective Historical Memory / Importance / High / Moderate
Construction / Government / Government
Sensitivity to / High / Situational
Role in National Identity / High / Moderate
Source: Edwin R. McDaniel*CIA Factbook 2012 figures
(Discussion of the first three variable sets has been omitted for the Global Classlesson)
Collective Historical Memory
Construction of historical memory by Northeast Asia nations has long been a controversial topic and oneof considerable academic focus. Of particular note is the Divided Memories and Reconciliation Project conducted by Stanford University, which examines how the WWII era is reconstructed by China, Japan, and Korea (“Divided”, n.d.). As previously discussed, collective historical memory often providesa lens for interpreting historical events and forjudging people from another nation, culture, or ethnic group. To assess the role that the respective collective historical memories might play in the Diaoyu/Senkaku disagreement, four factors will be examined for each country. These include (1) the importance placed on historical memory, (2) the primary agent of construction, (3) how sensitive are the people to the past, and (4) the role of historical memory in national identity.
Importance of collective historical memory. Both China and Japan place considerable importance on their national history, albeit with a selective emphasis. Each nation possessesmagnificentartifacts attesting to past cultural achievements and monumental events. China’s long, continuoushistory and record of scientific, social, and cultural achievements is considered a testament to the perseverance and ingenuity of the Chinese peoples. This is reflected in Chinese officials’ use of the word “rejuvenation”to refer to the country’s recent economic gains. From their perspective, China is not “rising” to a position of importance on the world stage but simply “recapturing” its previousgrandeur (Wang, 2013).
Along with the ancient record, China’s contemporary history also occupies a prominent place inthe nation’s collective historical memory.What receives the greatest attention is the period when China was divided and dominated by Western powers and Japan, known as the “Century of National Humiliation” (1839-1949). Japan in particular is regularly singled out for its belligerent conduct during that period, which includes the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), invasion of Manchuria (1931), and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45).
In many respects, Japan enjoys an equally illustrious past characterized by a plethora of noteworthy achievements and events. However, Japan tends to place the greatest emphasis on those historical periods prior to the early 20th century. Imperial Japan’s military demarches in the Pacific from the late 19th century until 1945 are generally downplayed, and historical recounts of that era often focus on the human suffering the Japanese experienced during WWII, rather than military activities in China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific.
The different emphasis that China and Japan place on their modern historical interactions clearly creates very different perceptions of events, often resulting in antagonism toward each other. The result of this selective, or “divided memories” (Shin & Sneider, 2011),approachexerts an unmistakable impact on communicative exchanges between the two counties, as even a cursory reading of contemporary news reports will disclose.
Construction of collective historical memory. In the case of both China and Japan, the collective historical memory is heavily influenced by significant levels of governmental involvement in school curricula and textbook content. Japanese students, for example, receive only a limited appreciation of Imperial Japan’s actions as an antagonistin Northeast and Southeast Asia. On the other hand, their Chinese contemporaries receive a comprehensive recounting of Japanese aggression and conductoccurringduring the century of humiliation (French, 2004; Jones, 2011; Mitani, 2011).
Moreover, contemporary Chinese society is treated to a near continuous litany of Japan’s misdeeds during the invasion and occupation of China. In the two year period 2011-12, Beijing approved 177 anti-Japanese media productions (“Staged,”2013). More recently, in February 2014 the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress established two new national holidays—Victory Day, marking the Chinese defeat of Japan, will be celebrated on September 3, and December 13 will be the Memorial Day for the Nanjing Massacre (“Keeping,” 2014)—over 60 years after the actual events. Also in February, an official Chinese news agency launched “Shoot the Devils,” and online game directed at Japan’s WWII military leaders.
The point-and-shoot game allows users to fire a handgun at one of 14 Japanese convicted as Class A war criminals after the war, to the accompaniment of a popular Chinese military tune. The 14 are the same men now honored at the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan… The selection screen includes biographies of each one, describing their roles in the war. (Feng, 2014, para. 5)
Reportedly, the objective of the game is to “expose the war crimes of the Japanese invaders” and help users to “forever remember history” (Feng, 2014, para. 6)
The Chinese people are also exposed to Beijing’s interpretation of history through the presence of numerous memorials and museums dedicated to events that transpired during the wars with Japan. The National Museum of China, directly across Tiananmen Square from the Great Hall of the People, houses “The Road of Rejuvenation,” a permanent exhibition detailing China’s struggles from the Opium War to the present.2While the exhibit very forcefully brings out the transgressions committed by the western powers and Japan, left unsaid are the deprivations of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
Beijing is also home to the Sculpture Garden of Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War, which is near the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War Memorial Hall.And both are in the immediate vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge, site of the 1937 incident considered the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Monuments, museums, and commemorative events are also used to mark prominent events that occurred during the war, such as the 1931 Mukden (Manchurian) Incident and the 1937 Nanjing massacre.
Quite in contrast to China, the Japanese public experiences far less exposure to events occurring between the 1930s and 1945, the end of WWII. Contemporary media presentations about the war are a rarity and usually center on the inhumanity and suffering of war, as seen in “With Best Wishes for Tomorrow” (Ashita e no yuigon; 明日への遺言). The 2008 Japanese film about a Class B War Crime trial recounts the story of a Japanese general who accepted fullresponsibility for executing a group of captured US airmen. The movie very directly questions the legality of US bombing civilian targets.
At the two most recognized Japanese war related memorials/museums, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, events are implicitlypresented from a victims’ perspective. Presentations at the National Showa Memorial Museum (Showakan; 昭和) in Tokyo are designed to demonstrate life in Japan during and immediately after WWII, especially for the Japanese children. Yasukuni shrine (靖国神社), a Shinto memorial and the focus of frequent Chinese and Korean opprobrium, is intended to honor the dead from all Japanese wars since the Meiji Restoration. Yasukuni’s infamous reputation is principally due to its enshrinement of over 1000 WWII war criminals(Lee, 2014), especially 14 individuals convicted of Class A war crimes.Immediately adjacent to Yasukuni shrine is the Yūshūkan (遊就館) war and military museum, which tracks Japan’s military activities from the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) to 1945. Suffice to say, the museum depicts Imperial Japan’s activities abroad from a clearly discernable right-wing,nationalistic perspective. According to a leading Japanese journalist, the museum “… declares the vindication of the Class-A war criminals on the basis of its private management’s conviction that the wars were fought for self-preservation, self-defense and for the liberation of Asia from Western colonial rule” (Watanabe, 2006, p. 8)
Of all the war related museums I have visited in Japan, only the Edo-Tokyo museum offers any noteworthy insight to Japanese WWII activities. There, a couple of exhibits make mention of Japanese wartime transgressions in China, such as the Marco Polo Bridge incident and aerial bombings.
This brief discussionclearly illustrates that influencing factors in China and Japan can, and do, lead to the construction of divergent collective historical memories. China buildsan active collective memory that casts the Japanese as an unrepentant antagonist, responsible for untold Chinese physical and social deprivation. In contrast, Japan’s post-war generations have been largely shielded from historical accounts of Imperial Japan’s overseas military ventures. These conflicting, or divided, views of history lead to skewed perceptions of the other, perceptions that can ultimately have a negative effect on communication between representatives from the two countries.
Sensitivity to historical memory.As can be deduced from the preceding section, sensitivity to historical memory varies in China and Japan. As previously suggested, the Chinese have long placed considerable importance on their history. Professor Peter Hays Gries has posited that “… in China the past lives in the present to a degree unmatched in most other countries…” (as cited in Wang, 2012, p. 8). The importance placed on China’s recent history is readily evident by the continuous references to the era of humiliation, particularly to Imperial Japan’s transgressions.This importance was clearly illustrated when Xi Jinping led the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureauto visit “The Road of Rejuvenation” exhibit in November 2012 (“Xi,” 2012).