‘Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Humanitarian Response’
A two-day course for humanitarian practitioners
Workshop Resources
Contents
The following resources will support the activities outlined in the facilitator’s guide.
The table below outlines which handouts support which task. It important to note that if you are using Option 2 for Task 3 (i.e. you are running a headquarter or regional version of the training and will not be using your own context for the basis of the analysis) you will need to provide handouts C, D & E as prereading.
Task # / Handout1 / No handouts required
2 / A & B
3 / No handouts required
4(Option 2 only) / C, D & E (Distribute ahead as course pre-reading)
5 / No handouts required
6 / G
7 / H
8 / I
9 / No handouts required
10 / J
11 / K
12 / L
13 / No handouts required
Task 1 / Handout A – Pakistan Floods (July 2010)
Overview
Field & community perspectives
Task 1 / Handout B – Haiti Earthquake 2010
Overview
Field & community perspectives
CARE staff organised a distribution for neighbouring camps in the Binot L’Estère area of Leogane, Haiti, identifying a central distribution area for beneficiaries from the two sites. Only when community members protested that they would prefer not to receive the nonfood items than go across to the other camp did the field monitors, themselves natives of Leogane, become aware of a long-standing cultural divide between the two communities. The programme changed its distribution strategy to avoid combining the sites, ensuring that each community could access the goods in their own location.
Task 3[1] / Handout C (& Pre-course reading)
Ivory Coast/Cote d’Ivoire Country Profile – Underlying causes of conflict
For thirty-three years following its 1960 independence from France, the Ivory Coast was led under a one-party rule by the charismatic and totalitarian leader, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Though the French had officially handed over power, they retained strong ties with Boigny and ensured the country’s protection against external aggression with the signing of the April 1961 Defence Agreement. For a time, the Ivory Coast flourished and Boigny was hailed as a leader capable of maintaining ethnic unity and political stability in the country. He kept the security sector in check by limiting their size, giving them ample pay, ensuring officers were given senior civilians positions in state-run companies and providing a counter-weight against the army with the paramilitary gendarmerie force.
By the 1970s, the Ivory Coast was the largest producer of cocoa in the world, becoming home to a wealth of diamonds in the North and exporting a number of other primary commodities. A large number of foreign workers, coming from Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Senegal and several other countries, entered the Ivory Coast to help provide cheap labour in these and other industries, while an influx of Lebanese began to thrive in industry and commerce. Many of the immigrants settled in the country with Boigny’s blessing and received citizenship. They continued to do well in favourable economic circumstances, compared to the situation in some of the neighbouring countries who were unable to heal the wounds left by colonialism, instead descending into ethnic and political disorder. The heavy reliance on primary commodities, however, led to a series of serious economic setbacks for the country, as the price of cocoa began to drop dramatically in the 1980s.
The severe economic problems, such as a rise in unemployment, began to manifest in feelings of increased tensions between several groups. A pro-democracy movement soon saw students and other activists taking to the streets in large demonstrations, with Boigny increasingly using force against them in an attempt to hang onto his slipping authoritarian rule. National and international condemnation of the attacks on these pro-democracy fighters forced Boigny to concede to hold multi-party elections in 1990 with Gbagbo as his major opposition challenger. The election saw Boigny gaining 85% of the vote in what was largely labelled as grossly unfair elections processes. The last three years of the Boigny regime, before his death in 1993, led to increasing disorder and more brutal clampdowns from the police and army factions. Following his death, Prime Minister Ouattara and President of the National Assembly Henri Bédie argued over who should succeed Boigny in the Presidency, with both coveting the position. Constitutional decrees suggested that Bédie should take over in such a case, and so Bédie took over the position as President until an election could be held.
Bédie was able to manipulate parts of the population using xenophobic political policies
Rising unemployment forced some of the urban population to return to seek refuge on the farms in the villages, but many found that they had since become worked by immigrants or first and second generation citizens. In this context, Bédie was able to manipulate parts of the population using xenophobic political policies, particularly the concept of ‘Ivorite’ or Ivorianess, which played on ethnic tensions between what was labelled as ‘real’ citizens and the mostly northern ‘foreigners’. Nearly a quarter of the country were considered foreigners, and using this Ivorite concept, Bédie was able to draft a law that was approved by referendum requiring that any Presidential candidate must have both their parents born within the country. This measure effectively excluded Alassane Ouattara, Bédie’s main opposition, from the 1995 election race, causing increasing civil tensions. Bédie was further accused of poor governance and internal corruption which led the IMF and World Bank to suspend all economic aid in 1998.
The new Bédie government began replacing soldiers with technocrats in coveted positions, leading to a feeling of marginalisation among some senior officers who had previously held high status within the Ivorian regime. The resentment led army chief of staff General Robert Guéï to defy President Bédie’s requests that the army intervene in popular demonstrations against the government, which resulted in his removal from power. Bédie began promoting many Baoule officers to key posts while sidelining army officers who had worked their way through the Boigny regime, effectively dividing the army and creating major tensions among the ranks. Junior officers from the excluded groups allied with some frustrated senior officers, including former General Guéï, and mutinied against Bédie, overthrowing him from his post in 1999. Guéï promised a new election to be held in the following year, initially stating that he would not run himself. Unfortunately, Guéï’s lust for power saw him throwing his hat in the ring, a move that angered many who saw him as plotting the coup for his own purposes.
The new Presidential elections were scheduled to be held on 22 October 2000. The Rally of the Republicans (RDR) and Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (PDCI) boycotted the elections in response to the exclusions of Alassane Ouattara and Emile Constant Bombet by Supreme Court decree, leaving out all major opposition to Guéï except Laurent Gbagbo. Gbagbo was widely cited as the winner with some 59.4% of the vote, though Guéï refused to leave his new-found power, claiming himself as rightful winner. Massive popular protests ensued, and with the help of a primarily Gbagbo loyalist gendarmerie, Gbagbo was brought into power.
The marginalisation of certain aspects of the security sector continued under the new regime, and led to a coup attempt by junior officers fearing increasing marginalization and demobilization under the new reform programs, causing several weeks of intense fighting in September 2002. On the first night of the uprising, former General Guéï was killed under disputed circumstances. The insurgent groups came together led by Guillaume Soro under the name the Forces Nouvelles or New Forces (FN) and gained control of the northern 60 percent of the country, effectively splitting the country in two.
The Ivorian government along with many other African countries called on France to intervene to stop the new rebel group, based on their previous defence agreements. The French initially refused, citing that the agreements only applied to external attack, but eventually intervened to slow the rebel advance on Abidjan. By October 2002, as fighting continued, Senegal’s foreign minister attempted to hold tentative talks with the rebel groups who demanded the overthrow of the government and called for new elections to be held. Amidst the fighting, the price of cocoa had fallen to a 16 year low and the humanitarian crisis began to deepen with more than 10,000 people fleeing their homes and many of the international aid agencies voicing concern that the war could soon spread to neighbouring countries. A cycle of violence and retaliation followed, and while several ceasefires were ordered, most were not adhered to. At this point, the rebel groups began to seriously splinter.
In January 2003, the Linas-Marcoussiss peace accords were signed, officially freezing the conflict while issuing the creation of a national unity government that would see nine rebel leaders given seats in cabinet. The accords were not accepted by many groups of people who either viewed the rebels as gaining too many concessions or who still wished to see Gbagbo ousted. Violence continued to flare up all over the country while the disarmament programme and the expulsion of foreign fighters in the north proved exceedingly problematic.
In September 2004, the UN and French soldiers handed over responsibility for security of the created peace line to ‘mixed brigades’ composed of ten FN rebels, ten loyalist gendarmes and four UN Police each. By November 2004 the peace accords were in complete disarray and Gbagbo’s government began bombing supposed rebel bases in the north, citing that they were accumulating weapons, a claim also made by the rebels against the government forces. A French base was bombed by the government, supposedly by accident, killing nine French soldiers and one aid worker. The French forces responded by attacking the Yamoussoukro airport and destroying the majority, if not all, of the Ivorian air force. The loyalist Young Patriots group began massively rallying against the French and precipitating violent looting and rioting, while clashes between the French and the Ivorian troops ensued. This resulted in many foreigners, mostly Europeans, fleeing or being evacuated from the country to escape the violence. French troops are said to have opened fire on rioters, killing a disputed number in the process and only increasing anti-French sentiment.
Following the Pretoria agreement in April 2005, the UN mission began implementing part of the mandate for security sector reform, training an initial 600 FN Security Auxiliaries into the national security system, even though the parties had yet to reach an agreement on the number and ranks that would be integrated or an official restructuring program for the FDS. Presidential elections that were originally scheduled for 2005 were repeatedly postponed until October 2010 as the key components were not yet met.
In November 2006, the FN created their own police and gendarmerie to patrol their controlled areas, while recruitment to the national police and army factions continued, mainly along ethnic lines favourable to Gbagbo and at least doubling in size by 2009. The national police and gendarmerie were militarized and brought into the war effort alongside the army, resulting in a loosening of the chains of command with many new recruits answering directly to their recruiting officers. Despite a UN arms embargo, both sides were able to rearm and re-equip themselves and became heavily fortified. Political manipulations painted the conflict as ethnic, even though in reality, the population was heavily mixed. These manipulations pitted Christian southerners against Muslim northerners, who were described by the government as being financially supported and supplied by neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea. Several militias were formed, and mercenaries from neighbouring countries brought in for use by both sides in several instances.
Following the 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement, the responsibility for implementing the accord, including security sector reform, now resided with President Gbagbo and newly-appointed Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, leader of the FN. The security sector reform was narrowed to the reunification of the Ivorian FDS and the FN, with the parties deciding to wait to develop a new security-sector policy and architecture until after the elections, contrary to popular advice of security analysts and experts. A scheduled 29 November 2009 election was again postponed, as electoral registration and identification processes that were officially closed on the 30 June, failed to reach their stated aim. The processes were said to have been ill-conceived and mismanaged, with the International Crisis Group stating that Gbagbo had deliberately hampered their financing and that the operation appeared to be running on a vague improvised basis without a clear timetable.
At the time of the elections, only 17,601 combatants had been demobilized. By June 2010, the UN recorded 32,777 registered former combatants, 23,777 to be demobilized, 5,000 to be incorporated into the new army and 4,000 to be part of the Integrated Command Centre. However, at the time of the elections, only 17,601 combatants had been demobilized and a limited number of weapons, most of them unserviceable, were collected. The constant delays of demobilization and integration programs created problems for future demobilization efforts, as once junior FN army officers were promoted to higher ranks, raising questions about how they would be integrated, given their new status and rank. Gbgabo had promoted a few senior FN members to positions within the FDS, but the majority of promotions were given along ethnic and loyalty lines rather than on merit, to the determent of the overall morale and creating outrage among the FN camp. In February 2010, the Gbagbo camp began to push for disarmament projects to finish before the October elections, a move the FN saw as yet another attempt to delay elections.
The first round of elections on October 31, 2010 ran fairly smoothly, with Gbagbo and Ouattara winning the right to challenge each other in the second round, as neither won a majority vote. Despite the talk of reunification of the armed forces, the country entered the second round on 28 November 2010 elections as a country essentially still split in two, with two armies and two completely separate chains of command. Almost immediately following the disputed results, the Integrated Command Centre dissolved and security forces became partisan participants in the crisis.