"A man must assign a good reason for coming (to the court). If the fact is denied, upon
which he grounds his right to come (into the court), he must prove it. He, therefore, is the
actor in the proof, and, consequently, he has no right, where the point is contested, to
throw the onus probandi on the defendant." Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. 330.
[Emphasis added]
In re Hamlet (After Remand), 225 Mich.App 505, 521; 571 NW2d 750 (1997).
“Mere statement of pleader's conclusions, unsupported by allegations of fact upon which they may be based, will not suffice to state cause of action.”
"An agency seeking to withhold information under an exemption to FOIA has the burden of proving that the information falls under the claimed exemption." GC Micro Corp. v. Defense Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Lewis v. IRS, 823 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir.1987)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/31/subtitles/iii/chapters/37/subchapters/iii/sections/section_3730.html
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government (FOOTNOTE 2) Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/31/subtitles/iii/chapters/37/subchapters/iii/sections/section_3730_notes.html
1988 - Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 100-700, Sec. 9(b)(1), which directed amendment of section 3730 of title 28 by substituting ''with the action'' for ''with action'' in subsec. (c)(4), was executed to subsec. (c)(4) of this section as the probable intent of Congress.
Instruction, in prosecution for willfully attempting to evade federal income taxes that whenever facts appear beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that accused has signed his tax return, jury may infer and find that accused had knowledge of contents, was not constitutionally infirm and did not require postconviction relief on theory that instruction created conclusive presumption contrary to constitutional safeguards pertaining to burden of proof. Wainwright v. U. S., C.A.10 (Colo.) 1971, 448 F.2d 984, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 2437, 407 U.S. 911, 32 L.Ed.2d 684.
admission of evidence subject to motion to strike because of insufficiency of proof of necessary preliminary facts is well within trial judge's discretion. U. S. v. Weiner, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1978, 578 F.2d 757, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 568, 439 U.S. 981, 58 L.Ed.2d 651, rehearing denied 99 S.Ct. 1060, 439 U.S. 1135, 59 L.Ed.2d 98.
§ 282. Presumption of validity; defenses
Use of phrases such as "clear and convincing" or "clear and satisfactory" adds nothing but confusion to the application of the basic preponderance standard on the issue of validity in a patent infringement action; those phrases imply that there is a murky middle ground of proof between preponderance and reasonable doubt, whereas in fact there are only those two levels of proof. Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., Inc., N.D.Cal.1974, 375 F.Supp. 1, 181 U.S.P.Q. 353, supplemented 409 F.Supp. 1019, 191 U.S.P.Q. 576.
the burden of proof rests heavily upon the party making such charge. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Nordson Corp., N.D.Ill.1968, 293 F.Supp. 448, 158 U.S.P.Q. 385.
Allegations of hardship unsupported by particulars by way of proof or affidavit cannot be accorded much weight in balancing conveniences. Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Vic Kirsch Const. Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1980, 486 F.Supp. 529.
The mere filing of charges by an aggrieved party or a complaint by Board creates no presumption of unfair labor practices under this section, but it is incumbent upon one alleging violation of this subchapter to prove charges by fair preponderance of all the evidence. Boeing Airplane Co., Wichita Division, v. N.L.R.B., C.C.A. 10 1944, 140 F.2d 423.
In proceedings against employer charged with violation of this subchapter, burden of proof was on Board to prove its charges by fair preponderance of evidence. Texarkana Bus Co. v. N.L.R.B., C.C.A. 8 1941, 119 F.2d 480.
In its capacity as accuser, the Board is held to same burdens and obligations of proof as any other litigant who takes the affirmative, and Board may not, by accusing, put accused upon proof but, as accuser, must prove its charge. N.L.R.B. v. Riverside Mfg. Co., C.C.A. 5 1941, 119 F.2d 302.
The Board had the burden of proof to establish before itself, in its capacity of trier, the accusations it had laid in its accusatorial capacity, by credible evidence from which men of unbiased minds could reasonably decide in its favor and could not leave right of matter to rest in mere conjecture. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. N.L.R.B., C.C.A. 5 1940, 112 F.2d 545.
Burden of proof, in secondary sense of going forward with evidence, rests on party who at particular stage of the trial is required to meet a prima facie case established by his adversary, once sufficient evidence has been offered to justify a finding. Lodge 743, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. United Aircraft Corp., D.C.Conn.1969, 299 F.Supp. 877, supplemented 336 F.Supp. 811, affirmed in part, remanded in part on other grounds 534 F.2d 422, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 79, 429 U.S. 825, 50 L.Ed.2d 87, on remand.
Burden of proving an enforceable closed shop agreement when a charge of unfair labor practice is asserted against employer is upon the employer. Stone Logging & Contracting Co. v. International Woodworkers of America, Columbia District Council No. 5, Or.1943, 135 P.2d 759, 171 Or. 13.
A person seeking to vacate his conviction bears burden of proof upon each ground presented for relief. Walden v. U. S., E.D.Pa.1976, 418 F.Supp. 386.
Burden of proof at a hearing on a petition for postconviction relief is on the petitioner. Dalli v. U. S., N.D.N.Y.1975, 396 F.Supp. 399, affirmed 535 F.2d 1240.
Redress may be sought in equity or at law, and the required allegations and proofs are substantially the same in one form of remedy as in the other. Parks v. Booth, U.S.Ohio 1880, 102 U.S. 96, 12 Otto 96, 26 L.Ed. 54.
Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants, and should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end. Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Lincoln Engineering Co. of Illinois, N.D.Ill.1938, 22 F.Supp. 585.
Complaint alleging patent infringement without stating facts cannot broaden suit, nor extend plaintiff's rights beyond maximum scope of patents sued on. New Jersey Zinc Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., D.C.Del.1926, 11 F.2d 908.
In patent infringement suit, plaintiff sustains the burden of proof, when it shows as to infringement, that alleged infringing product corresponds to the test of identity and the burden is then on defendant to prove, if it can, that the product, though identical in composition, was not produced by the patented process. Kalo Inoculant Co. v. Funk Bros. Seed Co., C.C.A.7 (Ill.) 1947, 161 F.2d 981, 74 U.S.P.Q. 1, certiorari granted 68 S.Ct. 89, 332 U.S. 755, 92 L.Ed. 341, 75 U.S.P.Q. 365, reversed on other grounds 68 S.Ct. 440, 333 U.S. 127, 92 L.Ed. 588, 76 U.S.P.Q. 280.
UNITED STATES v. MINKER, 350 U.S. 179 (1956)
Those safeguards would be imperiled if prior to the institution of the proceedings the citizen could be compelled to be a witness against himself and furnish out of his own mouth the evidence used…included within the protection of all the guarantees of the Constitution.
Persons dealing with the government are charged with knowing government statutes and regulations, and they assume the risk that government agents may exceed their authority and provide misinformation.
Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1981)
Public officers are merely the agents of the public, whose powers and authority are defined and limited by law. Any act without the scope of the authority so defined does not bind the principal, and all persons dealing with such agents are charged with knowledge of the extent of their authority.
Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 113 F.2d 284
Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority.
FEDERAL CROP INS. CORPORATION V. MERRILL, 332 U.S. 380 (1947)
Persons dealing with a public agency are presumed to know the law and are bound at their peril to ascertain and follow those procedures necessary to enter into a binding contract. (See Miller v. McKinnon, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 89; Bear River etc. Corp. v. County of Placer (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 684 , 690 [258 P.2d 543].)
SEYMOUR v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA , 156 Cal.App.3d 200
[Civ. No. 22606. Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District. March 9, 1984.]
"All are presumed to know the law."
San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel (1882), 62 C. 641; Dore v. Southern Pacific Co. (1912), 163 C. 182, 124 P. 817; People v. Flanagan (1924), 65 C.A. 268, 223 P. 1014; Lincoln v. Superior Court (1928), 95 C.A. 35, 271 P. 1107; San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard (1929), 98 C.A. 33, 276 P. 368.
"We thus require citizens to apprise themselves not only of statutory language but also of legislative history ... and underlying legislative purposes [citation]. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
People v. Morse (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 259 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 816
[Nos. A058935, A060033. First Dist., Div. Three. Dec 22, 1993.]
We thus require citizens to apprise themselves not only of statutory language but also of legislative history, subsequent judicial construction, and underlying legislative purposes (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100]).
Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112 , 253 Cal.Rptr. 1; 763 P.2d 852
[S.F. No. 24996. Supreme Court of California. November 10, 1988.]
"Everyone is presumed to know the law".
People ex rel. Mosk v. Lynam , 253 Cal.App.2d 959 [Civ. No. 31452. Second Dist., Div. One. Aug. 29, 1967.], Robertson v. Dodson , 54 Cal.App.2d 661 [Civ. No. 12069. First Dist., Div. One. Oct. 2, 1942.]