Institutional Entrepreneurship, Partaking, and convening
Accepted for publication by Organization Studies (July 2003)
(please cite but do not quote)
Silvia Dorado
College of Management
UMASS/Boston
100 Morrissey Blvd.
Boston, MA02125
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Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Doug Creed, Serghei Floricel, David Levy, James Walsh, Leslie Cintron and Peter McClure for helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented in 1999 at the Academy of Management Conference in San Diego.
Institutional Entrepreneurship, Partaking, and convening
Abstract
This paper proposes that processes of institutional change vary depending on the form taken by the three factors that define them: agency, resource mobilization, and opportunity. The paper builds on a conceptualization of agency that considers that change may result from diverse forms of agency (i.e. strategic, routine and sensemaking). It develops the concept of resource mobilization focusing on the process as opposed to the skills required for mobilization. It then suggests that the mobilization of resources, support and acceptance, accompanying the diffusion and legitimation of institutional changes may follow leverage, partaking, or convening processes. Finally, the paper defines institutional opportunity as an objective condition of organizational fields, suggesting that fields may be opportunity opaque, transparent, or hazy. Opportunities, of course, only become real when perceived by actors. Building on current sociological work, the paper suggests that actors’ perception of the opportunity transparency of fields varies with their temporal orientation and social networks. Considering the possible variations of agency, resource mobilization, and opportunity, and how they may combine the paper defines three profiles of institutional change: entrepreneurship, partaking, and convening.
Descriptors: economic sociology, entrepreneurs, institutional change, institutional organization theory, agency, institutional opportunity.
1Introduction
Recent organizational theorizing has aimed at solving the paradox of how institutional change is possible if actors’ intentions, actions, and rationality are conditioned by the institutions they wish to change (Holm 1995; Seo and Creed 2002). Researchers have adopted one of two roads to solve this paradox. Some have re-affirmed the ability of actors to escape the determining power of institutions (DiMaggio 1988; Rao 1998; Beckert 1999; Carney and Gedajlovic 2002) and explain that actors gain their agency from the presence of multiple institutional referentsthat overlap and conflict (Sewell 1992; Whittington 1992; Seo and Creed 2002). Others insist on the determining power of institutions and suggest that change results from the accumulation over time of acts not necessarily directed to generate it (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Giddens 1984). This paper reconciles these two perspectives by suggesting that institutional change processes can adopt multiple profiles.
The image of institutional change deriving from the actions of interested actors stems from a long tradition of institutional research (Selznick 1949; 1957; Stinchcombe 1968). In recent years, this perspective has acquired renewed currency and become dominant among scholars studying how actors gain support and acceptance for institutional change projects (Fligstein 1996; 1997; Rao 1998; Beckert 1999; Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000; Lounsbury 2001). These scholars agree with Stinchcombe (1968) that resource mobilization is mostly a political process and have advanced our knowledge ofthe skills and strategies usedto gain support for new institutional arrangements.
This image, however, is at odds, at least superficially, with the vision of institutional change put forward by scholars linked to the neo-institutional tradition (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). This tradition is defined by its crucial insight: actors perceive institutional rules and scripts as taken for granted (Beckert 1999: 778;Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Such insight, of course, raises the question of how actors ever imagine changing institutions. Building on the work of Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Giddens (1984), these scholars have answered this question by suggesting that change results from the uncoordinated actions of actors as they selectively reactivate past patterns of behaviour (Giddens 1984; Barley and Tolbert 1997).
This paper redefinesinstitutional changeprocesses suggesting they can adopt one of three profiles: entrepreneurship, partaking, or convening. It builds on a reconceptualization of the factors commonly seen as defining institutional change: agency, resources, and opportunity (DiMaggio 1988). Agency can be not only habitual (Giddens 1984), or strategic (DiMaggio 1988), but also sensemaking (Weick 1995). Which form of agencyactors adopt depends on which temporal orientation (towards the past, the present, or the future) is dominant in their minds (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). The mobilization of support and acceptance leading to the diffusion and legitimation of new institutional arrangementsmay follow one of three distinct processes:leverage, accumulation, or convening. Accumulation implies that support and acceptance emerge as the uncoordinated actions of countless actors probabilistically converge (Van de Ven and Garud 1993). Leverage means that politically skilled actors mobilize support and acceptance (Stinchcombe 1968; Rao 1998). Finally, convening describes a process of institutional change jumpstarted by thecreation of collaborative arrangements (Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips 2002). Convening may be the only process that can generate change inwhat Trist (1983) labels problem domains—i.e. organizational fields defined by problems too many sided and complex for any one single individual or organization to handle. Lastly, actors identify opportunities for change; but their ability to do so depends on the objective conditions of organizational fields. The paper suggests that fields can be opportunityopaque, transparent, or hazy depending on (a) the multiplicity—number and overlap of institutional referentsavailable in an organizational field (Sewell 1992; Whittington 1992; Seo and Creed 2002)— and on (b) the field’s degreeof institutionalization (Zucker 1977). As explained later, actors may perceive these objective conditions differently, depending on their temporal orientation (Emirbayer and Mische 1998) and their social networks(Aldrich 1999). Figure 1 provides a simplified version of how these sets of factors are linked.
Insert figure 1 here
Theredefinition of the process of institutional change here proposed presents two important advantages over current formulations. First, it provides a framework that spells out the conceptual linkages between the two dominant conceptualizations of how actors escape the determining power of institutions. Second, it highlightsareas in the interplay between agency and structure that require further exploration. Most interestingly, institutions have always been seen as crucial in reducing uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) but institutional theorieslack a developed treatment of how actors actively cope with uncertainty (Floricel and Dorado 2000). This paper addresses this limitation by providing a framework that can guide research into how actors can change organizational fields which may be toouncertain (complex and unstable) to permit strategic action(Milliken 1987)or comfortably accommodate routine behaviours (Emirbayer and Mische 1998).
Next, the paper analyses and develops the concepts of agency, process of resource mobilization, and opportunity. Then, it considers the alternative combinations deriving from considering the multiple forms these three factors can take. The paper concludes with an analysis of the implications and limitations of the study and a brief summary.
2Factors defining institutional change
A growing body of research aims at understanding how actors change institutions—understood here as social systems which, once established, tend to perpetuate themselves (Giddens 1984). Interestingly, there is little disagreement in this work regarding what institutional change involves. DiMaggio (1988) suggested that institutional changes ‘arise when organized actors with sufficient resources (institutional entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize an interest that they value highly’ (1988:14). Barley and Tolbert (1997) argue that institutional change is possible when actors follow routine behaviours but likely when actors participate wilfully, and when the conditions of the organizational field facilitate the assembly of resources and a rationale necessary for questioning scripted patterns of behaviour (Barley and Tolbert 1997:102). In short, scholars agree that institutional change responds to actors’ will and creativity (agency), requires resources, and depends on the availability of opportunities. This section defines thesethree factors.
2.1Agency
Agency refers both to the motivation and the creativity that drives actors to break away from scripted patterns of behaviour (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). By integrating a number of different literatures, this paper identifies three alternative forms of agency: routine, strategic, and sensemaking.
The idea that actors’ agency varies with their temporal orientation builds on Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) conceptualization of agency. Their analysis is useful for two reasons. It convincingly shows how purposeful and habitual agency are part of the same continuum (Tolbert and Zucker 1996) and opens the door for alternative conceptualizations of agency.
Emirbayer and Mische build on the work of Alexander (1988; 1992) and other sociologists in the pragmatic (John Dewey, George Herbert Mead) and phenomenological (Alfred Schutz) traditions. They define agency as a temporally embedded process of social engagement and suggest that it reproduces and transforms the world through the interplay of the habits, imagination, and judgement of actors. The emphasis is on its temporal embeddedness, which defines how actors may reproduce or transform institutions. An orientation towards the past encourages the selective reactivation of past patterns of thought and action. An orientation towards the present is common when actors make practical and normative judgements among alternate trajectories of action in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of evolving situations. Finally, an orientation towards the future enables the imaginative generation of possible future trajectories of action defined by actors’ hopes, fears, and desires.
These three orientations operate in conjunction; all three are simultaneously involved in human agency but one will dominate. This paper suggests that actors adopt one of three forms of agency depending on which one is the dominant temporal orientation: routine (Giddens 1984) when the past is dominant; sensemaking (Weick 1995) when the present is dominant; and strategic (DiMaggio 1988) when the future is the dominant temporal orientation held by institutional change agents.
Routine behaviours are common when the focus on the past is dominant. Actors are then likely to re-enact past patterns of behaviour and thus bring stability to institutional fields. On occasion, however, the selective nature of this reactivation will engender change (see e.g. Giddens 1984; Barley 1986; Pentland and Rueter 1994; Feldman 2000). This type of change may occur so gradually as to be recognisable only through accumulation in the gestures of countless individuals (Mead 1934). But, regardless of how hard it is to recognise, the change that this form of agency brings may be equally drastic. An example of such almost imperceptible but radical change is provided by the evolution of language (see Giddens 1984).
Sensemaking behaviours are probable when the present is the dominant temporal orientation. These behaviours are likely to be connected to processes of change occurring in conditions of uncertainty (Milliken 1987; Weick 1995; 1998). Actors faced with situations of uncertainty are not expected to follow routines and cannot undertake strategic projects (Milliken 1987; Weick 1995:83-105). Instead, they are likely to act by making sense of these situations (Schön 1983). They will construct, filter, frame, and create facticity (Turner 1987; Weick 1995:14) which will help them to define the adequate context or space for action (Schön 1983), limiting the uncertainty they face. As Weick (1998) has argued for problems involving global change, ‘precisely because global change is so difficult to comprehend, organizations designed to affect it need to develop a coherent story of what is going on as much as to decide what should be done given the unfolding story’ (p. 40).
Finally, strategic behaviours encompass a future temporal orientation compatible with the imaginative generation of trajectories of action defined by actors’ hopes, fears, and desires for the future. These behaviours take account of choice as well as causeeffect calculations (Alexander 1992). This form of agency involves actors defining their valued interests and deciding on a particular course of action toserve them.
The three forms of agencyare not independent. Routine behaviours are present always, even when the dominant orientation is the present or the future. Sensemaking is crucial in deciding among alternative paths when adopting a strategic plan of action.
2.2Resource mobilization
Resources—cognitive, social and material support—are integral to institutional change. Actors require them to buffer the risks involved in not following pre-established norms (Oliver 1991; Phillips; Lawrence and Hardy 2000), particularly when such new forms threaten dominant positions and break away from the legitimate order (DiMaggio 1988). In rare situations, very powerful actors may possess sufficient resources to impose change on an institutional field. For example, once John D. Rockefeller had acquired most of the oil refineries in the United States, he could easily change how the oil market operated by controlling prices and, given his dominant position, everyone had to accept the change(Chernov 1998). More frequently, the diffusion and legitimation of new institutional arrangements requires the mobilization of support and acceptance from multiple actors(Van de Ven and Garud 1993; Rao 1998).
A considerable body of work has focused on the skills and strategies that help actors mobilize resources (Stinchcombe 1968; DiMaggio 1988; Rao 1998; Lounsbury 2001). Important insights have derived from this research. For example, Hargadon and Yellowless (2001) describe the role of imitating existing arrangements to gain support for radical innovations. Rao (1998) has discussed the important role of framing innovations so that they become accepted within existing institutions. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) point to the relevance of inter-personal trust to gain support for ventures that have not been institutionally embraced. Finally, Fligstein (1997) provides an exhaustive collection of tactics that actors can use to garner resources for their institutional projects. The use of these strategies, however, is likely to vary depending on the process that generates support and acceptance for the novel arrangement (Lawrence, Winn, and Jennings 2001).
A review of the literature reveals at least three distinct resource mobilization processes: leveraging, accumulating, and convening. Leveraging derives from the work of scholars interested in the creation of new organizational forms (DiMaggio 1982; 1991; 1992; Aldrich and Fiol 1994; and Rao 1998). DiMaggio (1988) provides a good description of this process. First, actors define a project. Second, they gain support for their project from subsidiary actors or backers. Finally, in tandem with backers, they bargain for support and acceptance from external constituencies; that is, from individuals and organizations that have a stake in the organizational field affected. Politically skilled actors are the driving forced behind this process; and their talents at framing (Rao 1998; Thorton 2002) and convincing others of the need for change (Fligstein 1996) are crucial for this process to succeed.
Accumulating builds on the work of scholars interested in innovation, particularly Van de Ven and colleagues in the Minnesota Innovation Research Program. They argue that the origin of new industries cannot be traced back to a few key entrepreneurs. There is not one single thread or project but a web of independent actions and interactions of numerous reflective public, private, and professional actors over extended periods of time (Van de Ven and Garud 1989; 1993; 1994; Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, and Venkataraman 1999). These actions and interactions accumulateprobabilistically and overtime, result in a dominant design (Tushman and Anderson 1986) which is then diffused and replicated (Rosemberg 1983; Van de Ven and Garud 1993). This model describes the systematic nature of technological advances shown by Hugues (1983) in his studies on electrical power, or Kuhn (1962) on the evolution of science in general (Van de Ven and Garud 1994).
Finally, convening is inspired by the work of scholars interested in processes of organizing to solve complex social problems. Usually, these scholars refer to the seminal articles of Emery and Trist (1965) and Trist (1983) which concern the need to undertake processes of field reorganization (such as establishing cooperative inter-organizational links) to define institutional arrangements that will solve complex social problems. Scholars in this research tradition suggest that institutional change—the kind of change required to bring solutions to complex problems—requires the creation of interorganizational arrangements which then can jumpstart a process of change. Scholars have studied the creation of such organizational arrangements around environmental problems (Westley and Vredenburg 1991; 1997), refugee issues (Lawrence and Hardy 1999); urban problems (Gray 1989), and development challenges (Brown 1991; Brown and Ashman 1996).
In these organizational fields, change agents do not garner resources for a specific project. Instead, they activate collaborative initiatives (Brown 1980; Gray 1989; Waddock 1993). The creation of these collaborative initiatives does not involve convincing stakeholders in the field of the desirability and viability of a project. Instead, it involves convincing them of the desirability and viability of collaborating to jumpstart the development of a solution to a problem (Waddock 1993; Brown and Ashman 1996). For example, these processes may involve the creation of an international network of organizations interested in endangered species that recurrently meet to exchange information as opposed to the development of a solution to the problem of species in danger of extinction (Westley and Vredenburg 1997).
As in leverage, politically skilled actors are supposed to be instrumental for this process to succeed. These actors have been described as “the catalytic agent(s) bridging unaware, unsure or sceptical actors to explore the possibilities of cooperation” (Kalegaonkar and Brown 2000:9). Their effectiveness depends on (1) the credibility they have among the parties involved, (2) their familiarity with the problem being addressed, and (3) their position as a balanced or unbiased party (Kalegaonkar and Brown 2000; Gray 1985). They are also quick to appreciate the beneficial impact of mutual exchange, proficient at scanning the environment surrounding the collaboration; and skilled in appraising the consequences of contemplated future actions (Friend, Power, and Yewlett 1974; Emery 1982; Gray 1985).