Brewer p.1
Sydney Symposium in Social Psychology
University of New South Wales
March, 2001
Inclusion and Distinctiveness Motives in Interpersonal and Collective Identities
Marilynn B. Brewer
Ohio State University
The concept of social identity represents an important link between the psychology of the self and the psychology of group behavior and intergroup relations. As originally defined by Tajfel (1981), social identity is “…that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group... together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (p. 255; emphasis added). This definition implicated cognitive, affective, and motivationalprocesses in the meaning of social identity itself. Nonetheless, further theorizing on the construct (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) focused almost exclusively on the cognitive bases of social identity, redefining it as a self-representation derived from ingroup-outgroup categorization per se. Taken to its extreme, this perspective implies that a salient ingroup-outgroup distinction is both necessary and sufficient to engage self-categorization and associated social identification processes. Indeed, there is evidence that any association between the self and a group label automatically activates differential evaluation of the ingroup and outgroup as would be expected if social identity were engaged (e.g., Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 1999; Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999).
In my view, however, social identification entails more than automatic evaluative biases derived from associations with the self and a positive self-concept. In its more extended meaning, social identity is a transformation of the construal of the self to a level more inclusive than that of the individual self, with a concomitant shift from self-interest to group-interest as the basic motivation for behavior (Brewer, 1991; Kramer & Brewer, 1986). Because group identity sometimes entails self-sacrifice in the interests of group welfare and solidarity, understanding why and when individuals are willing to relegate their sense of self to significant group identities requires motivational as well as cognitive analysis. Motivational explanations are needed to account for why ingroup categorization does not always lead to identification and ingroup favoritism and why individuals are more chronically identified with some ingroups rather than others.
Motivational Theories of Social Identification
The motivational concept most associated with social identity theory is that of self-esteem enhancement. And it is true that initial development of social identity theory (e.g., Turner, 1975; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) implicated self-esteem in postulating a need for “positive distinctiveness” in ingroup-outgroup comparisons. However, it is not clear from these writings whether positive self-esteem was being invoked as a motive for social identity itself, or as a motive for ingroup favoritism given that social identity had been engaged. Whatever the original intent, subsequent research on the role of self-esteem in ingroup bias has generally supported the idea that enhanced self-esteem may be a consequence of achieving a positively distinct social identity, but there is little evidence that the need to increase self-esteem motivates social identification in the first place (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). To the contrary, there is considerable evidence that individuals often identify strongly with groups that are disadvantaged, stigmatized, or otherwise suffer from negative intergroup comparison (e.g., Crocker et al., 1994; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984).
Given the inadequacy of self-esteem as an explanation for why social identity is engaged, other motives have been proposed that do not require positive ingroup status as a basis for attachment to groups and self-definition as a group member. One proposal is that group identity meets fundamental needs for reducing uncertainty and achieving meaning and clarity in social contexts (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg & Mullin, 1999). In support of this hypothesis, Hogg and his colleagues (Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Mullin & Hogg, 1998) have generated compelling evidence that identification and ingroup bias in the minimal group paradigm are increased under conditions of high cognitive uncertainty and reduced or eliminated when uncertainty is low. And it is undoubtedly true that one function that group memberships and identities serve for individuals is that of providing self-definition and guidance for behavior in otherwise ambiguous social situations (Deaux et al., 1999; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000). However, group identity is only one of many possible modes of reducing social uncertainty. Roles, values, laws, etc. serve a similar function without necessitating social identification processes. Thus, uncertainty reduction alone cannot account for the pervasiveness of group identification as fundamental aspect of human life.
Uncertainty reduction as a theory of social identity places the explanation for group identification in a system of cognitive motives that includes needs for meaning, certainty, and structure. An alternative perspective is that the motivation for social identification arises from even more fundamental needs for security and safety. Consistent with this idea, Baumeister and Leary (1995) postulate a universal need for belonging as an aspect of human nature derived from our vulnerability as lone individuals who require connection with others in order to survive. But belonging alone cannot account for the selectivity of social identification, since any and all group memberships should satisfy the belonging motive. My own theory (Brewer, 1991) postulates that the need for belonging and inclusion is paired with an opposing motive—the need for differentiation--that together regulate the individual’s social identity and attachment to social groups.
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory
The theory of optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991; Brewer, 1993; Brewer & Pickett, 1999) is based on the thesis that distinctiveness per se is a factor underlying the selection and strength of social identities, independent of the positive evaluation associated with membership in particular social categories. According to the optimal distinctiveness model, social identities derive "from a fundamental tension between human needs for validation and similarity to others (on the one hand) and a countervailing need for uniqueness and individuation (on the other)" (Brewer, 1991, p. 477). More specifically, it is proposed that social identities are selected and activated to the extent that they help to achieve a balance between needs for inclusion and for differentiation in a given social context.
The basic premise of the optimal distinctiveness model is that the two identity needs (inclusion/assimilation and differentiation/distinctiveness) are independent and work in opposition to motivate group identification. Individuals seek social inclusion in order to alleviate or avoid the isolation or stigmatization that may arise from being highly individuated. In their review of the literature on social attachment, Baumeister and Leary (1995) conclude that "existing evidence supports the hypothesis that the need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation" (p. 497). And researchers studying the effects of tokenism and solo status have generally found that individuals are both uncomfortable and cognitively disadvantaged in situations in which they feel too dissimilar from others. On the other hand, too much similarity or excessive deindividuation provides no basis for comparative appraisal or self-definition and hence individuals are also uncomfortable in situations in which they lack distinctiveness (Fromkin, 1972). Arousal of either motive will be associated with negative affect and should motivate change in level of self identification.
One dimension along which social identities can vary is the degree of inclusiveness of the social category in which one is classified. Some categorizations refer to broadly inclusive social groupings that include a large number of individuals with only a few characteristics held in common (e.g., gender, racial categories, national groups); other categories are relatively exclusive, based on highly distinctive characteristics or multiple shared features (e.g., deaf persons, Mensa members, Baptist Korean-Americans). Within any social context, categories at different levels of inclusiveness can be identified, either hierarchically (e.g., in a gathering of academics, subgroups are differentiated in terms of academic discipline) or orthogonally (e.g., among social psychologists, those who are sailing enthusiasts constitute a cross-cutting category membership). The question is, at what level of inclusion are social identities most likely to be established?
The theory of optimal distinctiveness takes into account the role of the relative distinctiveness/ inclusiveness of a social category as a factor in social identification. Within a given social context, or frame of reference, an individual can be categorized (by self or others) along a dimension of social distinctiveness-inclusiveness that ranges from uniqueness (i.e., features that distinguish the individual from any other persons in the social context) at one extreme, to total submersion in the social context at the other. Satisfaction of the drive toward social assimilation is directly related to level of inclusiveness, whereas satisfaction of self-differentiation needs is inversely related to level of inclusiveness.
Optimal identities are those that satisfy the need for inclusion within the ingroup and simultaneously serve the need for differentiation through distinctions between the ingroup and outgroups. Individuals will resist being identified with social categorizations that are either too inclusive or too differentiating but will define themselves in terms of social identities that are optimally distinctive. To satisfy the needs simultaneously, individuals will select group identities that are inclusive enough that they have a sense of being part of a larger collective but exclusive enough that they provide some basis for distinctiveness from others.
Testing Motivational Models
One source of evidence for the validity of the optimal distinctiveness model is the pervasive finding in the ingroup bias literature that individuals favor and identify more with relatively small, minority groups compared to large, relatively undistinct majority groups (Bettencourt, Miller, & Hume, 1999; Leonardelli & Brewer, 2000; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Furthermore, this preference for minority group identities is stronger when the need for differentiation has been aroused by a recent deindividuation experience (Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993). However, these studies provide only indirect evidence that needs for inclusion and differentiation are implicated in the selection of distinctive social identities. Membership in small, distinct groups may serve a number of different identity needs, any of which may account for the effect of ingroup size. Thus, more direct tests of the motivational properties of inclusion and differentiation are needed to place ODT on firmer footing as a theory of social identity.
According to Baumeister and Leary (1995) a fundamental human motivation should “elicit goal-oriented behavior designed to satisfy it” (p. 498). Integral to optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991) is the idea that the way that humans go about satisfying both their inclusion and differentiation needs is by identifying with social groups that are optimal in being neither too distinct nor too inclusive. Equilibrium is maintained by correcting for deviations from optimality. A situation in which a person is overly individuated will excite the need for assimilation, motivating the person to adopt a more inclusive social identity. Conversely, situations that arouse feelings of deindividuation or overinclusion will activate the need for differentiation, resulting in a search for more exclusive or distinct identities. Thus, the model is testable as a theory of human motivation by demonstrating that deprivation of either the need for inclusion or the need for differentiation results in efforts to achieve or restore optimal social identities.
One method for assessing the motivational properties of inclusion and differentiation is to activate one motive or the other and then test whether individuals shift their social identity preferences in the direction of more or less inclusive groups (depending on which motive has been aroused). Evidence supporting this prediction was obtained in a set of studies by Pickett, Silver, and Brewer (2000). In two studies, activation of the need for inclusion or the need for differentiation was experimentally manipulated by telling participants that their personality type was either very unusual or very common (Experiment 1) or by reminding them of past experiences in which they had felt either too different from others or too undifferentiated from others (Experiment 2). Following this motive induction, participants rated the importance and level of identification with various social categories to which they belonged, some of which were relatively inclusive (e.g., age cohort, nationality) and some relatively small or exclusive (e.g., honors students, sports club). Consistent with ODT predictions, motive condition and group characteristics interacted to determine importance and identification. In general, participants in the need for differentiation activation conditions increased ratings of their exclusive group memberships and decreased ratings of large, amorphous group memberships in comparison with participants in either the need for inclusion or control (no need arousal) conditions. Participants in the need for inclusion activation conditions, on the other hand, showed greater increases in level of identification with their large social category memberships
A second way in which individuals can respond to arousal of inclusion or differentiation needs is to redefine an existing important social identity so that it better satisfies the temporarily activated motive state. One interesting demonstration of this mechanism was obtained in a third experiment conducted by Pickett, Silver, and Brewer (2000). Following experimental manipulation of need for inclusion or differentiation, participants were asked whether they endorsed policies that would either restrict or enlarge the enrollment in their university, and were also asked to estimate the current size of the university study body. Consistent with ODT, participants in the need for differentiation activation condition endorsed greater restrictiveness of policies compared to those in the need for inclusion or control conditions. Further, participants in the need for assimilation condition perceived the ingroup to be much larger (M = 44,816), than did participants in the no need arousal condition (M = 34,970) while participants in the need for differentiation condition perceived it to be much smaller (M = 26,434). Enrollment records indicate that the actual number of undergraduates at the time the study was conducted was 35,647. Thus, whereas participants in the no need arousal condition were quite accurate in their estimates of ingroup size, participants in the need for assimilation condition tended to greatly overestimate ingroup size (by approximately 8,500 students) and need for differentiation participants tended to greatly underestimate ingroup size (by approximately 9,500 students). Subjective estimates were apparently influenced by the need to satisfy temporarily activated needs for greater inclusion or greater differentiation.
Restoring Optimal Identities: Review of a Research Paradigm
The findings regarding size estimates described above demonstrate how an existing social identity can be modified to meet temporary activation of inclusion or differentiation motives. These results were particularly strong for students who were highly identified with their university to begin with. This effect suggested another research paradigm for assessing the consequences of threatening the optimality of an existing social identity by reducing inclusiveness or distinctiveness of that particular social group. The general logic of this paradigm is represented schematically in Figure 1.
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The paradigm starts with the assumption that optimal identities are ones which are both sufficiently inclusive and sufficiently differentiated from outgroups to meet both inclusion and differentiation needs. Under these optimal conditions, the opposing motives are balanced and neither is activated. Hence, salience of an optimally distinctive social identity should be associated with low arousal of identity needs. Given the two criteria for optimality, there are two ways in which the optimality of a given social identity can be threatened or challenged. On the one hand, as represented on the left hand side of Figure 1, the inclusiveness of the individual’s group membership can be decreased by assignment to a more distinct (less inclusive) subgroup of the original social category. This should arouse the need for inclusion and efforts to restore assimilation to the larger social group. On the other hand, as represented on the right hand side of Figure 1, optimality can be challenged by decreasing the differentiation between the ingroup and a larger more inclusive social category. This should arouse the need for differentiation and similar efforts to restore ingroup distinctiveness.
When an optimal identity is threatened in either case, individuals should show evidence of efforts to subjectively re-define the ingroup in a way that restores both inclusion and differentiation. Interestingly, many of the same mechanisms can serve both purposes. Based on the accentuation principle (Tajfel, 1978), assimilation within categories and contrast between categories are complementary processes. Intragroup assimilation serves to enhance contrast between categories, and intergroup contrast permits assimilation of differences within category boundaries. As a consequence, either mechanism can enhance ingroup inclusion (assimilation) and intergroup distinctiveness (contrast). Thus, we would predict that threatening optimal identities either by arousing the need for differentiation or the need for inclusion should result in efforts to restore the cohesion and solidarity of the ingroup by enhancing ingroup similarity/homogeneity and by enhancing ingroup exclusiveness and differentiation from outgroups.
Consequences of Arousing Inclusion and Distinctiveness Motives for Judgments of Group Homogeneity
We designed a study to test the prediction that the desire to achieve greater intragroup assimilation or greater intergroup differentiation would lead to motivated changes in perceptions of group homogeneity (Pickett & Brewer, in press). Enhancement of both ingroup and outgroup homogeneity increases intergroup contrast, which becomes particularly important when the distinctiveness of a particular social identity is threatened. However, enhancing homogeneity of both ingroup and outgroup also serves the inclusion motive. The perception that “we are all alike”—can help to re-establish secure inclusion within the group for an individual whose assimilation motive has been aroused. Further, perceiving the outgroup as homogeneous increases intergroup contrast, which also reinforces intragroup assimilation within the ingroup.