Plato’s Euthyprho

Reading Guide

The first and the most important thing we need to do when reading a philosophical text is to locate the key questions and then clarify what is being asked. Having done that, the next step is to identify the answers that are being put forward. In a conversation such as the one that is taking place between Socrates and Euthyphro, we shouldn’t be surprised to find that they consider several possible answers. In this reading guide we’ll mark the key questions, assumptions and answers in bold face type. You should go ahead and mark the questions and answers in your texts by putting a line under them or a star in the margin next to them with a note that this is a key question or answer. Once we have arrived at a clearer understanding of the key questions and purported answers, the next step will be to work through the main reasons that are being given on each side for thinking that that a given answer is adequate or inadequate.

  1. The first part of the dialogue serves as an introduction to the characters, the topic of discussion, and the questions they propose to address. The dialogue opens with Euthyphro and Socrates running into each other on the way to the Athenian courts. In the first few pages, we discover that Socrates is heading to the courts to face charges that are being brought against him, and that Euthyphro is heading to the courts in order to prosecute his own father.
  2. Euthyphro claims that he knows, with complete certainty, that his action of prosecuting his father is pious. He also knows his father’s action was unjust. His father left a servant by the road with his hands and feet bound while waiting for a messenger to return from the magistrate. This caused the death of the servant. The reason the father did this was the servant killed a slave in a drunken rage.
  3. A philosophical question is implied by what Socrates asks at 4e. He asks Euthyphro if his “knowledge of the divine, and of piety and impiety, is so accurate that, when those things happened as you say, you have no fear of having acted impiously in bringing your father to trial?” What is necessary for someone, like Euthyphro, to know that his own action is pious and that his father’s actions were unjust?
  4. Socrates seems to have doubts about whether or not Euthyphro is doing the right thing. It is reasonable to suppose that Euthyphro’s father, mother, and the other members of his family, all have similar doubts. Is it reasonable for Euthyphro to have such confidence in his claim to knowledge if others have such doubts?
  5. Question #1 (5c-d): Socrates asks a more general question. What is piety? In a similar vein, we can ask: What is the nature of justice? Piety and Justice are taken to be virtues of character. As such, there is a more general question lurking in the background: What, in general, is the nature of virtue?
  6. What reason do we have for thinking that this if the main question being asked in the first part of the dialogue? First of all, we can see that this question is more general than the question that was asked earlier. What is more, it is a harder question.
  7. Most importantly, it is the question that Socrates focuses on for the next several pages. In fact, it is the main question that he is trying to answer throughout the dialogue.
  8. Socrates asks: “Is the pious the same and alike in every action? Is all that is impious the opposite of all that is pious? Does everything that is to be impious present us with one form or appearance insofar as it is impious?” Euthyphro agrees with Socrates: the answer to each of these three questions is “Yes.” Key Assumptions: first, the pious is the same and alike in every action. Second, all that is impious is the opposite of all that is pious. Third, everything that is to be impious presents us with one form or appearance insofar as it is impious.
  9. In order to understand rest of the dialogue, we need to see that Euthyphro and Socrates are working on these three assumptions. For the sake of reading the dialogue, the reader needs to be willing work from these assumptions—even if the reader doesn’t agree with Socrates and Euthyphro.
  10. What are they agreeing to when they adopt this assumption? It is not obvious what Socrates means when he asks if piety has one form. Let us consider two examples to see what he might mean.
  11. First example: suppose two people step into a field filled with animals, all of which appear to be fairly similar. If one asks, “What kind of animals are these?” and the other answers “They are all horses, except the one right in front of us, which is a mule” we are faced with a similar question. What is necessary for this person to make a legitimate claim to the possession of knowledge concerning the nature of horses generally?
  12. Second example: suppose two people step into a laboratory in the chemistry department and see a vial of a clear liquid, a fairly clear block of a cold solid in a tray, and a light gaseous steam coming from a heated flask. If the first person asks, “What is the composition of these things?” and the second answers “I know that all three--this solid, this liquid and this gas--are all water,” we are faced with a question. What is necessary for this person to make a legitimate claim to the possession of knowledge concerning the nature of water generally?
  13. In both cases, we see that the possession of knowledge about the particular case—that this liquid is water, and that this animal is a horse—depends upon the possession of knowledge about something general. The person who really knows what makes a horse a horse would be able to give a general definition of the species horse. The person who really knows what makes a sample of water the kind of thing that it is can give a general definition of water. The person might, for instance, give a definition based upon the molecular structure, saying that all water is composed of two atoms of hydrogen attached to one atom of oxygen.
  14. When we use the term ‘definition,’ we might mean one of two things. First, the verbal definition of a word is an explanation of how we typically use the word in conversation. Second, the real definition of a conception is an explanation of what it really is. It is an account of the true answer to the question: “What kind of thing is water?” What kind of definition is Socrates searching for when he asks for the definition of piety? Is he looking for the verbal definition of the term ‘piety’, or is he searching for the real definition of what piety really is?
  15. It is quite clear that Socrates is searching for an adequate definition of piety. What is necessary to have knowledge of the real nature of piety? The idea expressed in Assumption #1 is that there is one form, or one standard of the truth of the matter. In order to have knowledge of the general nature of piety, there would have to be a truth of the matter, and one would have to possess an adequate understanding of the standard of the truth. One clear sign that you grasp the standard of the truth is that you can explain it by giving an adequate definition of what piety really is. As such, Socrates is offering part of an answer to Question #1: In order to know whether an individual action is pious or just, one would have to know what piety and justice are generally.
  16. Some students might be of the opinion that there is no true answer to the question “What is piety? or to the question “What is justice?” Such students might very well think there are true answers to questions about the chemical nature of water or the biological nature of horses. Is there really a true answer when it comes to ethical questions about how we ought to live? Or, is really just a matter of personal opinion?
  17. For the sake of understanding this dialogue, it is essential that you start by setting aside presuppositions that are contrary to those guiding the discussion. Socrates and Euthyphro have agreed to Assumption #1. When we have come to a better understanding of the dialogue, we can step back and ask questions based on assumptions that are different from those adopted by the author of the text. For now, however, it is important that we work from the assumptions adopted by Plato as we try to understand the meaning of the Euthyphro.
  1. Euthyphro’s first definition of piety is offered as an answer to Question #1 (5e): “I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else; not to prosecute is impious.”
  2. Socrates asks if there are many different examples of pious actions, and Euthyphro agrees. This suggests Euthyphro’s answer is inadequate. The reason is not due to the fact that the actions Euthyphro mentions--such as prosecuting someone for murder or for temple robbery--are impious. Rather, Euthyphro has given the wrong kind of answer. Socrates and Euthyphro started off agreeing that piety must have one form that makes all pious actions pious. If someone, such as Euthyphro, claims to possess knowledge of piety, then that person would need to understand the form of piety.
  3. One of the reasons Euthyphro has such confidence when he makes claims about having knowledge of the nature of piety is that he thinks he has a special understanding of the Athenian gods. Euthyphro knows that Zeus castrated his father, Cronos, for having unjustly swallowed one of his own sons. As such, Euthyphro thinks that his own action of prosecuting his father for killing the servant is similar to Zeus’s action of castrating his father. Euthyphro is firm in claiming that he knows many things about the gods, including the fact that the stories told by the poets to the effect that the gods have gone to war against each other really are true stories.
  4. At this point, Socrates restates his request (6e): “Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it, and using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not.” Euthyphro offers the following as a reply. Answer #1: “what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious.” Socrates indicates that this is the right kind of answer. It might not be the correct answer, but it is the right kind of answer because it is a general answer to the general question.
  5. Let’s try to clarify what Euthyphro means when he says that the pious is what is dear to the gods. To say that something is dear to the gods is to say that is loved and cherished by the gods, and to say that some thing is hated by the gods is to say that they despise it. On Euthyphro’s account, to say that some things are pious—such as praying and offering sacrifices to the gods—is to say that the gods look with great favor on these kinds of actions. To say that something is impious--such as desecrating a temple—is to say that the gods despise such actions. This account locates the nature of what is pious and impious in the feelings, attitudes, emotions and desires of the gods.
  6. So far, we’ve located the key question and identified the first answer. What is more, we’ve tried to clarify what was being asked in the questions and what was being offered in the answer. The next step is to see if the person who is offering the answer has given us any reasons for thinking it is the right answer to the question.
  7. Socrates asks us to examine three claims. First, Socrates and Euthyphro have agreed to a key assumption to the effect that the pious and the impious are opposites. Second, Euthyphro insists that he knows the stories about the gods to the effect that are sometimes in discord and fight with one another are definitely true stories. Third, Euthyphro claims that the pious is what is loved by the gods and the impious is what is hated by the gods. Socrates seems to think there is a problem here. Let’s try to figure out what the problem is.
  8. Starting with the second and third claims, Socrates points out that the Athenian gods are thought to be similar to us in the following respect. The things that they fight over are the very things that they love and hate.
  9. We don’t fight over the answers to following kinds of questions: Which number is greater? Which object is larger and which is smaller? Which object is heavier and which is lighter? We don’t fight over such matters because whenever these kinds of questions arise, we can find the answer by counting the number, measuring the lengths, and weighing the objects. In each case, we would apply some standard to as a basis for counting, measuring or weighing. What is more, these aren’t the kinds of things that get us riled up and lead us into discord with one another.
  10. Rather, we have disputes over what is just and unjust, what is beautiful and ugly, and what is good and bad. Like us, the gods love what is just, beautiful and good, and they hate what is unjust, ugly and bad. They care very deeply about these matters and, when they are unable to resolve their differences, they tend to be drawn into conflict with one another.
  11. What is the problem here? Socrates tries to explain the basis of the problem at 8a-b. He is giving some reasons for thinking there is something wrong with Euthyphro’s account of piety. In order to figure out what it is, it will help to do two things. First, try to state the reasons Socrates is giving in a clear order. Second, whenever you are faced with a series of points that are hard to make out, try to provide a diagram that shows what is entailed by those reasons.
  12. If we collect all three of the claims Euthyphro has made and agreed to in one place, we should be able to see that all three can’t be true. There is a contradiction in the claims. First: piety and impiety are opposites. Second, piety is what is loved by the gods and impiety is what is hated by the gods. Third, the gods are sometimes in conflict about what they love and hate.
  13. Try to diagram the relationship that holds between piety and impiety and compare it to the relationship between what is loved the gods and what is hated by the gods. If piety and impiety are opposites, there is no room for a middle class between these two. The middle is excluded. Things are different when we come to the relation between what is loved by the gods and what is hated by the gods. Between these two extremes, there is a middle class in which some of the gods love something and some hate the very same thing. The things in this middle class are both god loved and god hated.

  1. As such, what is pious and what is loved by the gods cannot be the same. The reason is that piety and impiety are opposites and do not admit of a middle class, while what is loved by the gods and what is hated by the gods are not opposites because these do admit of a middle class where the gods are in conflict.
  1. Euthyphro tries to modify his account in order to respond to the objection. He says that the pious is what is loved by all the gods and the impious is what is hated by all the gods. He doesn’t tell us what to do with the middle class, where some of the gods love something and some of the gods hate it. At 9c, Socrates seems to think the problem remains, but he doesn’t insist on the point. Instead, he asks another question.
  2. Question #2 (9a): “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?”
  3. Euthyphro indicates that he doesn’t understand the meaning of the question. It isn’t yet clear because he is so confused, but Euthyphro seems to be assuming that the latter is true: something is pious because it is loved by the gods. In other words, it is the activity by the gods of loving certain things that we do--such as giving prayers--that makes such actions pious.
  4. In order to illustrate the point, Socrates makes a comparison between three things: of something carried and something carrying, of something led and something leading, and of something seen and something seeing. Socrates says that there is a difference between the first in each pair and the second, and Euthyphro says that he thinks he understands the difference.
  5. At first glance, the difference seems to consist in the following. The first item in each pair is an activity that is done by an agent. The second item is the property the object has when the activity is being done to it.
  6. Clearly, the object has the property of being carried because there is an agent that is carrying it around.