The concessions in the newest version include a call for a Council decision “to convene immediately upon receipt of a report [of Iraqi non-compliance]… in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to restore international peace and security.” This was Washington’s incomplete answer to France’s demand for a two-resolution process, in which a second Council resolution would be required to judge whether Iraq was indeed in violation, as well as to determine what the consequences of any such violation would be. The current language, calling only for the “convening” of the Council, falls far short. There is no reference to an actual formal meeting being required, and more importantly, there is no reference to a Council decision being required to determine whether or not an Iraqi violation noted by the arms inspectors constitutes “material breach” at all, and if so what the appropriate response should be.

The other concessions had all been made last week, before the intensely awaited “final” U.S. draft was submitted. They included elimination of the call for UN member states (read: the U.S.) to provide military escorts and military “protection” for the UN arms inspectors, and a slight softening (though not elimination) of the inspectors’ authority to interview Iraqi scientists and their families outside the country and provide asylum if desired.

The resolution reflects the enormous international and domestic opposition to the Bush administration’s stated goal of war against Iraq – dressed up in the prim language of “regime change.” While the Republican sweep of the mid-term election will certainly further empower the administration’s most unilateralist voices, the recognition of diminishing public support in the U.S. for a solo attack without the UN or allied support may act as a brake on that trajectory.

So far neither France nor Russia has indicated willingness to accept the resolution as currently drafted. Russia’s deputy foreign minister said, “we still believe it is vital that the new resolution contain no automatic mechanism in using force.” The French foreign minister, while indicating progress had been made on France’s demand for a two-step process, said that France had “very wide backing among members of the Security Council” in opposing anything in the text that would provide automatic recourse to military force. The existing text does not include such explicit recourse to force. The problem is that the U.S. has made clear its position that it has the right to determine alone whether Iraq is in “material breach,” AND whether to go to war in response. Nothing in the resolution text specifically rejects that claim, or asserts the legitimacy of the Council as a whole to make such decisions instead of the U.S. alone.

In fact, the resolution says nothing that would authorize a U.S. call to war.

But the danger remains. The crucial factor remains whether the combination of international legality at the Security Council, massive international opposition at both the governmental and popular levels, and the pressure of a growing anti-war movement in the U.S., will be enough to restrain a newly emboldened Republican juggernaut. At the end of the day, the question is whether Washington can be forced to accept UN Security Council jurisdiction as paramount, or will Washington continue to claim that UN decisions do not “handcuff” any U.S. decision for war?

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