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TITLE
Immigration and Transnational Political Ties:
Croatians and Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada
AUTHOR
Dr. Sarah V. Wayland, Research Associate
Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition
McMaster University
1280 Main Street West
Hamilton, ON L8S 4M4
Phone905-522-5439 (h)
Please direct any correspondence to this address: 58 Mountain Ave.
Hamilton, ON L8P 4G2
BIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT
Sarah V. Wayland obtained her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Maryland. She has held teaching appointments at the University of Toronto, Brock University, and McMaster University. Her published articles address various aspects of immigration, citizenship, ethnic conflict, and diaspora politics in the Canadian and European contexts.
SUBMISSION DATE
June 12, 2003
IMMIGRATION AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL TIES:
CROATIANS AND SRI LANKAN TAMILS IN CANADA
Every year, persons from hundreds of regions of the world migrate across national boundaries to make new lives for themselves and their families. Most of them move to large urban centers such as Toronto where the presence of ethnic associations, ethnic neighborhoods, and informal networks facilitate adaptation to the new society.[1] Aided by these same ethnic networks, migrants often maintain a variety of connections to the homeland or sending state. Though integration or acculturation usually occurs in the succeeding generations, persons may maintain a keen interest in homeland affairs, including politics, particularly if there is a situation of ethnic conflict or violence involving members of the same group. The millions of refugees and exiles whose movements were spawned by circumstances in their home countries rather than by the wish to forge a new life elsewhere may especially continue to feel political loyalty to the homeland. The result has been the creation of Janus-faced communities, whose attention focuses simultaneously on their situation in the country of settlement and transnationally on their homeland as well as on kindred ethnic groups in the diaspora.[2]
This article analyses the transnational dimensions of immigrant politics by comparing two ethnic groups in Canada (primarily Toronto): Croatians and Sri Lankan Tamils. These differ in terms of the conditions of departure from the homeland, the time of their migration, and regional as well as ethnic origins. Yet members of both groups have been highly mobilized around issues in Canada as well as observing and even participating in wars for political autonomy and independence by ethnic kindred in the homeland. Both groups also migrated from states, where little ethnonationalist[3] expression was allowed, to Canada, a pluralistic society with an official policy of Multiculturalism since 1971. Finally, despite most Croatians having arrived in Canada at least a generation before the Tamils, both groups were very active in homeland politics during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, an independent Croatia was founded in 1991, while Tamils have engaged in a violent struggle to create a separate state of Eelam on the island of Sri Lanka since at least 1983. Croatians in Canada intensified transnational links as a consequence of independence, while Tamils -- almost all of whom have come to Canada since 1983 -- have maintained intense ties since the time of migration.
These marked similarities between Croatians and Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada raises a number of questions about trajectories of incorporation and homeland political ties among ethnonational groups in the diaspora.[4] What types of homeland-oriented political activities occur? Does mobilization decline as members of a group become more established in Canada? If so, might it be triggered anew by events in the homeland? Lastly, do diasporas transmit democratic values from Canada to homelands undergoing political transition? In this article, I make some answers to these timely and important questions by drawing on the examples of one well-established immigrant community (that also experienced significant immigration in the 1990s), and one newer but rapidly growing ethnic group in Canada. In brief, this is a preliminary attempt to sketch out some of the various conditions under which groups maintain transnational political ties and the forms (symbolic, financial, ideological, etc.) these ties assume.
Conceptual Framework
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Until recently, the vast majority of immigration research in the advanced industrialized democracies focused on conditions of migration and settlement[5] and either overlooked altogether the existence of transnational ties or discounted their ongoing importance. This has also been true in Canada, where studies have, by and large, failed to consider those factors that situate ethnic groups in global processes. Instead, research has focused mainly on the internal dynamics of ethnic communities and intergroup relations.[6] Rather than viewing ethnonationalist sentiments and expressions as antithetical to the immigrant adaptation process, I argue that transnationalism should be seen as playing a central and continuous role in the construction of immigrant identity. Whereas “immigrant” connotes someone in terms of their relations with the receiving state and society, the terms “diaspora” and “transnational” acknowledge that communities settled outside their natal territories maintain some level of ties with their place of origin. The homeland has some claim on their loyalty, emotions, and identity.[7]
Transnationalism challenges the socio-spatial assumptions of community.[8] Kurds in Germany may view themselves as having more in common with Kurds in Turkey or France than with their own next-door neighbours. (Whether or not this is actually true could be the subject of an interesting cross-national study.) Members of an ethnonationalist group dispersed throughout the world are able to maintain ties through publications, websites, and chat groups on the Internet. Thus, their communities transcend physical space, reaching across international borders and incorporating members based on ethnonational identities.
This challenges our assumptions about the territorial dimension of politics as well. One scholar of transnationalism asserts: “The blurring of once taken-for-granted boundaries differentiating states, ethnicities, and civil societies is producing new spaces of daily life, new sources of cultural meaning, and new forms of social and political agency that flow across national borders.”[9] Political activities are thus occurring outside the territory of the nation-state, where they are thus often more difficult to monitor and control by the state. As well, new arenas for political expression are opened, particularly for ethnonationalist communities that did not enjoy freedom of expression in the homeland. They can take advantage of freedoms of assembly, the press, and other forms of expression, and lobby the receiving state to implement desired foreign policies toward the homeland. Lastly -- aided by the existence of trans-state networks of communication, travel, political support, material assistance, and the possession of dual citizenship or residencies -- diaspora networks may generate loyalties in tension with allegiance to the territorial state.[10]
Indeed, globalization -- defined as “the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependences that characterize modern social life,” including the decline of geographical constraints[11] -- has enabled diasporas to become important international political forces. Globalization has facilitated the extent and the influence of diasporas as political agents in several ways. First, advances in communications, transport, and finance mean that diasporas are able to act internationally without the consent of the states in which they reside. Policy-makers in the receiving state face increasing limits on their abilities to pressure immigrants and their descendants to sever ties with their homelands. Second, these same globalizing factors enable migrants to retain an interest in homeland politics. Events in the country of origin seem closer than ever before. As such, it is possible that diasporas are not only able to maintain overseas contacts more easily, but that they are able to maintain these contacts for longer periods than was previously the case. This would especially seem to be true in the case of diaspora groups which have formed as a result of civil strife in the home country. Third, diasporas can generate the original impetus for ethnic mobilization and, eventually, secession. For example, Sikh mobilization for an independent Khalistan in India originated in the expatriate community rather than from within the Punjab itself.[12] Similarly, a distinct Sri Lankan Tamil identity -- as opposed to a Tamil identity that includes Tamils in southern India -- has in large part been created by Tamils overseas who have written extensively on Tamil history and ideology, and whose work circulates widely.[13]
One should not, however, overestimate the effects of globalization. While factors related to globalization have facilitated the political activities of diasporas as well as drawn attention to them, diasporas have long been active in homeland politics, and it is too soon to ascertain the extent to which globalization has significantly altered the effects of these activities. Moreover, just as there are new resources at the disposal of diaspora groups, especially via the Internet, these resources are also available to political adversaries.
Ironically, while diaspora activity poses challenges to territorially-bound politics, the goals of these mobilizing groups usually involve territory. Their activities may transcend space, but ethnonational identity is by definition rooted in territory. As van der Veer asserts:
A major feature of nationalism is the politics of space. Bordered territory symbolizes the fixity, stability, and sovereignty of the nation-state, so that borders have become the contested sites for international warfare, refugees, and immigration policies. Those who see themselves as a nation often seek a spatial, territorial expression of the nationhood. [14]
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In brief, diaspora politics allows ethnic actors to undermine states, often from abroad, yet the actors themselves seek statehood or, at a minimum, autonomy or control over a fixed space as an expression of their ethnonational identities. Gaining sovereignty or autonomy bolsters the legitimacy of the ethnonation in question. Thus, diaspora-based ethnonationalists seek the dismemberment of a particular state, not the destruction of the state system. Though they may not favor a particular regime or state structure, they still seek to reclaim the state as a repository of their own particular identity.[15]
Even for members of the diaspora who never intend to return to the homeland, the prospect of independent statehood has many attractions. In addition to the international legitimacy it bestows upon a territory, statehood is important for reasons related to settlement in receiving societies. Multiculturalist discourse in Western states recognizes national cultures, that is, those connected to an independent nation-state. Subnational and regional cultures are sometimes not viewed as worthy of recognition, nor of government funding. Thus, members of a diaspora may utilize links with an independent ethnic homeland so as to gain respect and legitimacy in the receiving state.[16]
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The preceding discussion reveals gaps in the seminal conceptualization of diaspora by Gabriel Sheffer. Sheffer posited that diasporas were part of a triadic relationship of “ethnic diaspora - host states - homeland states” that was becoming an integral and permanent feature of domestic and international politics.[17] His focus on diasporas was perceptive, but his formulation of the triad fails to capture the reality of diaspora politics in at least three ways. First, some diaspora groups do not have direct ties to a homeland state. Many Croatians abroad under Tito’s Yugoslavia did not view his government as representative of their interests, and the Tamil diaspora today views the Sinhalese-dominated government of Sri Lanka as fundamentally opposed to the interests of Tamils. The primary homeland ties for Tamils abroad are with the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which created a de facto state in the LTTE-controlled part of the island. Thus, a diaspora’s principal ties may be with an ethnonationalist group or organization that does not recognize the legitimacy of the homeland state, and may even be trying to overthrow its own government. In situations such as this, policy-makers in the receiving states find themselves in the awkward situation of trying to maintain relations with two parties in conflict with each other. Foreign-policy decision-makers are caught in the “two-level games” situation, meaning that they are simultaneously negotiating in both the domestic and international arenas, each of which places different -- often contradictory -- pressures on them.[18] These pressures, which exist in many circumstances, become especially acute in the case of a diaspora in conflict with its own home country government.
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Secondly, the phenomenon of diaspora-diaspora ties must be considered as well. Tamils in Toronto know the dynamics of the Tamil diasporas in London, Paris, and Johannesburg; Croatian-Canadians are in contact with Croatian organizations in the United States, Australia, Germany, Hungary, and other parts of Europe and South America. These transnational networks can be especially effective in the transfer of information and news stories from the homeland as well as in maintaining a broader sense of ethnic and political solidarity among members of the diaspora. In some cases, transnational ties within the diaspora may completely take the place of links between the diaspora and the homeland. For example, one well-educated Tamil man I interviewed said that, though he followed events in Sri Lanka, he had no contact at all with anyone there.[19] His parents are no longer alive, and every one of his eight siblings (as well as his wife’s five siblings) have left the country. His case is an example of the fact that, increasingly, every Tamil who has the means to get out of Sri Lanka does so. Though they are still oriented to their homeland in the sense that it is the common reference point for exile Tamils, their daily lives have less and less to do with anything that is happening there. This would seem especially true for those who are pessimistic about the prospects for the creation of an independent Tamil homeland and, thus, of ever returning there.
Third, the conceptualization of a diaspora as a unitary actor overlooks the internal differentation and heterogeneity found within ethnic communities.[20] Class, gender, religion, political ideology and other differences are found within virtually every diaspora group. However, it is true that outsiders may find it difficult to discern the presence of competing viewpoints. When diaspora communities form because of ethnic conflict in the homeland, ethnonationalist sentiment may be so strong that it becomes difficult for members to espouse moderate or pacifist perspectives. Thus, diasporas are not monolithic, but intra-communal pressures and the lack of fora for alternative voices may contribute to the impression that they are more unified than is actually the case.
In brief, diasporas can play important political roles in a globalized world. In the case of ethnonational groups, they operate transnationally and seek recognition and legitimacy through territorial autonomy. In relations with homeland states, receiving states, ethnonational movements, and co-ethnics in the diaspora, pressure to maintain a united front to outsiders may push internal differentiation beneath the surface.
In the remainder of this paper, I present an overview of Croatian and Sri Lankan Tamil populations in Canada as a means of highlighting two groups that have maintained diasporic links. As will be shown, both had small, long-established communities in Canada that generally followed an assimilationist model of incorporation. These were later outnumbered by larger cohorts of more-recent arrivals who had a stronger sense of national pride and were more reluctant to abandon the ways of the homeland. Both communities experienced some conflicts between early and later arrivals as well as inter-generational conflicts. Lastly, both groups suffered from negative stereotyping, Croatians because of their fascist government during World War II and Tamils because of links to the LTTE as well as highly publicized activities, including murder, by some Tamil youth gangs in Toronto.
In the following section, I use existing research on Croatians to outline some general patterns of settlement, internal divisions among Croatians, and past and present political ties with Croatia. The Croatian case illustrates the presence of political transnationalism in the early twentieth century, thus serving as an important counter-example to scholars who equate the rise of diasporic politics with globalization and the telecommunications revolution. The fragmentation among those who identify themselves as Croatian-Canadian also highlights the heterogeneity within diasporic groups. Lastly, the Croatian case provides a potential model for how diaspora relations with the homeland might unfold at the end of a civil war, in this case one that led to the creation of an ethnonationally-based state.
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Croatians
According to Croatian historian Anthony Rasporich, Croatians were the most likely South Slavic people to emigrate in the twentieth century. Croatians were 25 percent of Yugoslavia’s population, but they comprised 75 percent of the emigrants from Yugoslavia between 1890 and the late 1990s.[21] Today an estimated two million Croatians live in the diaspora.[22]