Lindsay Sandoval
“Climate Science as a Culture War” Hoffman, Professor of Sustainable Enterprise at Univ. of Michigan
Thesis: climate change debate is no longer just about scientific data, but about culture, worldview and ideology
●Scientific vs. Social Consensus in the Climate Change Debate
○Scientific consensus: What scientists generally agree to be true. All science councils of G8 countries plus five other countries believe human activities have increased the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (anthropogenic causes)
○Social consensus: What the public generally agrees to be true. Public belief in anthropogenic climate change has declined from 71 to 57 percent between April 2008 and October 2009
○Social identities (political, religious, regional, age, etc.) promote certain norms that may cause individuals to reject climate science
○Politicization of Climate Change
■Conservative belief in climate change dropped from 50-30 percent between 2001-2010, while liberals jumped to 70 percent by 2010
■In other words, political ideology determines how individuals selectively interpret climate change data to align with group norms
■Logic schism: climate debate has reached a point where both sides discuss completely different issues relating to climate change, causing the debate to stall
●Cultural Processing of Climate Science
○Humans rely on ideological filters to process information. Such filters are impacted by group values, especially connections with others
○Cultural cognition: to help define the self, humans support positions of the referent group (group which they identify with)
■Achieves consistency in beliefs by seeking out and giving weight to views that align with pre-existing worldview
■“Instead of investigating a complex issue, we often simply learn what our referent group believes and seek to integrate those beliefs with our own views.”
■Filters become more stable and difficult to change over time
■Individuals also tend to reject viewpoints that conflict with worldview
○Takeaways
■CC is not a pollution issue like environmental issues of the past, but a byproduct of our economic system and our way of life (i.e. culture)
■Climate change is an existential threat
●Need to reassess our role in the ecosystem, which forces us to questions our cultural values of development, domination over nature, etc.
●Need to think about global ethics and new ways to regulate CC emissions
●Three Ways Forward
○The Optimistic: people will not have to change their lifestyles if we can invent new technologies and energy sources
○The Pessimistic: People will fight to protect their values, resulting in a logic schism between cultural groups
○Consensus-Based Form: civil debate that includes a variety of stakeholders and provides a full range of technical and social solutions
■Similar to Pielke’s “honest broker” model
■Need more research into negotiation and dispute resolution
●Techniques for Consensus-Based Discussion
○Know Your Audience –The Six Americas that require tailored messaging:
■The Alarmed: most convinced that climate change is real and are very concerned
■The Concerned: concerned about CC but see it less as a personal threat
■The Cautious: Somewhat believe CC is real but could change their minds.
■The Disengaged: Not sure if CC is happening and do not feel threatened by it
■The Dismissive: are sure CC is not real. Mostly older, educated, wealthy white men
○Asking the Right Scientific Questions
■Are greenhouse gas concentrations increasing in the atmosphere?
■Does this lead to a general warming of the climate?
■Has the climate changed over the last century?
■Are humans partially responsible for the increase?
■Will the climate continue to change over the next century?
■What will the environmental and social impacts of such changes?
○Move Beyond Data and Models
■People use reasoning to reaffirm worldview
■Must address emotions while being mindful of underlying cultural values
○Focus on Broker Frames
■Use language of cultural group (e.g. business jargon for entrepreneurs)
■Focus on optimistic frames – CC can be an opportunity to change our society for the better
■Frames can be tailored to specific audiences (e.g. moral frame for religious audiences)
■Replace the uncertainty of CC with risks of CC
○Recognize the Power of Language
■“Global Warming” is less credible among GOP than “climate change”
■“Climate denier” implies science is based on opinion rather than fact
■Explain CC in concrete and intelligible ways for laypeople
■Employ climate spokespeople who can speak to specific audiences (e.g. religious leaders, entertainers, talk show hosts, business leaders)
■Recognize multiple referent groups: appeal to other identities that may be more sympathetic to climate change action (e.g. message about children’s futures to conservative mothers)
○Employ events as leverage for change: more American now associate extreme weather events with CC
●Ending the Climate Science Wars
○Need to reduce polarization if we want to reach social consensus on CC – increased polarization will result in a logic schism
○Public knowledge eventually beat out big tobacco pseudoscience about smoking
○Social scientists must help physical scientists navigate cultural/psychological motivations of laypeople
○More social and physical scientists need to become public intellectuals
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Susie Vulpas
Kahan, D. (2012, Aug. 15). Why We Are Poles Apart on Climate Change. Nature. [HTML]
A response to media’s decision that disagreement over climate change is a result of the public’s irrationality, Kahan’s column thesis states that “the problem isn’t the public’s reasoning capacity; it’s the polluted science-communication environment that drives people apart.”
Research (the column does not specify which research) says that the divides and skepticism over climate change is actually a result of the “polluted science-communication environment.”
Kahan continues, explaining that people with different cultural values, when presented with the same information, will draw different conclusions about what the evidence shows. Sometimes, this happens by discrediting the scientist if he belongs to a different cultural group. The gap is a result of being “too rational” and filtering information to further divide ourselves from others.
Additionally, whether or not one is correct about climate change does not matter in their daily life; however, disagreeing openly with their peers could have short term and lasting negative impacts. The example used refers to a South Carolina barber who, if he were to “implore his customers to sign a petition urging Congress to take action on climate change,” he would quickly lose business.
Kahan uses the example of recent weather (the article was written August 2012 after July 2012 set heat records across the 48 contiguous states where cultural groups seemed to dictate people impressions of that heat wave.
“Positions on climate change have come to signify the kind of person one is” writes Kahan. We consult others in our social groups for information and scientific knowledge which doesn’t generally pose a problem, however, in the case of climate change, the communication environment is flooded with partisan information, causing the public to split. Unfortunately, this divide will result in inadequate policy to mitigate the risks.
Concluding, Kahan recommends an interdisciplinary approach to keeping the science communication environment clear of “divisive cultural meanings.”
Greta Zukauskaite:
Guber, D.L. (2013). A Cooling Climate for Change? Party Polarization and the Politics of Global Warming. American Behavioral Scientist, 57 (1): 93-115.
Deborah Guber’s article begins by explaining that global warming has become an intensely partisan issue. This article takes a look at party polarization and the politics of global warming after examining 3 cross-sectional polls administered by the Gallup Organization in 10 year intervals: 1990, 2000 and 2010. This article aims to place the issue of global warming in a broader political context.
The first part of the study takes a look at the declining concern for global warming over the 3 decades. It compares levels of concern Americans express for global warming in comparison to other environmental problems. It seems that today, political ideology implies how groups respond to all environmental problems, not exclusively to global warming. Therefore, a decline in peoples’ concern with global warming could also be seen in a decline in concern for other environmental issues as well.
Second, this article places environmental issues within the context of U.S. National policies like immigration, the economy and unemployment among many others. It concludes that Americans are now more polarized on issues concerning the environment than any other point in time or any other political topic. The divide on the topic of global warming shows to be the deepest of all that were surveyed for.
Lastly, the article suggests that the public sorts themselves into certain views as they acquire more knowledge and become familiar with the cues that the political elite (i.e. Congress members) give them. Guber attests that this last point is the greatest concern for U.S. environmental progress.
Activists are divided on whether to pursue partisan or bipartisan strategies. A partisan approach could attract new voters but also sacrifice others by “triggering opposing dispositions.” A bipartisan plan might seek to find middle ground but could result in a much slower process of policy change.
As this article suggests, there is more behind the task of educating the public on this issue of global warming than meets the eye. It is deeply rooted in sociological and lifestyle trends as well as elite political members who have the power to divide or link the public.
Greta Zukauskaite:
Revkin, A. (2012, Nov. 6). Why Climate Disasters Might Not Boost Public Engagement. Dot Earth, New York Times.
Revkin begins the article by recalling the rush to use Hurricane Sandy as a “teachable moment” to focus on climate change. He proceeds to insert an essay from George Marshall, an expert on climate and communication, to explain why the assumptions that extreme weather would tip opinion towards climate change needs to be challenged.
George Marshall first explains that climate change awareness is complex and mediated by socially constructed attitudes, not just science. He uses interviews with people from a community in Texas that was extremely affected by forest fires.
First, he found that disasters can reinforce social networks and with them norms and world views. A stronger cultural cohesion after a disaster could make it ever harder for ideas like global warming that challenge views in that community to be voiced or accepted. They would also reinforce existing concerns in places that are already accepting climate change.
Second, disasters can increase social confidence and certainty. People could be less willing to change their society and economy when they feel it has served them well through the disaster and has helped them survive. Accepting climate change requires the opposite, which is a high degree of self criticism and self-doubt, which would be hard to posses after a disaster.
Lastly, disasters encourage powerful and compelling survival narrative that can overpower weaker and more complex climate change narratives. A story about survival is easier more appealing to listen to and understand. The narrative of Thanksgiving is used as a parallel example.
In general, it is easier for people to blame the government, mayor, or other tangible factors for more extreme natural disasters than it is to blame themselves as a part of a complex global warming web of problems.
Kelsey Evans
“Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement with climate change: insights from in-depth studies across the world” Johanna Wolf and Susanne C. Moser
●Definitions:
○Understanding: acquiring and employing factually correct knowledge of climate change
○Perception: views and interpretations based on beliefs and understanding
○Engagement: a state of personal connection that encompasses cognitive, affective, and/or behavioral dimensions
●Methodology:
○Authors synthesize results of small-scale, in-depth studies from around the world
■Importance of small-scale studies:
■deep insights into understandings, perceptions, engagement;
■testing of the impact of different communication strategies/campaigns/policies designed to change behavior;
■deeper insights into cognitive/emotional processes underlying responses;
■highlights importance of individual action
●Findings:
○Perceptions about climate change are linked to equity, development, perceived economic power, socio-political context, connection between management and science
■Direct experience with climate change impacts may not motivate behavioral responses
○Traditional knowledge vs. modern knowledge impacts perception of climate change
■Western society is distanced from the natural world
■Societies that spend more time outdoors notice climate change effects more often
■Traditional knowledge about climate can help supplement modern, scientific knowledge
○Framing of the issue is incredibly important
■ie if it’s framed as a scientific issue, many people do not feel compelled to address it
○Religious views can affect people differently
■If climate change/weather events are seen as God punishing humanity, this leaves no room for human agency
■Climate change seen as social injustice and encourages people to act so that they ‘love thy neighbor’
○Understanding
■Overall, there’s a lack of education about climate change
■Still an inconclusive relationship between education level and understanding of climate change
○Perception
■Perceptions of climate change are highly contextualized and encompass other issues ie positionality in society, pre-existing cultural worldviews, economic power, etc.
■Perception is also shaped by the framing used
○Engagement
■Affected by practical knowledge about how to reduce emissions, pre-existing beliefs (ie ‘God frame), incorrect scientific knowledge (ie thinking global warming as a result of the ozone hole)
●Future Research Implications:
○Much of the research thus far focuses on what does not work, and future research may want to focus on what does work in communicating climate change
Kelsey Evans
“Wicked Polarization: How Prosperity, Democracy and Experts Divided America” Shellenberger & Nordhaus
●American society became quite polarized in the ‘60s and ‘70s continuing to today
○Ex. of polarizing issues: urban planning, pesticides, corporate America, Vietnam, racial inequality, environment etc.
●Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber illustrate a “revolt against elites” that reflected a disenchantment with ability of experts to solve new social and environmental problems
○Rittel and Webber called these new social and environmental problems wicked problems
■Differing values from person to person = different views of wicked problems
■Disagreements over social/environmental policy cannot be solved by experts alone
■Combination of ideas and experts
○What Rittel and Webber didn’t predict was today’s political polarization/gridlock that makes wicked problems very hard to deal with
○Examples:
■Framing of obesity as the result of agribusiness and fast food vs. material deprivation in the inner city
■Leads to a focus on bringing more grocery stores to inner cities rather than focusing on better medical treatment or high education (which the author cites as a better and more effective method)
■Global warming as an unintended consequence of the poor becoming rich in developed economies vs. racist neoimperialism that requires global wealth redistribution
■Slowed American growth rates and the debate of whether or not this actual means Americans are poorer (authors argue that standards of living have risen even as growth rates have slowed)
○*** In all examples, partisan experts construct highly polarizing political discourses that undermine policy actions to help the poor
○Progressives blame corporations for the polarization and undermining of democracy rather than examining their own role
○Declining faith in public institutions is another reason for gridlocked politics
●In spite of the gridlock, we still have bipartisan agreement on some major issues (ie mixed economy, growing welfare state, technological innovation, etc.)
●Partisan gridlock threatens our ability to “skillfully govern the myriad, complex, and ever changing relationship between big government and big business, and to mitigate new social and environmental problems”
○However, we have never been more democratic and our markets have never been so robust
●To solve the gridlock, we must get rid of expert analysis and replace it with value value-laden analysis and policy making
○“there are no value-free, true-false answers to any of the wicked problems governments must deal with”
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Gabriella Giannini
Rayner, S. (1992). Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis. Social, Cultural, and Psychological Paradigms, 83-113.
Steve Rayner’s explanation of cultural theory and its application to risk analysis highlights the way individuals assess external risks and how it can influence them to embrace risk management strategies when confronted by a threatening stimulus. A person, or the “perceiver”, is passively exposed to these effects and analyzes the risks of the stimulus to determine potential consequences. Through this risk perception process, the perceiver is allowed to evaluate their environment and form opinions in order to prevent or reduce foreseeable threats. Furthermore, risk assessment is embedded within a particular culture or lens through which people perceive the world. Thus, public knowledge that results from these individualized risk assessments are very much a reflection of the specific cultural system from which people identify.
Rayner (p. 99) describes the unavoidable intersection between risk assessment and culture as natural feedback. Regardless of an individual’s risk assessment of a stimulus, their risk evaluation is dependent on thought, which is closely intertwined with cultural factors. For practical purposes this theory is useful, particularly in the case of sustainability issues where society associates many different meanings with the issue. Rayner would attribute these various perceptions in meaning to cultural affiliations. Oftentimes, our cultural identities greatly influence our schema, thereby shaping moral biases that each person indirectly uses to help assess risky environments.
In the case of climate change, people’s cultural backgrounds could conflict with the way that the problem is perceived and then communicated with others both within their group and those from the outside. However, the problem is not that common ground between different cultures cease to exist. Rather, it is that varying cultural experiences or identities directly conflict with one’s ability to similarly assess the risk of climate change. Surely, there are other factors at play besides culture, which influence a person’s ability to evaluate their environment and make risk assessments. But, within a larger and more global context, people are products of their own cultural environments, which inevitably shape their values and perceptions of the world.