POLS114 ESSAY #1
Identify three major challenges to state capacity faced by a country of your choice over the last decade.
No government can survive without the ability to implement policy. In Thailand, as with many countries, this essential function of government has been continuously challenged throughout its history. Over the last decade alone Thailand’s state capacity has been tested multiple times. Factors such as the coup d'état in 2006, the Muslim separatist movement in South Thailand and an increasing prevalence of narcotics, all act to limit the ability of the Thai state to carry out its basic functions; namely those of ensuring security and stability. In addition to examining the aforementioned challenges to state capacity, this essay will pay particular attention to the implications they pose for the further development of Thailand as a whole.
Simply put, state capacity is the ability of the state to wield power in order to carry out the basic duties of government. Such tasks may include (but are not limited to), the implementation of policies, preservation of security, enforcement of law and maintenance of stability.[1]This implies that the capacity of a state can be measured in relation to its tax base, legitimacy, political autonomy, responsiveness and internal coherence - the variables that enable a state to govern effectively. Examining how these factors are impacted by various elements can give insight into many areas of state business, such as the reasons behind policy responses, or why some states ‘fail’ while others succeed.
The military coup d’état in 2006 exemplifies one of the largest challenges to capacity a state can face. Military takeovers of government, however, are hardly a new phenomenon in Thailand. Following the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand has experienced “considerable political instability and numerous military interventions.”[2] While the occurrence of a coup d’état in 2006, therefore, is not historically atypical, the socio-political forces behind it certainly warrant attention. In ousting Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, dissolving government and suspending some national civil and political rights, the military claimed it was acting in the best interests of the people.[3] Cited as reasons for the take-over were allegations that the Thaksin government was penetrated by “rampant corruption”[4]and was “anti-royalist.”[5]Furthermore, the populist policies of the government prior to 2006 had politicised “the gaping division in Thai society;” the vast stratification between the “urban elite and the great informal mass.”[6] Accordingly, two opposing factions emerged: the pro-Thaksin ‘Red Shirts’ (largely rural and working class) and the royalist, anti-Thaksin “Yellow Shirts” (composed of the ruling elites, the military and a large segment of the middle class).[7]This division has important implications for state capacity in Thailand post-coup.
The stark divisions in Thai society, combined with the dissolution of democracy and rule of the military have eroded the ability of the state to carry out its main functions. Funston claimed that Thailand had divided itself between two coalitions, and this situation in turn points to an increased likelihood of conflict and greater difficulty in pursuing social cohesion. Furthermore, this implies that a significant proportion of the population did not support the military take-over, bringing the legitimacy of the state into question. The limited accountability of the military junta to the people of Thailand also raises the issue of citizen supremacy. Without a government responsive to the public, legitimacy of the kind that relies on consent rather than coercion is hard to achieve. In turn, an absence of legitimacy makes the implementation of policy very difficult for a state without the use of force, and heavily undermines state capacity.
Ethnic divisions, in addition to social and political, also provide a formidable challenge to state capacity. In the southern provinces of Thailand, such as Pattani, Yala and Narathiwa, the Muslim population (which constitutes around 4.6% of the total population) is estimated to account for 90 percent of the region's 1.7 million people.[8] In terms of language, culture and religion, the Muslims in this area are far closer to the peoples of Peninsula Malaysia than the Buddhists of Thailand.[9] Correspondingly, separatist groups have emerged with an identity constructed around being “members of a community defined by the old Patani sultanate,”[10] rather than as citizens of Thailand. As opposed to the relatively peaceful Muslims in northern Thailand, these groups have instigated multiple attacks against the state and non-Muslim civilians. The most recent outbreak of violence began in 2004 with a raid on an army camp and the simultaneous torching of 18 schools.[11] Since then, over 3000 people have died over the course of more than 2000 attacks.[12] This evident ethnic divide is quite clearly linked to the persistence of organised ethnic violence in these areas.[13] Such divisions have a decidedly negative impact on state capacity.
The consequences of ethnic conflict are obvious. Political violence will invariably place many strains upon the state, and at the very least the state must be able to defend itself with the use of its military and police force. At the same time, however, Muslim insurgency in the south impacts state capacity by limiting the level of security it is able to provide for its citizens, while strongly challenging its legitimacy and sovereignty in the southern provinces. McCargo emphasises the lack of legitimacy the Thai state can claim in these areas, while O’Neil implies that a state must be weakly institutionalised when it must exercise force in order to ensure compliance.[14] These claims have serious implications. The implementation of policy is greatly hindered if a state lacks legitimacy or is weakly institutionalised. In addition, the control of territory and monopolisation of violence is essential to state capacity; political violence of this kind is a direct challenge to the ability of the state to provide a secure and stable environment for its citizens. In breaking the monopoly of the state over violence in a certain territory, the secessionist movement strikes at the basis of a state itself.
While outright violence certainly poses a challenge to state capacity, the insidious impacts of the drug trade are equally as problematic. In addition to the usual issues associated with widespread drug use, the ‘war on drugs’ embarked upon by the Thaksin government has exacerbated these troubles, creating new complications which act to seriously erode state capacity. While no longer a main producer, as a member of the ‘Golden Triangle’ Thailand remains a “transit” and “consumer” state.[15] Since 1996, methamphetamine use (which is the primary drug of choice in Thailand)[16] has increased dramatically. The amount of pills available in 2002 was estimated at 700 million - this equates to 10 pills for every man, woman and child.[17] The drug trade in Thailand is a significant contributor to the underground economy, which in itself was judged to be more than two-thirds the size of official GDP in 2000.[18]
Stemming from this large-scale drug use are a multitude of detrimental social impacts, such as crime, decreased life expectancy and social exclusion. In order to combat some of these ills, the Thaksin government announced one of its top priorities as the “prevention and suppression” of narcotic drugs.[19] The process of battling drug trafficking and use in Thailand, however, quickly deteriorated into a ‘war on drugs’, and in the first three months of this new strategy in 2003 there were “some 2,275 extrajudicial killings.”[20] This campaign, however, led to many strains on the government in terms of both the monetary and human cost, as well as prompting much international criticism concerning alleged human rights abuses. The presence of narcotics in Thailand can therefore be seen to have heavily impacted Thai society.
Many challenges to state capacity emerge from the prevalence of drug use in Thailand. These challenges are multi-faceted and varied; the influence of narcotics pervades many areas of society, far beyond the users themselves. The social and economic costs associated with drug use, for example, including those both monetary and in terms of the work force, can limit the means available to implement policy. Additionally, individuals and elites can become accustomed to “working outside the regulatory framework and rule of law.”[21] Furthermore, criminal activities associated with the drug trade can act to subvert the authority and legitimacy of governments through challenging the state’s monopoly over taxation and violence.[22] This, in turn, can lead to a ‘thinning’ of government resources. For example, a programme was established in the northern border to provide villagers with arms and basic military training so that they might assist with the interdiction of narcotics. This is clear evidence that the Thai military resources have been over-stretched - one of the many negative impacts the drug trade has on the state.[23] Plainly then, the drug trade in Thailand can be seen to pose a fierce challenge to the capacity of the state to effectively implement policy.
In the past decade Thailand has faced many challenges. While citizens have suffered from violent unrest, societal divisions and the costs associated with drug usage, the capacity of the state has also been seriously undermined. The military coup in 2006, the separatist movement in the south and the widespread drug trade have tested the ability of the state to maintain sovereignty, legitimacy and its ability to implement policy in multiple ways. These problems, however, are not merely a recent phenomenon. Multiple coups have occurred throughout Thai history, while the Muslim separatist movement has been present since the early 20th century.[24] In order to continue developing as a nation, Thailand must examine their origins and wider historical context, not just their impacts. Only then can practical solutions be found and these challenges to state capacity addressed.
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[1]Francis Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State-Building,” Journal of Democracy 15/2 (2004): 22.
[2]Duncan McCargo, “Democracy Under Stress in Thaksin's Thailand,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 112-126.
[3]Andrew McGregor, Southeast Asian Development (New York: Routledge, 2008), 92.
[4]Ukrist Pathmanand, “A different coup de’tat?,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38 (2008): 124.
[5]ibid., 130.
[6]Johan Saravanamuttu, Malaysia's Foreign Policy: The First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 284.
[7] ibid.
[8]“East and Southeast Asia: Thailand,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed August 12, 2011,
AFP, “Bloodshed part of daily life in Thailand's Muslim south,” AFP, Mar 19, 2008, (accessed August 11, 2011).
[9]McGregor, Southeast Asian Development, 83.
[10]Neil A. Englehart, “Resource conflict and ethnic peace in northern Thailand,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 49 (2008): 107.
[11]Phongpaichit, Pasuk. “Thai politics beyond the 2006 coup.” Bangkok Post, July 31 2007. .
[12] AFP, “Bloodshed part of daily life in Thailand's Muslim south.”
[13]Englehart, “Resource conflict and ethnic peace in northern Thailand,” 107.
[14]Duncan McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 183;
Patrick O’Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), 38.
[15]Ananda Rajah, Burma: Protracted Conflict, Governance and Non-Traditional Security Issues (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), 21.
[16]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2011. August 10,
[17]Phongpaichit, Pasuk. “Drug Policy in Thailand.” Paper, Senlis Council International Symposium on Global Drug Policy, Lisbon, October 23-25, 2003.
[18]Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste, “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences,” Journal of Economic Literature 38, 1 (March 2000): 77-114.
[19]Jonathan Cohen, “Not Enough Graves: The War on Drugs, HIV/AIDS, and Violations of Human Rights,” Human Rights Watch 16, 8 (June 2004): 3.
[20]ibid.
[21]Ananda Rajah, Burma: Protracted Conflict, Governance and Non-Traditional Security Issues (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), 19.
[22] ibid.
[23]ibid., 21.
[24]“The Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed August 12, 2011.