Humanitarian conditions in Darfur, two months before the rainy season
Monday 7 April 2008.
Darfur’s rainy season largely coincides with the traditional “hunger gap” between spring planting and fall harvest; so the loss of transport capacity, rebel violence along the Chad/Darfur border, humanitarian obstruction by Khartoum, pervasive insecurity throughout Darfur, and the failure of effective UNAMID deployment may make this rainy season the “perfect storm” of human destruction
By Eric Reeves
April 5, 2008 — This overview attempts to bring together the most substantial data and reports about the nature and scale of the current humanitarian crisis in Darfur, and to put this information within the context of the immensely threatening environment facing aid workers throughout the region. It draws on a range of materials, including the most recent UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile (No. 30, reflecting conditions as of January 1, 2008). The sources for data, surveys, and anecdotal information are diverse, both on the ground in Darfur and within the international humanitarian community. Much information was provided exclusively on a confidential basis; non-confidential information comes chiefly from reports in the public domain, or public interviews by humanitarian officials.
It must be emphasized that there is a highly significant gap in the humanitarian data available concerning the scale of malnutrition in Darfur. Critical data for Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) and other malnutrition indicators (e.g., Mid-upper Arm Circumference [MUAC]) are simply not available, even on a confidential basis. Although some individual humanitarian workers and organizations were willing to provide anecdotal information, on a highly confidential basis, this is clearly inadequate. The reason consistently given for this extraordinary lacuna in humanitarian indicators was the refusal of Khartoum’s “Humanitarian Aid Commission” (HAC) to permit either the gathering or dissemination of data bearing on malnutrition. This highly consequential decision, made by a bureaucratic extension of the very regime that has done so much to engineer the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, deserves much greater highlighting.
At present, as Darfur’s 4.3 million conflict-affected people head into the rainy season/hunger gap---many weakened by long years in camps---we have almost no statistical understanding of their nutritional status. What we do know is that the UN’s World Food Program (WFP) is falling further behind every day in meeting the necessary benchmarks in transporting and pre-positioning food in anticipation of the rainy season. The current shortfall in food actually in transit to Darfur is approximately 50% according to WFP (see below).
Of course any assessment of humanitarian work and the organizational dissemination of data must have as context the security crisis constraining the delivery of aid in Darfur, a crisis that only deepens. Insecurity is the primary reason for the massive reduction in WFP transport capacity. The pervasive threat of violence persists despite a July 2007 UN Security Council resolution authorizing a large military and civilian police force to protect both civilians and humanitarians. Khartoum’s deliberate and consequential obstruction of this force has been well documented (see my two-part analysis at and shows no signs of abating. Similarly, humanitarian work in Darfur must be understood in the context of Khartoum’s widely reported obstruction, harassment, intimidation, and threatening of aid workers (see below). Funding shortfalls for humanitarian operations, particularly transport, also pose a grave threat to the life-sustaining work of this extraordinarily courageous cohort of individuals.
EASTERN CHAD
Despite the urgency of Darfur’s situation, the humanitarian crisis in Eastern Chad must not be overlooked or turned into a “side show.” Here violence, displacement, and dramatic impoverishment reflect in many ways the consequences of Khartoum’s military actions in Darfur---and reflect also the regime’s material support to and sanctuary for Chadian rebel groups, groups that at present are unified more by expediency than any desire to serve this impoverished nation’s national interest. Some 500,000 Darfuri refugees, Chadian Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and refugees from Central African Republic are living in increasingly difficult and dangerous circumstances.
The proxy war between Khartoum and N’Djamena continues, despite the recent signing of a sixth “peace” agreement. Indeed, recent communication intercepts by France and the US reveal that Khartoum’s intelligence service is inciting the Chadian rebels, long based in Darfur, to resume their assault on the Déby regime. Very recent reports of cross-border violence in the Adé area come from several sources, and indicate significant civilians casualties (see The early February 2008 assault on N’Djamena by Khartoum-backed Chadian rebels was enormously disruptive, even destructive of humanitarian efforts and resources. The arid land on which refugees and displaced persons are presently housed in Eastern Chad cannot possibly provide adequate water for this vast population, and security issues will not be easily resolved by the currently deploying European Union force (EUFOR; see below).
MILITARY CONTEXT
The humanitarian crisis, both in Darfur and Eastern Chad, exists within the context of an ongoing, genocidal counter-insurgency war against Darfuri rebels, conducted by Khartoum’s National Islamic Front regime and its Arab militia allies, the Janjaweed. To be sure, violence in Darfur has become extremely chaotic, and those responsible include some rebel groups, bandits, and other opportunistic armed groups. But this violence derives from the previous large-scale military campaigns against African populations by Khartoum and the Janjaweed, primarily but far from exclusively in 2003-2004.
Certainly Khartoum’s larger determination to resolve its “Darfur problem” by means of violence, including the present chaotic violence the regime has done so much to orchestrate, remains unchanged. The most substantial evidence is the brutal campaign against civilians north of el-Geneina (capital of West Darfur) in January and February 2008. A recent report on this campaign comes from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (March 20, 2008, and details many specific findings:
“[An] investigation [was] conducted by UNAMID Human Rights into the January and February [2008] attacks on the villages of Saraf Jidad, Sirba, Silea and Abu Suruj in West Darfur. The attacks were carried out in the context of a major military campaign which the Sudanese government launched in January 2008 in an attempt to regain control of the northern corridor of West Darfur and drive out the Justice and Equality Movement, a non-signatory insurgent group, from the area. The investigation revealed that violations of international humanitarian and human rights law against the civilian populations of Saraf Jidad, Sirba, Silea and Abu Suruj, were perpetrated by armed militias and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during those attacks. [ ]
“Military attacks in Sirba, Silea and Abu Suruj (8 February), involved aerial bombardments by helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft, accompanied by ground offensives by militia and SAF. Consistent information gathered by UNAMID Human Rights Officers indicated that these actions violated the principle of distinction stated in international humanitarian law, failing to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Moreover, the scale of destruction of civilian property, including objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, suggests that the damage was a deliberate and integral part of a military strategy. Information on extensive pillaging during and after the attacks was also gathered. In addition, consistent and credible accounts of rape committed by armed uniformed men during and after the attack in Sirba were collected.” (from the Executive Summary)
Here we might juxtapose some of the language from the UN human rights report and a key clause from the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
“the scale of destruction of civilian property, including objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, suggests that the damage was a deliberate and integral part of a military strategy”
“[Among the acts of genocide recognized by this Convention:] deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”
The UN human rights report also finds that, “Civilian homes, nongovernmental humanitarian organizations’ clinics and offices, community centers, water structures, schools, food storages, milling machines and shops were systematically pillaged, vandalized and/or set ablaze.”
Detailed accounts of the killings in Saraf Jidad, Sirba, Abu Suruj, and Silea make clear that within the villages victims were primarily women, children, the elderly, and the infirm. Many were burned to death in their own homes. The report’s accounts are based primarily on evidence provided by eyewitnesses.
UN investigators were also “denied [ ] access to Jebel Moon [to the northeast] until 1 March 2008, in breach of its obligation to allow UNAMID officials freedom of movement under the Status of Forces Agreement signed between the UN and the Sudanese Government in February 2008.” The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is the linchpin to effective deployment of the UN-authorized protection force in Darfur. Khartoum delayed signing the SOFA for five months (the deadline stipulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1769 was August 31, 2007); the regime’s failure to abide by the terms of this agreement, less than a month after signing it, suggests how little meaning this key document will have going forward, and how difficult deployment of UNAMID forces will continue to be.
At the same time, militarily capable nations around the world have failed to provide key resources for UNAMID, most conspicuously transport and tactical helicopters and ground transport capacity. For its part, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations refuses to review its equipment standards for deployment, thus freezing deployment of a battle-ready battalion from Senegal, for example, which will not receive the UN-required number of armored personnel carriers from South Africa for another five months.
[SOUTH SUDAN: Military tensions, orchestrated by the Khartoum regime, continue to rise in the Abyei region along the north/south border. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (January 2005) between Khartoum and the south stipulated that the boundaries of oil-rich Abyei be established by an independent Abyei Boundary Commission, comprising a number of Sudan experts accepted by both sides. The Commission report was presented to National Islamic Front President Omar al-Bashir in July 2005, and has since been entirely disregarded by al-Bashir and his regime. As a consequence, there is no accepted civil administration for Abyei, violent clashes have increased, and a reported 200 of Khartoum’s regular troops recently entered the Abyei area. Khartoum has also substantially armed some elements of the Misseriya Arabs of the area, and attempted to stoke ethnic tensions between Arab and Ngok Dinka populations of the region. In short, an explosive situation has been deliberately created over a period of months, with no sign that Khartoum intends to defuse what may be the crisis precipitating renewed north/south war.]
At the same time, there is no evidence that a Darfur peace process exists in any meaningful form. The UN’s Jan Eliasson and the AU’s Salim Salim have been without the resources, the commitment, or the diplomatic support from Western democracies and the AU that might have made progress possible. There are no encouraging political signs, including from within Sudan (see recent overview by Edmund Sanders of the Los Angeles Times, There is neither a diplomatic roadmap, a clear strategy for including Darfuri civil society in the peace talks, nor any sign of a willingness to confront Khartoum with the pressures necessary to ensure good faith peace talks. Nor are regional actors proving willing to help the process. Indeed, recent and highly reliable intelligence indicates that Egyptian pilots are operating helicopter gunships in Darfur, an extraordinary and highly inflammatory action, particularly since Egyptian troops, along with Ethiopian forces, are scheduled to rotate next into Darfur as part of UNAMID.
Unreasonable demands and continuing fractiousness on the part of the rebel groups guarantee that no peace process will emerge in the near term. Absent substantial and fully committed diplomatic resources, clear and unified leadership, and a forceful political posture, a Darfur peace process under present circumstances can only reprise the ghastly failure of the “Darfur Peace Agreement” of May 2006 (Abuja, Nigeria).
In the shorter term, this makes all the more important the deployment of 26,000 civilian police and military personnel authorized for deployment by UN Security Council Resolution 1769. Although we hear constantly the circular refrain that “peacekeeping in Darfur can’t work because there is no peace for the peacekeeping force to keep,” this has become a dangerous truism, obscuring what has long been evident: the UN/African Union “hybrid” force deploying has as its primary task civilian and humanitarian protection, not peacekeeping in the traditional sense. For while there is no “peace to keep,” and no prospect of such peace, this cannot be justification for denying innocent civilians and courageous humanitarians as much protection as possible. Nor is it acceptable to allow the present glacial pace of deployment to be determined by Khartoum’s obstructionism and its refusal to allow non-African units to deploy as scheduled by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (the regime’s rejection of an engineering battalion from Norway and Sweden, and its ongoing delay of special forces from Nepal, as well as a battalion from Thailand, are the most consequential actions delaying UNAMID deployment). The putative doctrine of a “responsibility to protect,” celebrated with much fanfare on adoption at the UN but so far meaningless for the people of Darfur, is on critical trial and seems to be succumbing to obdurate defiance on Khartoum’s part.
Given the Chapter 7 auspices of the UNAMID force, protection of civilians and humanitarians is certainly possible, even if it cannot be comprehensive. Specific security needs are clear and achievable, especially in protecting the delivery of food (including the pre-positioning of food before the rainy season makes transport difficult, if not impossible). Restoring adequate security in many of the camps should also be of the highest priority: humanitarians are increasingly at risk in many camp settings, even as they have lost access to huge swaths of rural Darfur. (A more detailed account of the insecurity threatening humanitarians and humanitarian operations, including threats and intimidation by Khartoum’s intelligence and other forces, appears below.)
HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS IN DARFUR AND EASTERN CHAD: STATISTICAL FUNDAMENTALS
The most recent data provided by various UN humanitarian offices indicate a number of alarming dimensions to the Darfur crisis. Much of what has been reported reflects conditions as of January 1, 2008---more than three months ago. Two particularly important surveys are [1] Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 30 [DHP 30], reflecting conditions as of January 1, 2008, and [2] “Food Security and Nutrition Assessment of the Conflict-Affected Population in Darfur” [FSNAD], reflecting conditions in August/September 2007, seven months ago. But telling information also comes from the ground in Darfur in unfiltered form.
DARFUR:
*4.27 million people in Darfur are conflict-affected, out of a pre-war population of 6.0 - 6.5 million [DHP 30];
*2.45 million people are internally displaced (the vast majority of those who have been displaced now live in camps, and most were displaced toward the beginning of major conflict in 2003) [DHP 30] [FSNAD];
*400,000 people have been displaced over the past 14 months, including 100,000 this year (approximately 1,000 per day); attacks by forces of the Khartoum regime and its Janjaweed militia allies account for approximately two-thirds of this new displacement [current UN data; public statement by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, April 4, 2008];
*approximately 250,000 Darfuris are refugees in Eastern Chad [UNHCR assessment March 2008];
*given large additional civilian displacement, many camps for displaced persons can no longer accept new arrivals [current assessment by UN and international nongovernmental humanitarian organizations];
*the gains in addressing malnutrition since the advent of major humanitarian efforts in 2004 have been largely lost [DHP 30];
*Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) late last year surpassed the emergency threshold (15% of the population) in a number of camps [DHP 30];
*Global Acute Malnutrition among all children under 5 years was 16.1% as of September 2007 [FSNAD];
*Global Acute Malnutrition among children 6 - 29 months was 21.3% as of September 2007 [FSNAD];
*“Middle Upper-arm Circumference [MUAC] surveys following [Khartoum’s] removal of the blockage of the corridor north of el-Geneina found up to one-third of the under-five population acutely malnourished” (UN assessment, April 1, 2008);
*200,000 people could not be reached for food assistance in October 2007 [DHP 30];
*according to the UN World Food Program, 83,000 metric tons of food should be pre-positioned in anticipation of the rains; current stocks are 60,000 metric tons---to maintain food levels, 40,000 metric tons of food should be in transit at any given moment; currently, only about 20,000 metric tons are in transit to Darfur; [current WFP assessment]
*“The prices for cereals in the markets are exploding upwards, increasing by five-fold in some areas.” (April 5, 2008 email communication to this writer from humanitarian aid worker in Darfur);
*“The pre-harvest studies for Darfur suggest a hunger gap of 70-78% for a number of populations; there will be a serious risk of localized famine and the WFP is under-funded and seriously pressuring nongovernmental organizations to lower distribution amounts” (April 2, 2008 email communication to this writer from source on the ground in Darfur);
*“Food security remains the major humanitarian problem, with only 30% of the conflicted-affected people considered food self-sufficient” [DHP 30]---in other words, over 3 million people are in need of food assistance;