Human and social capital: ideological constructs to serve a new world order
Paper presented at SCUTREA, 32nd Annual Conference, 2-4 July 2002, University of Stirling
John Wallis, University of Nottingham
This paper begins with the assumption that the discourse of human capital dominates debate and social policy surrounding education on a global scale. The pace set by industrialised nations has been taken up by the developing world and an economic future based upon knowledge and technological flexibility undergirds the rhetoric of virtually all nation states regardless of their economic conditions or recent history. A glance at the policies of a few countries – particularly in the nineties - readily exemplifies this claim: the “Skill New Zealand” programme ( Education and Training Support Agency, 1993), “Surpassing Ourselves (USA) (O’Connor, 1994) resonate with the Australian quest for a ‘clever society’ and the revealingly titled British initiative of Investors in People (1989). This stated dependence on the need for learning as the central motor of the economy has ushered in related systems of upskilling in the name of individual and collective occupational flexibility. It might be argued that this shift in macro policy has moved education in general to centre stage in economic strategy, giving it an importance that it has never had in the past; and if that is so in general terms it is even more the case for adult education, the ‘poor cousin’ (Newman, 1979) of the education world.
Perhaps the central concept that has emerged over the period has been that of lifelong education –an amorphous term that neatly encapsulates a sense of individual and collective development and taps the established adult education tenets of individual growth throughout life and the recognition of the adult as an active member of broader communities. However, even a cursory glance at the literature related to the concept reveals the ways in which it has changed in practice from a broad, multi-faceted, inclusive term to one much more narrowly restricted to economic utilitarianism. Lifelong learning in the recent past is perhaps most closely related to the UNESCO project of the seventies and later. The publication of the significantly titled Learning to Be (Faure Report) (1979) and related publications (Dave, 1976) promoted a vision of lifelong education that, while acknowledging the economic value of such work embraced also the central themes of democratic engagement and broad cultural development and diversity. More recently it is suggested that we have been invited to conceive of education throughout life in increasingly instrumental terms. This feature was noted early in the piece with strong reactions – at least in the United Kingdom – to what was seen as the vocationalising of education in general and of the education of adults in particular. The shift was seen as being flawed in its own right, in that there appeared little evidence that investment in skill-based education impacted on national economic performance after the provision of basic education (Woodhall, 1997,). At a more fundamental level objection was raised that the lifelong educational project was being stripped of its ethical and political elements and consequently impoverished see Hyland, 1994). Related criticisms were levelled at the modes of learning ushered in with these strategies. The extensive use of outcomes-based education and the use of competence measures to regulate assessment have been strongly challenged on the grounds of the fragmentation of knowledge and the undermining of the social power associated with traditional concepts of skill (CCCS, 1981)
For the purposes of this essay what is of most interest is the relatively scarce debates concerning alternative ways forward. It is relatively easy to point to adult education’s past and reel off the examples of both innovative and radical traditions and interventions – and to some degree they can still be found – work around gender, racial and community empowerment, and calls to re-connect with the traditions of “really useful knowledge” ( Johnson, 1979 Thompson, 2001). However, what is being argued here is that much of adult education in the higher education sector has been re-positioned within the dominant discourse and may be seeing its own potential radicalism reduced to one of methodological innovation. By this is meant the shift of adult education departments away from broad policies of social and cultural engagement to becoming channels through which adults access or prepare for entry to the established institutions. It is suggested that as a consequence the technologies of adult learning may dominate work rather than any expressed social purpose above that of human capital assumptions and the allied discourses of equality of opportunity and compensatory intervention. Again in the last two cases terms that before were associated with quite specific political intentions have been re-formed within the restricted horizons of individual opportunities and the allied notion of meritocracy. What is suggested is that the status of departments may be in their claims to be able to work specifically with adults and perhaps previously excluded groups – operating as access workers and operating within targeted schemes of widening participation and inclusivity. At this point it should be stressed that there is no suggestion that opportunities for occupational mobility should be denied to adults in the name of some ideological purity, but it is suggested that without the overt social purposes that distinguished earlier adult education work there is a danger that adult education staff may become no more than the brokers – or even gatekeepers for internal departments. There is perhaps the danger that the only claim to professional distinction is in pedagogic practice – a claim that was challenged many years ago within the profession (see Keddie, 1980)
When considering these trends on a global scale it is striking to note the extent to which completely different states and economies have responded in the face of globalising capitalism. For example in the cases of both the United Kingdom and South Africa the policy directions are very similar, yet the conditions utterly different. Before looking at the response of a developing nation a number of very practical issues arise within the developed world. Firstly, within the human capital/knowledge economy debate it is assumed that work in the future will be more skill-based, making greater demands on the worker and demanding greater skills of independent thought and problem-solving capacity. Although this might appear a parody of the debate, it is at least open to question whether the bulk of future work will demand significantly greater skill, however defined. Although it is beyond doubt that a certain sector of the labour force will need highly developed skills there is evidence in the economy that the bulk of new jobs are in the low skill service sector, and there is also evidence that developing technologies are reducing the need for those previously defined as skilled – perhaps banking is a good example of this feature. The second issue that resides in this debate but is often uninvestigated is the assumption that somehow the creation of a skilled labour pool will somehow create jobs. This would appear to be open to question for two reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above, the demand for skilled work may not expand and may actually decline. Secondly, and perhaps more important, within global capitalism, the sites of production are more fluid and skill is only one element in the equation over deciding where work is situated. It is commonplace to talk in terms of the “ageing” industries such as textiles and leather work that have been almost entirely re-located to low cost unregulated sites, but the recent move of the highly successful Spicer domestic appliance company out of the United Kingdom on the grounds of cost underlines the issue. This feature is particularly acute as low cost economies begin to raise their skill base to international standards thus reducing any competitive advantage enjoyed by the “older” economies.
In many ways the Republic of South Africa provides an interesting case study of how these trends are played out in the emerging world. In a country wrecked both economically and socially by apartheid the original national government set about reform with a will, adopting legislation at a fierce rate, within the context of a universalist liberal constitution ( RSA, ). However, despite the universalist promises of the key legislation the government decided that it had no choice but to engage actively with the globalising world and during its first term it willingly adopted a severe neo-liberal economic policy that sharply restricted resources in the public sector. This self-imposed structural adjustment package, known as the Growth,Employment and Re-development Plan( GEAR) (Department of Finance, 1996) sat alongside ambitious reforms for education and training as South Africa prepared to enter the international market as an active player. In line with trends throughout the world the government developed and adopted a national education and training framework which is intended to include all educational and training activities nationwide and operate as a guarantor of the quality of training and the probity of the awards offered. As in other schemes all awards would be defined in terms of standards and outcomes thus, it was hoped, providing conformity in practice. Of particular interest is the fact that this scheme – the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) - included compulsory schooling, the institutions of higher education, and technical and industrial training. The inclusion of schooling was linked to the introduction of a new outcomes-based curriculum entitled Curriculum 2005 (Department of Education, 1997) which was to be introduced into the mainstream schools gradually year on year until 2005 would mark completion and the system sit seamlessly within the new order. The case of Curriculum 2005 and the related basic education plan (1997) both highlight the difficulties of emerging nations of balancing the pace of what is perceived as essential innovation based on universal rights, neo-liberal economics, and the reality of the professional and administrative infrastructure.
To innovate at this pace would place a strain on any administration, but in the case of South Africa the infrastructure was already of very uneven efficiency as a result of the previous dispensation (see Kallaway, 1984). Additionally, many experienced administrative staff and senior teachers were offered the chance to take early retirement in the early stages of reform thus weakening the system even further (Harber, 2002). It must also be borne in mind that the education system under apartheid educated non-white teachers in ways that left them limited to a very traditional prescribed curriculum and extremely rigid modes of pedagogy. To move from their traditional patterns of work to student-centred, individually paced, and resource based learning was to say the least a major challenge. The staff development task was enormous. In the event national support comprised of a cascade model of training from national, through provincial to district levels. It was generally considered a serious failure. Ironically, those schools that had been singled out for preferential treatment under apartheid coped without difficulty as a result of their funding base and the skill and experience of thoroughly trained staff. Ironically, what was intended to be a move to greater equality largely served to reinforce already established inequalities.
The above is not intended as a diversion but to provide a brief case study of the possible effects on emerging nation states of a rush to competition based on skill levels. The attempt to graft a system of education largely designed in developed countries onto a society with serious social inequalities was always ambitious and its eventual impact on the quality of the service is awaited. Behind this rush to replicate international approaches lies the social reality of the state, with rising levels of violence, an adult illiteracy rate claimed to top 10 million, and the devastation of the impact of the AIDS pandemic. Also, what is not often addressed is the issue of unemployment. Again the picture is complex. While there are opportunities at the upper end of the skill ladder the opportunities in the lower reaches are often very scarce and this can apply to certain graduates. Recent research carried out in Durban revealed considerable unemployment among black graduates, many of whom thought their plight had little to do with their education but simply the result of economic conditions ( Mpungose and Wallis, 2000). The sense of futility was particularly keenly felt by those directed to overtly vocational training activities, who still retained very traditional concepts of both work and real jobs, and who pointed to the absence of opportunities to practice their skills. The sometimes hopeless plight of the young - men in particular - has generated a sense of social panic fed by fears of serious social alienation and the danger of possible violence ( Morrell, 1998).
Before leaving the case it is appropriate to mention one other element of the upskilling debate that is also very much in evidence in South Africa: the faith in the effectiveness of establishing small, medium and micro-enterprises as the route to job creation. Much work has been done in this field and there have been as everywhere else some successes. However, in large rural areas the development of small-scale farming, the creation of craft work, and the development of small trading units have tended much more to subsistence levels. As mentioned above there is no critique intended of such work, but it remains a very open question whether such work can really dent major unemployment.
At the simplest level, the above comments serve to highlight the difficulties facing developing countries in seeking to "modernise" in such a way and raise the question of whether other priorites ought to drive policies – even in the face of leading politicians claiming they have no choice if economic survival is the aim. It might be suggested that although there seems to be a universalisation of approaches to contemporary issues, the reality of the social order ultimately dictates the possible outcomes of policy.
The final part of the discussion refers to the rise in prominence of the concept of social capital as a complementary feature to human capital in social development. As with its related concept it is not easy to reach a consensual definition, but it became a key concept in the British Learning Society Research Programme. It is worth quoting key actors in the project:
We deployed as the focus of our fieldwork the notion of ‘social capital’, which contrasts with and complements the notion of human capital. Human capital in terms of the stock of individual skills, competences and qualifications (Woodhall, 1995). What we are interested in is how these are encouraged or inhibited by the relationships which exist between the stakeholder institutions. These relationships embody the social capital which enables human capital to be realised.
( Schuller,T and Bamford, C 2000,p 7)
In terms of broadening out the issues the use of social capital introduces a new dimension to the work of adult/community educators and raises very fundamental social issues. If a key to the development of human capital rests within the overall relations between broad social institutions another established role of adult education is invoked: that of community developer. However, the stress within social capital on trust and co-operation can have a very normative pressure and again contribute to the limitation of critical potential in educational practice. If a social order is riven with inequality and oppression it could be argued that no degree of social capital development can produce a consensus that will last through time.
Alternatively there remains the question of the degree to which any form of mutual social interaction represents a positive contribution to the stock of social capital. For example, the rise of semi-independent cultural groups articulated around either religion or ethnic origin may indicate a great enhancement in terms of social capital but may operate in largely exclusive forms and actually generate conflict within the broader social context. Also, particularly in the case of emerging nations, there are sectors of society that exhibit very high levels of social capital defined by tribal and traditional identity and the question remains whether such relations are in themselves either desirable or liberatory.
Given the above considerations where does lifelong learning stand? It is suggested that the mechanisms of late globalising capital are creating the circumstances that contemporary educational policy are attempting to address. In this context it is also suggested that the claims of contemporary policies to resolve the inherent inequalities are unlikely to be successful for the majority of people. It might be that the debates and promotion of social capital may yet be the latest in a long line of educational interventions stretching back over the years. What is perhaps more worrying is the possibility that the analysis labels communities as being in deficit in some way – one more case of blaming the victim for the effects of macro influences emanating from fundamentally unequal economic circumstances. Such an understanding is very clear in developing nations but perhaps more obscure in the developed world. In the case study above South African citizens denied an initial education may well be very rich in social capital but still left in acute poverty.