Horizontal Fiscal Equalisatio

Draft Report. October 2017

 Commonwealth of Australia 2017

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The Productivity Commission
The Productivity Commission is the Australian Government’s independent research and advisory body on a range of economic, social and environmental issues affecting the welfare of Australians. Its role, expressed most simply, is to help governments make better policies, in the long term interest of the Australian community.
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Opportunity for further comment

You are invited to examine this draft report and comment on it by written submission to the Productivity Commission by Friday 10November 2017and/or by attending a public hearing. Further information on how to provide a submission is included on the inquiry website:

The final report will be prepared after further submissions have been received and public hearings have been held, and will be submitted to the Australian Government in January2018.

Public hearing dates and venues

Location / Date / Venue
Perth / 14 & 15 November 2017 / Four Points by Sheraton
707 Wellington Street, Perth
Melbourne / 17 November 2017 / Productivity Commission
530 Collins Street, Melbourne
Sydney / 22 November 2017 / Sydney Masonic Centre
66 Goulburn Street, Sydney

Public hearings may be held in other locations if needed, and you may also participate via teleconference. Please visit the inquiry website to register your interest in participating in a public hearing.

Commissioners

For the purposes of this inquiry and draft report, in accordance with section 40 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998(Cwlth) the powers of the Productivity Commission have been exercised by:

Karen Chester / Deputy Chair
Jonathan Coppel / Commissioner
Opportunity for further comment
DRAFT REPORT / 1

Contents

Opportunity for further commentiii

Overview1

Key points2

What has motivated this inquiry?3

What is HFE and why does it exist?5

How does HFE affect State budget management?9

Does HFE affect State incentives for reform?11

Does HFE affect productivity and economic growth?14

In summary, how is the current system performing?15

Are there preferable alternatives?18

Is there a way forward?22

What complementary reforms would be needed?23

Draft findings and recommendations25

The full report is available from

Glossary
DRAFT REPORT / 1

Overview

Key points
  • The basic premise of HFE — fiscal equity in the Australian federation — has broad support.
  • While the specific practice of HFE has always been debated, it is now under significant strain as Western Australia’s share of the GST has fallen to an extreme low.
  • The practice of HFE has evolved over time, and now embodies an undeliverable ideal: to give States the same fiscal capacity. In other words, all States are brought up to the fiscal capacity of the fiscally strongest State (currently, as assessed by the CGC, Western Australia).
  • Notwithstanding anomalies, the current system of HFE has good points.
It achieves an almost complete degree of equalisation — unique among OECD countries.
The independent and expert CGC is well placed to recommend GST relativities. It has wellestablished processes that involve consultation and regular methodology reviews.
  • And HFE does not result in significant distortions to interstate migration or economic growth.
  • But the pure may be the enemy of the good: the current HFE system struggles with extreme circumstances, and this is corroding confidence in the system.
Equalising comprehensively and to the fiscally strongest State means that the redistribution task is too great for any jurisdiction to bear; and is volatile at times of significant cyclical and structural change.
There is scope for it to discourage desirable mineral and energy resources policies (royalties and development) and State policy for major tax reform (a costly firstmover disadvantage).
The system is beyond comprehension by the public, and poorly understood by most within government — lending itself to a myriad of myths and confused accountability.
  • The Australian Government should articulate a revised objective for HFE. While equity should remain at the heart of HFE, it should aim to provide States with the fiscal capacity to provide a reasonable level of services.
Equalisation should no longer be to the highest state, but instead the average or the second highest State — still providing States a high level of fiscal capacity, but not distorted by the extreme swings of one State.
By contrast, relativity floors or discounts for particular revenue streams do not resolve HFE’s deficiencies and must prove arbitrary, and likely have unintended consequences.
  • Any material change to HFE in the current extreme environment will lead to significant redistributions of the GST. Timing and careful transition are paramount, especially to ensure the fiscally weaker States are not significantly disadvantaged.
  • The Commonwealth Treasurer should ask the CGC to recommend relativities consistent with a revised objective. The CGC should also be directed to pursue significant simplification of its assessment process, even if it results in slightly less — or less precise — equalisation.
  • The CGC should play a prominent public communication and education role — a much needed objective voice to inform the public dialogue about HFE.
  • Reforming HFE will deliver benefits to the Australian community. But ultimately, greater benefits will only come from more fundamental reforms to Australia’s federal financial relations: namely, to spending and revenue raising responsibilities and accountabilities.

Overview

The Productivity Commission has been asked to undertake an inquiry into Australia’s system of horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE) as the basis for the distribution of GST revenue to the States and Territories (hereafter States). The Productivity Commission is to consider the influence the current system of HFE has on:

  • productivity, efficiency and economic growth, including the movement of capital and labour across state borders
  • the incentives for the States to undertake fiscal (expenditure and revenue) reforms that improve the operation of their own jurisdictions, and
  • the States’ abilities to prepare and deliver annual budgets.

Moreover, the inquiry poses the questions of whether the current system of HFE is in the best interests of national productivity and whether there may be preferable alternatives.

Much of the debate about HFE in Australia stems from confusion and disagreement about its objective. Clear specification of objectives is important for policy issues where there are tradeoffs, and a clear objective is essential for assessing the effectiveness of the system, now, and for any future changes.

With that in mind, the Productivity Commission has assessed the current HFE system and any proposed alternatives against an objective for HFE that takes account of equity, efficiency and simplicity. Our approach is focused on the Australian community as a whole, and is not framed solely in the interests of any individual State (as required under theProductivity Commission Act 1998 (Cwlth)).

What has motivated this inquiry?

There is nothing new about these arguments between the States. This has been going on since 1933. (Peter Costello 2006)

The distribution of the GST has frequently been a point of contention among States, as each State has vied for a larger share of the GST pool. But this friction has increased markedly in recent times as Western Australia’s share of the GST has fallen to an unprecedented low (figure1). This ‘new low’ has been anticipated since 2011, but arguably not at the time the GST distribution deal was struck in 1999.

A key factor behind this has been the recent mining boom, which had a particularly strong impact on Western Australia’s revenueraising capacity. This saw Western Australia’s relativity start falling from the middle of last decade. The mining boom is fading and Western Australia’s economy (and revenueraising capacity) has significantly weakened. However, Western Australia’s share of the GST pool remains historically low, due to the lags involved in the equalisation process.

Many parties have expressed extreme dissatisfaction with Western Australia’s low share of the GST. This discontent reflects perceptions about fairness and the extent of equalisation away from Western Australia. There are also concerns about the noncontemporaneity of the distribution — specifically, that it may exacerbate economic cycles instead of smoothing them. Since 201415, the Australian Government has provided over $1.2 billion in infrastructure funding to Western Australia, which has been quarantined from the HFE process, to effectively maintain Western Australia’s relativity at 201415 levels.

Figure 1State per capita relativitiesa
aThe Northern Territory is not shown. Its relativities fluctuated between a minimum of 4.02 and a maximum of 5.91 between 198889 and 201718.
Source: CGC(2017a).

Some parties have also argued that the HFE system impedes economic growth by acting as a disincentive for State governments to develop particular industries or projects, or by subsidising States that ban mineral or energy extraction. Others have spoken out against these views and emphasise HFE’s role in promoting equity across the Australian federation, given the inherent disadvantages some States face in raising revenue or delivering services.

What is HFE and why does it exist?

HFE is a common feature across federations. It involves the transfer of funds to or between States to offset differences in revenueraising capacities and/or the use and costs of providing services and infrastructure.

The primary rationale for HFE is fiscal equity, or the equal treatment of equals — as different regions might expect to be treated under a unitary government. This is an unrealistic expectation in a federation, where the States have significant policy autonomy, so in practice HFE seeks for the equal fiscal treatment of jurisdictions. This equity basis for HFE is largely undisputed even in the current debate.

There is also an efficiency aspect to HFE. The theory argues that, in the absence of HFE, people could move interstate solely due to differences in States’ abilities to offer lower taxes or a greater level of services, instead of underlying economic drivers like employment opportunities. HFE is sometimes also seen as a mechanism to insure against adverse economic shocks. The relevance of these other rationales for HFE is more contested.

The Australian federation is characterised by both horizontal and vertical fiscal inequities (gaps). The latter refers to the fact that the Commonwealth Government raises revenues in excess of its spending responsibilities, while State governments have insufficient revenue from their own sources to finance their spending responsibilities. For the States, some of this ‘gap’ is of their own volition — how they choose to use their tax bases. The distribution of GST revenues in Australia aims to correct both for the imbalance in taxing and spending powers between the Commonwealth and the States (vertical), and between the States (horizontal).

There is no Constitutional reference to HFE, nor is it explicitly defined in current legislation or in any formal agreement between the Commonwealth and States. The principle of HFE has evolved over time, primarily as a result of the work of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) (box1). It also evolvedfrom partial to full and comprehensive equalisation by the late 1970s/early 1980s. Australia is unique among federations in almost completely eliminating disparities in fiscal capacity between States.

HFE also forms the basis of how financial assistance grants are distributed among local governments. These grants are distributed on the principle that ‘… each local governing body in the State is able to function, by reasonable effort, at a standard not lower than the average standard of other local government bodies in the State’.

Box 1The evolution of HFE in Australia
Horizontal fiscal equalisation has a very long history in Australia. Upon federating, the six Colonies of Australia ceded the right to impose and collect customs and excise duties (the dominant source of public revenue at the time) in favour of the Commonwealth. This created a vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) and led to various general revenuesharing schemes with the States. In addition, special grants were made to the fiscally weaker States — Western Australia, Tasmania and South Australia, largely on an ad hoc basis.
In 1933, and following the threat of Western Australia’s succession, the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) was established to make recommendations on these special grants. This was done on the basis of making it possible for a claimant State ‘by reasonable effort to function at a standard not appreciably below that of other States’. The CGC also imposed a ‘penalty for claimancy’ until 1945.
During the Second World War, the Commonwealth assumed sole responsibility for collecting income tax. This significantly exacerbated VFI and necessitated a greater level of general revenue sharing with the States, via financial assistance grants. Inthe postwar period, specific purpose payments also became more important as a means of providing financial assistance and influencing the delivery of services and infrastructure within States. In contrast, the significance of horizontal equalisation achieved by way of special grants recommended by the CGCgradually declined. South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania and Queensland entered and withdrew from claimancy at various times between 1960 and 1975.
A major change occurred in the mid to late 1970s. Financial assistance grants (to address VFI) were replaced by income tax sharing arrangements, and the Premiers Conference decided that revenue under this arrangement was to be distributed on the basis of relativities based on equalisation principles. This meant that the same funding source was being used to address vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance, and the CGC’s recommendations affected the finances of all States, not just the claimant States — that is, full equalisation. By 1985, the allocation to the States had become a zero sum game, albeit initially from a much smaller pool of grants than today ($10 billion in 198586, or about $28billion in current dollars).
The full equalisation principle initially referred to ‘… standards not appreciably different from the standards of government services provided by the other States’. Since then, there have been further revisions by the CGC to the equalisation principle, which now refers to States being able to function at the ‘same standard’, but essentially the CGC has been recommending relativities based on full equalisation since 1981.
Another significant change occurred with the introduction of the GST in 2000. The GST replaced financial assistance grants and various state taxes, and the GST pool was to be returned to the States according to the principle of HFE. It meant that the Commonwealth no longer had any substantive role in determining the total level of general revenue grants to the States.
…[T]he terms were agreed between the States. This is a very important point. Now, New South Wales will come in here and say it needs more money. That is an argument it is having with Queensland and Western Australia. Not an argument with me. (Peter Costello 2006)

The practice of HFE in Australia

Presently, the CGC recommends a distribution of GST revenue according to the following:

State governments should receive funding from the pool of goods and services tax revenue such that, after allowing for material factors affecting revenues and expenditures, each would have the fiscal capacity to provide services and the associated infrastructure at the same standard, if each made the same effort to raise revenue from its own sources and operated at the same level of efficiency.