Shelby King

Ian Husted

Somath Hasina

11-9-12

Helen Strauss (p) v. Hungtington Park Railway Co. (d)

Superior Court of the City of Los Angeles (1954)

To be liable under a negligence rule, a harm must be both “foreseeable through cost-justified anticipation of harm” and “avoidable through cost-justified precautions, against foreseeable harm”:

  1. A reasonable individual could foresee the risks posed by attempting to enter a moving train.

Adams v. Bullock established that in the case of injury, it must be that “ordinary caution...involves[s] forethought of this extraordinary peril.” While the case was ruled in favor of the defendant given the extraordinary nature of the injuries suffered, this case is different because a reasonable individual would recognize the extreme injuries that could be suffered by attempting to board a moving train. Negligence is based upon the reasonable person standard, and thus it was the employees duty to “exercise the care that a reasonably prudent and careful person would exercise” while they were at work. Taking into account the size of a train, the number of potential passengers aboard and at the adjacent platform, and the precarious nature of the way a train’s wheels are balanced on the tracks, it can be sufficiently reasoned that if any injury occurs it will be great.

  1. The cost of discouraging reckless behavior is less than the expected cost of injury.

While the probability of injury may be relatively low when attempting to board a moving train, the potential damage suffered in the event of an accident is incredibly large, as serious injury or death to a large number of individuals, either on the train or on the proximate platform, seems to be the most reasonable outcome of such an activity. Given the relatively low cost of posting signs reminding passengers not to run, enforcing this policy with the existing staff, and not helping passengers onto a moving train, the Hand rule established in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. shows the burden of adequate precaution to be lower than the expected cost of injury.
A negligent injurer is not liable if able to prove that at least one sufficient cause was not due to negligence:

  1. Proximate cause: the workers were directly responsible for the explosion. Injuries would not have occurred if it were not for the workers pushing the man up onto the train.

Testimony by Herbert Gerhardt, Grace Gerhardt, and Lillian Strauss clearly shows that the platform man knocked the package carried by the second man attempting to board the train down onto the tracks. Dr. Karl A. Parshall shows that “[t]here is no question” the accident suffered by the plaintiff could cause the injuries to her vocal cords and mental well being, and the injuries could be permanent. Based on this notion of proximate cause, the railway workers were in fact a “substantial factor” with a “direct connection” to the explosion. Furthermore, Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Price established that an employee is an agent of the company and so the railway is liable for the actions of the guard and platform man.

  1. The people carrying packages are not at fault, carrying the packages alone would not have caused injury.

Under Kingston v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., it may be argued thatthe defendant is not liable given the doctrine of multiple sufficient causes since the running men were not behaving in a negligent fashion. However, this case differs because the actions of the men with the package were not sufficient to cause injury to the degree suffered by Mrs. Strauss. Having explosive materials does not immediately imply injury. A catalyst is necessary for harm to occur. The actions of the railway employees are a substantial factor in the resultant explosion, and the injury would not have occurred without negligence on their behalf.
Contributory negligence must be a proximate cause at the time of the injury to hold Plaintiff responsible:

  1. The plaintiff’s actions do not represent contributory negligence

Any argument that the plaintiff’s actions, for example standing near the vending machine that contributed to her injury, are not sufficient to remove liability from the defendant. Although Butterfield v. Forrester illustrated that contributory negligence prevents an injured party from collecting damages, the actions of the plaintiff do not in any way show proximate cause at the time of injury. Her actions alone would not have caused her any harm, and it could in no way be foreseen that they would.