UNIT CITATION
OF
81st ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
(106th Infantry Division)
UNITED STATES ARMY
FOR
CONDUCT IN GERMAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE
16 TO 23 DECEMBER, 1944
WITH
SUPPORTING NARRATIVE
HEADQUARTERS 106TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO # 443, U. S. ARMY
25 May 1945
200.6 (A)
SUBJECT: Unit Citation
TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth United States Army
APO #408, United States Army
1. Uinder the provisions of Section IV, Circular No. 333. War Department, 1943and pursuant to authority contained in Section VII, Memorandum No. 21. Headquarters, FifteenthU. S. Army, 4 March 1945. subject: “Awards and Decorations«, it is requested that the enclosed citation of the 81st CombatBattalion be approved by the Army Commander.
- Narrative.
In the early morning of 18 December 1944, a heavy artillery barrage was heard at the command post of the 81stCombat Battalionat Heuem, Belgium. At approximately 0800, a messenger from Company “A” arrived to report considerable activity in the sector of the 422d Infantry, to which the company was then attached.
A short time later Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Biggs, Jr., Battalion Commander, returned from the Division CP at St. Vith with reports of a concerted German attack along the Division front, and orders to assemble the Battalion to be immediately deployed as infantry. Schonberg, Belgium was chosen as an assembly point, and a quartering party dispatched there to choose covered assembly areas for each company. Members of the S-3 section went to Schonberg to establish an operational CP.
Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Lewthwaite, who had gone with the quartering party,returned with the report that Schonberg was at that time undergoing a severe shelling by heavy artillery, most of which was falling near the bridge in the center of town. It was realized that the destruction of this bridge would seriously cripple both lateral and vertical communications in the Division sector, since Schonberg was the central point in the Division road net. Immediately, Colonel Riggs sent LieutenantSouers and two members of the reconnaissance section to obtain data on the bridge and possible fords. They reported to Colonel Riggs that due to the heavy shelling, Schonberg vas no longer a feasible assembly area for the Battalion. This together with the fact that it had been learned that all of C and D Companies and one platoon of A Company had already been committed to the fire-fight with their respective combat teams, forced abandonment of the previous plan. LieutenantSowers, Lieutenant Hayden and Mr. House were ordered to return to Schonberg and evacuate all the heavy equipment which D Company had left there when committed. After considerable difficulty occasioned by the shelling of the area around the bridge, within which the bulldozer, the prime mover and the trailer were all located, and due to the necessity of searching the town for other pieces of equipment, all equipment was evacuated except one 1-ton trailer which was hit by a shell before it could be moved. TheoperationalCP was at the same time evacuated from Schonberg only a few minutes beforeit was hit by a shell-burst. Inspection of one of the shell craters and measurementof a fragment of one of the shells revealed this extended barrage to be from guns of approximately 380 mm. presumably railway guns. This was later confirmed by Division Artillery Headquarters.
Meanwhile, A Company was in the thick of the fight. The company commander had dispatched his work parties at 0800, and had departed for BattalionHeadquartersto report the early morning activity and to attend a scheduled meeting of company commanders. The 1st Platoon, under Lieutenant Coughlin, commenced work near Regimental Headquarters of the 424 Infantry. The 3rd Platoon,under Lieutenant Voerner. was laboring in the area of the 3d Battalion, and became engaged in the fire-fight early, losing all contact with the Company from that time on. The remainder of the Company, located at Auw, Germany, first heard rifle and automatic weapons fire in the near vicinity at about 0930. Due to the snow suits which the enemy was wearing and foggy conditions, visibility was poor, and elements of the attacking enemy forces had advanced to within several hundred yards of Auw and delivered direct rifle fire on members of the company before the situation was fully appreciated. Immediately,the 2ndPlatoon was dispersed and sent Into previously prepared positions from which they commenced the defense of the town. Company headquarterspersonnel took up positions in the building which housed the CP and began to return the fire.
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At this point, the 1st Platoon, having heard firing from the direction of A. returned amidst heavy fire which was directed at then awl their vehicles. quickly dashed into the hone in which they were billeted and started returning the enemyfive. At about 1100, members of the let Platoon, using tracer ammunition for the purpose. set fire to a barn across the road from their position. idle attess ttng to escape the blase. ten Barran infantrymen, who had been firing from the barn, wer, shot down by the cooks from Company Ssadqnarters.
Before noon enemy tanks entered Amy with additional infantry support for the attackers, and the three groups of A Company were isolated from each other. In order to avoid complete encirclement, Lieutenant Purtell's 24 Platoon withdrew up the Andler load shortly after soon. The enemy tanks proceeded up the main street with open turrots, carrying infantry. Man from the let Platoon and Company Raadquarters opened fire an them and infl is ted a considerable number of casualties. Thus action was followed by an intense fire from the enemy infantry while the tacks maneuvered into position to start firing on the houses occupied by the defenders. After tb• tanks opened fir*. Lieutenant Rutledge found it necessary to withdraw toward Andler with his Company Headquarters group. Turning their concentrated fire directly upon the one remaining point of resistance, the German tanks and infantry laid down a withering storm of
steel directed at the house occupied by Lieutenant Cotghlia's 1.5 Platoon. light rounds of point..blank fire from the tanks burst in the building, and the small arms fire increased in fury. B•allsing the position was untenable. Lieutenant Coughlin gave the order for withdrawal, which commenced at about 1500. At this point Tee 5 Edward S. Sri tbee insisted on remaining behind with his it-3 Sub..aachins gun to cover the Platoon's withdrawal across the open field at the rear of the house, even though he realised that death or capture would result. Tor this heroic action, Teo 5 Mithee (still MU.) was awarded the iistinguished Service Cross. This platoon joined a unit of the 5924 Field Artillery Pattnlfon and was eveonated to St. oith, where they made contact with. the remainder of their company the follow! ng day. The total casualties at Aar were twenty men. The 3d Platoon, committed with the 422d Infantry, is assumed to have been surrounded and captured with that regiment several days later.
At approximately 1030 on the moraine of 16 Decsmber, 3 Company vas ordered
by the Commanding Offieer of the 423d Regimental Combat Team to clear the village of
Blaialf. Germany of an occupying force of enegy which had infiltrated into that loans lion during the preceding night and early morning. tntracking at Schonberg, the companymoved to a point about a half mile vest of Bletalf. from which they oontinosd on foot,
leaving the drivers and several machine gunners to protect the vehicles. Captain
Hynes directed Lieutenant Gordon to take one platoon into Bletalf to make a recon
naissanoe in force, while the rest of the company covered their progress from positions
overlooking the town frost the south. Chief warrant Officer Carmichael arrived with
a truckload of ammunition at this point and aeeospanied Lieutenant Gordon and his man
on their mission. Upon entering the town, the platoon was met by a withering fire
from a aussbor of building• in which the Germans had set tip positions designed to hold the tow until reinforcing elements arrived. The engineer troops immediately deployed into vantage points for firing and begs to engage the enemy. Lieutenant Gordon.
displaying a disregard for his own safety and outstanding devotion to duty, continuously
moved from building to building, until he had accurately located each house in which the enemy troops were stationed. Mr. Carmichael then made his Bray out of the town with this information and made contact with a platoon of tank destroyer guns which wire located on the outskirts of town. By directing the fire of these guns on the occupied buildings, Mr. Carmichael enabled then to kill or monad a large pereentag! of the enemy and render the remainder ineffective, to that Lieutenant Gordon's platoon
could advance and mop up the occupied buildings. Kr. Carmichael thereafter returned to Battalion Headquarters. This was the last direct contact with that company.
The drivers. who had remained with their trucks, later reported that the tows underwent a terrific shelling by artillery in the lath afternoon and early evening of 16 December. The shelling vas partially directed at the track bivouac area, and
contias d intermittently e11 night. Just before dawn the following morning, the drivers were contacted by an artillery officer who ordered then to the rear, stating that his unit had been ordered to shell DIaiajf and the surrounding area. After telling his of the presence of their company in Bletaif and in defensive positions around it. they moved to Schonberg. where they remained until about 0715, when Berman tank* approached the village. At this time the drivers moved their vehicles to Heiem. where the Battalion Ctwas located. reporting the uresenc• of tanks in Schonberg. his neceeittated the evacuation of the CA from that location.
Bo further contact with B Company was over made, but two reports of their actiri ty rev: received through other sources. After the retaking of the torn of Schonberg In January 1945. civilians in the town stated that that company had made its final stand in and about Schonberg about two days after the action had occurred at Bleialf. aye to the fact that B Company had been billeted to Schoxberg. the civilians were able :o id*atify members of the company. including Lieutenant Gordon. Also, in subsequent report on interrogation of a German officer it was revealed that the only place along this section of the front which appeared to have a defense organised in depth was in ohs vicinity of Bletalf. With the exceotion of a number of drivers, the company clerk Lad several men who were on detached service, the entire company is listed as missing In action. I t Is assumed that they were surrounded and captured by the enemy forces which aeoonpli shed the encirclaaent of the 423d Infantry, whom they .cure supporting.
Meanwhile. Headquarters and Service Company, located at Houem. Belgium. was
~ttempttng to keep abreast with the fast-changing situation and to effect the evacuation if the heavy equipment of the Battalion. The heavy shelling of Schonberg on the morning
of 16 December. and the shell t ag of Heuem in tha early of to moor of that d . coupled with sabotage by civilians and the infiltrating en+rmy effectively destroyed all wire communication. Constaat use of radio by the units in direct contact with the enemy made this means of communication with Division Headquarters ineffective. due to the priority of the never.ending stream of messages sent by the other units. Thus, the slog process of sending and receiving messages by actor messenger was necessary. As a result, orders were slow in arriving and information was always far behind the current situation when it was received.
All of the heavy equipaeat of the Battalion. •xceit one bvlldoeer, was succews. fully evacuated under the direction of the reconnaissance section. All Rvacuations were effected under hoary fire and the last vehicle from C Company in this convoy was trailed up one portion of the Vint*rspel t- ckhalenfeld !oad by machine gun and mortar fire.
portions of A Company Headquarters, under Lieutenant Rutledge . had arrived at the Battalion C? in the late afternoon of 16 Tcember and were used to reinforce the defensiTe positions in that vicinity. Captain Harmon returned to the C? at Ecuem that night with about a dozen men whowere the survivors of his attempt to fight his way back to Avv on orders from the 42d 2egimental Combat ?ea Commander. As this group had approached Auv, they were hit by a volley of time-firs which burst directly above them. ?en casualties were suffered from this action.
Withdraving units passed through Reuem all through the night of 1-..17 December. After questioning of several units as they passed through, it became apparent that by very early on the morning of the 17th there was nothing between the C? anti the enemy except a light screen of achani sed cavalry. At 0230 Cal. Riggs returned from Division Headquarters with the information that the 7th Armored 1 ivision and Combat *Command B of the 9th Armored Division were arriving and an attack would commence at 0700 the following morning, aided by all the air support necessary. units of the 7th ArmoredDivision were scheduled to pass the Yngineer Battalion CF Just prior to 0700 on the morning of the 17th. 'Roads were cleared to facilitate this m+at and Beadnartersand Service Company consolidated its position at He em. to pursuance of this plan. S Sgt Moyer and S $gt Deming of the reconnaisesnce section made their pay into Fchorbert at about 0430 to check the condition of the bridge in that torn and to gain information of possible enemy infiltration. They reported that the bridge was intact
that the town appeared to be clear of the enemy.
Shortly after daybreak on the morning of 17 December, some enemy smell area firs was directed at personnel dug in on the bills surrounding !euea. Reinforcing guards were sent out to protect the C? in the belief that the position could be held until the erpeoted. attack commenced. At 0& drfv ors of the B Cos ny trucks arrived at Heuem, a distance of about one and one-half miles. At the same time, orders were received by motor messenger from Division Headquarters to evacuate Kenem and assemble the available units of the Battalion at Rodt, several miles west of St Tith. The evacuation was accomplished with the loss of a 3/4 ton truck, carrying an SCR 193 radio, which became stuck in a ditch and had to be destroyed. As the last vehicle left Keuem. personnel riding in it saw as enemy tank around the corner on the approach road into the tows. As a delaying action, a platoon of A Company Blot Ingineer Combat 1attalion, was left aid was joined by two N-3$ from the 14th Cavalry group. This group forced deployment and del r of this estimated force of four enemy tanks and an infantry company.
At 1000 on 17 December, Lt Col Riggs received orders to assemble all avail.. able men from the Slot rngine.r Combat Battalion and the 168th 7ngineer Combat Battalion (an attached unit) and organise a task force for the def~ane of the ep"roach
to st rith from the east s1ona the : nbexE-st Vith fit. T . total atr t avail.. able wee sliotly sore than two des, comprising all of Headquertars sM !lsnrice Co,paziy and about on...nhird of A Company of the Blot sneer CombatBattalion with
about one oospars7 from the 168th Rngi ex Combat Battalion.ertgtmn.t plan toorinise this defense about two atlas east of St Yith was diseartled when it vac found that the speed of the iir.or d edvunee had placed that point within onesy territory. '!. defensive position was then aeA up idong a wooded ridge about one all* east of It Qi th. near Pramerborg (set operational sap. inelossu a 2) . Rear 110„ all heavy equipment had been placed under onutrol of 'rrant Off tear (Jo) }ions* and evacuated to a wooded area northeast of Rod%, Belgium.
The enemy moral• at that tine was very high and the success of their initial attacks and the exploitation of their break-through combined to render the situation ertreaelp difficult for the defending forces. The main ene3pr thrusts of infantry supported by tanks had been effected on the north through Auw. (ermany, and oe the swath through Bleialf. Germacy, joining these two prongs at Schonberg. )olgiva, and continuing the attack to the vest toward the main communications center of the sector. %t Vith..bare Division Seadquarters vas located. This Juncture of the two attack-tug salients had cut off the 422d and 42d Combat Teams from the remainder of the Division, leaving St Pith open to a frontal attack by those two enemy elements. The larger picture revealed that deeper initial penetrations had been made to the is ediats north of ft with and a few alley south of St. with. In order for full exploitation of these smceesse• to be effected by the enemy, the oapture and use of the road oenter of St tith was necessary, so ass to provide lateral communication between thee* salient.. Thus, the defense of the town became extremely important, and the sole units initially undertaking that defense were the badly battered reanents of the 81st ingtneer Combat Battalion and the available portion of the 168th Xngtneer Combat Battalion under the eoawnd of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J Riggs, Jr., of the former unit.