GPPAC EWER WORKING GROUP MEETING

Beirut, Lebanon; 9 – 10 December 2009

INDEX

1.  Summary of background reader

2.  Preventive Action

3.  Draft Work Plan 2010

4.  Intentional Design EWER 2008 – 2010

5.  EWER activities 2006 – 2009

6.  Report Core group meeting of September 2009

7.  Infrastructures for peace

8.  Mid Term Review

9.  Strategic Plan 2011 – 2015

PARTICIPANTS LIST

Name / Presence / Flight arrival
Flight Number
Flight origin / Flight departure
Flight Number
Flight destination
Peter Woodrow (chair) / Yes / 6 Dec, 20.40h
Wataniya Airways2102 Bangkok-Kuwait / 11 Dec, 09.25h
BA
LHR
Andres Serbin (LAC) / Yes
Emmanuel Bombande (WANEP) / Yes
Takwa Zebulon (WANEP) / No / X / X
Siad Darwish (PPM) / Partly / X / X
Amal Jayawardane (PPM) / Yes
Ruby Rose Lora (IID) / Yes
Florence Mpaayei (NPI-Africa) / Yes
Igor Savin (North C'sus, West CIS) / Yes / 7 Dec, 09.20h
EK957
Moscow-Dubai / 11 Dec, 03.20h
EK956
Dubai-Moscow
Martin Fischer (Peacebuild Canada) / Yes / 6 Dec, 11.00h
MS 709
Cairo / 11 Dec, 03.30h
LH 3519
Frankfurt-Ottawa
Raya Kadyrova (Central Asia) / No / X / X
Andre Kamenshikov (W.CIS) / No / X / X
Ana Bourse (LAC) / Yes
Celia Medrano / No
Daniel Matul / Yes
Paul van Tongeren / Yes / 6 Dec, 13.40h
AF 568
Amsterdam-Paris / 11Dec 15.55h
AF 565
Paris-Amsterdam

1.  Summary of background reader

(2) Summary Preventive Action (see Page)

In February 2009, the EWER group reached a clear consensus to move towards an emphasis on early response. We’ll need to have a look at several different areas of programmatic intervention, such as Structural Prevention, Crisis Intervention/Operational Prevention, Post-war Prevention of Recurrence of Violence and Culture of Peace.

While the GPPAC rhetoric has supported an emphasis on early reponse, we have only recently found an approach that permits GPPAC regions to move assertively in that direction. The MER Project has proven a useful exercise that has enabled three GPPAC regions to conduct concrete assessments of particular situations and begin the process of determining action plans.

There is a proposed flexible outline for preventive action, which contains several steps, such as Identify Countries/Areas of Concern; Set Priorities; Engage in Conflict Assessments; Develop a Draft Preventive Action Plan for All Actors; Finalize the Preventive Action Plan; Mobilize Civil Society Action; Undertake National, Regional and International Advocacy; Perform Ongoing Monitoring of the Situation of Concern; Conduct Evaluations.

Most of the steps and actions outlined above are focused on the GPPAC Regions and on local/national focal points or GPPAC partner organizations. At the same time, the GPPAC Secretariat and the Preventive Action Task Force would play some specific roles. This approach has implications for other areas of GPPAC work—which have been, until now somewhat separate (even isolated) programmatic efforts. There have been many calls for a more unified and coherent approach for the next planning period.

(3) Summary Work Plan (see page)

The submitted plans for 2010 on Early Warning and Early Response contain three types of work plans. First, there is the second phase of the Mobilising Early Response Project in Central America, Kenya and Moldova/Transdniestra.

Secondly, there are proposals for several work shops and trainings. During the working group meeting in Beirut it may be a good idea to place this in a wider and coherent context and development. The Working Group needs to consider if a workshop or a training is an objective in itself, or that it is an instrument in the process of achieving a goal. For example, donors appear to be increasingly hesitant to support activities that don’t fit in a clear program plan.

Thirdly, there are proposal to conduct desk researches on existing EWER mechanisms and the creation of regional working group.

(4) Intentional Design EWER 2008-2010 (see Page)

VISION: The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict calls for a fundamental change in dealing with violent conflict: a shift from reaction to prevention, as an approach that will save lives, and prove more effective and less destructive. The Global Partnership seeks a world in which people and governments elect nonviolent means, rather than armed conflict, to achieve greater justice, sustainable development, and human security.
MISSION: GPPAC is building a new international consensus and enabling joint action to prevent violent conflict and promote peacebuilding, based on regional and global action agendas. GPPAC is a global multi-stakeholder network of organizations committed to act to prevent the escalation of conflict into destructive violence, at national, regional and global levels. This multi-stakeholder network includes civil society organizations, governments, regional organizations and the United Nations.
OUTCOME CHALLENGE: The EWER subprogram intends to see GPPAC Network Members that undertake adequate early warning and response activities within their capacity and strive to increase their human, methodological and material capacity. They take a lead in initiating and participating in early warning and early response actions regarding cross-border and (sub)regional conflicts. GPPAC Network Members mobilize appropriate actors with response capacity at local, national, regional and international levels, as relevant. They engage on a regular basis with governments, regional and international organisations to optimise these organisations’ collaboration with GPPAC Network Members on early warning and early response. They support each other and promote civil society-based EWER by sharing good practices, innovative approaches and lessons learned.

(7) Infrastructures for Peace (see page)

The integration of Infrastructures for peace (I4P) will be on the agenda during the Working Group meeting. How will this fit? Could the implementation of I4P be a part of the Action Plan, as proposed in the Preventive Action mechanism?

An Infrastructure for Peace means developing mechanisms for cooperation among all relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding by promoting cooperative problem solving to conflicts and institutionalizing the response mechanisms to conflicts in order to transform those conflicts. Part of such an Infrastructure are National-, District- and Local Peace Councils.

At the first Standing Conference on Stability, Security and Development in Durban in 2002, African leaders committed themselves in a Resolution to uphold their full responsibility to set up national institutions to manage conflict and working in partnership with their civil societies. In the SGUN Progress Report of 2006 on the 2001 Prevention of Armed Conflict Report, Infrastructures for Peace were mentioned: “ Essentially, the aim should be the creation of a sustainable national infrastructure for peace that allows societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally and with their own skills, institutions and resources” (page 16)

We lack an overall systems approach to build peace: what are the capacities, tools, mechanisms and institutions we need to build sustainable peace in countries. What can we learn from other system approaches :from fire prevention and from prevention in the sphere of health? From the war-infrastructure? Two African governments brought this concept ‘alive’ and are building an architecture for Peace in their countries: the governments of Ghana and Kenya. In both countries, general elections were held recently and the existence of Peace Councils has helped to reduce or prevent the escalation of violence.


2. A GPPAC Approach to Preventive Action

Proposal for Discussion

Introduction

Since the 2005 Conference in New York and the subsequent identification of GPPAC’s programme, Early Warning and Early Response has been a major focus for efforts in several regions. The overall objective for the work has been articulated as:

Early Warning and Early Response: Mobilising civil society early response actions to prevent violent conflict

Goal: The Early Warning and Early Response programme seeks to enhance the capacity and professionalism of civil society organisations to engage in early warning and especially early response efforts, and to advance interaction with governments, regional intergovernmental organisations and UN agencies.

In March 2009, the GPPAC EWER Task Force (now calling itself the Preventive Action Working Group) held a planning meeting at the conclusion of four days of meetings, during which we were able to examine in detail, both past experiences of intervention to prevent violence and three exercises aimed at assessing the current conflict realities in specific areas and prospects for forward action, under the Mobilising Early Response Project (MERP). During the Task Force planning meeting, the group reached a clear consensus to move, as much as possible, towards an emphasis on early response. While previous documents, including the goal statement above, support that direction, in practice EWER efforts have been more diffuse. Considerable effort has been focused on learning from the impressive example of civil society and government cooperation in EWER in West Africa—an experience that may not be replicable in other regions. So far, actual response actions have been few. Task Force members were united in moving towards preventive action. One participant went so far as to say, “If GPPAC cannot demonstrate a real capacity to undertake action to prevent violence, it will die in five years.”

A reformulated goal for Preventive Action might be:

(Proposed) Preventive Action Goal: GPPAC Regions, with support from the Global Secretariat, will identify specific areas of concern (country, sub-region of a country, border area) that are at risk for violent conflict and develop Preventive Action Plans for all actors. These Plans will serve as the basis for mobilizing action by civil society organizations and advocating for action by other actors, such as governments, intergovernmental bodies.

Basic Definitions:

The Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict identified two major phases and modalities of conflict prevention: “structural prevention,” which aims at transforming key social/economic/political factors that, if left unaddressed, could lead to violent conflict in the future, and “operational prevention,” which usually entails some form of urgent crisis intervention to deescalate rising tensions and avoid spillover into violence. In addition, many have identified the need to reduce the threat of a recurrence of violence during the so-called “post-conflict” peacebuilding phase, probably more accurately called the “post-violence” phase. These are illustrated in Figure 1, which presents a non-existent idealized model (that is, most real conflicts do not follow this exact pattern). As GPPAC regions develop deeper understanding of conflict prevention, we need to be clearer about the contextual differences, the different actors most able to respond, and the most effective modes of response in these phases.

Building on this basic differentiation, the practitioners and theorists recognize several different yet complementary areas of programmatic intervention—which will be referenced repeatedly below:

Structural Prevention: Actions taken to address serious problems that place a country or sub-region of a country at risk for eventual violence. Examples include efforts to address issues of political, economic or social exclusion or inequality, programs to redress extreme income disparities, initiatives to improve government accountability or the performance of other institutions, and attempts to enhance inter-group relations. These can be either long-term efforts that expect to see results only over ten to twenty years, or medium-term efforts that will show effects in three to five years.

Crisis Intervention/Operational Prevention: Urgent actions taken to prevent a crisis from escalating into widespread political violence. Examples include efforts to contain or stop initial signs of violence, intervention to address a confrontation among political leaders or factions, and initiatives to prevent violence associated with an immediate trigger event, such as a hotly contested election. Most crisis prevention efforts are immediate and short-term, although some can extend to several years.

Post-war Prevention of Recurrence of Violence: Programs designed to address the original causes of a recent war or mass violence and to deter a slide back to violent means for resolving conflict. One of the most reliable predictors of future violence is past violence; therefore, prevention must also address situations that threaten a return to violence. For example, in many cases, programs for refugee or IDP return, community reintegration, DDR, reconstruction, and state (re)building (among others) include elements designed to address conflict factors.

Culture of Peace: Long-term investments in educational programs that will, over time, instill new values of tolerance, inclusion, nonviolent approaches to change, and a “culture of peace.” The effects of such programs are only realized in a generational time span, as most are directed at children and youth.

Rationale for a Focus on Prevention Action

While the GPPAC rhetoric has supported an emphasis on early reponse, we have only recently found an approach that permits GPPAC regions to move assertively in that direction. The MER Project has proven a useful exercise that has enabled three GPPAC regions to conduct concrete assessments of particular situations and begin the process of determining action plans. In two of the three cases (Kenya and Moldova/Transdneistria), the regional groups were able to outline specific actions needed to prevent future violence. In the case of Central America (covering Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala), the group gathered considerable information, and is planning additional analysis and action planning in the coming months.

The Preventive Action Working Group—and GPPAC more broadly—should consider, refine and amend the following observations, which are based on the work of the EWER Task Force over the past several years, and the more recent MERP experience.

1.  While the West Africa (WANEP/ECOWARN) model for Early Warning is extraordinary, most GPPAC regions are not in a position to replicate it, and some regions have even been intimidated by the prospect of trying.

2.  Donors have grown tired of supporting Early Warning systems, and many have concluded that little action results from the considerable human and technical infrastucture required (example: defunding of the FAST program at swisspeace). Early Warning systems have also tended to focus on crisis intervention only.

3.  Most civil society organizations and networks are better equipped to undertake medium- and long-term efforts to address structural conflict and/or post-war peacebuilding efforts to prevent recurrence of violence, rather than intervene in urgent crises.[1] As noted below, over time, GPPAC will need to develop capacities for both structural and operational prevention. We also need to improve our understanding of the specific modes of intervention and programming for all phases of prevention.