Give War a Chance : All out War As a Means to Ending Conflict

‘GIVE WAR A CHANCE’: ALL OUT WAR AS A MEANS TO ENDING CONFLICT

Comparing Sri Lanka and Colombia

A Research Paper presented by:

Fabio Andres Diaz

(Colombia)

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of

MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Specialization:

Conflict Reconstruction and Human Security
(CRS)

Members of the examining committee:

Professor MansoobMurshed

Professor Helen Hintjens

The Hague, TheNetherlands
November, 2011

Disclaimer:

This document represents part of the author’s study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Inquiries:

Postal address: Institute of Social Studies
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Contents

List of Tables v

List of Figures v

List of Acronyms vi

Abstract vii

Chapter 1. Introduction 1

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 Two countries in a nutshell 1

1.3 What it is all about: all-out War 3

1.4 Validity and justification 4

1.5 Objectives 4

1.6 Research questions and working hypotheses 5

1.7 Structure of the document 6

Chapter 2. Colombia and Sri Lanka: from Colony to all-out war 7

2.1 Introduction 7

2.2 Colonial times: seeds of destruction? 7

2.3 The struggle after independence: looking for a nation and finding civil war 9

2.4 War as a phoenix phenomenon 11

2.4.1 In Colombia: deception, reincarnation and rebirth 11

2.4.2 In Sri Lanka: fight to the bitter end 13

2.5 Post 9/11: Justification, endogeinity, and discourse 14

2.5.1 Colombia: from guerrilla to narco-terrorist 15

2.5.2 Sri Lanka: from Tamil tiger to Tamil terrorist 15

2.6 Conclusion: new wars and the offspring of 9/11 15

Chapter 3. A theory of practice? The All-out war solution. 17

3.1 Introduction 17

3.2 All-out war: a solution for failed peace processes? 17

3.2.1 Benefits and costs of reneging 17

3.2.2 The discount rate 18

3.2.3 Inability to commit 18

3.2.4 Indivisibility issues 18

3.2.5 Credibility problems and trust 18

3.2.6 Difficulty of enforcing commitments 19

3.3 All-out war –a conceptual primer? 19

3.3.1 The empirical evidence 19

3.3.2 Back to basics: ‘old theories’ revisited 20

3.4 Achievement of ‘peace’through war: Sri Lanka and Colombia 20

3.4.1 In Colombia: continuity yet military build –up? 21

3.4.2 In Sri Lanka: blitzkrieg and scorched earth 23

3.5 Conclusion 24

Chapter 4. Theory,contradictions and practice: ontologies, ‘state’ making, and development 26

4.1 Collateral damage: weak foundations of the all-out war theory 26

4.2 Big Bang: ‘‘Tillian’’ wars 27

4.2.1 Colombia: The good ‘‘Tillian’’ student with bad grades 28

4.2.2 Sri Lanka: The bad ‘‘Tillian’’ student with good grades 29

4.2.3 In summary: can Colombia and Sri Lanja be described as ‘successful’ ‘Tillian’ wars? 31

4.3 Death (practice): is war making a particular model of development and state making? 32

4.3.1 The ‘liberal peace’ 32

4.3.2 The ‘illiberal’ peace? 33

4.4 Conclusion: Biases and implications 35

Chapter 5. Conclusions and reflections 36

References . 38

List of Tables

Table 2.1 An introduction to the Colombian and Sri Lankan conflicts 8

Table 2.2 Colombian and Sri Lankan conflicts through the lenses of different questions 10

Table 3.1 Possible positive externalities of the All-out War 19

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Map of Colombia showing the DMZ 12

Figure 2.2 Map of Sri Lanka showing the area claimed as Tamil homeland 13

Figure 3.1 Military spending as proportion of the GDP 21

Figure 2.2 Military expenditure of Colombia and Sri Lanka 21

Figure 3.3 Size of the insurgent forces 21

Figure 3.4 Size of military forces in Colombia and Sri Lanka 21

Figure 3.5 GDP growth in Colombia and Sri Lanka 22

Figure 3.6 Battle deaths related to the Colombian conflict (according to two different sources) 22

Figure 3.7 Battle deaths related to the conflict of Sri Lanka 24

Figure 4.1 Quintessential elements of the ‘give war a chance’ theory 28

Figure 4.2 Size of the military forces, government expenditure and revenue in Colombia 29

Figure 4.3 Size of the military forces and revenue in Sri Lanka 30

Figure 4.4 Revenueand taxes on income in Sri Lanka 30

Figure 4.5 Government debt 33

Figure 4.6 Economic openess 33

Figure 4.6 Political terror scale for Colombia and Sri Lanka 33

Figure 4.7 Displaced population of Colombia 34

List of Acronyms

FARC -Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

ELN -Ejercito de LiberacionNaciona

AUC -AutodefensasUnidas de Colombia

CGSB -CoordinadoraGuerrillera Simon Bolivar

JPV -JanathaVimukthiPeramuna

JHU -JathikaHelaUrumaya

LTTE - Liberation Tamils of Tamil Elam

SNL - Sri Lanka NidahasPakshaya

UNP -United National Party

PTOMS - Post Tsunami Operation Management Structure

SLMM -Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission

EU -European Union

US -United States

OAS -Organization of American States

DMZ -De-militarized zone

HRW -Human Rights Watch

ICG -International Crisis Group

ICRC -International Commission of the Red Cross

UNHR -United Nation Human Rights Commission

UNHCR -United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

CSO -Civil society organization

DDR - Disarming, demobilization and reintegration

GDP -Gross domestic product

Abstract

This paper investigates the emergence of a military approach as a means to solving protracted civil conflicts in the particular cases of Sri Lanka and Colombia. The article attempts a comparative study of the military alternatives emerging as an end to civil war in both countries. The approach adopted is to study the emergence of these military options within the context of each country’s history and to assess whether the call for war was merely a consequence of the war on terror, or driven by internal elements. The paper explores the epistemological groundings and pitfalls of the all-out war theory informing this approach, before reassessing the significance and validity of the theory in relation to Sri Lanka and Colombia. Finally, the liberal peace framework is used to approach an understanding of how development is being conceptualized through the practice of the all-out war theory in these two countries.

In order to do so, this document performs a comparative analysis, as well as an historical study of the evolution of both conflicts, incorporating elements of discourse analysis. The document also explores the notion of ‘‘Tillian’’ wars from an agent based perspective, not only to establish the logic and validity of these approaches, but also as a means to understanding possible solutions to protracted and intractable wars.

Keywords

Civil war, conflict resolution, peace settlement, military victory, agent based theories, Colombia, Sri Lanka, protracted conflicts.

vii

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Protracted and intractable conflicts (Coleman, 2000; Zartman, 2005) present a major challenge to scholars studying civil wars, and ‘complex’ wars[1] (Kaldor, 1999; Kalivas, 2001; Kalivas, 2010). Their resolution and comprehension tends to be difficult and complicated, with no accepted frameworks for understanding why peace initiatives so often fail (Kalivas, 2001). The usual frameworks proposed for conflict solution include: negotiations, third party intervention and mediation, development programmes, as well as policies geared towards social change which eliminates the social injustices and structural violence thought to underpin violence and grievances (Ballentine, 2003; Jacoby, 2008). However, these efforts have not proven to be effective methods of achieving peace in very protracted conflict situations like Sri Lanka and Colombia (Sørensen, 2001; Toft, 2010; Walter, 2004; Lutwakk, 1999). Therefore, this study reassesses an old framework. What about reconsidering the military solution’s ‘end’ to civil violence; the imposition of peace through force of arms? In other terms, this study will look at war as a means to achieving peace in civil war[2]environments.

To explore this question, I present here a comparative study of war as a means to achieving peace in Sri Lanka and Colombia. The military solution is considered by some to have brought about an ‘end’ to 26 years of civil war in the former (Arambewela, 2010; Shastri, 2009; Devotta, 2009). In the case of the latter, the Colombian conflict has dragged on for more than 50 years(Chernik, 2005; Sanin, 2005; Bushnell,1996), with a policy of all-out war having been in place for the last 8 years (2002-2010). This study will explore, compare and contrast both cases. The aim is to deepen our insight into the underpinnings of how military approaches have gained momentum in each country, what the logic was behind this shift in policy towards ‘peace’ (in both cases the military option emerged after a failed peace process). The examples demonstrate, in the case of Sri Lanka, a ‘successful’ military option, and in the case of Colombia, what might be considered a ‘marginally successful military option.’

1.2 Two countries in a nutshell

Sri Lanka’s civil war can be defined as a ‘classical’ civil war (Korf, 2006; Orjuela, 2003). Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948 (Devotta, 2000: 60). Prior to independence, the country was governed in the main by a Tamil minority[3].The years following independence saw a drive to balance ethnically-based inequalities (Frerks, 2005) that gradually reduced the Tamil minority to a less empowered condition. ‘Positive discrimination’ policies (Shasthi, 2009) were introduced with the intention of marginalizing the previously advantaged section of the population (Devotta, 2005; Frerks, 2005) andTamil was not recognized as the official language of the country.Gradual impoverishment in Sri Lanka, coupled with the incapacity of the political system to embrace and solve social disputes, increased the tensions that existed between the Sinhalese and the Tamil in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and as a consequence saw different riots in which Sinhalese or Tamil were victims(Devotta, 2000).

As the environment became more radical, armed groups emerged among the Sinhalese and the Tamil, the Tamil with the LTTE and several other groups, and the Sinhalese with the JPV (Shastri, 2009; Hoole, 2009). Both groups to some extent claimed universality on their right for a Tamil state (or a greater Tamil autonomy within a Federal Government) (Hoole, 2009; Korf 2006) or an exclusively Sinhalese state (Orjuela, 2003). Since its inception in 1983, the LTTE waged an irregular-regular war against the government (Uyangoda, 2007), while other groups such as the JPV became political parties or were destroyed in the carnage of the conflict. The LTTE controlled territories on the north and the east of the country, where the majority of the country’s Tamil population reside (Korf, 2006).

As the conflict unfolded, it became apparent that the Tamil would be difficult to halt or defeat, given their combination of irregular- regular tactics, such as suicide bombings, large scale military attacks on government garrisons, naval attacks, etc. A number of times, matters reached an apparent ‘mutual hurting stalemate’ (Zartman, 1995), that resulted in several failed negotiation attempts.The most notable of these occurred in 2002, and saw the international community playing an important role(Lewis, 2010). Following this peace process, public opinion and politicians changed inattitude towards the Tamil and the LTTE.In 2007, hard line policies and support for a military solution to the ‘Tamil issue’gained momentum, resulting in the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, the imprisonment of the majority of their soldiers, and the death of most of their leaders.

One of the major concerns around the policy of war as a means to achieving peace has been around the highly gendered and militaristic role of the army. Sri Lanka is an example of a country where militaristic action, couched in humanitarian language, has seemed to raise the status of the army and of the military (de Mel, 2009). Similarly, in Colombia, nationalism and praise of the military forces increased in the period of 2002-2010 (Rojas, 2009).

On the other hand, since 1964, the Colombian armed conflict has involved violence between left-wing guerrillas Richani, 2002), and the Colombian government, the FARC[4], and the ELN[5]. For some authors, the efforts of the guerrillas have always been interpreted as an attempt to overthrow the state. In contrast to Sri Lanka, Colombia can be framed as a ‘new war’, where the existence of armed groups might be explained by grievances related to land ownership (Richani, 2007)and previous inter-party violence over the control of the political power in the country (Palacios, 1995).Armed groups resort to kidnapping, drug trafficking, and taxation of commodities (Leal, 2006).

The violence also stems from right wing groups- emerging bands known as paramilitaries (Chernik, 2005;Pardo, 2007; Romero, 2007). These groups appeared as a response to left wing guerrilla violence, but also as a by-product of drug lords’ attempts to secure their assets from the government and the guerrillas and in some extent of their typical use of violence to acquire wealth (Duncan, 2005). The groups are quite dispersed, and the label of ‘paramilitaries’ functions more as a franchise than as a simple unified category. A comparison of the Colombian and Sri Lankan conflicts seems to suggest that the Colombian case is characterized by a higher degree of complexity. Drug production and trafficking have become major financers fuelling the fighting in Colombia (IEPRI, 2006).

As the conflict waged, the nature of the state changed.Policies aimed at creating a greater legitimacy and efficiency in the government (decentralization)had the side effect of exacerbating the effective co-optation by armed groups of state institutions at local and regional levels (IEPRI, 2006, Duncan, 2004; Lopez, 2010). For some authors, the Colombian conflict is understood as being grievance motivated, and for others as being greed driven, or even as both (Posada-Carbó, 2001; Bushnell, 1993; Pecaut; 2008). Similarly to Sri Lanka, in the Colombian case, after several failed peace attempts and different sets of negotiations (roughly one round of negotiations per decade), in 2002, the Colombian government finally opted for a military-focused policy.

This military option was supported by external donors, particularly the U.S. The strategy involved raising the strategic capabilities of the military, attacking theguerrilla’s military units, and weakening their income structure, which was strongly based on illicit crops and cocaine (Rojas, 2007) thereby forcing the guerrilla groups to negotiate a peace settlement. The implied argument behind this policy was that once the guerrillas had been defeated, paramilitary forces would no longer have any objective reason to exist, and the path to peace could be paved. The current results of these policies can be seen in a weakening of the guerrillas (Romero, 2007).On the other hand, the spaces abandoned by guerrillas have been co-opted by paramilitaries that have extended their influence across the country, even permeating the political system (Duncan, 2005). Despite the weakening observed, it appears that a military defeat of the guerrillas will be hard to achieve. On both sides, tactics and strategies have adapted to the new environment, making a possible peace hard to foresee.