Gender Conscientization, Social Movement Unionism, and Labor Revitalization

Gender Conscientization, Social Movement Unionism, and Labor Revitalization:

A Perspective from Mexico

Rachel K. Brickner

Acadia University

XVII World Congress of Sociology

International Sociology Association

July 11-17, 2010

This is a draft. Please comment but do not cite.

I. Introduction

In Anglo-American countries, labor unions are noted to be in a situation of stagnancy or decline, characterized by declining union memberships, interest in joining labor unions, and the political influence of labor unions. The roots of labor’s decline can be attributed to both economic and political factors, from the increase in flexible and part-time labor and shift from manufacturing to service sector employment to the deregulation and anti-union, anti-worker policies that are characteristic of neoliberal policies (Fairbrother and Yates 2003: 1-2). Despite the decline of labor union strength and influence, unionization remains important in guaranteeing workers good wages and benefits, a voice in their workplace, and protection from arbitrary and unfair management decisions. High levels of union density have also been shown to contribute to stronger economic indicators across the board (Schenk 2003: 244-45).

The recognition of the continued importance of unionization in the era of union decline has led to a vibrant discussion on union revitalization or renewal. The exact meaning of union revitalization varies. It can refer to expanding the number of unionized workers and restoring the strength of unions vis-à-vis governments and employers (Fairbrother and Yates 2003). It can mean a move to recognize more varied organizational forms, including “unofficial” workers’ organizations as well as unions (Nissen 2002: 271). Others have argued that union renewal must stress the role of unions as part of broader social and citizenship movements that reach out to other actors in civil society and frame the demands of workers the broader context of rights and social justice (Schenk 2003; Johnston 2002).

Despite certain arguments that that era of economic globalization would see a shift in the power of organized labor from the developed to the developing world as locations of production move to industrializing states (Silver 2001), rather than a universal decline in workers’ bargaining power (see Tilly 1995), in Latin America, this argument has not held. Between the 1980s and 1990s, when neoliberal economic transitions took place throughout the region, rates of union density fell in all the major economies except Chile (Smith 2005).[1] In Mexico, union density fell from 24.4 to 15.9 percent between 1984 and 1994 (Bensusán and Cook 2003: 237), despite the advent of NAFTA and the increase of manufacturing jobs. Partly as a result, the Mexican labor movement’s political influence has been in steep decline since the 1980s (Burgess 2003; Williams 2001; Middlebrook 1995; Garza Toledo 1994).

To the extent that unionization is important to ensure workers’ rights, good wages and benefits, and political influence, labor union revitalization is necessary in Mexico. And yet, union revitalization is rather complex because of Mexico’s particular institutions of state-labor relations. A corporatist state-labor regime that developed after 1936 gave unions that were officially linked to Mexico’s ruling party political influence and material benefits in exchange for restrictions on union autonomy. This relationship also weakened the ability of labor leaders to speak on behalf of rank-and-file workers and gave the state power to repress dissident unions (Bensusán and Cook 2003; Burgess 2003; Collier 1992). In Mexico, union revitalization requires a dual process of democratizing labor laws and labor unions (Bensusán and Cook 2003). Arguably, union revitalization in Mexico will require that unions engage in an increasingly pluralist civil society and form alliances with other social movements to promote this institutional change (Burgess 2003).

There is a gendered angle to Mexican union revitalization. Forty-two percent of Mexican women participate in the paid workforce (INEGI 2009: 284). Given their increasing presence in the workforce, it has been argued that targeting women would be a good strategy for increasing union membership and strength (Blanke 2008). Indeed it has been proposed that unions in industries with a high percentage of female workers, such as the export manufacturing industries along the US border, addressing issues of interest to women will be a boon to union membership (Frundt 2002). But even if unions are successful in organizing more women, it does not automatically follow that unions will advocate on behalf of the specific interests of women or respond to the changing role of women in the workforce. To do this, unions must embrace a gender agenda. This in turn would require the active participation of women in their unions, who, armed with a consciousness of the gendered nature of the workforce in Mexico, pressure their unions to take on a gender agenda (Heredia 2010).

Given the patriarchal history of Mexican unions this is no easy task, but there have been small steps in this direction. In this paper, I argue that there is an important role for civil society associations in creating spaces within which union women engage in dialogue, training, and education about the rights and interests of women workers and how they should be addressed by their unions. The work of these civil society groups has two important effects for union revitalization in Mexico. First, by arming women with the tools to broach gender issues within their unions, it contributes to the democratization of internal union dialogue. Second, it opens up the possibility of building stronger links within civil society, not only between women of different unions, but those women and various civil society organizations, enabling the kind of citizenship/social movement unionism that is necessary for unions to join in public dialogue with women’s groups to advocate for the rights of women in the face of economic globalization and a deeply entrenched domestic gendered division of labor.

This paper proceeds in four subsequent sections. Section II briefly explains the methodology of data collection for this analysis. In Section III, I discuss Mexican unionism and the importance of union revitalization. Section IV examines gender and Mexican unionism and the role of civil society organizations in strengthening labor unionism. Finally, Section V concludes by discussing the importance and challenges of a labor-feminist alliance in revitalizing Mexican unionism.

II. Methodology

In examining the role of civil society organizations in the development of labor feminism and union revitalization, this paper draws on research conducted over the course of several trips to Mexico City between 2002-10. The primary source of data for this study is a series of 48 semi-structured interviews with unionists, NGO workers, academics, and policy makers, all of whom have been engaged in some way in the struggle to expand the rights of women workers in unions or in public policy and labor law. Interview participants were identified using a snowball sample method, in which one interview respondent would refer me to other individuals. In all but a few cases, interviews were conducted in Spanish and translated by the author. Names of some interview respondents have been withheld out of respect for confidentiality. In addition to interview data, this analysis relies on published and unpublished documents from NGOs and unions, including training guidelines of NGOs, conference proceedings, and copies of speeches and reports.

III. The Challenge of Union Revitalization in Mexico

Regardless of how the concept of union revitalization is precisely understood, there is general agreement among those working on the topic that labor unions bring material and non-material benefits to workers, communities, and even the general economy, and that workers and communities will be strengthened if unions are efficacious actors vis-à-vis employers and the government. The same is as true in Mexico as in the Anglo-American countries that have dominated the literature, but the process of revitalization is arguably more complicated because of the way that official labor unions were incorporated into the state regime.

The Mexican State-Labor Regime

In the aftermath of the Mexican revolution (1919-20), one major objective of Mexico’s political leadership was to ensure political stability. The first step in achieving this stability was the creation, in 1929, of the political party that would become known as the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (Institutional Revolutionary Party—PRI). The PRI dominated the electoral process: from 1929 to 1988, no party candidate lost a presidential, federal senatorial, or gubernatorial election, and the party became synonymous with the state (Middlebrook 1995; Collier and Collier 1991).

One of the reasons that the party had so much electoral support was that it provided an institutional framework through a corporatist system of interest representation that could mobilize different social actors in support of the party’s goals. Corporatism is a vertical form of interest representation in which the state structures non-competitive and compulsory interest associations, provides subsidies and resources to support those associations, and imposes certain constraints on their internal functioning (Collier and Collier 1991: 51). State-labour corporatism in Latin America has been described as a relationship of exchange between labour leaders and the state. Labour leaders benefit from the official recognition of their unions, state provision of material and political resources to unions, and legal provisions making union membership compulsory. In exchange, labour leaders accept state intervention into leadership decisions and weaker organizational autonomy (1991: 51-52). In a system thus characterized by the relationship between unions and the state, the representation of workers is understood as the ability of union leaders to use their political status to deliver material benefits to the rank-and-file rather than leaders’ responsiveness to the interests of the rank-and-file as expressed through union elections or other avenues (Garza Toledo 2001: 10).

The development of state-labor corporatism and emergence of official unions linked to the PRI was part of the process of state consolidation that began in the 1930s, when the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (Confederation of Mexican Workers—CTM) was established to unite myriad unions into an umbrella federation that would have a voice with the PRI. The CTM became the largest of several labor federations officially linked to the PRI and consistently delivered electoral support to the party. State-labor corporatism in Mexico grew from this alliance between the “official” union sector, led by the CTM, and the PRI. It was institutionalized in part through particular aspects of the Federal Labor Law (Ley Federal del Trabajo—LFT). For example, the LFT’s ‘exclusion clauses’ required that anyone employed by a unionized company be a member of the union, which ensured union membership and gave labor leaders effective control over hiring and firing. Additionally, the LFT established Juntas de Concilación e Arbitración (Labour Arbitration and Conciliation Boards –JCA), which make decisions on industrial relations issues like union registration and strike legality. Legally, the JCAs require representation from unions, business, and government. Because “official” unions are typically represented on the JCAs, they rarely rule in favor of independent unions, whether for union registry or collective contract challenges (Cook: 2005: 153-54).

One result of political power of leaders in the official unions has been the proliferation of “protection contracts” and “white” unions in certain sectors. Protection contracts are collective contracts established by union leaders without the knowledge or agreement of the rank-and-file. They provide minimum protections to workers and are rarely updated through collective bargaining, but they are legally registered with the JCAs. White unions are official unions whose leaders support the companies and managers at the expense of workers’ interests, often through protection contracts. In both cases, workers may be unaware that they even belong to a union, their labor rights are routinely violated, wages and working conditions are poor, and efforts to form independent unions are resisted, often violently (Quintero Ramirez 2001).

Despite their alliance with the PRI, and the existence of white unions, official unions in Mexico were not mere puppets of the state. Official unionism developed out of the PRI’s need for labor’s political support, which gave the unions room to negotiate with the PRI—and to strike if necessary—in order to secure better representation and material benefits for workers, including better wages and benefits, health care, day care, and subsidized housing (Burgess 2004; Collier 1992). Moreover, there have always existed “independent” unions—those not affiliated with the ruling party—as well as movements for greater internal democracy within official unions. But, given the power of corporatist institutions and official unions, independent unions have never had an easy time getting recognized, and democratic movements within unions could be easily repressed by the state (Collier 1992: 54-63).

In 1982 Mexico experienced a severe economic crisis thatprompted a transition to a neoliberal economic model and a dramatic shift in the state-labor relationship. Heavy borrowing in the 1970s coupled with declining oil prices in the early 1980s led to escalating debt payments, capital flight, and inflation-induced currency devaluation. By August of 1982, the crisis had reached a climax. In responding to the crisis, Presidents Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) and Carlos Salinas (1988-94) pursued neoliberal economic reforms that severely weakened labor’s political power (Collier 1992; Middlebrook 1995; Cook, Middlebrook, and Molinar Horcasitas 1994).

De la Madrid’s first response to the debt crisis was to adopt a series of short term economic austerity measures. He cut social spending, reduced government subsidies on consumer goods and services, and began a process of privatizing state-owned industries and promoting export-oriented industrialization. By 1985 the economy had still not recovered, and he intensified efforts to privatize state-owned enterprises and liberalize trade (Collier 1992; Tiano 1994). Upon his election in 1988, Salinas intensified the policies of De la Madrid. Most notably, Salinas opened up free trade negotiations with the US and Canada for what would become the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Salinas also took action to weaken the political power of labor unions, denying even CTM unions representation in government bureaucracies, intervening in contract negotiations to undercut union bargaining power, and even jailing labor leaders who opposed his economic plans (Middlebrook 1995: 293-99).

For individual workers, the debt crisis was devastating. In the 1980s, workers’ real wages plummeted in the face of rising inflation. Unemployment and underemployment in the formal sector increased. Decreased social welfare spending and cuts to basic subsidies made it vastly more difficult for workers and their families to meet their basic needs (Middlebrook 1995; Collier 1992; Garza Toledo 1994; Aguilar García 2001). These economic hardships continued into the 1990s, especially after 1995 peso crisis, which left one million workers unemployed within six months. Through the end of the 1990s, the only stable growth in the formal economy occurred in the export manufacturing sector (Bensusán and Cook 2003: 233).

The debt crisis and neoliberal transition severely weakened the political power of labor unions. Privatization of state enterprises, the turn to flexible labor practices, and rising unemployment in the industrial sector decreased the strength powerful public sector and industrial unions. Where employment was growing—in the service and commerce sectors, as well as in the export sector—there were traditionally lower rates of unionization (Garza Toledo 1994: 208-10; Weeks 1999). As labor lost political power, its ability to deliver material benefits to workers plummeted. The CTM and other official unions were no longer able to negotiate for increased wages, which had been their primary means of maintaining rank-and-file support. Initially, the CTM joined forces with independent labor unions to protest these policies. In the early 1980s, strike activity increased. For example, in a single week in June of 1983, the CTM organized 3,000 strikes (Collier 1992: 82-83). But the CTM also sought to maintain its political power and participated in the development of economic pacts with Salinas that were aimed at containing workers’ wages, controlling inflation, and encouraging economic growth. These economic pacts allowed CTM leaders to maintain their political voice, even though they did not deliver material benefits to workers (Collier 1992; Middlebrook 1995; Burgess 2004; Zapata 1998; Garza Toledo 1994).

In the aftermath of the debt crisis and neoliberal transition, labor was in a weakened state even though the corporatist state-labor relationship remained intact. However, we can see two major trends in Mexican union politics. On the part of official unions, the leaders of the CTM have maintained a level of political power through what Bensusán and Cook (2003: 251) call “corporatist flexibility.” Even though the PRI, official labor’s party benefactor, lost the presidency in 2000 to the right-leaning Partido de Acción Nacional (National Action Party—PAN), ushering in a democratic transition, the official union sector “is willing to accept low wages and the government’s neo-liberal policies in exchange for preferential access to the state and support against unions that challenge this group’s monopoly of representation.” This explains the official union sector’s support for NAFTA, policies allowing wage and workplace flexibility, and resistance to changes to the LFT that protect the corporatist structure from which they benefit (Bensusán and Cook 2003: 249-51).