THREAT-RISK ASSESSMENT-OPEN CONTROL POSTS AT THE REGIONAL HEALTH CENTRE, PACIFIC REGION

RISK ASSESSMENT

OPEN CONTROL POSTS AT THE REGIONAL HEALTH CENTRE (RHC), PACIFIC REGION

1. Background

A major redevelopment and expansion of the Regional Health Centre in Pacific Region is presently in the final stages of construction. This project includes the provision of four new inmate accommodation units comprised of 96 Regional Reception and Assessment beds, 96 Chronic Care beds, 100 psychiatric care beds and 32 medical health care beds.

A section 127 complaint has been filed under the Canada Labour Code challenging the safety of the open control posts provided in each of the new units.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to present a risk assessment of the open control post (OCP) concept in the new accommodation units at RHC, Pacific Region. The assessment responds to a concern, expressed by some staff, over the use of open control posts in units that will house a multilevel security population, that will include inmates classified as maximum security. This concern is specifically addressed in Section 4.3.1. In discussing this primary concern, the team was apprised of other, related issues:

i) The expressed need for staff egress from the Post (Section 4.3.2 Secure Egress);

ii) The desire to isolate and contain individual "ranges" or "pods", to limit the impact of incidents (Section 4.3.3 Barriers);

iii) The security and privacy of protected information, CCTV outputs and electronic equipment within an open post (Section 4.3.4 Protection of Information).

This report will examine the concerns, identified above, in terms of the threat, risk, planned facility and operational capabilities and mitigating measures. The report recognizes the important inter-relationship between physical and operational capabilities in addressing threats and risks.

3. Identification of Threats and Risks

3.1 Threats

All of the identified concerns emanate from one source of perceived threat - the inmate population. Hence, the profile of this population and its movement capability are important considerations in assessing the nature of the threat and risk. In this regard, the following characteristics are considered most relevant to this assessment:

i)i) Overall the population at RHC is expected to approximate the security level distribution of the regional population: 15% maximum, 70% medium, and 15% minimum security.

ii)Regional Reception and Assessment Center: The traditional population profile of reception centres in federal corrections is 15% minimum security, 70% medium and 15% maximum. Only 5% of the RRAC population is expected to be maximum security due to their institutional adjustment. The remainder of the maximums would be so classified due primarily to their length of sentence. Typically, inmates in a reception unit are on their best behaviour so that a favourable classification decision will be made. This creates a situation within which acting out on the part of an inmate or group of inmates is highly unlikely.

iii)Medical Hospital: This unit will house persons with significant physical illness or some form of physical debilitation due to their chronic lifestyle of self-abuse through drugs and / or alcohol. The population in this unit will be small (32). Inmates entering this unit will be admitted voluntarily, in accordance with the normal medical practice, and will therefore be motivated to co-operate. They will be unlikely to physically impose themselves on staff in a manner that will compromise their treatment or the security of the unit. The threat of inmate activity against staff is highly unlikely and, due to the condition of the inmates, would be well within the capacity of staff to respond.

iv)Psychiatric Hospital: The patient profile of the Psychiatric Hospital will be influenced by the predominantly voluntary nature of admissions to the hospital. Canadian Hospital Accreditation Standards require that treatment be voluntary. The security level of this population is expected to be mostly medium security, based on experience with similar units in other locations (Bow Unit at RPC Prairies). Inmate activity against staff by these inmates is assessed to be highly unlikely.

v)Chronic Care: Patients who have an Axis 1 diagnosis and are being maintained by a combination of psychiatric medication and programming will be housed in this unit. There will also be 'low-functioning' inmates who, typically, cannot survive in normal prison populations. The propensity of an inmate on this unit to act out is highly unlikely and is generally controlled, in similar units elsewhere, through the use of staff interaction.

vi)Movement: A concern has been raised about how inmates and patients in the new RHC will be allowed to move about the institution. The plan is to allow almost no movement for the populations of the RRAC and Medical Units. Any movement of these groups will be escorted and they will not usually intermingle with the RHC population. While the inmates and patients of the Psychiatric Hospital and the Chronic-Psychiatric Units will be allowed to associate together, this association will be limited to program and support areas outside of the unit. Hence, the nature of eachhousing unit is expected to be relatively constant, known and manageable. Furthermore, as the units are designed to allow interviews in the housing areas, movement to staff areas can be controlled as required. Accordingly, there are no identified threats, associated with movement, that cannot be mitigated by clear post orders, careful assessment, movement control and dynamic security.

In summary, the populations currently envisaged for the RHC are largely expected to demonstrate behaviour that is consistent with the expectations for medium security inmates. The RRAC and Psychiatric units may include a small percentage (5%) of inmates that could be considered as being maximum security on the basis of institutional adjustment. However, even in the case of these individuals, negative behaviour is likely to be mitigated by clear movement control policies, inmate motivations (favourable placement) and / or admission conditions (voluntary).

While the above assessment concludes that there is no unmitigable threat posed by the inmate population, it is recognized that there may be isolated, unforeseen incidents when the level of threat may increase for a limited timeframe. Such atypical, unforeseen occurrences are addressed through contingency measures that supplement the normal operational and facility capabilities. It is important that these contingency measures be fully identified, understood and practiced.

Notwithstanding the assessment team’s conclusion that the planned inmate population does not constitute an abnormal or unmitigable threat, it is recognized that there is some staff apprehension emanating fromthe absence of a firm decision on the profile, having been communicated to staff.. It is similarly important that staff be reassured that the RHC will continue to have the authority to deny medical admissions or regular transfers from other facilities and that medical admissions to the RHC remain voluntary. This is seen to mitigate risk because the inmates are requesting to come to do programming and are returned to their parent institutions if they fail to meet behavioural standards. The capacity of the RHC to remove disruptive inmates and patients from its milieu is valuable. Threats to staff, inmates or patients can be mitigated effectively if RHC retains an effective, regionally supported transfer procedure that is in line with Commissioner's Directives.

1. Recommendation:

a) A final decision on profile and unit vocation should be communicated as soon as possible and the dialogue with staff should be continued in terms of how these populations can be managed and the related programs can be implemented.

b) A regionally supported admission and discharge (transfer/release) policy for RHC should be confirmed prior to opening.

c) It is recommended that, to the maximum extent possible, health assessments, treatment, inmate interviews occur within the housing units, rather than in the staff areas. This will reduce movement, maximize the number of staff in the units and facilitate interaction, observation and dynamic control.

3.2 Risks

Below is a Risk Management Decision Matrix that helps to assess the impact of risks by frequency and severity. The threats below were those identified by the Section 127 complaint and via the interviews with the UCCO and PIPS representatives.

Identified Threat

/ Risk - severity / Risk - Likelihood
Attempt to take over control of the post / Severity high if equipment remains operational. Severity moderate to low if equipment disabled. / Highly unlikely given profile, dynamic security, proper assessments of inmates and patients and well-trained and professional staff.
Inmate disturbance / Severity high if permitted to escalate.
. / Highly unlikely given profile. Reception inmates are motivated to do well and are so short term (70 days) as to make concerted attempts unlikely..
The patients of the Medical and Psychiatric Hospitals and the Chronic-Psychiatric Units are voluntary and being so are less likely to act in ways that would interfere with their treatment.
In addition, both the RRAC and Psych Units have two secure tiers each to hold those inmates assessed as potentially problematic

Inmate Assault on staff

/ High if staff egress prevented. / Not likely due to nature of inmate population.
Damage or theft of equipment and information / Low, all items replaceable, information protected by other means. / Low to moderate likelihood given inmate profile.
Impediments to safe staff egress. / High severity if staff imperiled, but no means of escape. / An incident requiring evacuation is unlikely considering the inmate profile. However, should evacuation be required, the RHC has defined egress routes for each unit.

Overall, the likelihood of the identified threats is considered to be low, sporadic and fully mitigable.

4. Management of Risks

It is recognized that a degree of risk is inherent in working in any correctional environment. However, risk must be managed and controlled so it is assessed as normal within the correctional environment. Broadly speaking, there are two inter-related means of managing risks within a correctional environment: operational and facility measures. The following sections identify and describe the operational and facility capabilities of the new units at the RHC. This is followed by the review team's assessment of the facility's capacity to address the identified concerns and thereby ensure that the risk is managed and controlled, so as to be considered "normal" for a correctional environment.

4.1 Description of Planned Facility Capabilities

Four accommodation units are presently being constructed at the RHC: a 96 bed Reception Centre (RRAC), a 96 bed Chronic Care Facility, a 100 bed Psychiatric Care unit and a 32 bed Healthcare Hospital. The RRAC is a stand-alone building, the Psychiatric and Hospital units are separate but interconnected by an outpatient clinic and staff area and the Chronic Unit, while presently a stand-alone building, has the capacity to be attached to another similar unit by a shared staff area.

In each case, the unit layout is based on and supports the principles of direct supervision and unit management, with podular-shaped ranges arranged around an open control post and staff work station. This correctional model, which has been successfully used in many jurisdictions (including Canada and the USA) for over two decades, is premised on maximizing direct staff observation and supervision and creating an environment that will encourage positive staff / inmate interaction.

The Design Guide for Secure Adult Correctional Facilities issued by the ACA supports the use of direct supervision facilities indicating:

"Numerous barrier-free facilities have operated successfully for many years with an average number of staff, without the use of mini-control rooms and related devices. It is strongly recommended that all housing units be barrier-free, except, perhaps, those for the small percentage of inmates who truly require maximum security controls".[1]

Studies of direct supervision facilities have further concluded:

"that direct supervision increases the ability of staff to control the jail through the immediate interaction with inmates".[2]

Units at the RHC are comprised of varying numbers and sizes of pods / ranges - RRAC consists of six two storey pods of 16 cells each; Psychiatric Unit consists of 6 two storey pods of 16 cells each and one single floor quiet area of 4 cells; Chronic Care has four two storey pods of 24 cells each; and the Hospital is made up of three single floor ranges of 10, 10 and 12 beds (including some double patient rooms). In addition to being direct supervision type units, all share the following capabilities:

  • Secure confinement at the cell, unit and building levels, with remote locking control from the Control Post;
  • Contiguous, but separate, unit-based staff areas;
  • Pod-based dining, common rooms and program, interview, and support spaces;
  • Pod-based exterior yards;
  • Observation (line of sight, mirror or camera) from the Control Post to all inmate areas;
  • Emergency shut down capability at each Control Post to shunt power to electronic systems, secure building, unit and cell doors and generally place the unit in a fail secure position, as and when deemed necessary.
  • Means of controllable egress routes from the Post to the exterior or secure area.
  • An open staff work station, raised by one step, and separated from the adjacent circulation areas by a continuous counter and swing gates.
  • An open control post in the centre of the open staff work station and separated from the adjacent spaces by an additional three steps and a continuous counter.

Over-and-above these common capabilities, two units provide pods that can be securely separated from the remainder of the unit. This additional capability is found in two pods in both the Psychiatric (32 cells) and RRAC (32 cells) units. The Psychiatric unit also includes a secure separation to a four cell quiet area and a non-secure separation to another 16-bed pod.

4.2 Operational Capabilities -

The operational capability of a facility is premised on its operating model and its operational policy. Within CSC, the operating model is Unit Management and this model will be the underlying model of the new units at RHC. This model is based on the Service's Principles of Correctional Operations[3]:

  1. To ensure that there is a meaningful interaction between teams of staff members and groups of inmates, with a particular emphasis on meaningful, on-going individual interaction between staff and inmates.
  1. To ensure that there is an integration of case management, program functions and security functions in the roles of team members.
  1. To ensure that there is staff participation in the decision-making process with authority for decisions concerning institutional operations and inmate management delegated to the lowest level possible.
  1. To ensure that individuals and groups are responsible and accountable for all decisions made and actions taken.
  1. To ensure that positive communication exists amongst management, staff and the Union, which fosters understanding and cooperative effort.
  1. To ensure that an excluded manager is in charge of the institution during times of major inmate activity.
  1. To ensure that a Correctional Officer's primary place of work is in the unit or areas of inmate activity.
  1. To ensure that there is consistency and continuity in the application of operations within and between institutions.
  1. To provide a single and consistent model for operations in all Correctional Service of Canada institutions.

These principles support the open model of corrections that the new units at RHC are designed to facilitate. The Unit Management model has a proven track record as a framework for managing a variety of populations.

Operational policy in the Correctional Service is embodied in the Commissioner Directives and in institutional Standing Orders and Post Orders. The Service's operational policies address all issues regarding the assessment and treatment of inmates as well as the security measures required to properly control inmates in the correctional setting. This framework of operational policy works well for institutions at all security levels across the Service and is expected to serve RHC in the same manner. Local policy will be required to address those operational issues not addressed in the national policy documents.

The following operational measures are aimed at ensuring that the threat and risks are well within that considered as “normal” for a correctional environment:

  • Staff training
  • Staff awareness and knowledge of the treatment plans, appropriate intervention approaches, and knowledge of the risks and needs of inmates in their respective unit;
  • Visibility and presence of the Unit Manager and Correctional Supervisors (management) in the Units,

Updated Contingency Plans - National Policy dictates that contingency plans and systems must be reviewed and updated annually, all staff must be trained and procedures rehearsed.

  • Standing Orders and Post Orders should be based on knowledge and experience in security issues. They should be detailed and all staff must be aware of their responsibilities while in the Open Control Post (OCP) and to the OCP while on the floor. All non-Correctional Officer (CO) staff should have knowledge of basic security practices for their respective units.
  • Weekly inter-disciplinary team meetings can be used to discuss the operation of the unit open control post and any changes that could be made to make procedures more effective (including, for example, specific movement procedures for certain inmates who pose a higher risk).
  • Operational reviews and a review of the unit inmate profile should be completed at least quarterly for the first year of operation.
  • Communication is essential to ensure all staff are aware of the institutional atmosphere and to share information. For example:

Mandatory shift briefings at the beginning of each shift (including all members of the inter-disciplinary team) to share information and to designate staff assignments and set priority tasks for completion during the shift;

Sign-in book for any staff member or visitor to the unit (E.G. must check in at OCP upon entry to the unit and OCP must ensure the individual is wearing their PPA or they will not be permitted in the Unit);