Foreign Policy Puzzle Assignment: Why Did It Happen?

Matt Biggar

TA: Simon Radford

Foreign Policy Puzzle Assignment: Why Did It Happen?

Puzzle 1:North Korea’s news source (KCNA), which reflects its government’s motives, recently released that the nation wishes to engage in “an all-out war and nuclear war” with South Korea and the United States.The KCNA also stated, “We will first target and dissolve mainland United States, Hawaii and Guam, and United States military based in South Korea. And the (South Korean presidential office) will be burned to the ground”(Kwon, Mullen, and Shoichet). This is puzzle, because North Korea’s release of its plans would theoretically give the US and South Korea a strategic advantage, because it would give them time to prepare.Furthermore, North Korea must realize that it will be wiped off the map if it attacks the United States, because North Korea is militarily inferior.

Middle range Dependent Variable: A nation releases threats of using hard power on rival nations.

Hypothesis 1. Level 1. Tool 2/3.Regardless of backlash in the international system, if a leader feels the instinctual drive to be more famous than a previous leader,especially in his bloodline, then he will releasethreatsof using hard power on rival nations.

Hypothesis 2. Level 1. Tool 8.By guaranteeing that Nation A will imminently attack Nation B, Nation B may have the right to attack Nation A first. Once that attack occurs, the commander-in-chief of Nation A may have the right to engage in massive nuclear retaliation on Nation B. Therefore, if the commander-in-chief looks forward and reasons back, then he will release threatsof using hard power on rival nations.

Hypothesis 3. Level 2. Tool 1. Scare tactics may push Nation B away from the border. When nation A is in a fundamental conflict with nation B’s governmental theory and they are landlocked, then Nation A will release threats of using hard power on Nation B.

Hypothesis 4. Level 2. Tool 4 (Bureaucratic Politics) When military bureaucracies dominate decision-making within a government, then that government is likely to reflect its image in the international system aswilling to use hard power, whether or not it is true. Therefore, if a nation is militarily bureaucratic, then it will release threats of using hard power on rival nations.

Hypothesis 4. Level 3.Countries increase defense spending in response to threats from Nation A, benefiting weapons-producing corporations. If weapons-producing corporations pay Nation A money, then Nation A is likely to release threats of using hard power on rival nations.

Puzzle 2: Canandian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau was in conflict with Richard Nixon and the U.S. in 1971 during the Cold War. In a trip to Moscow in the early ‘70s, he described Americans as “a danger to our national identity from a cultural, economic and perhaps even military point of view” (Granatstein). Trudeau did not approve of the Cold War, and made trips to befriend Russia and Cuba, once yelling “Viva Castro” at the end of his speech.Given that Canada relied on the United States as its largest trade market and for some of its military protection in North America, why would Trudeau cause conflict with his southern neighbors?

Middle Range Dependent Variable: Nation A protests Nation B’s war policy even though Nation B greatly supports Nation B economically and militarily.

Hypothesis 1. Level 1. If a leader of Nation A is easygoing and fun-loving,then he is likely to protest Nation B’s war policy even though Nation B greatly supports Nation A economically and militarily.

Tool: Personality attributes. Trudeau was once described as a “leftist high on pot” (Granatstein).

Hypothesis 2. Level 2. If a country has domestic issues, it will protest another country’s war policy even though it relies on that country economically and militarily.

Tool: Domestic Political Arrangements. Quebec was trying to secede from Canada, and by withdrawing from its ties to the U.S., Canada could fix its politics at home without having the distraction of wars overseas.

Hypothesis 3. Level 2. If Nation A has a strong ideology and political culture of peacemaking, Nation A is likely to protest Nation B’s war policy even though Nation B greatly supports Nation A economically and militarily.

Tool: History, tradition, ideology, and political culture

Hypothesis 4. Level 3.IfNation A is trying to find stability by appeasing both sides amongst great powers in a bipolar system, then Nation A will protest nation B’s war policy even though Nation B greatly supports Nation A economically and militarily.

Tool: Distribution of power within the system

Hypothesis 5. Level 4. If Nation A prioritizes the effect of nuclear war on the fate of the world’s climate, Nation A will protest Nation B’s war policy even though Nation B greatly supports Nation A economically and militarily.

Tool: Weather patterns and climate change

Puzzle 3: China and the United States have the largest militaries in the world, and China has kept secret its military buildup plans throughout the last few decades. For instance, the U.S. does not know how many nuclear weapons China has.Recently, China’s chief executive agreed to meet with the United States generals and discuss primarily how to avoid the use of nuclear weapons on North Korea, which are in both China’s and the United States’ interest. The meeting ended with both sides on good terms. (Garnaut) (Ng) Why, then, does China maintaina policy of secrecy in the People’s Liberation Army, when the two sides seem to seek peace?

Middle Range Dependent Variable:

Nation B refuses to disclose its military’s capabilities to Nation A, even though the two sides seek peace.

Hypothesis 1. Level 1. If the President of Nation B is a private person by nature, he will refuse to disclose his military’s capabilities to NationA, even though the two sides seek peace.

Hypothesis 2. Level 2. If Nation B has a policy of military privacy in its constitution, Nation B will refuse to disclose its military’s capabilities to Nation A, even though the two sides seek peace.

Hypothesis 3. Level 2. If the infrastructure of Nation B’s military relies on the element of surprise for success, then Nation B will refuse to disclose its military’s capabilities to Nation A, even though the two sides seek peace.

Hypothesis 4. Level 3. If Nation B believes the highest level of stability in the international system can be achieved by creating a bipolar system, and military animosity will create a bipolar system, it will refuse to disclose its military’s capabilities to Nation A, even though the two sides seek peace.

Tool: Distribution of power within the system

Hypothesis 5. Level 3. If Nation B is constrained by a treaty with Nation C, and Nation C dislikes Nation A, Nation B will refuse to disclose its military’s capabilities to Nation A, even though the two sides seek peace.

Summary Page

Puzzle 1: The best hypothesis for solving North Korea’s puzzle is found in the first level: regardless of backlash in the international system, if a leader feels the instinctual drive to be more famous than a previous leader, especially in his bloodline, then he release threats of using hard power on rival nations. Un’s bloodline has everything to do with his plots and schemes. The most recent evidence of this is in the planned date of his next nuclear test: “Many suspected the launch would happen Monday, on the birthday of Mr. Kim's late grandfather, Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea.” (Solomon) Un tends to view military acts as an inherent aspect of being a Kim. Using a nuclear act to honor a late family member shows how much the Kim family values power and violence as part of its identity. No wonder Un decided to threaten the U.S.; there is no greater honor to his family than to challenge the world’s greatest power.

Puzzle 2: The best hypothesis for the puzzle involving Canada in the early 70s comes from the second level: if a country has domestic issues, it will protest another country’s war policy even though it relies on that country economically and militarily. Historian Jack Granatstein, PHd, agrees, noting that the focus needed to be adjusted to solving its own issues: “In fact, what Trudeau wanted was an end to Canada’s nuclear role, to get Canadian troops out of Europe, and to focus the Canadian public and policymakers upon domestic concerns, such as Quebec separatism.” The greatest motivating force behind Canada’s decision to protest the United States’ foreign policy during the cold war and appease the Communists is that it didn’t want the burden of war to holding it back from advancing itself at a domestic level.

Puzzle 3: The best hypothesis for solving China’s military secrecy comes from the third level. If Nation B (China) believes the highest level of stability in the international system can be achieved by creating a bipolar system, and military animosity will create a bipolar system, it will refuse to disclose its military’s capabilities to Nation A (U.S.), even though the two sides seek peace. China is a major economic power, and it is increasingly showing signs of wanting to gain military power. By refusing to share its secrets, it increases its presence in the system as a dangerous military power.

Works Cited

Granatstein, J.L. "Gouzenko to Gorbachev: Canada’s Cold War." Canadian Military Journal. n.

page. Web. 13 Apr. 2013. <

Kwon, KJ, Jethro Mullen, and Catherine E. Shoichet. "State media: North Korea in 'state of war'

with South, threatens to 'dissolve' U.S.." CNN. 29 Mar 2013: n. page. Web. 15 Apr. 2013.

Gossage, Patrick. Close to the Charisma (Toronto: 1986), p. 260.

Solomon, Jay. "Kerry Focuses on Iran, North Korea Leaders." Wall Street Journal 15 Apr 2013,

n. pag. Web. 15 Apr. 2013.