European Neighbourhood Policy and Mediterranean Countries: Bridging the expectations gap
Michal Mravinač
Department of International Relations and European Studies
Vysoká škola veřejné správy a mezinárodních vztahů in Prague
Czech Republic
Paper to be presented at a joint conference of the Czech Association of European Studies and the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration:
"Integrating with the EU: Accession, Association and Neighbourhood Policy”
Charles University, Prague
2-3 September 2007
Introduction
In March 2003, the Commission launched an initiative called ‘Wider Europe’ as a complement to the upcoming Eastern enlargement. It was the brain child of a joint DG Enlargement and DG Relex taskforce designed to ‘avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union’ (COM 2003: 4). The reasoning behind the new approach was to devise a policy instrument functioning as a viable alternative to enlargement. At the time, the EU was facing an emotionally charged political debate about its ultimate boundaries, which has not abated since. Faced with growing disenchantment over enlargement in many member states shortly before the 2004 enlargement, the Commission sought alternatives to full membership that might be acceptable, albeit as interim measures, to the potential entrants. In 2004, the ‘Wider Europe’ initiative was extended to incorporate countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the Caucasian region and became known as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
The ENP is hailed by its promoters as an innovative approach to EU foreign relations. Interestingly, whereas the EU’s capacity for external action, or more precisely the lack of it, is often subject to vocal criticism, reactions to the ENP have been generally positive (Emerson 2004; Dodini&Frantini 2006; Wissels 2006; Lefebre 2006). This conspicuous absence of disapproval in political discourse on merits of the ENP prompted investigation of my own. The research presented here constitutes only a part of the whole study and it is meant to complement the work of my colleagues in the conference panel on the European Neighbourhood Policy. It focuses on the expectations raised by the policy, especially regarding its Mediterranean dimension.
In the following text, I will explore the ENP’s capacities to deliver the desired outcomes as regards stabilisation, increased prosperity and security in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. The ENP’s qualities and merits will be judged against expectations that it is assumed to meet. This paper advocates the following baseline hypothesis: in order to further the EU’s foreign policy interests in neighbouring countries, the ENP must primarily bridge the gap between expectations of EU member states on one side and the neighbouring countries (NCs) on the other. On the part of the EU members, these expectations mostly relate to security, migration, human rights and trade issues. The Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, aim to gain greater access to the EU market, larger development assistance and greater support in tackling Islamist fundamentalism and certain adverse social trends. The ultimate aim is to provide an impartial analysis of the policy framework and advise certain adjustments to improve ENP’s workability.
As regards structure of this paper, section I studies the ENP’s political context. It will provide insights into the ENP’s background and how it is designed to promote interests of EU member states (MS). Section II looks at the instruments of implementation and presents some preliminary assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the policy. Section III is dedicated to the Mediterranean dimension of the ENP. Attention will be focused on the analysis of the political and economic expectations of the governments in these regions and to the extent to which their expectations are met by ENP. Finally, the conclusions will provide a summary of the main findings and give some policy recommendations.
I. The European Neighbourhood Policy in context
Since the inception of the European integration process, member states of the European Economic Community (EEC), later European Union (EU), have experienced unprecedented levels of prosperity, stability and security. Over the years, close economic and political cooperation within the Community removed any tangible risk of conflict between EEC/EU members. The integration process also contributed to the arsenal of the member states’ (MS) foreign policy options, creating institutional structure to bring together their negotiating powers. Success of the EEC generated strong appeal for other countries to join the club. A promise of potential membership became a potent tool that empowered EEC members to impose their values and policy preferences on neighbouring states.
Doubtlessly, enlargement has been the most successful foreign policy tool of the EEC/EU in all areas of political, economic and security matters. Having the ultimate say over the prospect of membership, EEC/EU policy-makers have been able to require far-reaching legal, social and economic changes in countries vying for accession. For outsiders, the incentive to comply with requirements has proved to be strong. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, fledgling democracies in Southern Europe went through a serious legal, social and economic reform process in order to secure their candidacy for EEC membership; in 1990s the prospect of accession to the EU motivated changes in post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Democratic governments which replaced previous authoritarian regimes needed an anchorage on the international scene and strived to be re-identified with the prosperous EEC/EU, rather than their countries’ past. The opportunity to join the EEC/EU helped the governments to mobilise public support for (often unpopular) political, legal and economic reforms required to ensure compatibility with acquis communautaire.
Yet, regardless of previous successes, the EU’s enlargement capacity is reaching its limits. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates that any European state may apply for membership. As long as a candidate country fulfils the accession conditions (i.e. democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities, a functioning market economy, and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures) and is able to take on the obligations of membership, there are no legal obstacles preventing it from joining the club. However, the last wave of enlargement in 2004 and 2007 created an unfavourable atmosphere for potential future entrants. Especially in some of the original MS, the citizens and politicians alike perceive enlargement predominantly as a threat and not an opportunity. Due to this ‘enlargement fatigue’ in some parts of the EU, it is becoming increasingly unrealistic for certain potential candidates to entertain hopes of forthcoming membership.
Although in the last decade the EU has been troubled by internal disagreements and relatively slow economic growth (compared to the US, for instance), for many countries in its vicinity integration with the Union still represents the preferred route of future development. Turning an open concept of economic and political cooperation into an exclusive club can potentially have detrimental consequences to the EU’s interests abroad. Depriving countries harbouring membership aspirations of their hopes without offering a viable alternative can be especially damaging. Turkey can serve as an example of detrimental effects caused by EU’s failure to meet outsider’s expectations. For a long time, the carrot of enlargement served as an argument for successive Turkish governments enabling them to follow a path of democratic and market oriented reforms. As the enlargement enthusiasm in many EU countries started waning, Turkish citizens and establishment have become increasingly disappointed with the accession negotiations and alienated to the EU. According to the Economist (2006) EU’s popularity in Turkey fell from 80 per cent in 2004 to under 50 per cent by the end of 2006. This development is coupled with increasing esteem for radical strands of Islam in the country, causing growing security concerns over Turkey’s future as a part of Western civilisation.
Although the EU may not quite be a neo-medieval empire, as presented by Jan Zielonka (2006), its zone of interest in immediate neighbourhood expanded greatly with the Eastern enlargement. At the same time, the Union’s ability to maintain and impose security and stability by border expansion is not limitless. If the EU wants to retain its political clout in neighbouring countries once provided by the prospect of accession, it should operate a coherent foreign policy framework with a clear vision (Dannreuther 2004). This paper argues that the ENP has potential to become the framework of choice. Nevertheless, if the concept is to succeed, several adjustments ought to be made. The strengths and weaknesses of the ENP are further elaborated on in the following sections.
II. Preliminary assessment of the ENP
The EU currently relies on several types of institutionalised relationships towards its neighbours. They range from Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA), with the likes of Russia or Armenia, to an advanced stage of accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia. Kratochvil (2006: 13) argues that the heterogeneity of foreign policy instruments has significantly reduced EU’s capacity to conduct coordinated strategic actions towards more than one country. The ENP aspires to cover all countries in the EU’s vicinity apart from the candidates for accession and those deemed eligible for membership in the foreseeable future.[1] It encompasses political, economic and security aspects of cooperation with non-EU partners.
Rather than a policy, the ENP is best described as a policy framework. It is based on a principle of ‘joint ownership’. In other words, the EU together with NCs define a set of priorities that will be embedded in country-specific action plans (differentiation principle). They cover a wide array of areas ranging from political reforms to cultural and academic exchanges. Looking at the various action plans, one can see that they reflect differences in social development in the individual NCs, as well as different levels of relations with the EU. This specificity provides the necessary flexibility in bringing several groups of states with totally different priorities under a headline of one policy framework. All action plans are combinations of requirements and incentives. The incentives are largely economical, which reflects the limits of the EU’s power-projecting ability in external relations. The EU offers preferential trade relations and progressive financial support. In fact, though, virtually all NCs already participate in EU programmes in one way or another. In theory, the NCs that are party to the ENP should eventually obtain ‘a stake in the EU’s Internal Market (COM 2004: 3). What the ‘stake’ precisely means remains undefined. All the relevant Commission’s documents are conspicuously silent on this matter. Clearly, it is not a membership offer for any of the partners (Emerson 2004).
The idea of extending the internal market to non-EU states isn’t new. Since 1994, EFTA members Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland have participated in the internal market via the European Economic Area (EEA). This participation requires a great deal of coordination with EU policies. In fact, the economic regulatory environment in the aforementioned countries has been nearly entirely ‘Europeanised’ – i.e. brought in line with EU rules. What is more, although the non-EU EEA members are consulted, they wield no direct influence on adoption of internal market’s legislation. EEA membership requires a serious commitment on the part of non-EU governments, which they would certainly not accept, unless they perceived the relationship as mutually beneficial. Yet, even before inception of the EEA, the economic, social, political and regulatory environment in the EFTA countries had been much closer to the EU than is the case of ENP partners.[2] The regulatory and economic structures of ENP countries are generally incompatible with the internal market. In some cases, notably in Arab countries and Belarus, the social and political system does not correspond with fundamental EU values, as presented in the founding treaties. At this moment, it is therefore inconceivable to integrate the ‘ring of friends’ into the EEA. Instead, the ENP operates with rather vaguely defined ends.
The ENP framework is built on existing agreements with NCs. These are Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and Association Agreements (AAs) plus the Euro-Med partnership with Mediterranean countries. Such a contract is a prerequisite for the opening of negotiations on an action plan (Tulmets 2006: 43). According to Dodini & Fantini (2006: 510) the ENP was conceived as having a much stronger reform agenda than the previous foreign policy frameworks. In this case, they claim, the EU offers incentives, financial assistance and participation on some of its policies in exchange for commitment to adhere to EU’s values and standards. This represents the ‘conditionality’ principle. While shaping these requirements and strategies, the Commission relied heavily on its experience with the fifth enlargement. The participant NCs are expected to follow a path of development similar to the accession countries. The core issues involve respect for human rights, including minority rights, the rule of law, good governance, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of a market economy and sustainable development (COM 2004: 12 – 17). However, under the ENP the goal is the transition itself, rather than EU membership. The extent of the transition expected varies hugely across the individual NCs. It reflects whether there is any conceivable prospect for their accession to the EU or not.
The interpretation of the ENP’s significance and meaning differs hugely on the point of view taken by different actors. The reason is that the policy framework was designed to accommodate a wide variety of preferences within and outside the EU. The inclusion of such a diverse group of countries under a single policy breeds confusion. One may subscribe to the idea that the ENP’s underlying purpose is to reduce political pressure on further enlargement on the part of would-be candidates. Indeed, Eneko Landaburu, Director General at DG External Relations, made it very clear in his presentation in February 2006 at CEPS annual conference, when he said that “continuing to view our neighbourhood from enlargement perspective is an unhelpful distraction” (Landaburu 2006: 1). If that was the main purpose, though, the policy would bear little relevance to Mediterranean countries without any ambition or chance to become members. The ENP pretends to treat all the partners equally on the basis of joint ownership and conditionality. Yet, in reality the ENP has developed into a framework with variable geometry, applying different standards to different NCs. This is not necessarily wrong, as long as the framework meets the expectations of the parties involved. In the next section, I will focus on the Mediterranean dimension of the ENP and address the issue of expectations both on the side of the EU and southern neighbours.
III. The Mediterranean dimension of the ENP
While formulating the Mediterranean dimension of the ENP, two major factors were considered by the Commission. Firstly, it was the struggling Barcelona Process, also called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Secondly, the pressure from southern European states such as France, Italy and Spain, who feared that the ENP could potentially sideline the Mediterranean countries due to high preoccupation with the Eastern European dimension. Their concerns were well founded not least because the Barcelona Process failed to meet many of its objectives and there was little political will on the part of the EU to put more effort behind it. The inclusion of the Mediterranean countries resulted into a blurring of the policy’s boundaries and meaning. Arguably, the policy had been originally designed as a substitute for enlargement; suddenly it acquired another dimension aiming to raise the Barcelona Process from ashes.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was launched in 1995 at a conference of ministers of foreign affairs from both sides of Mediterranean held in Barcelona. It constitutes perhaps the most important initiative taken since the end of colonisation to develop an institutionalised relationship between the southern and the northern sides of the Mediterranean (COM 2000: 3). It aspired to create a free-trade area along the lines of NAFTA or ASEAN called the Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MFTZ), as well as a potent dialogue among partners geared to assist the southern states with transitional measures towards liberal social and economic regimes (Patten 2001: 7). Comparing the 1995 Barcelona Declaration with the 2004 Strategy Paper on ENP, one can find some striking similarities. Both documents present the goal of creating ‘a zone of peace, stability and security’. Both aim to stimulate trade in order to increase prosperity and hope to establish a mechanism for mutual cultural exchange.
The EMP was launched in a time of high optimism over the future of the East and the South Mediterranean. The US led Oslo initiative facilitating agreement between Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel created positive dynamics that were, unfortunately, crushed by later violent recurrence of the conflict in Palestine. The increasing intra-regional tensions coupled with the unwillingness of EMP partners to follow the reform path envisaged by the Barcelona process resulted in disappointment after a decade of partnership. Some observers identified a twin failure: the EMP has neither helped the governments to modernise and stimulate economic growth, nor has it improved the position of civil society on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean (Amirah-Fernandez & Youngs 2006: 77). Others expressed even harsher criticisms, claiming that the EMP was from the outset designed to cement authoritarian regimes in the southern and eastern Mediterranean and uphold European influence over certain policies, such as migration, drug trafficking or economic reform (Amin & Kenz 2005: 82-139).