Epistemic Disagreements and Epistemic Nihilism
2989 words
Abstract (112 words): John Mackie and others have argued that positive moral judgments are false because there are no moral properties or facts to make them true. I argue that Mackie’s main argument for moral nihilism suggest an analogous argument for epistemic or intellectual nihilism, i.e., a view on which there are no truth-makers for judgments about what’s reasonable, justified, known, should be believed, and so on. On this view, these kinds of judgments are also all false because there are no epistemic facts or properties to make them true. I suggest that since the latter view, epistemic nihilism, is false and so the argument for it unsound, the same is true for moral nihilism.
1. Introduction
John Mackie and others have argued that positive moral judgments are false because there are no moral properties or facts – “entities or relations of a certain kind, objective values or requirements” – to make them true.[1] This view, moral nihilism, implies that nothing is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, or virtuous or vicious.
I argue that Mackie’s main argument for moral nihilism suggest an analogous argument for epistemic or intellectual nihilism, i.e., a view on which there are no truth-makers for judgments about what’s reasonable, justified, known, should be believed, and so on. On this view, these kinds of judgments are also all false because there are no epistemic facts or properties to make them true.[2]
I suggest that since the latter view, epistemic nihilism, is false and so the argument for it unsound, the same is true for moral nihilism. But whether there are ways that anyone should respond to these arguments, i.e., any judgments about these arguments that are reasonable, is a focus of this paper. If there is, this seems to show that these arguments for epistemic and moral nihilism are both unsound and should be rejected.
2. From Moral Disagreement to Moral Nihilism
Mackie offers a number of arguments for moral nihilism. My focus is on his “argument from relativity” or disagreement.[3] It is based on observations about the variety of moral judgments and principles people accept and have accepted over time and space. We can present the argument this way:
(1) There are “radical” disagreements about which moral properties actions, societies, people, and so on have; these moral disagreements are within and between contemporary societies, as well as societies from the near and distant past.
(2) If there were moral properties, then, probably, there wouldn’t be such “radical” disagreements. E.g., if there were a property ‘being morally right’, then there wouldn’t be such radical disagreements about what is morally right; most people would see that something is right and so there would be fewer disagreements.
(3) Therefore, probably, there are no moral properties.
As this argument stands, i.e., as Mackie presents it, these premises are not optimally explained or defended. Regarding (1), a more precise measure of the depth and breadth of moral disagreements (and their resistance to informed, dispassionate inquiry), as well as moral agreements, would be helpful. Regarding (2), a more general account of the see-ability of properties would also be helpful: Mackie seems to assume that moral properties are such that they would be widely perceived, but since we know that some real properties are not like that, it’d be useful to know why we should accept Mackie’s assumption.
I will set these questions aside, however, and agree with (1): there are and have been many moral disagreements, some of which survive agreements about the non-moral facts and their relevance and honest, dispassionate moral inquiry. Concerns about (2) will be addressed later.
3. From Epistemic Disagreement to Epistemic Nihilism
The objection I wish to raise to this argument from moral disagreement is based in the fact that it seems that a strongly analogous, but seemingly unsound, argument can be generated that leads to a comparable, but – I suggest – false epistemic nihilism. Here’s the argument:
(A) There are “radical” disagreements or differences in belief about which epistemic properties beliefs and patterns of reasoning have; these epistemic disagreements are among contemporary people and within contemporary societies, as well as people and societies from the near and distant past.
(B) If there were epistemic properties, then, probably, there wouldn’t be such “radical” disagreements about which epistemic properties beliefs, believers and patterns of reasoning have. E.g., if there were a property ‘being known’, then there wouldn’t be such radical disagreements about what is known.
(C) Therefore, probably, there are no epistemic properties.
This argument has a surprising consequence in that if it is sound, then it is false to say that anyone should believe that it is sound (or unsound), it is false to say that it is unreasonable (or reasonable) to accept it (or reject it), and so on: all ascriptions of the epistemic qualities beliefs and believer would have vis-à-vis claims this argument are false since there are no epistemic properties to make them true. And this is true about every other epistemic judgment, about any domain of propositions.
If we should reject this argument and what’s entailed by it, i.e., we should think some epistemic evaluations are true, that some beliefs are reasonable, justified, ones that ought to be believed, and so on, then perhaps that should influence our evaluation of Mackie’s argument for moral nihilism also.
4. Does the Argument Need Defense?
A case can be made for this argument for epistemic nihilism above. Before I do this, however, I want to note that in many contexts when arguments are presented it is assumed that the premises, especially controversial ones, should be explained and defended: reasons should be given in their favor. It’s interesting to realize that if epistemic nihilism is true, then this practice of reason-giving and reason-demanding is based on some false assumptions. These include the assumptions that having reasons is (intellectually) better than not, that (from an intellectual point of view) we should have reasons (and we should sometimes adopt an intellectual point of view), that if we have nothing to say in favor of our views then that is bad, and so forth. If claims like these are never true, the implications are profound.
Some people think we can avoid these implications if intellectual claims are a kind of hypothetical imperative: there are no distinctly intellectual values or obligations; all claims concerning these matters are indirect claims about what would best satisfy the desires or interests we have. So, regarding the practice of reason-giving, some people enjoy doing this, find it satisfying and entertaining in various ways: in these cases, claims that you should have reasons for your philosophical views are shorthand about claims that you should satisfy your philosophical desires. About what many people regard as more important matters, reason-giving and evaluation can be important for finding food, shelter and mates, of course, so that’s why you ought to have reasons, the response goes.
But are any of these kinds of enjoyments good, or are any of these interests or preferences ones that should be satisfied? I assume that an epistemic nihilist would be a moral nihilist also: if moral or epistemic nihilism is true, then no: the evaluative assumptions behind intellectual work of all kinds are, as Mackie put it, “simply attitudes and policies”[4] that some people have, others lack, and others despise. But, on nihilism, no views are better or worse, from a distinctly evaluative point of view, since this point of view presumes a false evaluative metaphysics. Of course, different approaches and attitudes towards thinking will have different non-evaluative results, but no results are better or worse, since there is no better and worse from moral or epistemic points of view.
5. Defending the Argument
Although epistemic nihilism implies there is not an intellectual need to defend arguments that one presents, let me say some things in defense of the argument for epistemic nihilism.
At first glance, it seems that premise (A) concerning epistemic disagreements is quite plausible. There are at least some, perhaps many, epistemic propositions (e.g., propositions that assert that p is reasonable for S at t, or justified for S at t, and so on) for which there are comparably intractable, “radical” disagreements over their truth-values, i.e., disagreements about whether the proposition has the epistemic properties attributed to it or not. There also are disagreements about whether something is evidence, a reason, and whether something is sufficient, or good, or conclusive, evidence or reason. There is disagreement about epistemic principles, judgments about what’s intellectually valuable, judgments about what kinds of beliefs we should be most confident in and the cogency of certain manners of reasoning. These claims are true about judgments pertaining to a wide range of issues, not just a few subject matters: politics, sports, religion, history, philosophy, dieting, cosmology, medicine, and science, to name just a few areas. So a prima face case exists for premise (A).[5]
Apart from this particular argument, questions about epistemic disagreement are independently interesting: given that there are some disagreements about epistemic evaluations – both particular evaluations and in terms of moral general principles – what explains this? E.g., do global epistemological skeptics truly see that the standards for knowledge are never met? Or do non-skeptics see the truth about knowledge? This is just one example, but it raises interesting questions: if the skeptics are right, do they have a kind of “philosophical perception” that enables them to see truths that few others can? Or does the fact that things seem to them this way explained by factors other than “philosophical perception,” e.g., temperament, influences of their teachers and peers, psychological gratification from holding perverse views, or what? Insofar as there are, at least, some seemingly deep disagreements about some epistemic judgments, this is enough to raise our interests. And since there has been much discussion of this kind of issue in ethics, perhaps thinking through more of the parallels will be useful for both fields.
Regarding premise (B), concerning the see-ability of epistemic properties, I think the “defense” of this needs only be as strong as the defense of the analogous premise (2) found in the argument for moral nihilism. Here it seems the defense is meager. Perhaps relying on the (perhaps) not-well-developed argument that if a property exists, then it is perceivable; moral properties are not perceivable, so they do not exist. “Perceivable,” however, means cannot-be-perceived, and I don’t know why anyone should think that disagreements show imperceptibility: perhaps one party to a disagreement can perceive the truth-making moral property about the issue.
Perhaps (2) would be motivated by epistemological puzzles about how one would detect moral properties, but comparable puzzles are found with epistemic properties: how, exactly, does one (reasonably) detect that a belief is reasonable, or justified, or known? (Recall that epistemic disagreements were given as a reason to doubt that we have such an ability, since there are no such facts to detect). Epistemic epistemology is as murky, if not murkier, than moral epistemology. Attempts to “naturalize” epistemology do not make things any clearer or simpler, since the question of what, if anything, would make it such that mental states with some specified naturalistic features (e.g., true, produced by reliable processes, etc.) better or more valuable than ones without them are still open.
Thus, although little conclusive can be said here, it seems plausible that someone who accepts (2) above would, and should, accept an analogous premise concerning the see-ability of epistemic properties (B). So, if this person recognizes epistemic disagreements as being as deep and wide as moral disagreements, this person should conclude, that there are no epistemic properties (and so that this very sentence is false!).
6. Clarifications, Objections and Replies
To respond to this case for epistemic disagreements and the nihilism that, in conjunction with (B) that might follow from it from it, someone might deny that there are epistemic disagreements. They might claim that epistemic evaluations often take the form of an “epistemic operator,” a sentential operator, such as “It is reasonable that”, “It is known that”, “It ought to be believed that”, and so on, applied to a believed sentence. Once this is recognized, the objector might claim, we see that epistemic disagreements are over the truth-value of the object of the operator, not whether the operator “fits” the believed sentence. If this is the case, then, the objector claims, the disagreements are just over the truth value of the belief in question, not its epistemic status, so there aren’t epistemic disagreements.
So, for just one example, there is considerable disagreement about whether religious beliefs are epistemically rational. Although these disagreements are often “public,” a “private” example will help. Consider some philosopher who wonders if his own theistic belief is rational. He is on the fence: sometimes he thinks is and other times thinks it is not. So he is having something of an internal disagreement about whether this proposition is true: ‘it is epistemically rational for me to believe that God exists.’ But, the objector might claim, his internal disagreement is not about whether that claim is true, it’s just about whether God exists or not: his internal disagreement about whether it’s reasonable to believe that God exists is just a disagreement about whether God exists. The suggestion would be, in general, epistemic disagreements (internal and, more importantly, public) are not over the which epistemic evaluations apply to various propositions and believers; rather they are just over the truth values of the proposition that are the objects of the epistemic operators themselves.