January 7, 2009[1]
Chapter 4
Empirical Illustration:
Anaphoric Relations in Japanese:
1. Introduction
2. The BVA (Bound variable anaphora)
2.1. The linguistic intuition BVA
2.2. The bridging statement
2.2.1. The Lexical condition
2.2.2. The Structural condition
2.3. The Model of prediction making
2.4. Modification
2.5. Further modification
2.6. Some methodological clarification
3. BVA and "Principle B" Effects
3.1. A Problem
3.2. Modification regarding pf-LF correspondences
3.3. Further modifications
3.3.1. A new repeatable phenomenon
3.3.2. An account
3.3.3. A new prediction
3.3.4. Further predictions
4. "Principle B" effects for coreference: a further prediction
5. The Hypotheses about zibunzisin and otagai, revisited
5.1. Eliminating a *Schema-based prediction and adding a new one
5.2. Attempts to 'save' the zibunzisin-as-a-local-anaphor hypothesis
5.2.1. The initial formulation
5.2.2. Modification attempted
5.3. Attempts to 'save' the otagai-as-a-local-anaphor hypothesis
5.4. Summary
6. Summary
7. Appendix: Hoji 1995
1.Introduction
In this chapter, I will provide further illustration of our methodological proposal, building on the empirical paradigms discussed in chapter 2. I will make crucial reference to the model of prediction making put forth in chapter 3 and illustratethe suggestion made in chapter 3 as to how we can deal with the failure of a prediction. In section 2, I will first consider the bound variable paradigm discussed in chapter 2 in light of the proposal in chapter 3. The discussion will lead us to address in sections 3 and 4 the effects of so-called Binding Principle B in Japanese in some depth. The discussion will illustrate how we can maintain our proposal by modifying certain aspects of what gives rise to the empirical prediction while maintaining our hypothesis about properties of the Computational System, without rendering our 'move' theoretically degenerating in the terms of Lakatos 1970/1978. We will then discuss in sections 5 whether we can in a similar way save from refutation the hypotheses discussed in chapter 2 that zibunzisin and otagai are 'local anaphors', i.e., that they are lexically specified in the same way, in the relevant respect, as the English reflexives and reciprocals. It will be concluded that such attempts to save those hypotheses would likely result in the elimination of the *Schema-based prediction without introducing a new *Schema-based prediction, which would leave us with a proposal that cannot be empirically disconfirmed. Such a 'move' would likely be theoretically degenerating in the terms of Lakatos 1970/1978.
2.The BVA (Bound variable anaphora)
2.1.The linguistic intuition BVA
Let us first go over again what is meant by the intuition BVA(A, B)[2], which plays a central role in our empirical discussion. Our initial illustration in chapter 2 of what is intended by BVA was based on examples like (1) in English.
(1)a.every teacher looked at his student
b.*?his student looked at every teacher
We let BVA(A, B) express an intuition that (i) B does not have an inherent referent of its own, and (ii) its 'value' co-varies with that of A; e.g., BVA(every teacher, his) as it is intended in (1a) expresses the intuition that has often been stated as in (2a).
(2)a.For all x, teacher(x), x looked at x's student
b.For all x, teacher(x), x's student looked at x
It is commonly understood that (1b) cannot be interpreted as (2b) while (1a) can be interpreted as (2a).
As noted in chapter 3: 6.2, we do not wish to define BVA(A, B)as an intuition that arises whenever B is interpreted as a variable bound by A in terms of logical representation. For example, the anaphoric relation holding between someone and his in (3a) is not an instance of BVA(A, B)for our purposes although it is often expressed as in (3b).
(3)a.Someone washed his car.
b.some x, person(x), x washed x's car
We intend BVA(A, B) to have the properties in (4).
(4)a.A is not singular-denoting; i.e., either there are two or more individuals or entities that are 'expressed' by A or there is no individual or entity expressed by A.
b.B does not refer to a particular individual or entity.
c.B is singular-denoting.
d.B is understood to 'express the same thing' as A is understood to express; i.e., the value of B co-varies with that of A.
What is crucial in our characterization of BVA(A, B) are (4a) and (4c), which ensures that the anaphoric relation between A and B cannot be an instance of coreference.[3] A in BVA(A, B), in fact, need not contain a quantifier in its standard sense. For example, we regard the intuition that even John and his can be anaphorically related in (5) asan instance of BVA(even John, his) although even is not a quantifier.
(5)even John criticized his teacher.
BVA(even John, his)
We might thus consider the linguistic expressions in (6) as a candidate for A of BVA(A, B) and those in (7) as a candidate for B of BVA(A, B).
(6)a.every boy
b.Toyota and Nissan
c.the three companies
(7)a.it
b.him
c.the boy
In (8a) and (8b), for example, we could address BVA(every boy, his)and BVA(every boy, the boy), respectively.
(8)a.every boy called his mother
b.every boy called the boy's mother
With such a BVA, (8a) and (8b) both correspond to the interpretation in (9).
(9)every x, boy(x), x called x's mother
If there were no restrictions in regard to the overt marking of singularity and plurality of the relevant linguistic expressions, the sentences in (10) might be interpreted as in (11) and the BVAs would be BVA(Toyota and Nissan, it) for (10a) and BVA(the three companies, it) for (10b).
(10)a.Toyota and Nissan criticized its attorneys.
b.The three companied criticized its attorneys.
(11)a.every x, x is a member of the set {Toyota, Nissan}, x criticized x's attorneys
b.every x, x is a member of the set of the three companies, x criticized x's attorneys
The English examples in (10), however, cannot yield the BVAs as corresponding to (11). The impossibility of BVA(Toyota and Nissan, it) and BVA(the three companies, it) in English, and other similar languages,seems to be due to some restriction in regard to the overt marking of singularity and plurality on the two NPs/DPs that are intended to stand in an anaphoric relation.
If a language does not have such a restriction, as it seems to be the case in Japanese, the BVAis possible in analogous examples. For example, BVA(Toyota to Nissan 'Toyota and Nissan', soko 'it') and BVA(ano mittu-no kaisya 'those three companies', soko 'it') are possible in (12), despite the fact that soko is singular-denoting, as will be illustrated directly.
(12)a.Toyota to Nissan-ga soko-no mein banku-o uttaeta (to sitara)
'(if it happened that) each of Toyota and Nissan sued its main bank'
b.Ano mtitu-no kaisya-ga soko-no mein banku-o uttaeta (to sitara)
'(if it happened that) each of those three companies sued its main bank'
As discussed in Hoji 1995, so-ko must be singular-denoting. Consider the examples in (13) and (14).[4]
(13)a.(Hoji 1995:259, (16), slightly adapted)
*Toyota1-ga Nissan2-ni [CP zeimusyo-ga so-ko1+2 -o sirabeteiru to] tugeta (koto)
Toyota-nom Nissan-dat tax:office-nom that-place-acc is:investigating that informed (fact)
'Toyota1 informed Nissan2 that the tax office was investigating it1+2'
b.*Toyota1-wa Nissan2-ni [NPso-ko1+2-no goodoopaatii-no kaizyoo]-o teiansita.
Toyota-top Nissan-dat that-place-gen joint:party-gen place-acc suggested
'Toyota1 suggested to Nissan2 (about) a place for its1+2 joint party'
(14)a.Tom1-ga Nick2-ni [CP CIA-ga karera1+2-o sirabeteiru to] tugeta (koto)
Tom-nom Nick-dat CIA-nom they-acc is:investigating that informed (fact)
'Tom1 told Nick2 that the CIA was investigating them1+2'
b.A-no ninensei1-waa-no itinensei2-ni aitura1+2-noatarasii kooti-o syookaisita.
That-gen sophomore-top that-gen freshman-dat they-gen new coach-acc introduced
'That sophomore1 introduced to that freshman2 their1+2 new coach.'
c.A-no ninensei1-wa a-no itinensei2-ni [kooti-ga aitura1+2-o mihatteiru koto]-o morasitesimatta.
that-gen sophomore-top that-gen freshman-dat coach-nom they-acc is:watching fact -acc revealed
'That sophomore1 revealed to that freshman2 that the coach was watching them1+2 (from somewhere).'
d.A-no ninensei1-wa a-no itinensei2-ni[kooti-ga soitura1+2-o mihatteiru koto]-o morasitesimatta.
that-gen sophomore-top that-gen freshman-dat coach-nom they-gen is:watching fact -acc revealed
'That sophomore1 revealed to that freshman2 that the coach was watching them1+2 (from somewhere).'
The split antecedence is not possible in (13), in contrast to (14). As pointed out in Hoji 1995, this observation can be accounted for if so-ko 'that place', used in (13), is understood to be singular-denoting, in contrast to karera 'they', aitura 'those guys', and soitura 'those guys', used in (14).
The anaphoric relation as indicated in examples like (15) therefore cannot be that of coreference.
(15)a.(Hoji 1995: (17)), slightly adapted)
Toyota to Nissan-ga John-ni [CP CIA-gaso-ko-o sirabeteiru to] tugeta (koto)
Toyota and Nissan-nom John-dat CIA-nom that-place-acc is:investigating that told
'each of Toyota and Nissan informed John that the CIA was investigating it'
b.Toyota to Nissan-ga so-ko-no torihikisaki-o uttaeta (koto)
Toyota and Nissan-nom that-place-gen business:associate-acc sued
'each of Toyota and Nissan sued its business associate(s)'
It is argued in Hoji 1995 that the anaphoric relation in examples like (15), holding between Toyota to Nissan 'Toyota and Nissan' and so-ko 'that place, it' is an instance of bound variable anaphora, i.e., BVA(Toyota to Nissan, so-ko) in the terms of the present discussion. If so-ko is replaced by a-soko the BVA is no longer available, as indicated in (16).
(16)a.*Toyota to Nissan-ga John-ni [CP CIA-gaa-soko-o sirabeteiru to] tugeta (koto)
Toyota and Nissan-nom John-dat CIA-nom that-place-acc is:investigating that told
'each of Toyota and Nissan informed John that the CIA was investigating it'
b.*Toyota to Nissan-ga a-soko-no torihikisaki-o uttaeta (koto)
Toyota and Nissan-nom that-place-gen business:associate-acc sued
'each of Toyota and Nissan sued its business associate(s)'
The contrast between (15) and (16)—and, more generally, the contrast between a so-NP and an a-NP—is discussed in chapter 2, in relation to the availability of BVA in examples such as (17). I have added the judgments on (17) here.
(17)a.(=chapter 2: (72b))
90% izyoo-no ki-ni so-re-o ueta sotugyoosei-no namae-ga kizamareteiru rasii.
90% or:more-gen tree-on that-thing-acc planted graduate-gen name-nom be:engraved seem
'It seems that on each of 90% or more trees is engraved the name of the graduate who has planted it.'
b.(chapter 2: (71b))
*90% izyoo-no ki-ni a-re-o ueta sotugyoosei-no namae-ga kizamareteiru rasii.
90% or:more-gen tree-on that-thing-acc planted graduate-gen name-nom be:engraved seem
'It seems that on each of 90% or more trees is engraved the name of the graduate who has planted it.'
The contrast is quite striking in light of the fact that bothso-ko and a-soko can be coreferential with Toyota, as indicated in (18) below.
(18)a.Toyota-ga so-ko-no roodoo kumiai-o hihansi-ta (koto)
Toyota-nom that-place-gen labor union-acc criticize-past (fact)
'Toyota criticized its labor union.'
b.Toyota-ga a-soko-no roodoo kumiai-o hihansi-ta (koto)
Toyota-nom that-place-gen labor union-acc criticize-past (fact)
'Toyota criticized its labor union.'
The generalization in question has been noted in works such as Hoji 1991 among others and is often stated as in (19), as noted in chapter 2.
(19)A so-NP can be 'bound' by a quantificational NP while an a-NP cannot.
The pair in (20) further illustrates the contrast between the so- and the a-demonstratives.
(20)a.(Hoji et al. 2003: (15a))
Toyota-sae-ga [{so-ko/*a-soko}-no ko-gaisya]-o suisensita.
Toyota-even-nom that-place-gen child-company-acc recommended
'Even Toyota recommended [its subsidiary].'
b.Toyota-sika {so-ko/*a-soko}-no sitauke-ni toohyoosinakatta
Toyota-SIKA that-place-gen subsidiary-dat did:not:vote:for
'No company other than Toyota voted for its subsidiaries.'
2.2.The bridging statement
2.2.1.The Lexical condition
The bridging statement relates the informant's linguistic intuitions to theoretical concepts. The general form of the bridging statement given in chapter 3 is as in (21).
(21)(=chapter 3: (36))
A certain linguistic intuition such as the sense of the availability of interpretation a, b) arises only if (a) certain condition(s) is/are met at LF.
The lexical condition on BVA(A, B) in Japanese as noted in the preceding subsection can be stated as in (22a) or (22b), depending upon whether we take the relevant lexical marking as a 'positive' or 'negative' specification for the availability of BVA(A, B).
(22)a.BVAa, b) arises only if b has a lexical marking on it at LF.
b.BVAa, b) arises only if b does not have a lexical marking on it at LF.
The relevant hypothesis about items in the mental Lexicon of the speakers of Japanese must have the consequence in (23) or (24)
(23)Under (22a):
a.An a-NP does not have a lexical marking M on it at LF.
b.Aso-NP has a lexical marking M on it at LF.
(24)Under (22b):
a.An a-NP has a lexical marking M on it at LF.
b.Aso-NP does not have a lexical marking M on it at LF.
In chapter 2, we expressed the relevant contrast by adopting Ueyama's (1998) theory of anaphoric relations; we introduced in chapter 2 the following aspects of Ueyama 1998.[5]
(25)There are three types of individual-denoting NPs:
a.D-indexed NPs[6]
b.Non-indexed NPs
c.I-indexed NPs
(26)a.A-NPs areD-indexed.
b.So-NPs are either I-indexed or non-indexed.
From (26) we obtain (27).
(27)a.A-NPs areD-indexed.
b.So-NPs are not D-indexed.
And our account in chapter 2 of the contrast noted above was based on the assumption that a necessary condition for BVA(A, B) is the absence of a D-index on B. In the terms of Ueyama 1998, the lexical marking M in (22) amounts to being D-indexed. With the bridging statement in (28), combined with (27), we obtain (29).
(28)BVAa, b) arises only if b is not D-indexed.
(29)So-NPs can be B of BVA(A, B) but a-NPs cannot.
Given the view we adopt that the demonstratives so/a(and ko/do)are not the heads of so/a-NPs (or ko/do-NPs)[7], it is not entirely clear how the lexical specification on the demonstratives so- and a- has the said consequence on the entire so-NPs and a-NPs. I will assume that so/aas in (30) is an adjunct rather than the head, as suggested in Hoji 1995, and that it serves to provide a (partial) 'instruction' as to how the value of what it modifies is to be determined.[8]
(30)a.so-re
b.so-ko
c.so-no N
d.a-re
e.a-soko
f.a-no N
In sum, the hypothesis about the so- and a- demonstratives we adopt is that they are marked in the mental Lexicon of the Japanese speakers in such a way as to have the consequence that an a-NP cannot be B of BVA(A, B) whileso-NP can. Such a lexical hypothesis is language-particular while the structural hypothesis on the availability of BVA(A, B), on the other hand, is universal.
2.2.2.The Structural condition
In chapter 2, we considered the possibility of BVA in paradigms with 'binder-bindee' pairs such as those given in (31).
(31)a.NP-sae ('even NP'), so-ko ('that place/it')
b.NP-dake ('only NP'), so-ko ('that place/it')
c.10 izyoo-no NP ('ten or more NPs'), so-ko ('that place/it')
The relevant paradigms discussed in chapter 2 are repeated here.
(32)(=(98) in chapter 2)
a.okExample1-1-1
Toyota-sae-ga so-ko-no kogaisya-o uttaeta.
Toyota-even-nom that-place-gen subsidiary-acc sued
'Even Toyota sued its subsidiaries.'
b.*Example1-1
So-ko-no kogaisya-gaToyota-{o-sae/sae-o} uttaeta.
that-place-gen subsidiary-nomToyota-{acc-even/even-acc} sued
'Its subsidiaries sued even Toyota.'
c.okExample1-3-1
So-ko-no kogaisya-o Toyota-sae-ga uttaeta.
that-place-gen subsidiary-acc Toyota-even-nom sued
'Its subsidiaries,even Toyota sued.'
d.okExample1-2-1
Toyota-{o-sae/sae-o} so-ko-no kogaisya-ga uttaeta.
Toyota-{acc-even/even-acc} that-place-gen subsidiary-nom sued
'Even Toyota, its subsidiaries sued.'
e.*Example2-1
[Kyonen Nissan-ga Toyota-{o-sae/sae-o} uttaeta saiban]-ga
last:year Nissan-nom Toyota-{acc-even/even-acc} sued law-suit-nom
so-ko-o toosan-ni oiyatta.
that-place-acc bankruptcy-to forced
'The lawsuit(s) that Nissan sued even Toyotalast year forced it to bankruptcy.'
(33)(=(101) in chapter 2)
a.Toyota-dake-ga so-ko-no kogaisya-o uttaeta.
Toyota-only-nom that-place-gen subsidiary-acc sued
'Only Toyota sued its subsidiaries.'
b.So-ko-no kogaisya-ga Toyota-o-dake uttaeta.
that-place-gen subsidiary-nom Toyota-acc-only sued
'Its subsidiaries sued onlyToyota.'
c.So-ko-no kogaisya-o Toyota-dake-ga uttaeta.
that-place-gen subsidiary-acc Toyota-only-nom sued
'Its subsidiaries,onlyToyota sued.'
d.Toyota-o-dake so-ko-no kogaisya-ga uttaeta.
Toyota-acc-only that-place-gen subsidiary-nom sued
'Only Toyota, its subsidiaries sued.'
e.[Kyonen Nissan-ga Toyota-o-dake uttaeta saiban]-ga
last:year Nissan-nom Toyota-acc-only sued law-suit-nom
so-ko-o toosan-ni oiyatta.
that-place-acc bankruptcy-to forced
'The lawsuit(s) in which Nissan sued only Toyota last year forced it to bankruptcy.'
(34)(=(103) in chapter 2)
a.10-izyoo-no zidoosyagaisya-ga so-ko-no kogaisya-o uttaeta.
10:or:more-gen auto:company-nom that-place-gen subsidiary-acc sued
'Each of 10 or more automobile companies sued its subsidiaries.'
b.So-ko-no kogaisya-ga 10-izyoo-no zidoosyagaisya-o uttaeta.
that-place-gen subsidiary-nom 10:or:more-gen auto:company-acc sued
'Its subsidiaries sued each of 10 or more automobile companies.'
c.So-ko-no kogaisya-o 10-izyoo-no zidoosyagaisya-ga uttaeta.
that-place-gen subsidiary-acc 10:or:more-gen auto:company-nom sued
'Its subsidiaries,each of 10 or more automobile companies sued.'
d.10-izyoo-no zidoosyagaisya-o so-ko-no kogaisya-ga uttaeta.
10:or:more-gen auto:company-acc that-place-gen subsidiary-nom sued
'Each of 10 or more automobile companies, its subsidiaries sued.'
e.[Kyonen Nissan-ga 10-izyoo-no zidoosyagaisya-o uttaeta saiban]-ga
last:year Nissan-nom 10:or:more-gen auto:company-acc sued law-suit-nom
so-ko-o toosan-ni oiyatta.
that-place-acc bankruptcy-to forced
'The lawsuit(s) in which Nissan sued each of 10 or more automobile companieslast year forced it to bankruptcy.'
The account adopted in chapter 2 of the contrast in the paradigms in (32)-(34) can be understood as containing the bridging statement in (35) and the hypothesis about the Computational System as in (36).
(35)Bridging statement about BVA (I), to be revised:
BVA(A, B) is possible only if there is FD(t, B) at LF, where the t is the trace of A.[9]
(36)Hypothesis about the Computational System (HCS) (I), to be revised:
FD(a, b) only if a c-commands b.
As discussed in some depth in chapter 3, in order to make a testable prediction on the basis of (35) and (36), it is necessary to commit ourselves to how a certain surface string may or may not correspond to a particular LF representation, more precisely, how a certain linearly arranged elements including a and b may or may not correspond to a particular structural relation between the LF objects corresponding to a and b.[10]
Let us review what LF representations each of (37) may correspond.
(37)a.A-ga B-o V
b.B-o A-ga V
In chapter 2, we adopted the view that had emerged since the mid 1980s, which can be summarized as in (38).[11]
(38)a.(37a) necessarily corresponds to an LF representation in which A (and its trace if there is one) c-commands B but B (or its trace even if there is one) does not c-command A.
b.(37b) may correspond to an LF representation in which A (and its trace if there is one) c-commands B, or to one in which B (and its trace if there is one) c-command A.
That is to say, we assumed in chapter 2 that there is a strong tendency for a phonetic string conforming to the schematic form in (39a) to get 'parsed' so as to 'give rise to' a numeration that would necessarily result in the LF representation schematized in (39b) or (39c).