MGW Debate camp1

Emilio Lozano/Grant WuAff Troop Decrease

Decreasing Troops Solvency

Decreasing Troops Solvency

Solves China/US relations

Solves for proliferation

Solves for proliferation

Solves for South Korean relations

Solves for South Korean relations

Solves for South Korean relations

Solves for patriarchy

Solves for patriarchy

Solves for patriarchy

Solves for patriarchy

Solves Heg

Solves Heg

Impacts

Impacts

Impacts

Impacts

A2: Withdrawal decreases deterrence→ War

A2: Withdrawal decreases deterrence → War

A2: Withdrawal decreases deterrence → War

A2: Withdrawal decreases deterrence → War

A2: Withdrawal decreases deterrence → War

South Korea/ North Korea relations

Withdrawal solves reunification

Withdrawal solves reunification

Withdrawal solves reunification

US solves for NK invasion

Withdrawal solves reunification

US solves for NK invasion

Solves for Imperialism

Solves China/US relations

Withdraw good – key to increasing China/US relations

Cha, associate professor of government and D.S.Kong-Korea Foundation Endowed Chair at Georgetown University,2002

(Victor D. Cha, “Focus on the Future, Not the North”, accessed on Project Muse, pg. 11, Accessed on 6/22/10 jb, sob)

Beyond the broader alliance missions, the ground troop presence on the peninsula, which the Chinese have always found disconcerting, would appear less provocative to Beijing after restructuring. China will undoubtedly still oppose any configuration that maintains a U.S. presence in Korea, but a USFK that relies less on pre-positioned heavy equipment and two-division-sized ground force deployments and more on air and naval presence (excluding long-range bombers) to improve regional stability would generate less opposition in Beijing than the alternative.

Solves for proliferation

Withdrawal good – key to denuclearization

Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the Naval War College,2009

(Jonathan D., The Washington Quarterly: Kim Jong-il’s Clenched Fist, pg. 158-159, October 2009, accessed June 22, 2010, FS TS)

<. Pyongyang characterized the North’s 2006 test and its accumulation of weaponized plutonium as a fundamental strategic turning point that diminished the importance the DPRK had previously attached to diplomatic relations with the United States.28 According to senior North Korean diplomats, ‘‘the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’’ would require the United States to disengage from its security commitments in Northeast Asia, remove its nuclear umbrella from South Korea, withdraw U.S. military forces from the peninsula, and develop a U.S.—DPRK ‘‘strategic relationship’’ paralleling the U.S.—ROK alliance. North Korean officials also asserted that normalization, presumably entailing a peace agreement to supplant the armistice accords of July 1953, would have to precede denuclearization. Moreover, dismantlement and final verification would not be possible unless and until the United States again provided the light water reactors initially pledged under the now defunct Agreed Framework.>

US withdrawal would facilitate a nuclear-free Korean peninsula

Bandow 10

(Doug, former special assistant to Ronald Reagan, American Spectator “How much Longer?” June 25, 2010 6/26/10 GW)

But none of that should matter in Washington. It is far past time for the ROK to take over responsibility for its own defense. It can decide how much to spend, how large a military to maintain, and whether to emphasize domestic or international duties. Having become one of the couple dozen most important countries in the world, the South should play the part in its own defense.

The nuclear issue would remain, but without U.S. forces on station in the South, vulnerable to North Korean attack, Washington could step back there too. Creating a nuclear-free peninsula is most important for South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. They should take the lead.

Japanese proliferation leads to decrease in proliferation

Bandow 10

(Doug, former special assistant to Ronald Reagan, Campaign for Liberty “Why Are We Worrying About North Korea?” June 10, 2010 Accessed on 6/26/10 GW)

Washington's best policy would be to step back from this geopolitical miasma. Any map demonstrates which countries have the most at stake in a stable Korean peninsula: South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. It is time for them to take the lead. American officials should be particularly blunt with Beijing. If the DPRK creates a growing atomic arsenal, Washington has no interest in being in the middle. So the U.S. would do nothing to discourage South Korea or Japan from going nuclear in response. Hearing Tokyo and nuclear weapons in the same sentence would cause Chinese policymakers to break out in a cold sweat and encourage them to take action against the North.

Solves for proliferation

US disentanglement with Korea will allow others to take over proliferation issue

Bandow 10

(Doug, former special assistant to Ronald Reagan, American Conservative Defense Alliance “What Good are Allies? Turning Means into Ends” April 5, 2010 Accessed on 6/26/06 GW)

Yet the U.S. remains dangerously entangled in the vagaries of inter-Korean politics. The South is well able to defend itself. If Washington did not deploy troops on the Korean peninsula, it could lean back and let Seoul in conjunction with Japan and China take the lead in dealing with the North. Indeed, the nuclear issue is of far greater concern to them than to America, which possesses the ability to destroy the Kim regime many times over even if North Korea developed a nuclear arsenal. The U.S. has an interest in promoting nonproliferation, but not in being the guarantor of Northeast Asian stability.

Solves for South Korean relations

Pulling troops out helps ease tensions between the US and South Korea

Nam, Associate Professor of Political Science at Inha Uni-versity, 2006

(Chang-hee, “Relocating the U.S. Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture”, Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4, accessed at Accessed on 6/24/10 KK/EL)

Another psychological and cognitive impetus for change arose on the opposite side of the globe. Although Washington does not admit it publicly, many U.S. citizens took exception to large-scale anti-U.S. demonstrations triggered by the accident involving the American armored vehicle. During a major television broadcast, the commander of the Eighth U.S. Army of the USFK was infuriated when a Korean mob destroyed an American flag. This incident also caused many American commentators to call for a reduction of the USFK. For instance, after the candlelit vigils were shown on television, leading opinion makers such as former U.S. National Security Council advisor Richard Allen, columnist Robert Novak, and Washington Post columnist Fred Hiatt opined that America should pull its troops out of Korea altogether if the "ungrateful" Koreans did not want U.S. troops protecting them from the North. Even though the USFK spokesman stated that the plan to relocate the 2nd ID had nothing to do with these types of sentiments, these events demonstrated that the USFK had not maintained harmonious relations with residents near camps located north of Seoul and that conditions surrounding the bases were deteriorating. Consequently, it would be fair to say that complaints about the U.S. military indirectly prompted the discussion about relocating the U.S. bases in Korea.

Removing troops helps adjust US/South Korea alliance for future

Relocating the U.S. Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture Author(s): Chang-hee Nam Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 615-631 Published by: University of California Press ( Accessed on 6.22.10) (ELKK)

Withdrawal or reduction of U.S. military forces have historically played a significant role in the dynamics of ROK-U.S. relations and security on the Korean Peninsula. Many older Koreans believe that the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950 was related to the full-scale withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1949. The relocation and reduction of U.S. troops amid the acute on going tension over North Korea's nuclear affairs--would significantly change the security environment on the peninsula. The Grand National Party, the largest opposition party, and some security specialists question the timing of the realignment in light of widely shared concerns about North Korea's dangerous "nuclear black-mail diplomacy." By ending the role of forward deployed U.S. ground forces as a "tripwire" along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the Pentagon is seeking a different war-fighting posture for the ROK-U.S. combined forces. This unprecedented move on the part of the USFK is heading in a direction that challenges the half-century-old alliance between the U.S. and ROK, but the action also simultaneously promotes a new partnership between the two countries.

Solves for South Korean relations

Reduction of troops in South Korea decreases anti-Americanism

Relocating the U.S. Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture Author(s): Chang-hee Nam Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 615-631 Published by: University of California Press (Accessed on 6.22.10) (ELKK/)

Thistension, has complicated the environment in which U.S. troops are stationed. Continued conflict and the failure to harmonize with local communities will hurt training efficiency and U.S. force morale. Thus, thedesire to avoid conflict with local communities may have also prompted the USFK to become more serious about realignment plans. For example, friction with local residents might have affected, albeit indirectly, the U.S. decision to move the 2nd ID in Dongduche on and Uijeong but to less-populated areas. One important factor for both countries to consider is that the success of planned force realignment may be affected by how the local public responds to the expansion of existing U.S. bases, which will absorb those being redeployed.

The Korean public supports US withdrawal

Sheen, assistant professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, 2003

(Dr. Seongho, research fellow at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, M.A., B.A., ex-assistant research professor at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Asian Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2, The Responses of Asian Nations to Bush Administration Security Policies: Grudging Partner: South Korea, pg 100-101, 2003, accessed June 22, 2010, FS TS)

Domestic issues involving U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) have also heightened anti-American sentiment and public skepticism of the need for U.S. troops in South Korea. As Korean society becomes more prosperous and self-confident, it has become less tolerant of inconvenience and unfortunate incidents caused by the U.S. military presence-such as the infringement of private rights by training exercises and crimes committed by soldiers. The issue of moving the main U.S. military base in Seoul, Yongsan military garrison, became the focus of an intense public debate. Last year, the announcement of U.S. plans to construct a new apartment complex at Yongsan base, a piece of prime real estate in down-town Seoul, ignited public protests over the permanence of a U.S. military presence in the center of the capital.

Other issues, such as pollution involving USFK bases and complaints about training exercises, all contribute to severe public criticisms of the United States and are making cooperation between the two governments more difficult. Even South Korea's decision to purchase U.S. military aircraft and warship systems was seriously criticized by the public, who questioned the alleged "imperialistic" U.S. pressure for a contract involving billions of dollars.

Solves for South Korean relations

Decrease in US bases improves US/SK relations

Mitchell, senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, 2003

(Derek, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea”, The Washington Quarterly• 26:1 pp. 123–137, accessed at http://muse.jhu.edu, Accessed on 6/24/10 KK/EL)

U.S. forces in Korea and their political/military leaders should similarly pay substantial attention to any measures that will reduce the footprint of U.S. military personnel based or stationed on the peninsula. These measures could include consolidating and reducing bases where possible, good-neighbor initiatives to promote understanding and good will between base personnel and local communities, and heightened sensitivity to the environmental (including noise) and other hazards that the U.S. military presence poses to local populations. The United States should also consider reforms in the combined military command structure that will provide greater responsibility and authority to Korean leaders

Withdrawal good – helpful for South Korean politics

Yeo 10

(Andrew Department of Politics Catholic University of America “U.S. Military base realignment in South Korea”, Peace Review May 18, 2010 Accessed 6/21/10 AW GW)

Activists faced an uphill battle blocking USFK base expansion with the majority of South Korean political elites strongly supporting U.S.–South Korean alliance relations. South Korea faces an external security threat from the North, as well as regional uncertainty involving larger Asian powers such as Japan and China. Thus political elites agree, at least in principle, that U.S. forces in the mid to long term are necessary for South Korean security. This pro-U.S. consensus held by elites prevented activists from forming significant ties with key political leaders. Moreover, this ideological constraint made it difficult for activists to shift the public debate on basing issues. Although local residents and activists provided an alternative security discourse that included the withdrawal of U.S. military bases, the state, in an effort to maintain positive U.S.–South Korean relations, launched its own media campaign preempting South Korean activists.

Korean progressives are critical of US military presence.

Shin, Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies, 2010

(Dr. Gi-Wook, Professor of Sociology; FSI Senior Fellow Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies; Professor of Sociology; FSI Senior Fellow and Director, Shorenstein APARC; Director, Korean Studies Program Director, Shorenstein APARC; Director, Korean Studies Program, One Alliance, Two Lenses – US-Korea Relations in a New Era, Alliance Politics in South Korea, pg. 98-99,2010, Accessed on 6/24/10 KK EL FS TS)

<In no uncertain terms, Hankyoreh exhibited more negative tones than Chosun – toward the United States, U.S.-ROK relations, and every U.S. – related issue. Table 4.4 introduces aggregate data on both papers’ average news tones toward the United States and U.S. ROK relations as well as relevant issues and subjects. The greatest disparity in tone between the two newspapers is observed for the subject of U.S. forces in the ROK (-1.34 for Hankyoreh versus -0.23 for Chosun). As shown in Table 4.3, the progressive newspaper devoted the highest proportion of its U.S.-ROK coverage to this subject, and this coverage was clearly quite negative. Thus, these sizeable disparities in views confirm not only that Korean progressives are very critical of the U.S.-ROK alliance but also that the alliance, including the U.S. troop presence in Korea, has become a point of significant contention between progressives and conservatives.>

Withdrawal good – key to maintain South Korea public support

Chaibong 2005

Hahm, professor of political science at Yonsei university. “The Two South Koreas: A House Divided”. From the Washington Quarterly, summer 2005 issue, pg 57-72 M.H and S.H

An even more important factor in the progressives’ ability to maintain their appeal has been nationalism. As South Koreans become increasingly successful, they are also becoming more vociferous in expressing their national pride. The massive rallies during the national soccer team’s World Cup victories in the summer of 2002, for example, became occasions for South Koreans from all walks of life to celebrate the nation’s coming of age. When the news spread in the fall of 2002 that two schoolgirls had been killed during U.S. troop maneuvers, however, those same people came out to mourn the deaths and to protest the insensitive manner in which the United States handled the case. Then, led by the progressives, these rallies were transformed into anti-American rallies. The leftist nationalists had appropriated a nationalism based on justifiable pride in the nation’s successes in achieving industrialization and democratization (as well as winning soccer matches) and transformed it into anti-American sentiment. Many South Koreans, regardless of their ideological orientation, had by this time become critical of certain aspects of the U.S. presence in their land, such as perceived arrogance and misbehavior on the part of U.S. troops or unequal clauses contained in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which went into effect in July 1966. Many now want to see U.S. bases removed from what has become the choicest piece of real estate in the middle of Seoul. Such sentiments play into leftist nationalists’ hands. More limited demands to remove U.S. bases from Seoul and to amend the SOFA agreement are conflated with broader calls to remove U.S. forces from South Korea and to condemn U.S. imperialism.

Decrease in military presence helps US/SK relations