Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović[1]
Truth and reconciliation in Serbia
The main goal of this paper is to provide a general overview of the current situation related to truth and reconciliation in Serbia. The relationship that exists in Serbia towards the past is observed through an analysis of state organs, media, NGOs, international community and donors, as well as the citizens of Serbia.
As the basis for the presentation and the analysis of the situation in Serbia, I essentially used the results of my own continuous monitoring and analysis of the process of truth and reconciliation in Serbia in the period between 2001 and 2004, and the results of the project of Victimology Society of Serbia in cooperation with Fridrih Ebert Foundation From remembering the past towards positive future: which model of truth and reconciliation is needed for Serbia? The analysis particularly used ideas and attitudes of citizens related to the need of a process of truth and reconciliation as well as the obstacles and problems connected to this process. These attitudes were expressed by participants of panel discussions, organized as a part of this project[2].
The attitude of the state organs
Changes that took place in Serbia in 2000 did not simultaneously cause an opening of the story on truth and reconciliation; the new authorities did not offer its citizens a clear message about its attitude towards the crimes committed in the 1990s in Serbia and in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. The new government in the period 2000-2004 still reflected, in all societal aspects, the great gaps and divisions in Serbia, making them even deeper, related both to the past and present. The political scene in Serbia thus transformed into a permanent political conflict which turned from the conflict between the democratic opposition and Milosević’s regime into the conflict between the nationalist, anti-Hague forces on the one hand, and pro-Hague oriented groups and individuals on the other. This division is specific because it caused another division to the existing ones: the division within democratically oriented parties (of the former opposition), in other words, a division within the government itself (the new authority).
Division within the government itself, which is simultaneously a constant „generator“ of new divisions, is the biggest obstacle on the road to truth and trust, in fact to reconciliation, not only in Serbia but also on the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia. In a situation of this type, no wonder that the government was not capable to reach any consensus regarding its attitude towards the past, that good actions and initiatives of certain state organs remained without any visible effects or their positive effects simply remained blocked.[3]
Within the government there is a constant contradiction related to what should be done and how things should be done, which in its very essence reflects its political division and conflicts. Messages coming from DOS government[4], both at the beginning of the changes and in the end of its mandate were characterized by inconsistency that triggered confusion in the citizens[5]. The trials for the organized crime and political murders, especially the trial for the murder of the Prime Minister Đinđić, and the relationship of the government towards the accused, especially towards Milorad Ulemek, accused of several murders, simply introduced a new confusion and confirmed the absence of political will to confront the past.In that sense, the policy of the current government does not allow for the functioning of the mechanism of legal defense, but in fact disturbs the process of finding the truth, which was clearly visible in the trials for war crimes and organized crime during 2003 and 2004.
It is clear that over the last few years, the government has been sending contradictory messages and instead of contributing to the deconstruction of nationalism and stereotypes and the divisions in the society, it affected the creation of new divisions, prejudice and animosity. One of important obstacles to successful confrontation with the past is the absence of the rule of law, inability to differentiate between what is allowed and what is not, as well as the incorporation of criminal in the state apparatus itself, especially in police and justice systems, which block attempts to determine the truth and renders the process of lustration extremely hard and complicated, and mostly undesirable.
Participants of panel discussions organized by VDS noticed very well that neither the former DOS government nor the current one showed a genuine political will to disclose facts, punish the perpetrators and reconcile neighbors. All the moves in that direction seemed to be only reactions on political pressure from abroad. Truth and reconciliation were reduced to the (non) cooperation with The Hague and the decisions related to that were guided by possibilities to gain or lose political points in Serbia or by the necessity of making concessions under the pressure of the international community.
Besides the attitude towards the extraditions of the accused to ICTY and towards the trials before domestic courts, the attitude of the government towards the past is reflected, to a great extent, in the failure of the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation. The Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was founded in haste without a serious discussion that would lead to a consensus about the way it should work. It caused doubts that the president's goal was seeking political points and not a contribution to truth and reconciliation. The very moment of establishment of the Commission (immediately before the extradition of Milošević to the Hague), the fact that Commission did not manage to give any substantial contribution to confrontation with the past, as well as its transformation into a tool of one party, caused not only the Commission to be disregarded by the public but also the idea of its existence in the form of an institution to be discredited as well.
For the above mentioned reasons it is not surprising that the Commission formally ceased to exist during the process of country's reformation and that very few individuals acknowledge this form of dealing with the past.
Finally, the overall impression is that the authorities were using as an excuse for not dealing with the past the alleged incapability of Serbian citizens to swallow the „bitter pill“ of acknowledging the crimes committed in their name. As Nebojša Petrović, PhD, said in an interview in the radio program Katarza (Catharsis) on B92: „ if politicians in power oppose the reconciliation, they have a great opportunity to avoid saying it explicitly, by referring to a supposed will of the people, against which they allegedly cannot do anything.[6] “
In supplanting this empirically uncertified thesis[7], they were assisted by media and individuals, members of some NGOs[8], who instead of focusing their energy on a constructive critique of government in power and extremist forces, dealt with the insistence on guilt and incapability of the entire Serbian people to confront with the truth.
Public discourse regarding truth and reconciliation in Serbia and the role of media
The attitude of authorities towards dealing with the past is reflected in the media. As the participants in VDS’s panel discussions noticed, media reflects the confusion of the authorities and stultify the citizens.
An analysis of public discourse about the war crimes and confrontation with the past[9], shows that in Serbian public there are two opposite voices that are heard the most, both of which are negative in a similar way: an extreme nationalist and an extreme antinationalist discourse. Whereas extreme nationalists acknowledge only victims on the Serbian side, and/or war crime perpetrators consider as national heroes, extreme antinationalist acknowledge only non-Serb victims and demand punishment for Serbian war crime perpetrators only (or at least that is the impression they give to the public). Discourses that refer to other peoples in Serbia are similar. The similarities of these two discourses that paralyzes the process of truth and reconciliation (simply because these two discourse are the most prominent ones) are the following: exclusiveness i.e. inability to listen to others, accusation of their opponents as the essential form of communication, making a hierarchy among victims by excluding the notion of victim (by acknowledging only some of the victims with a simultaneous disregard of the others), as well as an abstract dealing with victims and the acknowledgement of only one part of the truth.
All these characteristics of the extreme public discourses, as well as the emergence of the third, moderate one, were particularly obvious during the debate that took place for several months in 2003 in the weekly magazine Vreme, and which was initiated by criticism by Ms Sonja Biserko from the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. She criticized the manner in which RTV B92 and daily newspaper Danas as well as the magazine Vreme[10] dealt with the crimes committed in former Yugoslavia. These discourses were also prominent in the exhibitions of photographs from the war by Ron Haviv that took place in Serbia, in 2002.
This trend continued during 2003 and 2004 in media presentation of the murder of the prime minister of Serbia, police action „Sablja“ and the trial for the prime minister’s murder and other murders with the element of state terrorism. The two opposed discourses now acquired an even more prominent layout of „the pro-Hague“ and „anti-Hague“ discourse, compiled with the demands for punishing the responsible ones for the crimes committed in Serbia on the one hand, and on the other, accusing the victims and extolling the accused as national heroes. This way, discourses on war crimes and discourses about (political) organized crime merged which accentuates the relationship between these crimes more than ever before; and denial of the crimes that are committed towards other peoples extends to denial of crimes committed among Serbs themselves i.e. within Serbia itself.[11]
Third discourse, which is only now trying to find its way in Serbia, strives to deconstruct the victimization rhetoric, used in war propaganda, and define the victims and crime perpetrators in such a way to include all those who were victims i.e. all those who committed crimes with the respect towards differences and specifics[12]. Besides the victims and perpetrators, the definition encompasses victims and perpetrators of crimes committed in circumstances of the violation of human rights and political feuds within Serbia itself.
Regarding the third discourse, or „the third way“ towards truth and reconciliation in Serbia, it can be noticed that authorities and media are not really receptive to it. However, it seems that over the last months of 2004 initiatives of this kind received more significant media attention in Serbia. One of the best examples may be the manner in which the media followed the International conference Truth and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia- where are we now, and where to go? In media presentation of the conference the prevailing messages were such as: „everyone should clean its own yard“ as well as that the initiatives and problems related to the confrontation with the past exist not only in Serbia but in other parts of the former Yugoslavia as well.
When it comes to media and public discourse about the past in Serbia, it should be stressed that the public discourse in Serbia lacks the sense of dialog among opponents, i.e. among people who have different attitudes on the same question. This is particularly encouraged and supported by the media, especially electronic media, with its manner of making their programs. The unsatisfactory level of media transformation is obvious as well as the lack of active support on behalf of authorities in the processes of truth and reconciliation, which presents an important condition for the change in the role of the media. In the panel discussions organized by VDS Serbia within its project From remembering the past towards positive future[13], we could hear opinions such as the following: „most media encourages intolerance and enflames the hatred. The events from the past, as well as the ongoing events are presented with bias, in a simplified manner, black and white, thus contributing to the maintenance of the existing stereotypes and prejudice. Conflicts are being manipulated with - whether they will be given attention in Serbian media or not, depends on the political “utility” at the given moment”.
It has been already highlighted that the topic of truth and reconciliation is prevented from getting enough attention in media by media’s lack of interest for the topic. Therefore,the contribution of certain independent media, such as the weekly magazine Vreme and TV B92, though important, is not considered to be strong enough since these two media have a restricted influence on the formation of public opinion. Related to this aspect, the necessity of involving the state media in the process of confronting the past was emphasized.[14]
Non-governmental organizations and truth and reconciliation
Research conducted by Quaker Peace and Social Witness for Serbia and Montenegro[15] showed that very few NGOs in Serbia deal with projects that include direct work on topics related to confrontation with the past. Most of the organizations included in these activities place their activities on confronting the past in a broader context of their work or create indirect educational programs/projects for young people as beneficiaries. The topics they cover most frequently are the following: tolerance to differences, stereotypes, prejudice, human rights, conflict resolution and non-violent communication. The means of tackling the problem of confrontation with the past include: collecting documentation and research, education, culture and art, direct assistance to victims, advocacy and influence in the public sphere, public events and debates, cross-border cooperation, publications and exhibitions. Therefore, according to the results of the above-mentioned research[16], round tables and publishing classify as the most frequent activities within short-term projects that include one to three activities. One of the rare NGOs that has long-term and comprehensive dealing with truth and reconciliation as a key activity, certainly is Victimology Society of Serbia.
The data cited show that the activity of the NGO sector in the field of truth and reconciliation is considerably smaller in comparison to the impression created in the public regarding this issue. They also show that NGOs don’t have clear and long-term strategies in dealing with this issue. On the contrary, they act in an uncoordinated manner, guided more by the wishes of their donors than by their own needs. Thus it is not unusual that on the panel discussions of the Victimology Society of Serbia people described the NGO activities in this area as important but isolated and not mutually coordinated which considerably diminished their effectiveness. The lack of coordination among NGOs was particularly seen as a problem in exerting pressure on the government.
NGOs were described as important actors in the process of truth and reconciliation whose role in the whole part in the process was seen in raising the awareness of citizens and the initiation of essential topics. However, in order to make their activity more efficient, an active involvement of the government in the process of reconciliation was seen as a necessity, as well as an exchange of experiences between the NGO sector and the state institutions. Also, participants of panel discussions recognized the importance of broader inclusion of citizens in the process of truth and reconciliation and narrowing the gap that exists between NGOs and a broader population.
The International Community and the policies of foreign donors
The policy of foreign donors has mostly supported the projects that dealt with the past in a one-sided and fragmented way, with a lack of a comprehensive and contextual dealing with the committed crimes, their perpetrators and victims. Confrontation with the past was mostly limited to insistence on repression i.e. trials and conviction of our own side, as well as to insistence on reconciliation and projects of cross-border cooperation, even there where the conflicts still continue (e.g. Kosovo). As a consequence, all efforts to confront the past led to an unproductive enforcement of the guilt complex, with all negative consequences of that (such as anger and aggression). On the other side, constant frustration is felt, because truth and reconciliation cannot be reached so quickly. Moreover, this led to the above-mentioned divisions in projects of domestic NGOs and their disloyal competition, lack of cooperation, loss of citizens’ trust in NGOs and ultimately failure to produce a network of cooperation between the citizens and NGOs.
This policy of donors reflects the policy of the international community, which, unlike in other post-conflict countries, such as South Africa for example, insists on the traditional retribution model with a simultaneous suspiciousness towards the ideas related to initiatives of restorative justice, including those that relate to the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.[17] Also the pressures from the international community for the extraditions often coincide with important political events in the country and often act in a counterproductive way on the domestic politics and truth and reconciliation process, because they contribute to increasing of nationalism and resistance towards discovering the truth.