SC2/ DP4

COSCAP-NA 2nd STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING

CAA INSPECTORS’ REMUNERATION
Discussion Paper

1. Introduction

1.1Some ICAO Member States have encountered difficulty in recruiting / retaining suitably qualified inspectors and have requested ICAO assistance in addressing the issue. Lack of adequately qualified technical human resources within the States’ CAA Regulatory apparatus has also been highlighted by ICAO in its Universal Safety Oversight Audit (USOAP) Protocols. The purpose of this paper is to outline a mechanism available to States to engage and retain such suitably qualified inspectors.

2.Background

2.1It is implicit within the Convention, its Annexes, and associated guidance material that Contracting States will establish the necessary organizational structure within their Civil Aviation Administration or Authority (CAA) or equivalent Government organization to adequately discharge their certification and safety oversight responsibilities. Each State can exercise this responsibility directly, with its duly trained and experienced human resources, or through a recognized operations and airworthiness agency from outside the State.

2.2Resolution A29-13 – Improvement of Safety Oversight, which was adopted by the 29th ICAO Assembly in 1992, recognized that many Contracting States may not have the regulatory framework or financial or technical resources to carry out the minimum requirements of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes and noted that many Contracting States might experience difficulty in carrying out their responsibilities under international law for safety oversight of air carrier operations. The 31st session of the ICAO Assembly in 1995 endorsed a safety oversight programme based upon the previous resolution, and established a mechanism for financial and technical contributions to that programme.

1.3Over the past several years, ICAO has been involved in a number of technical cooperation projects designed to establish or improve Governments’ flight safety oversight capability. Although circumstances differed from country to country, it has become apparent that there are many common obstacles to creating and maintaining fully functional Government flight safety programmes.

1.4There are two common barriers to establishing flight safety organizations which are patterned after the model described in the ICAO Manual of Procedures for Operations Certification and Inspection and in the Manual of Procedures for an Airworthiness Organization. First, most developing countries do not have adequate basic air law and / or code of air navigation regulations. Second, and most difficult to overcome, is the inability of many developing countries to recruit and retain suitability qualified inspectors.

2.Discussion

2.1For Civil Aviation Administrations, obtaining qualified people to be trained as flight operations and to a lesser extent airworthiness inspectors is not an easy task. There is often a wide gap in salary and other emoluments between what a Government regulatory body can offer to such personnel and what they may expect if employed by private industry.

2.2The difficulty in attracting fully qualified airline maintenance personnel to serve as airworthiness inspectors compels CAAs to recruit engineers and other technical staff directly from universities. Although these individuals have the necessary academic credentials, their lack of practical experience in airline maintenance diminishes the effectiveness of their efforts.

2.3For a CAA, the recruitment, training, and retention of flight operations inspectors is particularly difficult. Inducing a fully qualified pilot to accept a civil service salary in lieu of the remuneration offered by an airline is very difficult.

2.4Recruiting and training ex military pilots is one solution, but this process has its own draw backs. If the CAA engages only former military pilots, the CAA may be perceived as not having the desired experience to understand civilian air operator requirements. In some countries, pilots are seconded from the airlines to the CAA, either on a split-duty basis or dedicated to the CAA for short periods of time. Besides the obvious shortcomings in employing this approach (airline pilots on secondment), the perceived conflict of interest requires careful management on behalf of the CAA. This system is also not as desirable as having full time dedicated inspectors.

2.6There are a variety of mechanisms by which additional remuneration may be achieved without adjusting the base salaries. This would prevent any negative repercussions within the civil service structure. One such method employed by ICAO is through the National Officer (NO) scheme of employing national professionals through the ICAO /UNDP system.

3.National Officer Mechanism

3.1ICAO has effectively and with much success used the NO system in many Contracting States in Latin America. This system basically requires the affected State to deposit the agreed finances with the ICAO in a Trust Fund; and ICAO in turn compensates the inspectors with additional remuneration. The Trust Fund deposits are used exclusively for the benefit of these inspectors and the State, in consultation with ICAO, would have the option of choosing a level of compensation. The ICAO NO system is the same as in the UNDP and provides for a large range of pay scales which are flexible to meet the requirements of a State.

3.2The NO scheme could be established through the COSCAP-NA system rather than through a separate project. It could be handled as a sub-project with a separate budget. This would ease approval / fund remittance for the NO scheme from the respective State. Since most COSCAP-NA States are signatory to the UNDP Standard Basic Assistance Agreement and the Technical Assistance Agreement), the employment of the NO system by ICAO’s Contracting States should be technically and legally possible.

4.Action by the Meeting

4.1The Steering Committee is requested to note the proposal. COSCAP-NA States, that are facing difficulty in recruiting / retaining inspectors, may wish to utilize this system to their advantage.

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16 October 2003