DRAFT – NOT TO BE CITED WITHOUT PERMISSION
HM Inspectors in England: the first 150 years
This Working Paper offers a short review of the key changes over time in the HMI until 1990 approximately, and analyzes their ways of working and organization.
From Unobtrusive to Insecure Power
Associated with the HMI, and used by them in various ways, is the continuing myth of their independence. The idea of an ‘independence’ has been challenged in this period but rarely so. Few in numbers, they have an unobtrusive power which appears to be rarely exercised since the late 19thC days of school examination and ‘payment by results’. In 1839, Parliament had decided that no further grants for education should be made without the right of inspection, and in the same year the two first inspectors were appointed
‘We are still appointed in the same way and have retained the title "Her (His) Majesty's Inspector". The form of appointment derives from Tudor times, and over a century it has helped to safeguard and still symbolises our cherished independence of judgment. [1960 p235]]
In a system which was heavily stratified into a restricted elite secondary education and a mass elementary education, the official purpose of education was limited, and the tools of governance ranged from central grants, examinations, handbooks and inspections. Oversight of the system, particularly its efficiency, depended upon HMI judgments. With the exception of financial data [about grants], the system was without data.
HM Inspectorate relied on a strong collegiate tradition and shared experience (as well as internal guidelines) to achieve reliability and common practice . [1998 Mc p21-2]
The very existence of an HMI implied a system of assurance.
In a published paper, written for a European audience, an HM Inspector described their operation in the postwar years before the changes of the 1970s. The particular position of the HM inspector is laid out here. This is not a regulatory inspection agency. It is not ‘political’ but acts within the limits of government policy. It offers advice but this can be ignored. It has a limited number of formal areas to report on and yet may offer, at school and national level, a much wider set of impressions.
These reports express the opinion of the inspector, who is expected to give his own views without fear or favour; in assessing school work he speaks for himself and not as a mouthpiece of the government. When, of course, he is acting as the Minister's emissary or representative, he must be careful to speak within the range of government policy. He is not allowed to write textbooks, though he is naturally free to write at academic level. It is very seldom that any practical difficulty arises over such points. [1960 p 236]
A distinction is made between a formal and limited set of observations and professional judgements:
I can comment formally upon any breach of the regulations concerning such matters as opening or closing, registers, the premises, or the holding of religious instruction; but beyond this I speak for myself alone. The Headmaster is responsible for curriculum, timetable, choice of text-books, and indeed the school as a whole. My comment expresses a personal point of view and not Ministry policy; the Headmaster is free to accept or reject any suggestion which I may make. It is true that in practice his independence is, to some extent, limited by external examinations, by inspection itself, and, most important, by public opinion; in practice too he will attach considerable weight to what I say though not necessarily to the point of putting into practice what I suggest. …. In practice the schools really do have very great discretion and vary greatly among themselves; there is no set pattern. [1960 p237]
Their power is expressed as a form of mediation, in which judgement and experience, shielded by their ‘independence’, allows them to move between institutions – from their base to schools and LEAs and to the Ministry.
I have no actual powers; the schools are administered by the local education authority, not by the Ministry. I could, it is true, make representations to the Ministry which might end in the grant to the Authority being cut down or even withheld; but this kind of thing almost never happens. If the Education Officer respects me, it is for three reasons: first, H.M.I. represents an honourable tradition and enjoys a position of respect, both as a representative of the Ministry and as an individual; second, he is dis-interested, with no "axe to grind", as we say; third, he knows his schools - better than the administrator can hope to know them. For much of the time I shall be expressing my own individual opinion, but I can also help to see that the Ministry understands the Authority's needs and problems, and that the Authority appreciates considerations which arise from the central and national aspects of educational planning. [1960 p 237]
They have discursive power, managed through conversations and reports, which appears to be centred upon their elite status, their professional community, and their operational significance [as the only body which unites disparate sites and practices in the country]. This description of themselves fits in closely to the prevailing description of the education system viz ‘a central system, nationally administered’ or ‘a partnership between central and local government and the teaching profession’.
In the postwar period, the discourse around the HMI shifted, and it became linked to the growth of local schools advisory services in the counties and the cities. By the 1970s, school inspection was no longer only the work of HM Inspectors, as local authorities, to varying degrees, had their own school-focused staff. A city like Birmingham had its own inspectors [treated historically as ‘efficiency’ inspectors] and organizers [treated as subject specialists, amalgamated into one body by the late 1970s. [1982 p121]. They had their own hierarchy, were 44 in number and had a degree of independence from the CEO. [1982 p 124-5]. During the 1970s, a progressive withdrawal of HMI from the field of formal inspection of individual schools left a vacuum for LEAs to fill [1982 p 127]. Around this time then, LEAs may
have instituted more formal inspections of schools, recognising inspection as a strengthening of authority…Inspectors and advisers have powers too, in administrative matters, and may have considerable influence over say, design of schools, allocation of finance, permission for school activities such as school visits, and areas of school activity outside the curriculum which are within the orbit of administrative systems; [1982 p 132]
By 1975 there were some 1650-1700 LEA inspectors in the country, including a significant number of advisers appointed to work with secondary head teachers, following comprehensive reorganization, and the first substantial recruitment of advisers specifically for primary education [1986 p335]. The rise of school inspection reports could overwhelm elected representatives, and so could the formalization of professional judgments
Some LEAs, foreseeing these problems, opted instead for self-evaluation under the guidance of advisers, but while the research community took to this idea with enthusiasm only a handful of LEAs have kept it going, again at high cost in manpower and time. [1986 p336]
On the LEA side, it is equally understandable that schools and local authority alike should have come to rely on and value highly the close personal knowledge of schools and teachers built up by advisory staff [1986 p341]. By the late 1980s, and post national Curriculum reorganization,
‘the logical route was to make use of a re-jigged LEA inspectorate overseen by HMI. Seven pilot projects were begun in which HMI worked with LEAs to explore ways and means to bring about workable and rigorous arrangements. [1998 Ox p53]]
The growing number of local advisers close to the schools began to affect the way that the HMI was described:
The report of the 1968 Select Committee went as far as to suggest that the bulk of inspections should pass to local authorities. As a result of that, it was argued, the inspectorate should be more outward-facing, providing advice to teachers and other professionals (DES, 1982). [1997 B p42]
and
HMI had 'an inward looking task, its task was to inform government of the state of the education service and in particular to be sure that it was in a position to inform the government in relation to its interest in policy' (SCI interview).[1997 B p42]
So, although an evaluative oversight remained the province of HMI, it was seen less as an active inspectorate working locally, and more like a national advisory service.
It was not until a collapse in public confidence in the service emerged in 1976 that the question arose whether the LEA had any direct accountability for standards or curriculum. By that time, the LEA advisory staffs had developed and matured into a quite distinctive service meeting quite different needs from those addressed by HMI [1986 p332]
As the advice became more public, HMI became more visible in its work at a time when post war politics had been fracturing. Its role as an inspection and advisory service to schools was also problematic as output based criteria were being established. On the one hand, it was proposed that they should cease inspection and concentrate on the changed functions of education
‘more in touch with social developments affecting education' (Parliamentary Select Committee on Education 1967/68 Session Report on Her Majesty's Inspectorate (England and Wales), Part 1 recommendation 42 HMSO).[1998 Ox p47-8]
And then that they should act as a ‘regulatory body to the 'privatised' inspection teams.[1998 B p420]. In both cases, their numbers would be cut in half to less than 200.
Intelligence/ Knowledge
HM Inspectors could still claim in the 1960s that the
main value of our contribution lies in our knowledge of individual schools as they are, [1960 p235]
This knowledge was turned into notes, files, reports, and letters [1960 p237] usually at the end of the inspection week. Judgment, comparison and experience were the ways in which they worked.
H.M. Inspector finds himself concerned with policy, at the early stage of distilling experience, at the point where distilled experience is crystallising out into the beginnings of policy, and finally where policy comes to be realised in practice; the process is of course continuous and the inspectorate has a contribution to make at every point of it. [1960 p237]
They brokered and enhanced this knowledge through specific and deliberate actions. They
‘exercised a strong influence on the use of the Department's limited budget for research. They act as influential advisers to the major funding bodies in research and their specialists in higher education can affect the priorities attached to major bids for funds. [1986 p335]
As the 1970s developed, they produced their own research and sampling techniques for national Primary Surveys and published analytic studies of the accumulation of inspection reports.
’The 'Primary' and 'Secondary' surveys became baseline documents and important sources from which policy on curriculum, quality and standards were derived. It can also be argued that these surveys reconstructed a power base for HMI [1987 B p42]
More generally HMI have in the last four or five years developed into one of the most prolific sources of incisive, constructive pamphlets on current educational issues. Their studies of individual subjects are less admired than studies of slow-learning pupils, the neglect of girls' negative attitudes to science in mixed schools, and other issues that many teachers and schools overlook. HMI also travel increasingly, and this year have revived, with a penetrating report on education in the German Federal Republic, a tradition created a century before by Matthew Arnold HMI. Taken as a whole this output is of very high quality. As the output of a small body of overburdened professionals, it is remarkable (DES, 1980, 1984, 1986b) [1986 p334]
By the late 1970s, Callaghan asked: 'What is the role of the Inspectorate in respect of national standards and their maintenance?' (Maclure, 1988, p. 157).
The Chief HMI, Bolton, was clear that if HMI were to improve standards they must both have a model of good practice and be prepared to offer explicit advice about practice: [It was for] HMI to say not so much what it itself or any one thought was good practice, but what the characteristics were from inspection (SCI interview). [1997 B p43]
By the mid 1980s, the sense of trust and reliability which surrounded them was breaking. They were becoming exposed and made visible in their ‘progressive and often radical’ approach [1986 p 335] at a time when the politics of education was being analyzed and disputed
There was a clear 1960s ethos and a very clear agenda which permeated virtually all the civil servants. It was rooted in 'progressive' orthodoxies, in egalitarianism and in the comprehensive school system. It was devoutly anti-excellence, anti-selection, and anti-market. …. If the civil servants were guardians of this culture, then Her Majesty's Inspectors of Education were its priesthood (Baker 1993, p. 168).[1997 B p45-6]
As they continued to make judgements and good practice models, based upon accumulated reports, they were in conflict with a government intending to reverse or overturn post war practices and could appear critical [1998 B p416-17]
Government dissatisfaction with the publication of HMI reports which appeared to be implicitly critical of Government actions or policies (or at least, the reports were presented as such by the opposition parties and/or the media); hostility towards LEA inspectorates and HMI from influential right-wing think tanks, who regarded the then current inspection procedures as being inadequate, and who also suspected HMI and LEA inspectors of subscribing to 'trendy' educational theories; [1998 B p420]
The problem began to resolve itself as a knowledge and intelligence deficit in policy making. Instead of direct attacks on an ‘independent’ HMI, it was constructed as a problem of lack of evidence: on what evidence were they making judgements? [1998 Ox p48]
‘If the Government of the day chose to be involved in issues such as the relevance of the content of the curriculum and the quality and standards being achieved, it had a right to expect that the national Inspectorate would be able to provide it with the professional information, advice and judgment necessary for developing, pursuing and evaluating its policies for education (1995, pp. 23-24).
Through the 1980s, the high profile role of the HMI in policy making could be seen as threatening their judgment role
the most serious threats to HMI's independence of judgment were not from politicians seeking, directly, to influence HMI's work and judgments, but from the involvement of HMI in developing policy and practice that to some degree or other were prompted by inspection information and findings. [1998 Ox p 50]
By 1989, HMI was publicly and heavily involved in inspecting, reporting and advising on policy and its implementation across the whole of the education service.[1998 Ox p51]. It was more politicized and vulnerable about evidence and judgment.
It was the view of our HMI informants that the creation of the new form of inspection in 1992 would make difficult the maintenance of an interpretative community, and in two senses. First, our interviewees take the view that locating the new inspectorate in a building separate from the Department for Education would reduce its capacity to influence policy developments on a day to day basis. Second, under the new arrangements inspectors are recruited from broad base of educationists and lay people and trained to inspect in a specific manner using specified critera. It was hypothesised by our informants that policy advice and guidance from OFSTED would be at best very muted. In fact, the opposite has occurred. Crucially, as we noted above, HMCI has continued to employ the Annual Report as a powerful mode of intervening in policy making and steering the system. [1997 B p46-7]
End Note
HM Inspectors in the 20thC worked in a system which was fairly stable and used them as one way of assessing/evaluating the working of the system [sometimes known system efficiency]. They used their own elite judgments and experience of observation and comparison to make sense of school and LEA visits; this was also the site of their accumulated wisdom about the system.
In the post war period, local inspectors were also beginning to make codified reports on their schools, using a similar approach. By the 70s, they appeared to be nearer to schoolwork
From the 1970s, new questions about standards and accountability raised questions about their independence and their value: partly due to an increase politicization of education and their raised profile in publishing their reports, and offering public advice,
Proposals about what function they should have was related to the growing power of local authority inspection services.
Their knowledge base gradually changed over time – it had to be produced so that it could be read publicly; its validity was challenged; it began to be codified.
References
Allen, GC [1960] H.M. Inspector of Schools: A Personal Impression International Review of Education Vol. 6, No. 2 (1960) pp235-9
Bolton, E HMI: The Thatcher Years Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 24, No. 1,
(Mar., 1998), pp. 45-55
Evans, J and Penney, D Whatever Happened to Good Advice? Service and Inspection after the Education Reform Act