Special Report: Israeli Intelligence Services

Special Report: Israeli Intelligence Services

Summary

Israel is a small country with a security obsession that requires diligent intelligence efforts. Its intelligence community was defined by the creation of a state in hostile territory, and a series of failures that put the state at risk. While Israelis are famous for special operations, their true focus is on closely monitoring regional threats- specifically Hezbollah and Hamas- and developing liaison relationships with international players. The country has a well-trained, aggressive and flexible intelligence apparatus that is currently focused on Iran, its neighbors, and the United States.

Editor’s Note: This is the third installment in an ongoing series on major state intelligence organizations.

Analysis

Israel perceives threats from all sides and in fact had a fight for its modern existence, which makes accurate intelligence and clandestine operations more vital to its survival than possibly any other country. While the threat in its region certainly exists- be it internal Palestinian uprising or external invasion by Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, or Egypt- Israel is equally concerned about the distant great powers. Its neighbors provide the more immediate threat in terms of a direct attack, but they also rarely offer a true threat to Israel’s existence [LINK: http://www. stratfor. com/analysis/geopolitics_israel_biblical_and_modern]. It is the confluence of these regional powers that can become a serious threat to Israel. While facing this constant regional insecurity, Israel’s superseding concern is over great powers’ influence in the Middle East. Outside influence can vary from a great power patron for Israel, to major powers giving support to Israel’s regional adversaries and to a full-scale invasion by an outside power for a strategic foothold on the Eastern Mediterranean. Monitoring world powers, manipulating their influence in the Middle East and gaining their support is a long-term intelligence priority for Israel of equal importance with short-term warning intelligence on hostile activities within its region.

Israel’s intelligence services are unique in their global focus and great importance for a small country. They were built out of the underground wartime independence movement- the Haganah- and still hold a strong military character. They also take on a responsibility that no other intelligence service is willing for its own- the protection of Jewish people worldwide. For a small country, Israel puts a large amount of resources into its intelligence collection capabilities, but also carefully focuses them on time-sensitive intelligence requirements, rather than maintaining worldwide coverage. It cannot maintain as many or as large stations around the globe that the U. S. , Russia and China can, or maintain as large of technological presence. But it maximizes the use of its resources, through three methods: flexibility of its operations and officers, liaison relationships with other intelligence and military services, and a global Jewish community willing to help.

With these strategic concerns come very aggressive intelligence operations and periodic failures. They maintain active capabilities for aggressive and often risky external and internal operations that other intelligence services rarely take on. But that success combined with urgency from Israel’s leaders led to a handful of hastily planned operations and failed analytical warnings. While devastating, none of Israel’s intelligence failures have led to decisive defeat. Instead failures ignite fierce and probing investigations into the cause of the failure, and these defining events can serve to significantly strengthen the structure, orientation and culture of the intelligence services.

Brief History

The history of espionage by Hebrew-speaking people in the Levant commonly refers back to Joshua, Caleb and ten other spies sent to Canaan by Moses in the Book of Exodus. Joshua later sent two spies specifically to Jericho where they were hidden by a female sympathizer prior to the Israelites invasion. While the historical veracity of these stories can be debated, they nonetheless serve as classic examples of espionage, and ones that are at least a legendary prelude to the modern state of Israel. Joshua and his cohort were attempting to establish their own home in hostile territory, and used a network of sympathizers to support their operatives. While most countries have a history of using espionage for wartime expansion from a core power base, Israel’s is based on immigrating to a new territory, creating a core, and maintaining a new state, both thousands of years ago and in the last century.

Modern Israeli intelligence services are a direct descendent of those operating under the Zionist militant group, Haganah that formed in 1920 to both fight the British-appointed government and defend Jews against Arabs in what was then known as Palestine. Its intelligence service known as Sherut Yedioth (SHAI), or the Information Service, was created in 1929, and many of its members later founded Israel’s intelligence community. SHAI was responsible for a multitude of tasks- collecting intelligence on the British, outside countries who supported or opposed a Jewish state, the Arabs in Palestine and competing Israeli militant groups such as Irgun and Lehi (it should be noted that members of Irgun and Lehi both went onto join Israel’s intelligence community and government in the 1950s). Another important institution was called Mossad LeAliyah Bet, or the Institute for Immigration B. Immigration A was the legal policy for Jewish immigration. But when the British began to limit and then completely cut off legal immigration, Haganah found a new solution. Aliyah Bet operatives travelled across the world to Jewish communities and arranged for them to surreptitiously travel to Israel. In service of these operations, the organization needed to gather intelligence on international political situations, which became valuable for Haganah beyond bringing more Jews to Palestine. While the Mossad that exists today is a completely separate and distinct organization, many of its former officers first gained experience working for Aliyah Bet. Multiple other organizations under Haganah carried out duties typical of intelligence services: Rekhesh handled clandestine arms acquisition for the military force Palmach, which had its own intelligence units. Palyam, the Maritime bureau, later became Naval intelligence.

After Israel’s May 14, 1948 independence, Isser Beeri, the director of SHAI, chaired a meeting on June 30 to discussion reorganizing the intelligence community. The new state’s leaders created the Israel Defense Forces with a military intelligence unit lead by Beeri under the Operations Branch of the General Staff. The new country also needed a domestic security apparatus, a position filled by Shin Bet and led by Isser Harel. The new Foreign Ministry created a Political Department, responsible for both foreign intelligence collection and analysis. It served in those early days as Israel’s main foreign intelligence service. But a turf battle between the new agencies developed and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion assigned Reuven Shiloah to reorganize the Israeli intelligence community. Shiloah disbanded the Political Department in 1951 and military intelligence, known as Aman, began carrying out foreign intelligence activities running agents abroad. At the same time he created an organization, first known as the Central Institute for Coordination on April 1, 1951, that would later become the Mossad. Ben-Gurion appointed Shiloah its first director. Soon after, in 1952, Aliyah B was also disbanded, after making a major demographic contribution to the state of Israel. Its planes became El Al airliners, and many of its officers went to work for the Mossad or other intelligence services, while Mossad took over its clandestine responsibilities.

While Shiloah founded Mossad and was regarded well, he was not seen as a good manager and Ben-Gurion placed Harel, the Shin Bet chief, in charge of the Mossad in 1952 giving him command of both agencies. Harel would go on to lead Mossad for eleven years, the longest serving Director and thus crystallized Mossad’s operations and character. Ben-Gurion gave Harel the informal title ‘Memuneh,’ or first among equals within the Israeli intelligence community, a title that was passed on to other Mossad directors. Israel, along with these agencies, was founded soon after the Holocaust, an event they were determined to never allow repeated. Some of the intelligence community’s leaders had escaped from the Holocaust and some even organized resistance networks behind Axis lines. Others were involved in the bitter fighting against both Arabs and the British to establish Israel’s independence. All were focused on the security of Israel, and understood the importance of intelligence for its survival.

Entebbe- the importance of flexibility and friendship

The Israeli military operation carried out in Uganda in 1976 is a well-known story in military history. But the details of the intelligence gathering required for the mission are often ignored. On June 27, 1976 members of the PFLP and two Germans from the German Revolutionary Cells hijacked an Air France plane en route from Tel Aviv to Paris. Idi Amin, who had previously been aided by Israeli military advisers to take power in a coup, allowed the hijackers to land in Entebbe, Uganda. Soon after, Israel’s military and intelligence leaders began focusing on developing the proper intelligence to stage a rescue operation. The Mossad sent intelligence officers to Nairobi, Kenya, with whom they already had a strong liaison relationship after providing training to the security services. Entebbe is situated on Lake Victoria, which serves as a border with Kenya, making it a valuable staging point while Israeli’s leaders negotiated with Amin and the hostage takers. Along with Zaire, and Nigeria, Kenya was one of the country’s Israel focused on for a foothold in Africa. Mossad developed relations with the Kenyans by stationing a liaison officer in Nairobi and aiding Kenya’s Directorate of Security Intelligence. Moreover, they had a friend in the government of Jomo Kenyatta, Bruce Mackenzie, a British businessman who settled in Kenya but kept links with both MI6 and Mossad. The Mossad could not have expected its relationship with the Kenyan government to be preparation for an operation in Uganda, but its prescient understanding of the overall value of that relationship offered the support required for the sudden shift in priorities.

With liaison links established, Israeli intelligence officers were to quickly respond to the requirements for tactical intelligence on the situation at Entebbe. Six or more Israeli intelligence officers set up an ad-hoc operations center in Nairobi’s Directorate of Security Intelligence by the end of June. Others set off across Lake Victoria either disguised as businessman or in rowboats to gather intelligence on the layout of the Entebbe airfield and current conditions. A Mossad officer quickly travelled from London to update 5-year old aerial photos of the area. He flew a plane over Entebbe under the guise of shooting pictures for a tourist pamphlet. In Nairobi the Mossad officers found that one of the Kenyans had familial relations with one of the Ugandan guards. He was able to visit Entebbe, count the guards and assess the hostage situation. In Paris, Mossad officers interviewed the hostages who were released. One of them, a Jewish Frenchman who previously served in the French military kept an acute memory of the conditions on the ground, which was also passed on to military planners.

With the quick reaction by Mossad, and the help of the Kenyan liaison, the IDF was able to put a hostage rescue mission together. They found that there were 6 hostage-takers, 15 Ugandan guards at the airport, and Ugandan forces surrounding the airport. The Frenchman reported that the hostage takers thought they were safe from any military assault because Amin was in ongoing negotiations with the Israeli government. On July 3, Mossad operatives on the ground used new electronic equipment to jam the airports radar as four Israeli Air Force C-130s landed at the airport. The operation is held high as a major success for Israeli intelligence and special operations forces. It is indicative of the ability of Mossad to quickly shift missions and develop sources as intelligence priorities change. Most importantly, it shows the value of liaison relationships, without Kenya and its security service, the rescue operation may have been impossible.

The Yom Kippur Failure

The surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on Israel on October 6, 1973, the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, is a classic intelligence failure in Israeli history. It led to a series of reviews and reforms that define the intelligence community today. According to the Agranat Commission Report, an in-depth study of the failure, the first warning of war was delivered by Aman to Israeli leaders at 0430 on October 6, predicting an attack at 1800 that day. Egypt and Syria’s forces, in fact attacked at 1400, but either way the warning was not early enough. Aman was well aware of the current military doctrine that the IDF needed 48 hours to mobilize its forces.

The AMAN officers relied on “the conception” of Arab intentions, according to the Agranat Commission, which mean that reliance on a previous opinion blocked their ability to reconsider new intelligence. “The conception” rested on two assumptions by these officers, as well as many Israeli leaders. First, Egypt would not go to war until she had air-strike capability deep into Israel to neutralize it’s air force. Second, Syria would not go to war with Israel without Egypt. Therefore, neither would go to war until Egypt had stronger air capabilities. Aman’s leadership followed this paradigm to explain away Arab military preparations